THE MARTIAL REVIEW: OR, A GENERAL Hiſtory of the LATE WARS.

THE French, while they pretend to inſtruct the reſt of mankind in the arts, have learnt the nobleſt of them all from Great Britain, I mean that of civil polity, or the art of encreaſ⯑ing national riches, power, and in⯑fluence at home and abroad. She ſaw all her attempts for univerſal monarchy deſeated by the aſſiſtance and protection given by England, a commercial nation, to the other ſtates of Europe; and therefore judging that commerce was the ſource of real power, ſhe applied herſelf to its cultivation. During the long adminiſtration of Cardinal Fleury, the French commerce was in⯑credibly extended; but the pride and ambition of the Princes of the Blood, and their great nobi⯑lity, (the late Marſhal de Belleiſle in particular) [2] drove that miniſter from his pacific plans, and France renewed her expenſive operations in a land war on the continent.

It appeared, during the courſe of that war, that Fleury had not taken meaſures for protecting the commerce which he had ſo greatly extended, nor could we have been ſenſible of the vaſt trade which France then carried on, but from the prodigious loſſes it ſuſtained by our marine. This counter⯑balanced all the ſucceſſes of their arms on the continent of Europe; and, at the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, the whole ſyſtem of continental power was altered. France gave up, or demo⯑liſhed, that barrier, which for ſo many years might have been termed the cock-pit of Europe, from the many millions of lives ſacrificed to acquire or d fend it, and ſhe agreed to the conferences of Aix-la-Chapelle, merely with the inſidious view of gaining leiſure for purſuing her com⯑mercial ſchemes, and retrieving that error, which had proved ſo fatal to her during the war, I mean her inability to defend her trade.

With thoſe two views that treaty was begun and conducted on the part of France. Her great ſcheme was, that nothing definitive ſhould be concluded. She was aware, that our poſſeſſion of Nova Scotia had been too looſely ſtipulated by the treaty of Utrecht, and that it was liable, at leaſt, to ſome cavils, though nothing can be more certain from the ſpirit, and even from the words of that treaty, than that it comprehended all the lands claimed by the Engliſh, and that when the treaty of Utrecht was executed, the Engliſh, in conſequence of that claim, took poſ⯑ſeſſion of all Nova Scotia, or Acadia, in preſence of the French commiſſaries, as appears by the report on 30th of Auguſt, 1714.

[3] It is not our intention to enter here into a mi⯑nute diſquiſition of the particulars of that con⯑teſt, which we [...] afterwards fully diſcuſſed in the ſtate papers. It is ſufficient to ſay, that the Engliſh, by the confeſſion of the French them⯑ſelves, had an infinite ſuperiority in point of ar⯑gument, notwithſtanding the vaſt diſadvantages they were under from their ignorance of the places in queſtion, and the arbitrary maps and charts (without the leaſt foundation of truth to ſupport them) fabricated and produced by their adverſaries. The Britiſh plenipotentiaries at Aix-la-Chapelle, little dreaming, perhaps, of the con⯑ſequences, or the importance of the diſcuſſion, referred the limits of Acadia, or Nova Scotia, to be ſettled in conferences between the commiſſa⯑ries of the two nations at Paris. Our propoſed brevity will not admit of particularizing the va⯑rious ſhifts and ſhufflings of the French com⯑miſſaries, who proceeded on the ſame indeciſive plan with that of their plenipotentiaries at Aix-la-Chapelle, that they might amuſe Great Britain, while France was encroaching upon her property in North America, and fortifying her encroach⯑ments in ſuch a manner, as to bid defiance to all that the negociation could effect. It ſoon appeared▪ that they pretended to the poſſeſſion of all the vaſt country between Canada and Louiſiana, and were building a chain of forts, to maintain that poſſeſſion, and to exclude the Britiſh traders from all communication with their back ſettlements. In ſhort, under pretence of having diſcovered the mouths of the Miſſiſſippi, they claimed all the country towards New Mexico on the eaſt, ex⯑tending to the Apalachian or Aligany mountains on the weſt. Thoſe claims were in direct vio⯑lation of the rights of the crown of Great Bri⯑tain, whoſe ſubjects had been the firſt diſcoverers [4] of thoſe countries, and accordingly his Majeſty King George the Second had ordered a patent to be made out for a company of merchants and planters, granting them a conſiderable tract of land near the river Ohio, (by which the com⯑pany was denominated) but within what had been always conſidered to be the limits of the Britiſh province of Virginia. The intereſt of this company was incompatible with that of the French government; and it was very plain, that both could not ſubſiſt. Either the Engliſh muſt be excluded from all trade with the Indians, and expoſed to continual incurſions both in war and peace, or the communication between the French Canadians, and the mouth of the Miſſiſ⯑ſippi muſt be cut off. Such an interruption would render the maintenance of the two provinces, which if joined muſt be of infinite value, of little or no ſervice to France.

The French, ſenſible of this, not only drove the ſubjects of Great Britain from their new ſet⯑tlements, but ſecured the command of the en⯑trance into the countries on the Ohio and Miſ⯑ſiſſippi, by means of a fort built on the Forks of the river Monongahela, called Fort du Queſne. The Britiſh government at this time were by no means diſpoſed for entering into a freſh war; but the perpetual alarms it received from Virginia, and all their northern colonies, who conſidered themſelves as being on the brink of perdition, at laſt rouſed the miniſtry. Mr. Pelham was now dead, and his ſucceſſors in the government ad⯑viſed his Majeſty to vigorous meaſures. There was ſtill, however, in the cabinet a pacific party ſtrong enough to prevent any precipitate ſteps being taken. It was therefore reſolved that no hoſtilities ſhould be committed againſt France, but ſuch as were abſolutely neceſſary for aſſerting [5] the undoubted rights of the Britiſh crown, and for repelling the invaſions upon our own colonies. This plan was the more plauſible, as it could be carried to what extent we pleaſed. The French had violently diſpoſſeſſed Major Waſhington from a fort, or rather entrenchment, raiſed on Britiſh ground; many Britiſh ſubjects had been killed; many were carried into captivity; and the French had declared they were reſolved to maintain their uſurpations by the ſword. What added to the deplorable condition of the Engliſh in thoſe parts, was the colluſion between the French and their barbarous Indians. For the former no ſooner granted a capitulation, which they never did but for their own conveniency, than it was broken by the latter, whom the French pretended they could not controul.

In conſequence of the Britiſh miniſtry's having received undoubted intelligence that the French had ſent ſeveral ſhips of war with land forces, arms, and ammunition of all kinds, to ſupport their uſurpations in America, orders were ſent to all the Britiſh colonies there to arm, and make ſuch diſpoſitions as might effectually oppoſe the enemy, and diſpoſſeſs them from their encroach⯑ments. They were given to underſtand, at the ſame time, that they were to be ſupported by a body of regular troops from England, under Ma⯑jor General Braddock, who was to command in chief in America; and that ſeveral expeditions were intended. The firſt and chief, headed by Braddock, againſt fort du Queſne; one againſt the French forts in Nova Scotia, and another againſt Crown-Point, on the frontiers of New-York; beſides another under General Shirley, to the lakes Eric and Ontario. It appears, that the conduct of the Britiſh colonies on this occaſion was neither ſuitable to their danger, nor the in⯑tereſt [6] of their mother country. Many of them, from the character they had acquired in the pre⯑ceding war, took it amiſs that they were to be commanded by a General from England; each province had a ſeparate intereſt to purſue; and, in ſhort, the diſpoſitions they made for receiving and ſupporting Braddock, upon ſo long a march, and ſo dangerous an expedition, were weak and diſſipated; though it was plain, that the ſucceſs of the whole depended upon their unanimity and hearty concurrence.

As to Braddock, he was unexceptionable in point of courage and regular education as a ſol⯑dier, but a very unfit man to command irregular and provincial troops; and indeed, from the time of his arrival in America to the day of his death, he ſeems to have reſolved to do his duty, but to have deſpaired of doing it with ſucceſs; and the event but too fatally verified his forebodings. He complained that nothing was in readineſs for his reception or march; he conceived an averſion and contempt for the provincials, and he was upon no very good terms with his own officers; but, what was worſt of all, he abandoned the excellent ſet of inſtructions which had been given him by his R. H. the D. of C. for his conduct during the expedition. The conſequence was, that for want of employing irregulars on the flanks of his ar⯑my, and to ſcour the country through which he was to march, he fell into an ambuſcade of French and Indians on the 9th of July, 1755, and was totally defeated. The enemy had en⯑trenched themſelves ſo artfully, that his troops had not an opportunity of exerting their valour, and ſtunned with the frightful yells of the barbarians, they ſeemed to forget the uſe of their arms, and ſtood the unactive marks of their enemies fury; [7] ſo that all who remained in the field, amongſt whom were the General and almoſt all the offi⯑cers, were killed, and ſcarce half the army eſ⯑caped.

The expedition againſt Crown-Point was com⯑manded by General Johnſon, who, having ad⯑vanced as far as lake George, was attacked in his entrenchments by Dieſkau, the French Ge⯑neral, who being likewiſe a regular bred officer, had ſo great a contempt for the provincials un⯑der Johnſon, that he attacked them without can⯑non; but was defeated, and himſelf taken pri⯑ſoner. This ſucceſs happening ſo late as the 7th of September, the victory was attended with no great advantages to Great Britain.

As to General Shirley's expedition, it is ſcarcely poſſible to deſcribe it, his proceedings were ſo unintelligible to all but himſelf. What we know of them is, that having marched over prodigious tracts of land, he came very late in the year to fort Oſwego, and left 700 men there to be ſacrificed, as they afterwards were, by the enemy, and then returned without doing any thing elſe.

The expedition againſt the French forts in Nova Scotia, under Colonel Monckton, was ſucceſsful, and of infinite ſervice to the mother country.—But we are now to attend the opera⯑tions of another element.

On the 10th of June 1755, two French men of war were taken by the Admirals Boſcawen and Moſtyn, who had been ſent to America to intercept the French ſupplies. But notwith⯑ſtanding all the Britiſh ſucceſſes, the public of England were far from being ſatisfied with the ſtate of the war, which they were taught to be⯑lieve would have been much more ſplendid in their favour. A reſolution was therefore taken [8] by our government to conſider the war as being actually proclaimed by the hoſtilities that had been committed by the French in America, and orders were given for the Britiſh ſhips to take all the French veſſels and their cargoes, wherever they could be met with by ſea; ſo that before the end of the year, above 300 French veſſels, many of them very richly laden, and above 8000 of their moſt ſerviceable ſeamen, were carried into the ports of Great Britain.

This proceeding amazed all Europe, and the tameneſs of France was not leſs aſtoniſhing. The Duke de Mirepoix, the French Ambaſſador, had declared to his Majeſty and his miniſtry, that the firſt gun, fired by Britiſh againſt French ſhips, would be conſidered by his maſter as a declaration of war, and ſet all Europe in a flame, and upon hoſtilities being begun in America, he was re⯑called. No repriſals, however, were made by the French, all they did was to ſend a letter to Mr. Fox, the Britſh ſecretary of ſtate, accuſing our Admirals and ſea Captains of piracy and rob⯑bery; and to fill the courts of Europe with com⯑plaints of our conduct. In acting, they affected ſo much moderation, that after taking the Bland⯑ford ſhip of war, they releaſed her upon that prin⯑ciple. The motives of this paſſive conduct were ſoon explained.

Since the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle to the year 1756, the French had been inceſſantly labouring to repair their marine; but though they ſpent im⯑menſe ſums, and made a vaſt progreſs in that de⯑ſign, yet it was ſtill unequal to that of Great Britain. They therefore formed two ſchemes, the firſt was the conqueſt of Minorca, and the latter an attempt upon Hanover. To render both ſucceſsful, in the ſpring of 1756, they brought down troops to Picardy, and ſuch of the [9] French coaſts as lie neareſt to England, wi [...] a ſhew of invading Great Britain; and, in the mean time, a ſquadron of twelve men of war of the line, commanded by the Admiral Galiſſoniere, with 11 or 12,000 troops on board, commanded by the the Duke de Richelieu, ſailed from Toulon, and landed in Minorca, where, on the 25th of April, they opened trenches before fort St. Philip.

His Britannic Majeſty was, all this while, con⯑certing meaſures for keeping the flames of war from breaking out in Germany, and for the pre⯑ſervation of his Hanoverian dominions. No Prince or private man in Europe underſtood, ſo well as he did, the views and intereſts of the Northern Powers. He was ſenſible that the Em⯑preſs Queen would take the firſt opportunity of revoking the ceſſion of Sileſia, which ſhe had made to the King of Pruſſia by the treaties of Dreſden and Breſlau; and the court of Vienna had already been tampering with him on that ac⯑count, but perceived him inflexible in his gua⯑rantyſhip of that country to his Pruſſian Majeſty. Her Imperial Majeſty refuſed him the troops ſti⯑pulated by treaty for the defence of Hanover, which the French made now no ſecret they intended to invade. The Dutch were required in like terms to furniſh the 6000 troops ſtipulated for the de⯑fence of Great Britain, in caſe of a war with France, but refuſed for the ſame reaſon, viz. becauſe the war between Great Britain and France in Germany, not affecting Europe, was not a caſe of the treaty. His Britannic Ma⯑jeſty had the magnanimity to overlook this in⯑gratitude of the Dutch, by ordering his miniſter Colonel York to deſiſt from the demand.

By this time the French armies had aſſembled on the Upper Rhine, and the Moſelle; and the court of Verſailles found means to bring the E⯑lector [10] of Cologne over, to ſuffer magazines to be erected in Weſtphalia, which could only be with a view of attacking Hanover. But though the dread of ſuch an attack did not in the leaſt ſhake his Majeſty in the ſyſtem he had adopted, viz. that of hazarding all events rather than Great Britain ſhould ſuffer; yet he took early and wiſe precautions for the defence of his Hanoverian dominions; and at the very time when, unknown to him, the courts of Vienna and Peterſburgh were forming ſchemes for dividing the ſpoils of Pruſſia, he entered into a ſubſidiary treaty for taking 55,000 Ruſſians, and 40 or 50 Ruſſian galleys into pay for preſerving the quiet of Ger⯑many, if invaded by foreign troops. He like⯑wiſe entered into another ſubſidiary treaty with the Landgrave of Heſſe, for 12,000 of his troops, who were to be employed, if either England or Hanover ſhould be attacked. Theſe treaties, though ſtrongly oppoſed in the Britiſh Parlia⯑ment, were at laſt approved of there, and, in fact, brought on a new treaty between Great Britain and Pruſſia.

His Pruſſian Majeſty had for ſome time been ſe⯑cretly diſcontented with the miniſters of Verſailles; but they continued to all appearance to be ſo in⯑timately connected, that his Britannic Majeſty was not a little apprehenſive that France had brought him into her views; to obviate which had been the great end of the two ſubſidiary trea⯑ties we have mentioned. But no ſooner was that with Ruſſia made public, than his Pruſſian Ma⯑jeſty declared in the ſtrongeſt manner, that he would oppoſe to the utmoſt, the introduction of all foreign troops whatſoever into the empire. Thus the views of their Britannic and Pruſſian Majeſties came to be preciſely the ſame, though ariſing from different objects. The former was [11] apprehenſive of the French, the latter of the Ruſ⯑ſians; and this coincidence of ſentiments, with ſome eclairciſements, as to the views of the court of Vienna, brought on the famous treaty of London with Pruſſia, which was ſigned January the 16th, 1756; by which he obtained a ſubſidy from Great Britain of 750,000l. a year, for ſer⯑vices that were extremely obvious, and the two Potentates agreed not to make a peace without the conſent of each other. The publication of this treaty produced that of Vienna, between the Em⯑preſs Queen and his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty; to which the Empreſs of Ruſſia acceded, and laid the foundation of the preſent bloody war. The Britiſh court was not inſenſible that the French intended to attack Minorca, and had appointed Admiral Byng to ſail to the Mediterranean with a ſquadron equal to that under Galiſſoniere. The public is well apprized of Byng's miſcon⯑duct, miſcarriage, and fate. He had, at beſt, a doubtful engagement with Galiſſoniere, and un⯑der pretext of providing for the ſafety of Gi⯑braltar, he abandoned that of fort St. Philip, which was taken by the French, and Minorca reduced to their obedience.

This advantage gained by the French, with the account of the loſs of Oſwego, and of the pre⯑valence of the French power in America, raiſed ſuch a clamour againſt the Britiſh miniſtry, that the chief of them reſigned their places, but their characters were fully vindicated by a parliamen⯑tary enquiry ſet on foot, and carried on by their enemies; the report of which entirely acquitted them of being in the leaſt acceſſary to any of the late military misfortunes; but as this is a martial and not a cabinet review, we are to con⯑fine it to military matters.

[12] The danger of an invaſion from France ſtill continuing, a motion was made, and carried through the Houſe of Commons, to addreſs his Majeſty to call over a body of Hanoverians and Heſſians, for the defence of his regal dominions. This addreſs was complied with, and the fo⯑reigners accordingly arrived, to the number of 12 or 13,000, and to the great diſguſt of the public, who thought Great-Britain was in a con⯑dition to defend herſelf.

His Britannic Majeſty was this year offered a neutrality by the courts of Vienna and Verſailles, but he magnanimouſly rejected it, becauſe the conditions annexed to it were diſhonourable in themſelves, and would have been detrimental to the common cauſe. This firmneſs endeared him ſtill more to his Parliament, who being fired with indignation at the menaces of the French, now in full march againſt Hanover, agreed on the 21ſt of February, to aſſiſt his Majeſty in forming, what was called, an army of obſervation in Germany, to be commanded by the Duke of Cumberland, who accordingly put himſelf at the head of it on the 16th of April, 1757.

The French on this occaſion had formed two armies, the one commanded by Monſ. d'Etrees, one of the beſt general officers in France, conſiſt⯑ing of above 86,000 men, deſtined to act againſt Hanover, but under the pretext of ſerving as allies to the Empreſs-Queen, and guarantees of the treaty of Weſtphalia. The other, conſiſting of 25,000 men, was commanded by the Prince de Soubiſe, and was to join the Army of the Empire, which was to put in execution the Im⯑perial Ban againſt his Pruſſian Majeſty. Before the latter army paſſed the Rhine, it ſeized the Pruſſian territories of Cleves, Meurs, and Guel⯑dres, while a detachment of the army under [13] d'Etrees made itſelf maſter of Embden, and of every thing belonging to his Pruſſian Majeſty in Eaſt Frieſland. But we are now, in as ſummary a manner as poſſible, to attend the important operations of his Pruſſian Majeſty's arms.

We have already taken notice of the dange⯑rous tendency of the treaty of Peterſburgh againſt his Pruſſian Majeſty, and having full proofs of its ſecret articles, he reſolved to loſe no time. He had ordered his miniſter at the court of Vi⯑enna to demand clear and categorical anſwers as to the deſtination of the vaſt armaments making in Moravia and Bohemia, but he received no ſatisfactory anſwer. At the ſame time the King of Poland had aſſembled an army of 16,000 men, with which he took poſſeſſion of the important and impregnable paſs of Pirna. On the 29th of Auguſt, 1756, he demanded from the King of Poland, Elector of Saxony, free paſſage for his troops, and that his Poliſh Majeſty, as a proof of his neutrality, ſhould diſmiſs his army. This not being complied with, the paſs of Pirna was blockaded, there being no way to reduce it but by famine. The blockade was ſcarce formed, when Brown, the Auſtrian General, marched to the relief of the Saxons; upon which his Pruſ⯑ſian Majeſty put himſelf at the head of his army under Field-Marſhal Keith, and fought the bat⯑tle of Lowoſitz, in which Brown was defeated, and the Saxons at Pirna forced to ſurrender upon capitulation; ſo that his Pruſſian Majeſty's army wintered in Saxony, and he himſelf, by forcing his way into the archives of Dreſden, notwith⯑ſtanding the oppoſition made by the Queen of Poland, whoſe huſband had retired to his regal dominions, obtained the original proofs of the confederacy that had been formed againſt him.

[14] At the opening of the campaign next year, every thing appeared very unfavourable for the King of Pruſſia. His victory at Lowoſitz had been attended with no other conſequence than the ſurrender of the paſs of Pirna! the Auſtrian army in Bohemia, commanded by Prince Charles of Lorrain and General Brown, amounted to 80,000 men; the Czarina ſent 60,000 men un⯑der the command of Marſhal Apraxin, aſſiſted by a ſtrong fleet, to invade the Ducal Pruſſia; and the Swedes, in hopes of recovering what they had loſt in Pomerania, joined the ſame con⯑federacy, being aided by 6000 troops of Meck⯑lenburgh. His Pruſſian Majeſty, however, with a cool rapidity peculiar to himſelf, divided his army into three bodies, which at the ſame time penetrated into Bohemia. The firſt was under Marſhal Schwerin, and entered that country from Sileſia. The ſecond was under the Prince of Bevern, who marched from Luſatia, and bravely defeated a body of 28,000 Auſtrians on the 21ſt of April. The laſt body was commanded by the King of Pruſſia himſelf, who, after a train of operations, the moſt judicious, perhaps, that can be met with in hiſtory, joined his two Generals in Bohemia, and proceeded againſt the great body of Auſtrians, who thought themſelves impregna⯑bly encamped near Prague; but nothing could withſtand the ardour of the Pruſſians; for under all diſadvantages they gained a complete victory over an hundred thouſand of their enemies, about forty thouſand of whom eſcaped to Prague, which was now inveſted on all ſides by his Pruſſian Majeſty. He had loſt in the late battle his brave General Schwerin, as the Auſtrians had done General Brown, and he truſted chiefly to Field-Marſhal Keith for the conduct of the ſiege.

[15] It was in this ſituation of affairs, which threa⯑tened the houſe of Auſtria with ruin, that Count Daun, who 'till then had made no diſtinguiſhed figure in military hiſtory, was appointed to the command of the Auſtrian troops. This General collected the diſperſed parties of the Auſtrians, and while the King of Pruſſia was endeavouring to make himſelf maſter of Prague by a tremen⯑dous bombardment, he took a ſtrong poſt near that city, and the Pruſſian army not being nu⯑merous enough entirely to inveſt it, he encou⯑raged the garriſon to make a vigorous defence, in hopes of being relieved. By this time his army was 60,000 ſtrong, and the Empreſs-Queen looking upon Prague as the Bulwark of Vienna, was continually reinforcing it. His Pruſſian Majeſty knew the value of time, and too much deſpiſing the enemies he had lately conquered, came to a reſolution of forcing Daun in his in⯑trenchments at Colin, though they were by all but himſelf deemed impregnable. If he was guilty of any miſtake that day, it was his under⯑taking that mighty attempt with no more than 23,000 men. This temerity can only be excuſed by the neceſſity he was under of continuing the blockade of Prague; but, on the other hand, we are to conſider what prodigious conſequences would have attended his attempt, had it been ſucceſsful, and likewiſe the neceſſity of checking Daun's growing power, by which in time he himſelf might have been beſieged by two ar⯑mies, one without and the other within the city. His conduct and courage on this occaſion exceeded all expectation. He carried his two brothers with him to the action, and never was valour more ſignally, and more unſucceſsfully employed. The battle laſted from three in the afternoon till it was dark. His Pruſſian Majeſty [16] charged at the head of his own cavalry, but had neglected to bring along with him a ſufficient number of infantry, or a train of artillery equal to his mighty enterprize. In ſhort, he performed every thing but impoſſibilities. He could not diſlodge the Auſtrians from their triply fortified camp, each entrenchment riſing above the other, and defended by an immenſe artillery, in a ground where cavalry, in which the Pruſſian ſtrength chiefly conſiſted, could ſcarcely act. After ſix attacks, the King, collecting all his force, made the concluding charge, which, though more fu⯑rious, was as unavailing as the preceding; and perceiving that he could not gain his point, he ordered the Prince of Bevern to give the ſignal for a retreat, ſaying, very cooly, We ſhall do bet⯑ter another time.

If we view the merit of a great man in the light of philoſophy, his Pruſſian Majeſty gained more honour by this defeat, than he did by all his preceding victories. It made not the ſmalleſt alteration in his countenance or his manner; nor did it even interrupt the courſe of his uſual a⯑muſements. Far from diſguiſing the indiſcretion of his own conduct, he acknowledged it in the face of all Europe, and did ſuch juſtice to the courage of his enemies, that he ſeemed to envy Daun the glory of commanding ſuch troops. His army ſpent the night after the battle near the place where it was fought, and he formed an al⯑moſt inſtantaneous reſolution of raiſing the block⯑ade of Prague. Many obvious motives deter⯑mined him to that ſtep; and amongſt others was a ſcarcity of ammunition, occaſioned by the ca⯑ſual blowing up of a large laboratory full of bombs. Though he had been on horſeback and in perpetual action all the day of the battle, yet that very night he ſet out for his camp before [17] Prague, eſcorted by no more than about a dozen Huſſars, with orders for his army to follow him as ſoon as poſſible. This they did without being harraſſed by the Auſtrians, though the Pruſſian loſs in the late battle was near 8000 men, and all the Pruſſian army, by a moſt admirable diſpo⯑ſition, drew off from before Prague, without any loſs, and retreated towards Letomeritz.

By this time the army, called that of Execu⯑tion, was formed in the empire, with a view of executing the ſentence of the diet of Ratiſbon againſt the King of Pruſſia. This army was compoſed of the troops of the Princes of the Empire, many of whom were Proteſtants; and ſcarcely any of them ſatisfied as to the juſtice of the cauſe in which they fought; ſo that the army in itſelf, which was commanded by the Prince of Saxe Hildbourghauſen was not formidable till it was joined by a large body of Auſtrians, and by the French army under the Prince de Soubiſe, and then its numbers were double to thoſe of the Pruſſians. All Europe now thought that his Pruſſian Majeſty muſt be inevitably ruined; but he had reſources in his own genius that placed him above the power of fortune. After his ar⯑rival at Letomeritz he omitted no opportunity of provoking Count Daun to a battle, and even made ſome deſperate efforts for that purpoſe; but the mechanical manner in which Daun carried on war defeated all his views. Leaving part of his army at Barnſtadel, under the Prince of Be⯑vern, he and Marſhal Keith proceeded with the reſt to Erfurth, where they arrived the 14th of September. Upon this, the army of the empire retreated firſt to Gotha, and then to Eiſenach, where it took ſo advantageous a poſt, that he found it impracticable to force them to a battle.

[18] In this ſituation of things, his Pruſſian Ma⯑jeſty bethought himſelf of one of thoſe happy expedients that are ſo common amongſt great Generals, that, if attended with diſappointment, bring no diſgrace, and if with ſucceſs, immortal glory. Under pretext of being deſtitute of pro⯑viſions, he retired to Naumburg, and ſent Mar⯑ſhal Keith with ſeven battalions to Leipſic. Af⯑ter this, he ſeemed to throw himſelf quite off his guard, and ſent his troops into ſuch quarters as could beſt afford them ſubſiſtence, but privately made ſuch diſpoſition of them that he could aſ⯑ſemble them at a ſhort warning. His enemies were not ſo far impoſed upon as not to imagine that he had ſomething in view. But they miſ⯑took the object: they thought he intended to cover Magdeburgh, and that they in the mean time had a fair opportunity of reducing Leipſic, which place they actually ſummoned Marſhal Keith to ſurrender. Keith probably was in his Maſter's ſecret, and made preparations for de⯑fending Leipſic to the laſt extremity. The Im⯑perialiſts and the French made diſpoſitions for be⯑ſieging it, which was the preciſe ſituation to which his Pruſſian Majeſty wanted to bring them. He was at this time to all appearance upon the brink of deſtruction; but the reader will beſt judge of his ſituation, from a deſcrip⯑tion of his perſon and condition printed at that time in the public papers as follows, ‘Many perſons who ſaw the King of Pruſſia when he paſſed lately through Leipſic, cannot expreſs how much he is altered. They ſay he is ſo much worn away, that they ſcarce knew him. This, indeed, is not to be wondered at; he hath not a body of iron like Charles XII. and he endures as great fatigues as he did. He is as much on horſeback as Charles was, and [19] often lies upon the ground. His inward ſuf⯑ferings cannot be leſs than his outward: let us caſt our eyes on a map of the Pruſſian do⯑minions, and meaſure what he hath left of the many fair poſſeſſions he had in the month of April 1761, of which a ſpace of ſeven months have ſtripped him; whence can he have men? he is ſhut out from the empire; and from whence can he draw money? the dutchy of Cleves, the principality of Muers, the county of Lingen, the county of Lipſtadt, the prin⯑cipality of Minden, Eaſt Frieſland, Embden, and its infant company, part of the rich bi⯑ſhopric of Magdeburg, ſome other parts of the Marche, Ducal Pomerania, a great part of Sileſia, a great part of the kingdom of Pruſſia, Berlin itſelf, and almoſt all his domi⯑nions are taken from him, or laid under con⯑tribution, and poſſeſſed by his enemies, who collect the public revenues, fatten on the con⯑tributions, and with the money which they draw from the electorate of Hanover, and other conqueſts, defray the expences of the war. This picture certainly differs greatly from that which the King of Pruſſia might have ſketched out the day he took arms to enter Saxony. Add to this the Duke of C—'s convention, which deprived him of all his allies, and left him without any aſ⯑ſiſtance whatever, excepting 4 or 500,000 l. ſterling, which the Britiſh parliament may give him. Add likewiſe ſome domeſtick un⯑eaſineſſes.’ Such was the picture exhibited of his Pruſſian Majeſty while his enemies were beſieging Leipſic, and when all of a ſudden they received intelligence of his marching to its re⯑lief, his name was ſo terrible that the Imperialiſts retired over the Sala; but they were followed by [20] his Pruſſian Majeſty, who had wiſely declined to give them battle till almoſt the depth of win⯑ter, having provided for the ſecurity of all his paſſes and fortreſſes in Sileſia and Saxony. At laſt on the 5th of November, his Pruſſian Ma⯑jeſty came up with his enemies near a village called Roſbach, and a battle being now inevi⯑table, he addreſſed his troops in very near the following terms: ‘My dear friends, you know the hour is come in which all that is, and all that ought to be dear to us, depends upon the ſwords which are now drawn for the battle. Time permits me to ſay but little; nor is there occaſion to ſay much. You know that there is no labour, no hunger, no cold, no watch⯑ing, no danger, that I have not ſhared with you hitherto; and you now ſee me ready to lay down my life with you, and for you. All I aſk, is, the ſame pledge of fidelity and af⯑fection that I give. And let me add, not as an incitement to your courage, but as a teſti⯑mony of my own gratitude, that from this hour, until you go into quarters, your pay ſhall be double: Acquit yourſelves like men, and put your confidence in God.’

The ſpeech made by his Pruſſian Majeſty, as before-mentioned, rendered the meaneſt ſoldier in his army an hero. Though they were but 25,000 ſtrong, and their enemies more than dou⯑ble that number, they called out to be led to ac⯑tion, in which they were headed by the King himſelf. The French cavalry at firſt behaved well, and their infantry diſputed an eminence, which, if they could have maintained, would have given them great advantages; but nothing could withſtand the ardour of the Pruſſians, who gained ſo compleat a victory, that night alone ſaved the French and [21] Imperialiſts from total deſtruction; three thou⯑ſand, however, were killed upon the field, 63 pieces of cannon, with a great number of co⯑lours, were taken, eight French Generals, 250 Officers, and 6000 common men were made pri⯑ſoners.

The victory compleat, and ſeemingly deciſive as it was, was far from giving any reſpite to his Pruſſian Majeſty's military labours. The Au⯑ſtrians were ſtill ſtrong, and perhaps the ſenti⯑ments of ſome of his own family did not entirely favour the ſyſtem of his operations. Thus much at leaſt is certain, that he was diſſatisfied with the conduct of his Generals in Sileſia, where, on the 11th of December, the Auſtrians after a vi⯑gorous ſiege reduced Schweidnitz, and obliged the Pruſſian garriſon, to the number of 4000, to ſurrender priſoners of war. After this, on the 22d of the ſame month, they attacked the Prince of Bevern's army, which, we have already men⯑tioned, his Pruſſian Majeſty left at Barnſtadel. The Prince lay then near Breſlau, which was by this time inveſted by the Auſtrian General Nadaſti. There is ſomewhat in the Prince of Bevern's conduct at this time, that requires to be touched by an Hiſtorian with a tender hand. He gallantly repulſed the Auſtrians, who attacked him with great fury, and he even defeated them. It is poſſible he, and the Generals under him, thought that his Pruſſian Majeſty's affairs were irretrievable, and abandoning their ſtrong ſitua⯑tion they paſſed the Oder, where the Prince of Bevern, riding out, on the pretext of reconnoi⯑tring, was made priſoner by a body of Croats who had paſſed that river. After this, Breſlau fell into the hands of the Auſtrians, and it was thought they had nothing now to do but to take poſſeſſion of all Sileſia.

[22] During this deſperate plunge of fortune, his Pruſſian Majeſty behaved with the ſame intre⯑pidity and coolneſs as he would have done had he been conquered. He was now in Luſatia, and far from being terrified by the progreſs of his enemies, he made a war of diverſion, by detach⯑ing Marſhal Keith with part of his army into Bohemia, where he advanced almoſt as far as Prague, every where levying contributions.

He then entered Sileſia, after a dreadful march of upwards of 200 miles, on the 2d of Decem⯑ber, at the head of not above 15,000 men, and when he was joined by the Prince of Be⯑vern's army, his whole force did not exceed 40,000, and thoſe greatly fatigued and harraſſed. The Auſtrians were at this time in poſſeſſion of the ſtrong camp that had been ſo unaccountably abandoned by the Prince of Bevern, and they were commanded by Count Daun, their num⯑bers being above 70,000 men. Upon his Pruſ⯑ſian Majeſty's arrival in Sileſia, he was to his great, but agreeable ſurprize, joined by the cap⯑tive garriſon of Schweidnitz, who, upon their hearing of his victory at Roſbach, had maſtered the eſcort which was conducting them to their priſons. Upon this, on the 5th of December, he came to a reſolution of giving Count Daun battle. The Auſtrians by this time, truſting to the ſuperiority of their numbers, were ſo far from declining an engagement, that they quitted their ſtrong camp, and both armies met at the village of Leuthen. The ground which was there oc⯑cupied by the Auſtrians was exceſſively ſtrong, and ſurrounded or interſperſed with eminences, on which were raiſed batteries of cannon; they likewiſe had the precaution to fell down large trees to encumber the Pruſſian cavalry, and Ge⯑neral [23] Nadaſti commanded a corps de reſerve poſted ſo as to take the Pruſſian army in flank.

The prodigious quickneſs and ſagacity of his Pruſſian Majeſty made him obviate all the diffi⯑culties, numerous as they were, which he lay under. He ſaw that great part of the for⯑tune of the day muſt depend upon Nadaſti's attack, and he provided againſt it by plac⯑ing four battalions of infantry behind the cavalry of his right wing: and their fire was ſo furious that they obliged the Auſtrians to retreat. Upon this the Pruſſian cavalry fell upon the enemy ſword in hand, and their artillery being well ſerved, the whole Auſtrian army was broke, but not till after a moſt obſtinate reſiſtance, eſpeci⯑ally about the village of Leuthen, which they had endeavoured to render impregnable by re⯑doubts and entrenchments. Loſing that poſt, they fled with vaſt confuſion; 6000 were killed on the field of battle, 15,000 were taken priſo⯑ners, and his Pruſſian Majeſty continued the pur⯑ſuit as far as Liſſa. The Auſtrian loſs of artil⯑lery in this battle, which is called that of Breſ⯑lau, was about 200 pieces of cannon.

This victory of Breſlau, which was obtained exactly a month after that of Roſbach, was, if we except that of Minden, the moſt amazing of any that has been fought theſe two centuries. Though it was in a ſeaſon of the year in which other troops are indulged in winter quarters, his Pruſſian Majeſty on the 7th of December formed the ſiege of Breſlau, which, on the 20th of Ja⯑nuary ſucceeding 1758, ſurrendered to him; the Auſtrian garriſon, conſiſting of 10,000 fighting men, beſides 4000 ſick and wounded, becoming priſoners of war. It would have been worſe than madneſs after this, in ſo rigorous a ſeaſon, to have thought of beſieging Schweidnitz, which [24] was provided with a numerous Auſtrian garri⯑ſon. The return of Marſhal Keith and his ar⯑my, loaded with the ſpoils of Bohemia and Sax⯑ony, completed his Pruſſian Majeſty's triumphs this year, and all Sileſia, Schweidnitz excepted, now returned to his poſſeſſion. Nay, before he went into winter quarters, he reduced many places in it, belonging to the Empreſs Queen.—Having thus brought the Pruſſian operations of 1757 to a cloſe, I am now to attend thoſe in which Great Britain was more immediately intereſted.

His late Majeſty King George the Second, in point of good faith, was, perhaps, one of the moſt ſcrupulous Princes that ever lived. Though he knew the juſtice on which his Pruſſian Ma⯑jeſty's invaſion of Saxony was founded; yet as it did not immediately concern himſelf, either as a member of the empire, or as King of Great Britain, he was ſo far from giving it any coun⯑tenance, that he ordered his miniſter at the Saxon court to do every thing that was in his power to ſoften the rigour of his Poliſh Majeſ⯑ty's fate. But King George the Second, who of himſelf always thought and acted as a King and a man, had contemporary Princes to deal with, who liſtened more to the voice of reſentment, than to that of reaſon; nor perhaps upon certain occaſions can be entirely clear even his Pruſſian Majeſty of that charge. Thus much at leaſt is certain, that had his Britannic Majeſty's voice been heard, a ſtop might have been put to the horrors of war, about the beginning of the year 1757; but the ſore was more feſtered than he or the public apprehended. The French, fatally for themſelves and all Europe, imagined, that his Britannic Majeſty never would be proof againſt an attack upon his electoral dominions; [25] and that they ſhould be able in Germany to eſta⯑bliſh their encroachments upon the continent of America. Our taking the French ſhips without a formal declaration of war, though a ſtep that had no manner of relation to his Majeſty's con⯑duct as Elector of Hanover, ſerved them as a pretext for invading that country, and his Pruſſi⯑an Majeſty's irruption into Saxony, gave them as guarantees of the treaty of Weſtphalia, ſome colour of juſtice in the eyes of the reſt of Eu⯑rope. They demanded a paſſage from the Dutch for their warlike ſtores through Namur and Mac⯑ſtricht, which, notwithſtanding our oppoſition, was granted them, and about the end of March 1757, they rendezvouſed at Nuys, oppoſite to Duſſeldorp. Upon their entering Germany they met with little or no oppoſition, and even the ſtrong town of Weſel belonging to his Pruſſian Majeſty, fell into their hands. They raiſed at the ſame time vaſt contributions, and blockaded the town of Gueldres. Their army, amounting to above 110,000 men, was commanded by the Marſhal D'Etrees, who was then reckoned to be the beſt General France had, and in a very ſhort time, they made themſelves maſters of the Pruſſian Guelderland, the dutchy of Cleves, and all his Pruſſian Majeſty's eſtates upon the Rhine.

Notwithſtanding this formidable progreſs of the French, his Britannic Majeſty's delicacy, in point of good faith, would not ſuffer him to take the leaſt ſtep that could carry the ſmalleſt appear⯑ance of violating the peace of Germany. All the uſe he made of his connections in the empire, was to form an army of obſervation, the com⯑mand of which was given to his royal highneſs the Duke of Cumberland, who arrived in Ger⯑many early in the ſpring of 1757, and took poſt with about 40,000 Heſſians and Hanoverians in [26] the Pruſſian territories of Ravenſburg. D'Etrees, who had the flower of the French Generals to command under him, ridiculouſly demanded a ſafe paſſage through the Hanoverian dominions to march againſt the King of Pruſſia, though it would have coſt him a detour of many hundred miles. This demand being rejected, the French army advanced againſt that of obſervation to⯑wards Bielefield, the Duke of Cumberland's head quarters.

It is impoſſible for a writer to make the ſub⯑ſequent operations of his royal highneſs compre⯑henſible to a candid reader, without touching up⯑on the civil hiſtory of the times, which with ſome reluctance, I am now obliged to do. The eyes of the Germanic body were at this time fixed upon the parliament and miniſtry of Great Bri⯑tain; neither of whom were very forward in ex⯑tending their German connections. Whatever private convictions the miniſtry might have as to the expediency of defending Hanover, the topic was ſo unpopular that few of them cared to avow their ſentiments. His Britannic Majeſty ſaw this with ſome concern, nor durſt he venture to give either his Hanoverian regency or the Princes of the empire, who were in his intereſt, any poſitive aſſurance of their being ſupported by Great Bri⯑tain. Hanover was but a feeble object, when oppoſed to an army of 110,000 men, and it was natural for his Majeſty to liſten to the repreſenta⯑tions of his miniſters there, who adviſed him to a neutrality if it could be obtained. This being premiſed, the conduct of his royal highneſs the Duke of Cumberland will appear not only intel⯑ligible, but ſo far as related to himſelf, magnani⯑mous and defenſible upon every principle of juſ⯑tice and prudence.

[27] About the 13th of June, the French army ap⯑proached to Bielefield, and notwithſtanding its vaſt ſuperiority of numbers, his royal highneſs did not paſs the Weſer till the 19th. While the two armies continued on the oppoſite banks of the Weſer, the French took poſſeſſion of Embden and all the Pruſſian territories in Eaſt Frieſland, as they did of the country of Bentheim, which had been purchaſed by his Britannic Majeſty in the year 1752. After garriſoning thoſe acquiſi⯑tions, the French detachments returned to their main army under d'Etrees, who being an able General knew the inconveniencies the Duke of Cumberland was under to guard all the paſſages of the Weſer, and prepared to paſs that river at Hoxter, at a large diſtance from the Duke's army. The apparent conſequence of which was the laying all the ſouthern parts of Hanover under contribution. His royal highneſs, not⯑withſtanding the prodigious odds of numbers, made moſt excellent diſpoſitions for oppoſing his enemies, and at laſt, after a moſt judicious choice of ground, he encamped at Haſtenbeck near Ha⯑melen. The French attacked the rear of the ar⯑my of obſervation, in which they were ſeveral times defeated, and the Duke having paſſed the Weſer, the Marquiſs d'Etrees, the French Ge⯑neral, found himſelf under great difficulties in forcing him to a battle. After ſeveral marches and countermarches, in which the Duke's army was neither numerous enough to attend him, and far leſs to guard all the extenſive banks of the ri⯑ver, the Marquiſs d'Armentieres, while his roy⯑al highneſs was intent upon the motions of the Duke de Broglio and Monſieur Chevert, on the 9th of July threw bridges over the river at Hox⯑ter, and paſſed it with a large detachment of troops and artillery. He was followed by the Duke of [28] Orleans, and then by d'Etrees and all the French army. This, together with the ſubmiſſion of the landgraviate of Heſſe-Caſſel to M. Contades, enabled the French to extend their contributi⯑ons; and on the 25th of July, they attacked the Hanoverians at Haſtenbeck, where the moſt com⯑plete generalſhip ſhewn on the part of his royal highneſs, which was admired by his enemies themſelves, did not give him victory. He was obliged to retire after the loſs of about 1500 men, that of the enemy being greater, by the way of Hamelen, Nyenburg, and Hoy, till he came to Ferden. The French followed him, but very ſlowly, and forced the garriſon of Hamelen to capitulate. They had ſeveral reaſons for this de⯑lay. They did not chuſe to preſs too hard upon an army which had been ſo little diminiſhed by the late battle; they knew that a great part of the Hanoverian regency were inclined to a neu⯑trality, but above all, the arrival of the Duke de Richelieu, who ſuperceded M. d'Etrees in his command, retarded their march. Richelieu, a rapacious expenſive Officer, had, by the influ⯑ence of the French King's miſtreſs, obtained that command to repair his broken fortunes, and he made the moſt of it by his acts of oppreſſion and plunder.

He ſent the Duke de Randan to take poſſeſ⯑ſion of the city of Hanover with 2000 men, which he did without reſiſtance, and was appoint⯑ed to be its governor; but all the treaſure, ar⯑chives, and effects, had been before ſent to Stade. Richelieu, at the ſame time, took poſſeſſion of all the other conſiderable places of the electorate, and ordered its ſeveral diviſions to ſend deputies to his camp, to ſettle the mode and proportion of the contributions they were to furniſh. After thus collecting his army, he marched towards [62] Ferden, as his royal highneſs did to a ſtrong camd between Otterſberg and Rothenburg. The French, by their ſuperiority of numbers, were en⯑abled to make diſpoſitions which might have cut off the communication of his royal highneſs with Stade, the moſt important fortification in all the electorate, and this obliged him to retire with his army under the cannon of that place.

It was generally thought that his ſituation, as he could retire no further, muſt have brought on a battle, which, every thing conſidered, muſt have been deciſive in his favour. But it was otherwiſe reſolved upon in the Hanoverian coun⯑cils, which had prevailed upon the King of Den⯑mark to employ the Count de Lynar to mediate a convention between the two armies, which was ſigned at Cloſter-Seven, and by which the Ha⯑noverian army was bound up from hoſtilities, and was ſent into different cantonments in their own country. This convention left Richelieu at li⯑berty to tyrannize over all that electorate, which he did in the moſt inhuman, rapacious, manner; though we muſt do the Duke de Randan the juſ⯑tice to ſay, that his conduct in his government was directly the reverſe of that of Richelieu: for which he received the thanks of his Britannic Majeſty.

The reader, from what is before ſaid, may gueſs at the ſecret cauſes that produced the ſurpriſing convention of Cloſter-Seven. It is certain, that neither his royal highneſs nor the Britiſh miniſtry were privy to them. The latter, ever ſince the French had entered Weſtphalia, had foreſeen the expediency of giving them a diverſion in their own country, and that ſame ſummer, 1757, a powerful armament for a ſecret expedition was fitted out in England. The deſign was ſo well concealed, that the moſt penetrating [30] politicians were at a loſs to account for its object, and the chief command of the expedition was gi⯑ven to Lieutenant General Sir John Mordaunt, under whom ſerved the Major Generals, Con⯑way and Cornwallis, with about 6000 land troops on board. On the 21ſt of September, this ar⯑mament appeared off Rochfort, and ſoon after, the ſmall iſle of Aix was reduced by the Britiſh ſhipping. From the fortifications of this iſland the coaſts and ſituation of the country was atten⯑tively obſerved, and ſome of the Britiſh officers imagined they diſcovered two encampments. This produced diſputes and doubts among the officers, which were heightened by the apparent difficulties of landing, but all agreed in the expe⯑diency of taking a ſmall fort, called Fort Fouras, in order to ſecure their retreat. This attack was neglected; but it was reſolved to land the troops in boats on the 28th of September. The weather being ſomewhat boiſterous, (tho' it did not appear to be ſo for three days before) the troops, after being put into the boats, were ordered to reim⯑bark. Sir Edward Hawke, who commanded the fleet, grew uneaſy at its ſituation at that time of the year, and it was reſolved, but without any regular, or general, meeting of the council of war, that the whole expedition ſhould return to Eng⯑land, without making any further attempt. The conſternation of the people and parliament, after the loſs of their money, and what is ſtill more, of their national reputation, was inexpreſſible. His Majeſty referred the caſe of the commanding offi⯑cer to a board of general officers, and in conſe⯑quence of their report, he was tried at a general court martial, held at Whitehall the 14th of December 1757, and acquitted upon the dubiety of the evidence which was againſt him.

[31] The public of England had now a diſagreeable proſpect before its eyes. The army of obſervati⯑on had been rendered inactive; and thus there was no co-operating power to take off the weight of the French arms from his Pruſſian Majeſty, who appeared to be in a moſt melancholy ſituation. The Empreſs of Ruſſia, his irreconcileable ene⯑my, ordered her troops to quicken their motions, and they entered the Ducal Pruſſia, under Mar⯑ſhal Apraxin and General Fermer, where they were guilty of monſtrous inhumanities. An Auſ⯑trian army penetrated as far as Breſlaw into Sile⯑ſia, and laid ſiege to Schweidnitz, while another body reduced Zittau. The Swedes, to the num⯑ber of 22,000, made themſelves maſters of the towns of Anclam and Demmein, in the Pruſſian Pomerania, and laid the neighbouring country un⯑der contribution, as Richelieu, being now eaſy on the ſide of Hanover, did the old Marche of Brandenburg, which, however, did not ex⯑cuſe the inhabitants from being plundered where⯑ever the French came. As the recovering of Sileſia was the main object of the Empreſs Queen, the army of the empire was joined by that of the French, under Prince Soubiſe, and marched to⯑wards Saxony, which left Sileſia expoſed to all the Auſtrian force, ſo that the King of Pruſſia durſt not venture to defend even his capital Ber⯑lin, which was entered and laid under contribu⯑tion by General Haddick. The Ruſſians, tho' intent only upon their own views, ſtill encreaſed the diſtreſs of his Pruſſian Majeſty. His Gene⯑ral Lehwald had orders at all hazards to oppoſe their progreſs, and with no more than 50,000 men, he attacked above double that number at Norkittin, on the 30th of Auguſt 1757. The Ruſſians may be cut to pieces, but it can ſeldom be ſaid, they are beaten. Though they loſt five [32] men for one that fell on the Pruſſian ſide, yet Lehwald was obliged to retire, which he did with great reputation to himſelf, and the arms of his maſter. Notwithſtanding the amazing exertions of valour and conduct daily made by his Pruſſian Majeſty, all Europe, not excepting even his friends in England, thought him now to be at the laſt gaſp. He had loſt poſſeſſion of the dut⯑chies of Gueldres and Cleves, the principalities of Muers and Munden, with the counties of Lingen and Lipſtadt; Eaſt Frieſland, Embden, part of Magdeburg, and the Marche, the Du⯑cal Pomerania, great part of Sileſia, and Regal Pruſſia. Conqueſts, that while they took from him the means of carrying on the war, gave them to his enemies. His chief means of ſubſiſtance reſted on his Britiſh ſubſidy; but that, though great, was not only inadequate to his neceſſities, but precarious in itſelf. The unaccountable fai⯑lure of the expedition againſt Rochfort had ſoured the nation, and it was uncertain into whoſe hands the miniſtry was to fall.

But the juncture in which his Pruſſian Majeſty was thought to be the moſt diſtreſſed, rendered him formidable. He had by an admirable train of operations covered Saxony; but when the army of the empire, and that of Soubiſe advanced to the frontiers of Miſnia, and ſeemed to point to⯑wards the ſiege of Leipſic, he put his troops in motion, after taking all poſſible precautions againſt the Auſtrians in Luſatia, and for the defence of Schweidnitz. The Imperialiſts knew what great things his Pruſſian Majeſty was capable of, and they retired at his approach; till having rein⯑forced themſelves with a vaſt ſuperiority of numbers, they again faced his army, and he in his turn retired. It was now the 24th of Octo⯑ber, and he had ſecretly determined on a battle, [33] but found great difficulties in bringing it on with advantage to himſelf. To effect this, he can⯑toned his troops in ſuch a manner as to perſuade his enemies, from the diſtance between their corps, that he intended to act only on the defenſive, during the remaining part of the winter; but on the 27th of October, to the amazement of his enemies, ſo quickly had his troops advanced, he was at the head of 25,000 choice men.

Though the convention of Cloſter Seven was equally binding upon the French as upon the Ha⯑noverians, yet the former behaved with all the inſolence of tyrants over ſlaves. The rapaciouſ⯑neſs of the Duke de Richelieu knew no bounds, one cruel exaction followed another, but though all was ſubmitted to, the wretched inhabitants found no relief from plundering and pillaging. Money, and booty was all that Richelieu had in view, nor indeed durſt he repreſs the licentiouſ⯑neſs of his ſoldiers, which not only carried them beyond all the bounds of military diſcipline, but led them into habits of life, that proved fatal to them, in the diſeaſes they introduced, attended with vaſt mortality; while their General and o⯑ther Commanders, mindful only of enriching themſelves, neither provided for their recovery, nor furniſhed them with arms, cloaths, or any means of ſubſiſtance, but what they acquired by plunder. Richelieu was ſenſible of his army's growing weakneſs, and to guard againſt the ef⯑fects of it, he required the Heſſians and Hano⯑verians to deliver up their arms, a condition that had not been ſtipulated by the convention of Cloſ⯑ter Seven. He puſhed the breach of thoſe articles ſtill further, by attempting to ſeize upon places not comprehended in them, and by ſhutting them up in ſuch narrow diſtricts of cantonment, as rendered it impoſſible for the inhabitants to ſubſiſt. [34] The revenues of the electorate was farmed out to one Faidy, a money-undertaker, under pre⯑tence of its being a conquered country, and he ſet up a booth at Hanover by virtue of his com⯑miſſion, which impowered him to commit what exceſſes he pleaſed.

All theſe, and many other oppreſſions, con⯑vinced the regency of Hanover, how greatly they were miſtaken, in imagining, that the conven⯑tion of Cloſter Seven would bring any relief to their country. It fortunately happened, that the court of Verſailles refuſed to conſider the conven⯑tion, as being obligatory upon her, unleſs the auxiliary troops of Hanover were diſarmed, and unleſs his Britannic Majeſty would abandon his electorate as a prey to the French. Thoſe de⯑mands, therefore, in fact, freed his Britannic Majeſty, as much as it did France, from looking upon the convention as being obligatory, and he could no longer reſiſt the voice of his diſtreſſed ſubjects. He appointed Prince Ferdinand, the brother of the reigning Duke of Brunſwic, to be his General, and the battle of Roſbach critically happening at the ſame time, the Hanoverians and Heſſians reſumed their arms, united under him, and broke from their diſgraceful confinements. The French were in no condition to reſiſt the ſpirit of liberty, enflamed by reſentment. They were every where beaten. The Hanoverians took the town of Harburg, and the gallant reſiſt⯑ance made by the caſtle, which at laſt was re⯑duced likewiſe, was the only inſtance, in which the French could be ſaid to act like ſoldiers or men. Prince Ferdinand then retreated to Ultzen, half way between Zell and Lunenburg, and Broglio having paſſed the Aller with a large body of cavalry, the Hanoverians expected every mo⯑ment to be attacked. But the movements of the [35] French proved to be only a feint to cover ſome waggons of Richelieu's ill gotten plunder, and they fell back upon their head-quarters at Zell. We ſhall now attend the Ruſſians.

The army under Apraxin had behaved with ſuch unexampled brutality, that in deſolating the countries, through which it marched, they left no ſubſiſtence for themſelves; and the court of Vienna had been ſo ſlow in its remittances, that the troops, both officers and ſoldiers, being great⯑ly in arrear, they took a reſolution to evacuate the Pruſſian territories, which, to the amazement of all Europe, they accordingly did. His Pruſ⯑ſian Majeſty, who at firſt ſcarcely believed the news, upon this, ordered Lehwald to march his army into Pomerania againſt the Swedes. Leh⯑wald, on entering that country, ſcarce met with reſiſtance from a people, whoſe military virtues, but a few years before, had ſtruck terror into all Europe. He not only drove them out of the Pruſ⯑ſian Pomerania, but took poſſeſſion of all the Swediſh, excepting Stralſund, under the cannon of which, the Swediſh army took ſhelter. The Duke of Mecklenburgh Schwerin, who, during all the war, had ſhewn a remarkable attachment to the French, being, by the retreat of the Ruſ⯑ſians and Swedes, left expoſed to his Pruſſian Majeſty's reſentment, was obliged to take ſhelter at Lubec; and it is to be lamented, that his ſub⯑jects, though Proteſtants, paid dearly for the miſ⯑conduct of their Sovereign.

The enemies of the King of Pruſſia were more ſtrongly united againſt him by fear and hatred than they would have been either by intereſt or principle. The bloody events and various for⯑tunes of the laſt campaign, ſuch as never before happened in ſo ſhort a time, had not diſpoſed any of the powers at war to make ſo much as a pro⯑poſal [36] for peace. That the King of Pruſſia might give ſome repoſe to his troops, the campaign did not open till the beginning of April, 1758. The conſequences of the battle of Liſſa had been extremely favourable to the King of Pruſſia, as by the contributions he raiſed in Saxony and other places, he was enabled to ſpare his Heredi⯑tary countries, and to ſend a ſmall body of caval⯑ry to the aſſiſtance of Prince Ferdinand. The Count de Clermont had now the command of the French army in Weſtphalia. But the change of the General did them no ſervice. They retreated or rather fled every where before the Hanoveri⯑ans, who marched in two diviſions; one on the right to the country of Bremen, and another un⯑der General Zaſtrow, to the left towards Gifforn. In a few days the French retired from Otterſburg, Bremen, and Ferden, and the caſtle of Rotten⯑burg did not hold out above ſix hours. It was expected that Count Chabot, who was poſted with a ſtrong detachment at Hoy above Ferden, would have made a vigorous ſtand; and Prince Ferdinand appointed his nephew, the young Prince of Brunſwick, with four battalions of foot and ſome light-horſe, to diſlodge him. This Prince, though but twenty years of age, had ſeen a great deal of action, and his genius was ſo truly military, that he had performed exploits which would have done honour to the ableſt Generals. He had ſignalized himſelf at the battle of Haſ⯑tenbeck, and ſuch was his ardour for glory in a noble cauſe, that he had, though with the ſeem⯑ing diſapprobation of his father, followed his uncle to the field. The enterprize he was charg⯑ed with was not only full of difficulties, but a train of diſappointments threatened to render it unſucceſsful. Having a broad river to paſs, and but one float to carry his troops over it, and the [37] wind blowing freſh in his teeth, he found it im⯑practicable to paſs over but one half of his de⯑tachment. It was now the 23d of February, and he boldly, but wiſely, determined to ſurprize the town before it was day-light ſufficient for the French to diſcover the ſmall handful he was at⯑tended with. Before he was arrived at the town, the enemy was alarmed by an accidental firing, and prepared to receive him; but the Prince by his courage and excellent diſpoſitions conquered all oppoſition. He beat the enemy from the poſſeſſion of a bridge they held, took poſſeſ⯑ſion of the town, and forced Chabot, the French commandant, who had thrown himſelf into the caſtle, to ſurrender it with all his ſtores and magazines. The Prince, who had with him no heavy artillery, ſuffered the troops under Chabot to depart, but he had in the preceding action killed a great number of the enemy, and made almoſt 700 priſoners, with no more than 100 of his own men killed and wounded.

The Hanoverian army continuing its march in two diviſions, at laſt cleared all the electorate of the French, Minden excepted, which was garriſoned by 4000 men; but the place being in⯑veſted, they were obliged on March the 14th to ſurrender themſelves priſoners of war, after a ſiege of no more than nine days. It does not fall within the narrow compaſs of our deſign to par⯑ticularize the many ſkirmiſhes that all this while paſſed between the French and the Hanoverians. The former ſcarce made a reſiſtance but when they were prompted by deſpair, and even then it was ineffectual. All ſubordination was loſt a⯑mongſt their troops. Deſtitute of cloathing and covering in a bitter ſeaſon many periſhed on the roads, and the ſword was ſcarcely wanted to fi⯑niſh the deſtruction of the ſurvivors, moſt of whom were ſo weak and diſeaſed, that they were [38] knocked on the head by the clubs of the enraged peaſants, while the Hanoverian Huſſars and Hun⯑ters harraſſed the few who had ſtrength enough to attempt an eſcape. Upon the whole, it is reck⯑oned at a moderate computation, that, of 130,000 French, who had entered Weſtphalia, all of them fine troops, not above 50,000 were alive at the end of the campaign. Theſe being collec⯑ted together from all quarters, at laſt reached the Rhine, except a body which maintained itſelf at Weſel, under count Clermont. We muſt, how⯑ever, from the ſcene of French oppreſſion and barbarity we have exhibited, except the conduct of the Duke de Randan, who preſerved his vir⯑tue and humanity, even amidſt all the horros and provocations of this diſmal retreat. Though he had large magazines, far from deſtroying them, as the cuſtom of common war might have juſti⯑fied him in doing, he conſigned them to the Ha⯑noverian magiſtracy for the benefit of their poor, and that, by his preſence, he might prevent all diſorders, he was the laſt Frenchman, who marched out of Hanover.

The ſame ſpirit of deſpondency ſeemed to in⯑fect the French troops in other places. A ſmall Engliſh ſquadron under Commodore Holmes ar⯑rived before Embden, which, as we mentioned before, was taken from the King of Pruſſia by the French, and, by them, garriſoned with 4000 men, and cut off the communication between the place and the mouth of the river. The gar⯑riſon, either ſtruck with a panic, or apprehend⯑ing that Holmes expected a ſpeedy ſupply of ſhips and troops, evacuated the town, and ſent their heavy artillery and baggag up the river. Holmes ordered ſome armed boats to purſue them, and ſome of their veſſels were taken. In one of them was a youth, the ſon of a French officer of diſ⯑tinction, [39] whom the Commodore immediately ſent to his father, and offered to ſend him the money too, upon his giving his word and honour that it was his own property. We mention this circumſtance, becauſe it is the duty of hiſtory to do juſtice to private, as well as public, virtue.

Though the French in the ſpace of a few months had ſuſtained almoſt incredible loſſes in Germany, yet we are not with ſome writers to repreſent them as being at this time a ruined people. Their councils, it is true, were not only divided but un⯑ſteady and infirm. All reciprocal confidence had been loſt between their court and parliaments, and the ableſt of their miniſters had with indig⯑nation retired from public buſineſs. Notwith⯑ſtanding this, France was ſtill internally power⯑ful, and had prodigious reſources. The ſlighteſt condeſcenſions, on the part of her King, gave ſpirit to her people, and even the loſſes he had ſuffered ſerved to animate them with a paſſion to repair them. The Duke de Belleiſle, ſo famous for his exploits civil as well as military, was pointed out by the public voice, as the only mi⯑niſter who could prevent farther diſgraces, and the French King accordingly put him at the head of the war-department, to the general ſatisfaction of his ſubjects.

England preſented a very different ſcene. The adminiſtration there was popular. A harmony ſubſiſted between the court and parliament, and between the parliament and people, circumſtan⯑ces which were almoſt unprecedented in hiſtory. The few inteſtine diviſions that ſtill prevailed were ſwallowed up in a univerſal admiration of his Pruſſian Majeſty's virtues and victories, after the train of diſtreſſes he had undergone. This made it ſafe for the miniſtry thoroughly to adopt a new ſyſtem, in which there otherwiſe would [40] have been ſome danger to themſelves. The deſign met with little oppoſition either without or with⯑in doors, becauſe, they who really inclined to op⯑poſe it, though a conſiderable party in parliament, thought it would be to no purpoſe, and that it would expoſe them to the odium of the public. His Pruſſian Majeſty had hitherto received only occaſional aſſiſtances from Great Britain; but on the 11th of April, 1758, a convention was con⯑cluded between him and his Britannic Majeſty, by which his Pruſſian Majeſty was to receive 670,000l. ſterling a year from Great Britain; and the contracting parties mutually engaged, that one ſhould not make peace without the other. Some thought there was danger to Great Bri⯑tain, in thus becoming as much a principal as Pruſſia itſelf, in a continental war, and the Bri⯑tiſh miniſters themſelves perhaps did not foreſee the conſequences that have ſince happened, or that the empreſs of Ruſſia would prove ſo intrac⯑table as ſhe did. The retreat of her troops was conſidered as a prelude to an alteration of her conduct; but the public were ſoon undeceived in that reſpect. Apraxin was diſpoſted and put un⯑der arreſt, as was Beſtucheff her Imperial Majeſ⯑ty's firſt miniſter, for countenancing the retreat, and the command of the army was given to the Generals, Brown and Fermer. In Sweden the flagrant diſgrace her arms had ſuſtained, ſeemed to encreaſe the animoſity of his Pruſſian Majeſ⯑ty's enemies againſt him, and without conſulting the King, the Senate came to a reſolution of proſecuting the war with more vigour than ever.

After the reduction of Schweidnitz, which ſur⯑rendered April the 16th, 1758, his Pruſſian Ma⯑jeſty had no enemies within his dominions. His credit was now high, and his armies ſtrong. He had a body of troops commanded by Count [41] Dohna, on the ſide of Pomerania, which over⯑awed the Swedes and Mecklenburghers. Sileſia was covered by another body, poſted between Wohlau and Glogau, while an army of 30 bat⯑talions and 45 ſquadrons was formed in Saxony, under the command of Prince Henry, his Pruſ⯑ſian Majeſty's brother, to face the army of the empire, which was again become formidable; and thoſe armies were all ſo judiciouſly poſted, that each had a communication with the other. His Pruſſian Majeſty's affairs wearing ſo promiſ⯑ing an aſpect, he reſolved upon an offenſive war, and to make the untouched country of Moravia its theatre. To conceal his deſign, after the re⯑duction of Schweidnitz, he ordered ſome troops to take poſt as if he intended to invade Bohemia, but all of a ſudden making a rapid march, he opened trenches before the city of Olmutz, the barrier of Moravia, on the 27th of May. We may perhaps venture to ſay that the flattering proſpect of carrying the war to the gates of Vi⯑enna was his Pruſſian Majeſty's main motive in this expedition, which at firſt threw the Auſtrian councils into vaſt perplexity. Marſhal Daun was then in Luſatia, but marching through Bo⯑hemia, he took the command of the army that was to oppoſe his Pruſſian Majeſty, and poſted himſelf between Gewitz and Littau, by which ſituation he had at his back the fruitful country of Bohemia, and could by his parties intercept the Pruſſian convoys from Sileſia. It ſoon ap⯑peared that his Pruſſian Majeſty had not ſuffici⯑ently conſidered the difficulties attending his ex⯑pedition. Olmutz was a city of ſuch extent, that his troops were not numerous enough compleatly to inveſt it: ſo that Daun was ena⯑bled to ſupply it with proviſions and every thing neceſſary for making a vigorous defence, and he [42] never ſhewed himſelf ſo compleat a General as he then did. Perceiving that his Pruſſian Majeſ⯑ty had taken a falſe ſtep, he availed himſelf of it to the utmoſt; and took ſuch meaſures, that his royal antagoniſt, notwithſtanding all his endea⯑vours and provocations, perceived it was imprac⯑ticable to force him to a battle. In the mean while, the beſieged plied the Pruſſians with inceſ⯑ſant ſallies, by which they ruined their works, and nailed up their cannon, not to mention their loſs of men. As to his Pruſſian Majeſty, his ſi⯑tuation was ſuch, that by the neighbourhood of Daun's army, he found himſelf unable to employ above 10,000 men upon the ſiege, and they were in a manner themſelves beſieged by the enemy. The country about Olmutz afforded them no ſub⯑ſiſtence, all having been deſtroyed by the Auſtri⯑ans; and to complete the King's misfortune, Daun lay as near to Sileſia as he did, and by means of the country people, he was admirably well ſerved with intelligence. Hearing that a great Pruſ⯑ſion convoy was arrived at Troppau, he ſtruck a blow which proved him to be a General of en⯑terprize as well as caution. He ordered two de⯑tachments from two very different places, Mug⯑litz and Prerau, to put themſelves in motion, and preſcribed them ſuch regulations for their march as that they ſhould come up at the ſame time ſo as to attack the convoy on both ſides. To favour this manoeuvre, Daun made diſpoſitions as if he intended to fight the Pruſſian army under the King, who had left the command of the ſiege to Field-Marſhal Keith. This ſudden change in Daun's operations, gave the King ſome ſuſpici⯑ons, and he ſent a body of troops under General Ziethen to ſupport his convoy. Ziethen came too late to prevent its being attacked, but it had repelled the Auſtrians. The latter, however, [43] were reinforced by Daun with freſh troops, who renewed the engagement next day, defeated Zie⯑then, ſeized on the centre of the convoy, while the rear precipitately retired to Troppau, and but few of the Van reached the Pruſſian camp.

This diſappointment of the convoy before mentioned, was fatal to his Pruſſian Majeſty's aſpiring views: July was now drawing on, and he had thrown away a moſt precious part of the ſummer in unſucceſsful operations, without hav⯑ing it in his power, ſo judicious were the mea⯑ſures of his enemy, to diſplay either courage or generalſhip. The Ruſſians had again taken the field, and their Coſſacks and Calmucks, were as uſual, making cruel incurſions into Sileſia, and Berlin itſelf was threatened. Such was his Pruſ⯑ſian Majeſty's ſituation, when he took the ſecret, but unwilling, reſolution of raiſing the ſiege of Olmutz. By this time Daun had made a motion to Poſnitz, which muſt have laid the Pruſſians under ſtill greater difficulties, and might have not only raiſed the ſiege, but have ruined their army. Beſet with ſo many dangers, his Majeſty, by an uncommon effort of genius, inſtead of retiring, reſolved to advance into his enemies dominions, a reſolution equally wiſe and bold. Perceiving that Daun by the change of his ſituation had left Bohemia uncovered, he ordered on the laſt of July the ſiege to be carried on with more briſk⯑neſs than ever, but on the night of the ſame day his whole army took the road of Bohemia, gain⯑ed 24 hours march of the Auſtrians, defeated all the parties that attempted to oppoſe him, ſeized upon a grand magazine at Leutomiſſel, and ar⯑rived at the important poſt of Konigſgratz in Bohemia with all his waggons, baggage, artil⯑lery and military ſtores, and after defeating 7000 Auſtrians who lay entrenched before it, he took [44] poſſeſſion of the place. All Europe was ſur⯑prized that he avail'd himſelf of this important conqueſt no farther than by laying it and the neighbouring country under contribution. But the danger his hereditary dominions were in from the Ruſſians juſtified his again evacuating Bohe⯑mia and marching towards Sileſia, where he un⯑derſtood that his barbarous enemies had entered the New Marche of Brandenburg, and laid ſiege to the important fortreſs of Cuſtrin.

Though Great Britain had hitherto ſent but a few troops to the aſſiſtance of Prince Ferdinand in Germany, yet her miniſtry had made inceſ⯑ſant efforts for diſtreſſing the French. The fears of invaſion lay ſo heavy upon the ſpirits of the people, that her miniſtry found themſelves under a neceſſity of endeavouring to remove them. The Britiſh Councils for ſome time fluctuated between two meaſures propoſed for that purpoſe. The one was to ſend a ſtrong body of troops to act in conjunction with Prince Ferdinand in Germany: The other was to alarm the ſea coaſts of France by frequent deſcents upon them. The firſt pro⯑poſal was thought too much to break in upon the anticontinental plan our Miniſters had adopted, and the latter was eſpouſed upon three principles. The firſt was, that ſuch deſcents would oblige the French to divide their forces and to weaken their army in Germany, in order to guard the vaſt extent of their ſea coaſts. The ſecond was, that it would employ the natural ſtrength of Great-Britain, her marine, which would give ſatisfaction to all parties amongſt us. And the third, that it would prove that the French were vulnerable in their own dominions, and muſt there⯑fore lay aſide all thoughts of invading ours.

Though we are little diſpoſed to enter into po⯑litical diſquiſitions, yet we cannot help ſaying [45] that the two firſt principles ſeem to have been miſtaken. A nation like France, that can bring into the field, excluſive of militia, 300,000 men, is not to be diverted from its main object by ſo inconſiderable a force as we propoſed to em⯑ploy againſt it. The marine of Great-Britain was indeed exerted, but in a very diſadvantage⯑ous manner. It ſerved only as a convoy to our land troops, but could be of little or no uſe to them after they were ſet on ſhore; while the dif⯑ficulties of the coaſt, and the uncertainties of wind and weather, rendered it extremely hazard⯑ous for our ſhips to continue in any one ſtation ſo as that they could be ready to re-admit the land troops after they had executed their commiſſion; and▪ in fact, the frequent debarkations and re⯑embarkations which the ſervice propoſed required, proved it by experience to be inconvenient almoſt to impracticability. The third principle was better founded, though not without its excep⯑tions.

The meaſure of making a deſcent upon France being reſolved upon, the Duke of Marlborough was appointed to command the land troops. He was the grandſon of the Great Duke of Marlborough, and from him inherited a ſtrong paſſion for military glory, eſpecially againſt the French. In other reſpects he was in private life a nobleman of the moſt amiable character, and had diſcovered upon ſeveral occaſions that he had ſtudied the art of war, and that his abilities were equal to ſuch a command; ſo that no officer in the Britiſh ſervice was more proper either in point of popularity, or that of ſufficiency, to conduct ſuch an expedition. The land forces under him conſiſted of 16 battalions and 9 troops of light horſe.

[46] To give the greater eclat to this expedition, a moſt formidable naval armament was fitted out. We wiſh we could ſay that this equipment had been as judicious as we preſume it was well in⯑tended. On the 1ſt of June, Admiral Anſon, with the fleet under his command, ſailed from St. Helens, as did Commodore Howe with his ſquadron, and all the tranſports about two hours after. The Admiral directed his courſe down the Channel, and the Commodore his for the coaſt of France: the ſhips under the Admiral were the Royal George, 100 guns; Duke, 90; Nep⯑tune, 90; Ramillies, 90; Barfleur, 90; Union, 80; Newark, 80; Magnanime, 74; Norfolk, 74; Alcide, 74; Chicheſter, 74; Duc d'Aquitaine, 64; Fougueux, 64; Achilles, 60; Intrepide, 60; Norwich, 50; Dunkirk, 60; Southampton, 36; Acteon, 36; Tartar, 20; Leoſtoft, 20; and Coventry, 36. There were on board the fleet 16 regiments, nine troops of light horſe, and above 2000 marines.

The ſhips under Commodore Howe were the Eſſex, 70 guns; Rocheſter, 50; Deptford, 50; Portland, 50; Pallas, 36; Brilliant, 36; Rich⯑mond, 36; Active, 36; Maidſtone, 20; Flam⯑borough, 20; Roſe, 20; Diligence, 16; Suc⯑ceſs, 16; Saltaſh, 16; Swallow, 16; Speedwell, 16; Pluto fireſhip, 16; Salamandar ditto, 16; Infernal bomb, 16; Granada ditto, 16; Cor⯑morant, 14; 10 Cutters, each 10 guns; 100 tranſports, 20 tenders, and 2 ſtoreſhips.

When this fleet ſailed, the public imagined that the whole was to burſt upon the coaſt of France, but they were ſoon undeceived. The pow⯑erful ſquadron under the Lord Anſon ſoon parted from that under Commodore Howe, but left, under the command of the latter, all the tranſ⯑ports with the land troops, and his Lordſhip [47] proceeded for the bay of Biſcay, in order, as was ſaid, to alarm the coaſts of France, and to ob⯑ſerve the French ſquadron in Breſt. Whether either of thoſe two purpoſes were objects worthy ſo prodigious an armament, we ſhall not pre⯑ſume to determine, becauſe we are not fully in⯑formed as to the effects it produced, or whether they were anſwerable to the high ſtation of the Commander, and the prodigious expence of the equipment.

The leſſer ſquadron, under Commodore Howe, proceeded with the tranſports to the coaſt of France, and without any material accident, arrived at Cancalle bay, on the coaſt of Britanny, on the 5th of June, about 7 miles diſtant from St. Malo; which whether it was the original, or the accidental object of the expedition, we ſhall not determine; but they reſolved to attack it, if prac⯑ticable. After the troops were landed, the ſtricteſt diſcipline was obſerved, and though the inha⯑bitants of Cancalle had fled in their firſt conſter⯑nation; yet all exceſſes committed upon their effects by the Britiſh ſoldiery were puniſhed with the utmoſt rigour. This humane regularity of diſcipline had excellent conſequences. The in⯑habitants of the country returned to their habi⯑tations, and treated our troops not as their in⯑vaders but their friends. After fortifying a poſt near Cancalle, the army under the Duke of Marlborough, ſet out towards St. Malo, where they ſoon found, what ſome may think they ought to have known long before, that the place was unaſſailable by the force they had with them, being ſituated at the extremity of a long narrow cauſeway. His Grace, however, did all that was poſſible to be done with the force he had. On the 12th of June, he burnt one man of war of 50 guns, one of 36 (and, to uſe the words of the [48] Gazette, the beſt authority we can follow) ‘All the privateers, ſome of 30, ſeveral of 20 and 18 guns, and, in the whole, upwards of 100 ſhips, notwithſtanding they were under the cannon of St. Malo; but finding it im⯑practicable to attack that place, and receiving intelligence of troops being on their march from all ſides, his Grace thought it neceſſary to march back to Cancalle: Commodore Howe had made ſo good a diſpoſition of the boats and tranſports, that four brigades, and ten companies of grenadiers were embarked in leſs than ſeven hours, the enemy not hav⯑ing attempted to attack them; and on the 12th all the troops were on board, waiting to take advantage of the firſt wind, to purſue the farther objects of his Majeſty's inſtructions.’ It is extremely remarkable that during the exe⯑cution of an enterprize, which did ſuch infinite damage to the French, the detachment employ⯑ed in it met with no oppoſition, not even from a ſingle ſhot of the enemy, and they returned equally unmoleſted to Cancalle.

The re-embarkation being made, the Duke of Marlborough and the officers under him proceed⯑ed to the coaſts of Normandy, where they re⯑connoitred the town of Granville, which they did not think fit to attempt, becauſe a large body of French troops lay encamped in its neighbour⯑hood. They then moved towards Cherbourg; but the weather proving unfavourable, the fleet running ſhort in proviſions, and the crews ſickly, all further attempts were judged impracticable, and the fleet arrived, on the 29th of June, at St. Helens; and the Duke of Marlborough was appointed to take the command in chief of the Britiſh troops ſerving in, or deſtined for Ger⯑many.

[49] Had it not been for the prodigious force of the Britiſh fleet on its firſt ſailing for this expe⯑dition, it is more than probable that the public would have been much better ſatisfied with the event of it. The damage done to France, how⯑ever, was very conſiderable, and the people were pleaſed with the reflection that we in reality had ſubjected her to the hoſtilities with which ſhe had only menaced us. If no exceſſive joy was expreſſed, no murmuring was heard in public; and the ſpirit of the nation was kept up by the declarations of the miniſtry, that the remaining part of the ſeaſon would be employed in action. In leſs than a month after the return of the ar⯑mament under the Duke of Marlborough, an⯑other, but not of equal ſtrength, was fitted out.

General Bligh was appointed to command the new armament, as was before mentioned; he had ſerved with great reputation in the late war, and it was judged neceſſary to prove the miniſter to be in earneſt, notwithſtanding, the ſmallneſs of the land force, which was not 6000 men com⯑plete, that the ſecond Prince of the blood, Prince Edward, ſince Duke of York, ſhould ſerve on board the fleet. Like the great Czar of Muſcovy, he reſolved to go through all the ſubordinate du⯑ties before he arrived at the higher commands. Commodore Howe had the command of the fleet, and General Bligh of the land forces, the Duke of Marlborough having by this time been nomi⯑nated to the command of the Britiſh troops who were ordered for Germany.

It was the firſt of Auguſt before the fleet ſailed from St. Helens, and on the 6th it appeared off Cherburg. This is a ſea-port in the very middle of the channel, and therefore commodiouſly ſi⯑tuated for diſtreſſing the Engliſh navigation by [50] privateering, and even for facilitating an invaſion. The place is naturally weak, but the convenien⯑cy of its ſituation for the above purpoſes had in⯑duced the French court to laviſh moſt immenſe ſums in ſupplying the defects of nature by enlarge⯑ing and deepening the harbour, raiſing fortifica⯑tions, making Sluices, building a mole, opening flood-gates, and forming a baſon, ſo that the whole was juſtly deemed a ſtupendous undertak⯑ing, and worthy the genius of Monſieur Belidor, the famous engineer who had projected it. Hap⯑pily, perhaps for us, either the wiſdom or the parſimony of Cardinal Fleury did not keep pace with the vaſtneſs of the deſign, but enough was finiſhed to give every Briton an idea that another Dunkirk, more dangerous than that which had been demoliſhed, would ariſe in Cherburg, that it would prove to England what Carthage was to Rome, and therefore it was neceſſary to ruin it.

The Britiſh fleet coming to anchor before this important place, it ſoon appeared that the French had more than ſuſpected its deſtination. They had ſtrengthened the landing places with forts, and a large body of militia, while three regiments of regulars lined the ſhore, ſo that a reſolute oppoſition was expected. Intrepidity is often the cheapeſt way of making war, and that of the Britiſh Commodore upon this occaſion ſaved blood. His diſpoſitions were ſo juſt, and yet ſo bold, that the troops landed almoſt without loſs under the fire of the ſhips, and the amazement of the French at their courage ſeemed to take from them the powers of reſiſtance, though fa⯑voured by all that art could contribute to render it effectual. They abandoned fort after fort, and one port after another, ſo that the Britiſh troops may be ſaid to have walked ra⯑ther [51] than to have marched into Cherburg, the day after their landing. The deſign of the ex⯑pedition was ſoon anſwered; a few hours quickly laid in ruins the labours of half an age, and the product of 40 millions of livres. A moſt ſu⯑perb train of braſs artillery fell into the hands of the conquerors, who behaved with ſo much hu⯑manity and good manners to the deſenceleſs in⯑habitants, that when the ſhips in the harbour were burnt, and the work of demolition was over, they appeared to be viſitors rather than in⯑vaders.

Were not the fact recent and unqueſtionably atteſted, it would appear highly improbable, that 6000 Britiſh troops ſhould remain unmoleſted for ten days in France, which proudly, perhaps juſtly, boaſts herſelf to be the greateſt land pow⯑er in Europe; that they ſhould without oppoſiti⯑on take hoſtages for payment of contributions, and reimbark, as commodiouſly and ſafely, as if they had been in their own country. The ar⯑tillery was ſent to England, and September 16th drawn in triumph from Kenſington to the tower of London with a pompous attendance of guards, horſe and foot, and every circumſtance that could ſerve to awaken in the minds of the people the ideas they had formed of the military glories of their anceſtors.

After the reimbarkation was completed, the fleet was driven towards the coaſts of England, but ſoon after made for the bay of St. Lunar, where the land troops made a ſecond deſcent near the town of St. Malo. The moſt favourable conſtruction that can be put upon this attempt is, that it was poſſible the French in St. Malo might have been off their guard, or like thoſe of Cherburg, intimidated from making reſiſtance. This ſuppoſition proved groundleſs, and after [52] the troops were landed, their commanders could not figure in their own minds a practicable object of attack, while the rockineſs of the bay ren⯑dered it ſo dangerous for the Commodore to con⯑tinue there with his ſhipping, that he was obliged to move three leagues weſtward to the bay of St. Cas. This ſeparation of the fleet from the army, and the operations of the latter, which were viſibly undetermined and uſeleſs, gave ſpi⯑rit to the French. The Duke d'Aguillon, go⯑vernor of Brittany, who in point of reputation was then at the head of the ſecond rate French Generals, and perhaps now deſerves to be rank⯑ed amongſt the firſt, got together 12 battalions, 6 ſquadrons of regular troops, and two regiments of militia, which are little inferior to regulars, and advancing within ſix miles of the Engliſh army, was now arrived at the village of Matig⯑non, after repelling all the flying attacks made upon them by the enemy. The inequality of the force, and the diſadvantages of ſituation ſoon determined the Britiſh commanders to make the beſt of their way to St. Cas, which lay at the diſtance only of three miles. The march of thoſe three miles however contained in it cir⯑cumſtances and incidents more puzzling and un⯑accountable than that of Hannibal over the Alps, and we are better acquainted with the particulars of the latter than of the former. It is ſufficient to ſay, that, to the eternal diſgrace of the French, every man of the Engliſh was not deſtroyed or taken. The French were ſo cautious in their approaches, that the Engliſh proceeded unmo⯑leſted in their march, though it was ſo interſected by incidents and their ignorance of the country, that it was in the power of the Duke d'Aguillon entirely to have cut off their communication with their fleet, an advantage which a Britiſh [53] officer would have eſteemed to be his higheſt good fortune had the French been under the like circumſtances in England. The Duke, however, more prudently perhaps, permitted all the Engliſh but their rear, which was moſtly compoſed of the foot guards and grenadiers, to embark, and then he marched down from the heights that en⯑vironed the bay to attack the Engliſh. The re⯑ſiſtance of the latter did honour to their country, but beſides the diſadvantages of numbers, the French being above twelve to one, they were under the irreparable one of falling ſhort of am⯑munition. The bravery of their fellow ſubjects contributed to their misfortune. Commodore Howe ſeeing their danger, ordered himſelf to be rowed in his own ſhallop, attended by the boats of the fleet, as near the ſhore as poſſible to aſ⯑ſiſt in bringing off his countrymen. By this time the ſmall handful of Britiſh ſoldiers had been entirely broken by the vaſt ſuperiority of the French, who refuſed them quarter while the fire continued from the fleet. That ceaſing, about 600 were made priſoners, and it appeared that about 400 had been killed, amongſt whom was Sir John Armitage, a young gentleman of large fortune in Yorkſhire, and a volunteer in the ſervice. General Drury was likewiſe amongſt the dead, being drowned by endeavouring to eſcape to a boat. But we are now to attend a more important and a more fortunate expedition in another quarter of the world.

The year 1757 was far from being favourable to the Britiſh arms either by land or ſea. In A⯑merica, where the Earl of Loudohn commanded in chief, an expedition had been planned againſt Crown Point; but it was dropt, and it was reſolved to attack Louiſbourg. Admiral Hol⯑bourn was appointed to command the fleet, [54] which was ſtrong and well provided, and ſailed from Corke with 6000 land troops on the 7th of May. We ſhall omit the ill-natured re⯑flections which were given out, as if an oppor⯑tunity had been loſt, during the voyage, of fight⯑ing the French fleet. It is certain that the Admiral landed at Hallifax the beginning of July, where he was met by the Earl, at the head of 6000 men, brought with him from New-York. When this formidable armament was preparing to proceed to the place of its deſtination, a kind of a panic ſeized the land forces, upon an intelli⯑gence that was pretended to have been received, that 17 French ſhips of the line, beſides frigates, with all kind of ammunition and military ſtores, were arrived in the harbour of Louiſbourg. One Engliſh officer, Lord Charles Hay, was for proceeding; but he was put under arreſt, not without ſtrong ſuſpicion of his being a madman, and afterwards tried for his life, on an accuſation of mutiny. He was almoſt ſingle in his opinion, and the council of war (tho' it does not appear that any enquiry into the report was made) agreed in opinion for laying aſide the expedition by land for that ſeaſon. As to our fleet, they ſailed, as was ſaid, to block up Louiſbourg harbour, and to provoke that of France to an engagement. The Admiral was diſappointed in both. The French, whoſe force was greatly inferior to his, were too wiſe to attack him, and on the 25th of Sept. ſuch a ſtorm aroſe as drove the Admiral from before the harbour, and obliged him to return to England, in a moſt ſhattered condition, after loſing one ſhip, and having eleven diſmaſted.

Diſgrace ſucceeded diſappointment, and our proceedings in America during the remainder of this year formed a ſeries of melancholy miſcarri⯑ages. The French, who had taken Oſwego, [55] were maſters of the Lakes, and we abandoned to their mercy both the friendſhip and the protection of the five Indian Nations. So that at laſt, fall⯑ing from one blunder into another, our forts were demoliſhed, our communication with the Indians, our allies, was cut off, our frontiers invaded by the French, and their Savages, who deſtroyed all our fine ſettlements on the Mohawks river, and the German flats; and at laſt the ſiege of Fort William Henry, built on the Southern edge of Lake George, was formed, a place of the utmoſt importance for covering that frontier.

The reflections ariſing from ſo many ruinous diſgraceful events were the more mortifying, when it was conſidered that America had never ſeen in one body ſo great a Britiſh force as it did that year; a force which was thought ſuf⯑ficient to have driven the French out of that continent. There was a garriſon of 2500 men within Fort William Henry, and General Webb lay near it with 4000 more. Monſ. Montcalm, the French General, had not in the whole above 8000 men, including the Canadians and Indians. In war incredulity and credulity have often the ſame fatal effects. Montcalm's intentions, and preparations, tho' ſufficiently public, were diſbe⯑lieved. No care was taken to bring the militia together, which had it been done, would have rendered the Engliſh far ſuperior to their enemies. Montcalm was encouraged to proceed in the ſiege by the ſmall reſiſtance he met with, and on the 9th of Auguſt, which was ſix days after the ſiege was formed, the place was ſurrendered; the garriſon engaging not to ſerve againſt the French for eighteen months; but obtained the favour of marching out with their arms and baggage. The French Savages, paid ſo little regard to the terms of the capitulation, that they [56] plundered the Engliſh ſoldiers as they marched out, and ſcalped the Indians and Blacks, that had been in the garriſon, and practiſed a thouſand other inhumanities, from which the French Generals pretended to reſtrain them, but to no purpoſe. It was however ſtrongly ſurmiſed in England that the Savages were privately inſtructed to act as they did; becauſe, had the French General encouraged the Engliſh to ſtand to their defence, and made diſpoſitions of his own men for ſupporting them, as the laws of war required him to do, the Savages durſt not have ventured to be ſo outrageous.

After demoliſhing the fort, and carrying off all they found in it, the French put an end to the campaign, and the world ſaw with amaze⯑ment 2000 regular troops, beſides a great number of Provincials, and a vaſt naval force of 20 ſhips, provided with every thing that could render war glorious and ſucceſsful, loiter away a whole year, at the expence of twelve millions to their mother country, in doing worſe than nothing, againſt an enemy, whoſe only ſtrength lay in the avarice of thoſe, whoſe unprecedented appointments had rendered it their intereſt to protract the war.

The indignation conceived by the people of England at this inglorious campaign in America rouſed the national ſpirit. The new miniſtry, and the old, concurred equally in cheriſhing it; and it was reſolved to change hands, and to em⯑ploy other commanders, both by land and ſea, in making a new attempt upon Louiſbourg.

On the 19th of February Admiral Boſcawen ſailed with a powerful fleet of ſhips of war and tranſports from England to Halifax; from whence he ſailed with 157 ſhips, great and ſmall, and about 14,000 land troops, under the command of [57] General Amherſt, and on the 2d of June appear⯑ed before Louiſbourg. The French in America on this occaſion behaved better than their coun⯑trymen in France did in the deſcent upon Cher⯑bourg. They raiſed batteries all along the coaſt where a landing was practicable, and the ſurf was ſo great that for ſix days no boat could approach the ſhore. At laſt the ſurf ſubſiding, diſpoſitions were made for landing in three diviſions; the left, where the hotteſt ſervice was expected, being under the command of General Wolfe. The frigates of the fleet were poſted to the right and left, to rake the enemy on their flanks. General Wolf's diviſion moved in boats towards the land, and nothing but the greateſt intrepidity of that brave commander and his ſoldiers could have rendered the landing effectual. The enemy reſerved their ſirc till the Britiſh troops were near the ſhore, and then gave it with full effect both from their cannon and muſquetry; but neither the ſlaughter of men, the overſeting and wreck⯑ing of boats, nor the advantageous poſition of the enemy, could daunt the aſſailants. Each encouraged his neighbour. They who could not jump waded aſhore, and at laſt the whole fell upon the enemy and drove them from their poſts; upon which the other two diviſions made good their landing with far leſs loſs than could have been expected.

The ſurf on the ſhore returning, rendered it difficult to land the artillery and the implements neceſſary for the ſiege; and the French had in the harbour of Louiſbourg five men of war that could bring their artillery to bear upon the approaches of the Britiſh troops. Perſeverance, intrepedity, and judgment, ſurmounted all thoſe difficulties. General Wolfe on the 12th of June took from the enemy a poſt, called the light-battery, [58] by which he could annoy the enemy's ſhips, and the batteries on the other ſide of the harbour. And on the 25th he ſilenced what was called the iſland battery, which bore the hardeſt upon him. Notwithſtanding this, t e enemy continued to make a brave reſiſtance; but on the 21ſt of July one of the French ſhips of war blew up, and the exploſion being commu⯑nicated to other two, all the three were deſtroyed. This loſs ſeemed to damp the garriſon, and the Admiral now thought it practicable to deſtroy the two remaining ſhips in the harbour. For that purpoſe a detachment of about 600 ſeamen were ſent in boats, under the command of Captains Laforey and Balfour, who executed their inſtruc⯑tions with amazing intrepidity and ſucceſs. They towed one of the ſhips out of the harbour, and burnt the other, which ran aground. Upon this a council of war was held within the place, and it was determined to treat about a capitulation. Drucour, the Governor, at firſt demanded the terms that had been granted to the garriſon of Fort St. Philip in Minorca, but the Britiſh Ad⯑miral and General in a joint letter informed him, that the Engliſh were about to enter the harbour, and batter the town, in which caſe he muſt ſtand to all the bloody conſequences, if he and his gar⯑riſon did not immediately ſurrender themſelves priſoners of war; which they accordingly did.

The taking of Louiſbourg, though attended with ſome loſs, was a greater proof of the debi⯑lity of the French Government than of the cow⯑ardice or the miſmanagement of their troops. It is true the garriſon, which ſurrendered the 26th of July, amounted to 5637 troops, and they were provided with 221 pieces of cannon, 18 mortars, and a conſiderable quantity of ſtores and ammunition; ſo that it ought to have made [59] a better defence than it did. But on the other hand, the fortifications of the place, conſidering its vaſt importance to the French, had not been ſufficiently attended to; and in any event had the ſiege continued, famine muſt have obliged it to ſurrender. Add to this, that the French court failed in all its promiſes to Drucour of ſending him a force from Canada ſufficient to raiſe the ſiege. The ſurrender of Louiſbourg brought on that of the iſland of St. John, and of all the French ſtations for carrying on their fiſhery to⯑wards Gaſpeſie and the bay de Chaleurs.

The Britiſh nation had, for years before this important event happened, been ſo accuſtomed to miſcarriages in America, that they could ſcarcely credit their good fortune when the news of the ſurrender of Louiſbourg arrived. The acquiſiti⯑on of the place was not of greater ſervice than the ſpirit it raiſed in the nation; and both we and our confederates were now convinced, that the high ideas we had entertained of the French power had been the chief means of their ſucceſs. We had ſeen them inſulted in their mother coun⯑try, and deprived of the ſtrongeſt, as well as the moſt convenient place they held in America; for Louiſbourg was the place of rendezvous for all their veſſels employed in the cod fiſhery, and all the troops they ſent to Canada. The views of the Britiſh government now enlarged, and it was judged expedient, if not neceſſary, to drive the French from Ticonderoga, deemed their moſt im⯑pregnable paſs on the continent of America, and Crown-Point, which Ticonderoga covered. Ge⯑neral Abercrombie, who had ſucceeded Lord Lo dohn as Commander in chief of the Britiſh forces in America, undertook this expedition. On the 5th of July, he embarked upon Lake George, with almoſt 16,000 troops, regulars and [60] provincials, and a numerous well provided artil⯑lery; and next day he effected his landing with⯑out oppoſition; the advanced guard of the French retiring before them. No man, who has not been in perſon in America, can have a juſt idea of the face of the country, which lies between the place of landing and Tigonderoga, and which had, perhaps, never been trod by humane feet, if we except the ſavage, thinly ſcattered, natives. The Britiſh troops had no direction for their march but the quarters of the heavens; and even theſe were intercepted by the trees of the woods through which they were obliged to paſs. It was therefore no wonder if the officers and ſoldiers, many of whom, perhaps, were not ex⯑pert aſtronomers, loſt their way in this more than bewildering march. The French advanced guard did the ſame, and a rencounter enſued, in which about 300 French were killed, and 148 taken priſoners. But this rencounter, though the Eng⯑liſh were victorious, coſt them dear, for in it was loſt the gallant Lord Howe, whoſe name in⯑terrupts the narrative of hiſtory to commemorate his virtues. He was the Scipio of his age and country; formed for all that was amiable in ſo⯑ciety, and great in war; while he iſſued the or⯑der, he ſet the example; and by his behaviour towards his ſuperiors, he taught his inferiors their duty towards him. But thoſe are qualifications that enter into the character of every complete officer. Lord Howe, to great merit as an officer, joined great genius as a ſoldier. He had the ſpi⯑rit to adapt himſelf to the ſervice he was engaged in, diſcouraging and difficult as it was, by re⯑trenching in his own perſon every incumberance that could ariſe from his rank, either as a noble⯑man or an officer, even to the cutting off his hair. The common ſoldier ſaw him fare like [61] himſelf, nor did he ſeem to affect the leaſt pre⯑eminence but in his forwardneſs to encounter dan⯑ger and endure fatigue; ſo that he appeared to be rather imitated than obeyed by all under his command.

On the 28th of July the Britiſh army, which had marched in four columns, appeared before Ticonderoga, which is ſituated on an iſthmus between Lake George and a gut which commu⯑nicates with Lake Champlain. The French, who had been apprized of the expedition, had omitted nothing to render the paſs impregnable. It was acceſſible only in the front, where a large moraſs was to be paſſed, the vacuities of which were ſupplied by a fortification eight or ten feet high, well furniſhed with cannon, and lined by above 5000 men. The ground, as uſual, was reconnoitred by General Abercrombie's order, and the engineer reported, that he thought the intrenchments were practicable by ſmall artil⯑lery. This fatal report produced an order for an attack, without waiting for the great artil⯑lery, which was ſlow in coming up; leaſt the French ſhould be joined by 3000 troops, who were ſaid to be on their march to Ticonderoga. The attack was made with that vigour and in⯑trepidity which is peculiar to the Britiſh troops, and they performed every thing but impoſſibili⯑ties. The paſs was not only fortified, as has al⯑ready been deſcribed, but ſhut up with vaſt trees felled down with their leaves towards the aſſail⯑ants, ſo as both to conceal and favour the French. The carnage was horrible, and the General be⯑ing convinced that the attempt was impractica⯑ble, ordered a retreat, after loſing about 2000 men killed, wounded, or taking priſoners in the action, which laſted about four hours. That this attack was unfortunate cannot be denied; [62] and it was the more ſo, becauſe the loſs fell upon the braveſt of our troops, who had not the ſatis⯑faction of dearly ſelling their lives; ſo inacceſ⯑ſible were their enemies in their entrenchments. There was plainly a defect of judgement, but the public is not yet agreed where the blame ought to lie. According to the General's account he was miſinformed by the engineer. Be that as it will, the retreat ſeems to be the wiſeſt part of the expedition as well as the ſpeedieſt; for the even⯑ing after the action, the Britiſh army regained their camp to the Southward of Lake George.

The unfortunate attack upon Ticonderoga did not prevent our operations in America, during the year 1758, from being in the main ſucceſsful. To make the beſt of our miſcarriage, Colonel Bradſtreet was ſent with 3000 provincials againſt Fort Frontenac, the garriſon of which was under⯑ſtood to be weak. The great difficulty of this expedition lay in the length of the way which the army had to ſurmount before they could come at their object. At laſt, with aſtoniſhing perſe⯑verance, it arrived at Oſwego, embarked on Lake Ontario, and the 25th of Auguſt came before Fort Frontenac, which ſtands near the communication between that Lake and the river St. Lawrence. It could not be expected, that a place garriſoned as that was, only by 150 men, could make any conſiderable reſiſtance. The Colonel, two days after he came before it, took it without the loſs of a man, and deſtroyed within it a large magazine of proviſions that was to have ſupplied their Southern forts. Nine armed ſloops were likewiſe taken and burnt, and the fort was deſtroyed, becauſe as matters were then circumſtanced, it would have been ſacrifi⯑cing men to have left a garriſon within a place, where a communication with our other ſettle⯑ments [63] was extremely difficult, if not impractica⯑ble. The execution of an expedition againſt Fort du Queſne, a poſt of vaſt importance for commanding the Ohio, and for breaking the chief link of that chain of forts which the French had erected for effecting a communication be⯑tween Canada and Louiſiana was committed to General Forbes, an officer of experience, bred up under General Campbel, who loſt his life at Fontenoy, and preſent at moſt of the conſiderable actions in Europe during the laſt war. He marched from Pennſylvania with a conſiderable army, through countries which no Europeans had ever before paſſed; and infeſted on every ſide by the enemy's Indians. Major Grant with a body of Highlanders and Provincials, as being moſt proper for that ſervice, had the command of the advanced guard, which conſiſted of about 800 men; but advancing too near the fort, in hopes poſſibly of ſurprizing it, he was defeated by the garriſon with ſome loſs. The main body of our army coming up, the garriſon which conſiſted of between 4 and 500 men, after damaging their works fell down the Ohio, and left the General at liberty to enter the place; which he repaired, and it now goes by the name of Pitſburgh, ſo called from the gentleman who was looked upon to be the ſoul of all our proſperous undertak⯑ings.

The ſucceſſes of the Britiſh arms in America this year, though not ſtriking, were ſolid, be⯑cauſe they directly regarded the primary object of the war on our part, which was the ſecurity of our back ſettlements, and conſequently of all our intereſt in North America, which was not only effectually done, but the enemy by the loſs of Louiſbourg, the American Dunkirk, was de⯑prived of that reſervoir which ſupplied the chan⯑nels [64] of war thro' all their other ſettlements. It is poſſible, that had they not been ſo infatuated, as to imagine they could retrieve in Germany all that they had loſt in America, the Britiſh court in the beginning of the year 1759 might have liſtened to terms of accommodation. But no⯑thing could convince the French, that by mul⯑tiplying the dangers of Hanover and the King of Pruſſia, they could not force our court to a peace on their other terms; and this brings me back to the affairs on the continent of Europe.

On the 1ſt of June, Prince Ferdinand, who could not prevent the French from paſſing the Rhine, purſued them acroſs that river, which he paſ⯑ſed at Herven and Rees, in ſight of all their ar⯑my, which was ſo much aſtoniſhed at the boldneſs of the paſſage, that they retired towards Meurs, while it was plain by the motions of the Prince that he deſigned to paſs the Maeſe, and there⯑by oblige the Prince de Soubiſe to abandon an enterprize he was meditating againſt Heſſe Caſ⯑ſel. To prevent his executing this ſcheme, the French at laſt made a ſtand at Crevelt, with their right towards the village of Viſchelon, and their left towards Anrath; Crevelt lying in the front of their right. In ſhort, their ſituation was ſtrong, their diſpoſitions judicious, and it required great exertion of military genius to attack them with any appearance of ſucceſs. A wood covered their left wing at Anrath, and the Prince after accu⯑rately reconnoitring all their viſible poſts, and in⯑forming himſelf of the nature of the ground, judged an attack on the flank of their right wing was the moſt practicable, but that it muſt be fa⯑voured by two other attacks, which, though real, were in a great meaſure to be continued or diſcontinued according to the ſucceſs of the main one, and which was to be commanded by himſelf. [65] He accordingly advanced at the head of the gre⯑nadiers againſt the enemies leſt wing, which ſuf⯑fered from the ſuperior fire of the Hanoverian ar⯑tillery; but the French, favoured by the wood, ſtill maintained their poſts, which made it neceſ⯑ſary to diſoodge them by a cloſer engagement. This was begun by the gallant Hereditary Prince of Brunſwick, at the head of the firſt line of foot, with which he formed a front againſt the wood, and the fire of the muſquetry here continued inceſſantly for two hours and an half. The Hanoverian infantry at laſt penetrated into the wood, where they found two ditches lined with troops, which were ſucceſſively forced. This intrepidity threw the French into a diſorder which was a prelude to the defeat of that wing; but a defeat which in its conſequences was no way correſpondent to the courage and conduct of the conquerors. The French cavalry were not to be broken by the utmoſt efforts of the Hanove⯑rian horſe, and notwithſtanding a moſt dread⯑ful fire, maintained themſelves in good order upon the plain, and covered the remains of their infantry of the left wing as they were driven out of the wood. The two other attacks went no further than cannonading, but though the enemy ſuffered by it, their wing and center retired in good order to Nuis. We are apt to believe that the loſs on both ſides was carefully concealed. That of the French in killed, wounded and priſoners, was about 7000, according to the beſt accounts, and the loſs of the Hanoverians exceeded 3000; but it is difficult to aſcertain the loſs of an army that is victorious and keeps the field of bat⯑tle. In this engagement was killed the Count de Giſors, the only ſon of the Marſhal Duke de Belleiſle, a young nobleman who at the time of his death was not above 25 years of age, but [66] ſo amiable in his manners, and ſo accompliſhed in his perſon, that in him ſeem to have expired the lingering remains of French urbanity and virtue. Books, travelling, converſation and ſtudy, had given him every kind of knowledge but that of war, which he reſolved to acquire by experience; but he fell at the head of his re⯑giment in his firſt eſſay.

Though all concurred in doing juſtice to the military merits of Prince Ferdinand, and the courage of his troops, yet ſome wiſhed they had been employed on an occaſion in which ſucceſs might have been attended by deciſion. The French, notwithſtanding, their repulſe at Cre⯑velt, were in the neighbourhood of their own country, from whence they drew ſuch reſources that not only made them ſtronger than ever in the field, but enabled them to reinforce the Prince de Soubiſe. Prince Ferdinand, conſcious of his inferiority, ſought to avail himſelf of his victory. He paſſed the Rhine, and on the 28th of June he appeared before the important city of Duſſeldorp, ſituated on that river, belonging to the elector Palatine, and the capital of the Dutchy of Berg. It was garriſoned by 2000 French; but after a briſk bombardment it ſur⯑rendered to the Prince on the 7th of July, and the garriſon was ſuffered to depart with the ho⯑nours of war. By the taking of Duſſeldorp, Prince Ferdinand was enabled to ſecure his re⯑treat over the Rhine, which it was too apparent he muſt ſoon be forced to make. After leaving three battalions of Hanoverians to garriſon Duſ⯑ſeldorp, he ſpent ſeveral days in facing the French army, and watching his advantages. But both parties had their reaſons for declining a ſe⯑cond engagement. Prince Ferdinand flattered himſelf that the Heſſian General, the Prince of [67] Yſenburg, would cut out work for the Prince de Soubiſe, till he could carry the war into the enemies country by paſſing the Maeſe, the ef⯑fects of which probably muſt have been, that the Prince would have fallen back upon the main body of the French army, which was now com⯑manded by the Marſhal de Contades. The hopes of his Serene Highneſs ſoon vaniſhed; for on the 23d of July, the Duke de Broglio defeated the Heſſian army of 7000 men near Sangerſhau⯑ſen; by which they came to the command of the river, and maſters of all that part of Weſtpha⯑lia.

By this time the Engliſh miniſtry were con⯑vinced of the neceſſity they were under to ſup⯑port the German war with Britiſh troops as well as Britiſh money. The King of Pruſſia could ſpare no troops to Prince Ferdinand; none were to be expected from the few Princes of the em⯑pire, who had the courage to appear openly for the Proteſtant intereſt; his Daniſh Majeſty's de⯑clared intention was to remain neutral; Hanover and Heſſe could bring no more to the field than they had done; the Dutch had abſolutely refuſed to join us; and to receive aſſiſtance from the Swiſs, or any other power, was impracticable; and at the ſame time it was thought that 12 or 14,000 men, eſpecially Britiſh troops, would turn the ſcale of war in our favour. Our mini⯑ſters had in their eye another conſideration, which was that of diverting the French from interrupt⯑ing the vaſt deſigns they now meditated in Ame⯑rica and the Eaſt Indies. All thoſe conſiderati⯑ons, joined to the diſpoſitions of the public in their favour, encouraged them to agree to ſend a body of about 10,000 Engliſh troops, under the Duke of Marlborough, to Hanover, and they had landed at Embden about the time the unfor⯑tunate [68] battle was fought at Sangerſhauſen. The reader, however, muſt obſerve, that by this time the new eſtabliſhment of the militia went on with ſo much ſucceſs, that ſo conſiderable an evacuation of regular troops was neither felt nor dreaded by the public. But Prince Ferdinand and our friends in Germany were apprehenſive that the French, after their late advantage in Heſſe, might intercept the army under his Grace before they joined the Allies. Prince Ferdinand would gladly, in ſo diſagreeable a ſituation, have fought the French, but they had taken their mea⯑ſures ſo well that he could not bring them to a battle. He would have repaſſed the Rhine, but the roads he was to march through had been rendered almoſt impracticable by the rains that had fallen, and the overflowings of the rivers, nor, till theſe were abated, could he paſs the bridge at Rees, which was covered by Baron Imhoff with about 3000 foot and four ſquadrons of ca⯑valry, in order to ſecure the junction of the Bri⯑tiſh troops with thoſe of their Allies.

Mons. de Chevert, the moſt active of all the French officers, had been detached from the French army, which was now under no appre⯑henſions; but the rains and other accidents pre⯑vented the execution of Baron Imhoff's deſigns as was before mentioned: he therefore ſtrength⯑ened himſelf with draughts from garriſons, which encreaſed his army to about 12,000 men, with a deſign to attack Imhoff. But while the French General thought himſelf ſecure of his blow, a re⯑ſolution, not perhaps wholly uninfluenced by deſ⯑pair (for he could obtain no ſuccours from Prince Ferdinand, becauſe the ſwell of the waters ſtill continued) prompted Imhoff to become the ag⯑greſſor. He then lay near Meer, to the right of the Rhine, and on the 5th of Auguſt his detach⯑ment, [69] with their bayonets fixed, attacked all the army under Chevert, while they were in difficult grounds and in a critical ſituation. An attack ſo ſpirited and unexpected, ſtruck the French with a panic, from which all the efforts of their Ge⯑neral could not recover them. Their reſiſtance did not continue half an hour; for they took refuge under the cannon of Weſel, leaving many dead upon the field, with a great number of priſoners, and 11 pieces of cannon, in the hands of the Hanoverians. After this victory, which did Imhoff great honour, he ſecured his maga⯑zines at Meer, and after receiving a few rein⯑forcements, which paſſed the Rhine in boats from Prince Ferdinand's army, he marched to meet the Duke of Marlborough, whom he joined without farther trouble.

Prince Ferdinand was now to repaſs the Rhine, which he did under great difficulties. The Hereditary Prince forced a ſtrong poſt poſſeſſed by the French at Wachtendonck, being the firſt who plunged into the river to attack it, and was followed by his grenadiers, who diſlodged the enemy with fixed bayonets. This bold action encreaſed the terror of the French; and tho' the bridge at Rees continued ſtill impaſſable, he ef⯑fected his paſſage on the 9th and 10th of Auguſt at Griethuyſter, a little below that bridge.

Upon the whole, however, the campaign in thoſe parts this year was rather bloody than advantageous to either party. Prince Ferdinand had not been able to improve his victory at Crevelt, nor the French theirs at Sangerſhauſen, the Prince of Yſenburg, after his defeat, having retreated to a ſtrong encampment. Reputation was all, in reality, that either ſide had loſt or won, and in that reſpect, the advantage lay clearly on the ſide of Prince Ferdinand and his troops.

[70] The Ruſſians had now penetrated into the New Marche of Brandenburgh, where they beſieged Cuſtrin, and a few days would have led them to the defenceleſs gates of Berlin. The Swedes had gained ground upon the Pruſſian Generals, Wedel and Manteufel, in Pomerania, and the army of the Empire with a body of Auſtrians under General Haddick, were not only poſſeſſed of many ſtrong poſts on the frontiers of Miſnia; but began to pinch the quarters of Prince Henry of Pruſſia, who lay with about 20,000 men at Diepoldſwald. While matters were in this ſituation, his Pruſſian Majeſty had no choice left, but to clear his own dominions, if poſſible, of the Ruſſians; while Marſhal Daun, neglecting all other objects, was intent upon recovering Saxony from the Pruſſians. But through his natural caution he ſeveral times altered the plan of his operations, ſometimes pointing them to⯑wards purſuing the King of Pruſſia into Sileſia, ſometimes againſt Berlin; but at laſt leaving the Generals Harg and de Ville on the ſouthern frontiers of Sileſia, to amuſe the Pruſſians he began his march by Zittau, Gorlitz, and Bautzen, to⯑wards Dreſden. By croſſing at Meiſſen he might have cut off all communication between Dreſden and Deipſic, and by attacking Prince Henry, who was now encamped at Seidlitz, he might have put him between two fires, that of his own army, and that of the army of the Empire. But the vigilance of the Prince, who ſecured a communication with his brother, and took care to keep Dreſden at his back, fruſtrated for that time all the ſchemes of that cautious General.

Mean while, his Pruſſian Majeſty, notwith⯑ſtanding all the interruption given him by the Generals Jahnus and Laudohn, marched by Wiſoca, Politz and Landſhut, and on the 20th [71] of Auguſt he reached Franckfort on the Oder, where he joined Count Dohna, who lay there with ſome troops, but too inconſiderable to act againſt the Ruſſians, who ever ſince the 15th had been throwing bombs and red-hot ſhells into Cuſtrin; by which the place was ſet on fire, and the inhabitants reduced to the moſt deplorable ſtate that imagination can form, and to complete their misfortune, their principal magazine had blown up. On the 23d his Pruſſian Majeſty paſſed the Oder about 20 miles to the north-eaſt of Cuſtrin.

As the greateſt Generals have never been known to be without their failings, that of his Pruſſian Majeſty is, perhaps, a too great diſregard for his enemies. He conſidered the Ruſſians as being Barbarians, without reflecting that they were Barbarians who never knew how to yield, and that they were commanded by officers of expe⯑rience, who knew how to turn that barbariſm, which he affected to deſpiſe, into ſteady courage and military diſcipline, ſo as to baffle all the efforts of more active valour. On hearing of his having croſſed the Oder, they took poſt between the villages of Zwickau and Zorndorff. His Ma⯑jeſty at firſt attempted to put in practice one of thoſe military motions in which he had been often ſucceſsful, by turning the left flank of the enemy and attacking them in the rear; but the Ruſſians foreſeeing his deſign, had thrown them⯑ſelves into a kind of hollow ſquare, which pre⯑ſented him every way with a front fortified by artillery and chevaux de frize. It was therefore neceſſary for the King to attack them with his artillery. The cannonading began at nine in the morning by a moſt dreadful diſcharge of great and ſmall artillery, in which the Pruſſians were greatly ſuperior, and which did amazing execution [72] upon their enemies, who ſtood as if they had been invulnerable, and ſupplied every vacuity in their ranks with unparallelled readineſs and alacrity. This behaviour was new to the Pruſſians, who, ſeeing their enemy, in a manner, court death, made a pauſe, which the firſt line of the Ruſſians, hav⯑ing exhauſted their ſhot, improved into a panic, by breaking in upon them with their ſwords and bayonets, and which forced the hitherto im⯑penetrable body of the Pruſſian infantry to recoil. This change in the fortune of the day, effected by their broken and defeated battalions, was ſo unexpected by the Ruſſian Generals, that they had made no diſpoſitions for ſupporting their in⯑fantry by their cavalry; but his Pruſſian Majeſty, whoſe preſence of mind never fails him, brought the whole of his cavalry under General Seidlitz to his center, and they made head againſt the fatigued Ruſſians, while the Pruſſian infantry recovering from their diſorder, and ſtung with what had happened under the eye of their ſo⯑vereign, formed behind them, and made ſo dreadful a charge upon the unſupported Ruſſian battalions, that they recovered the field. When the Ruſſians are beat, inſtead of flying they grow ſtupid, unleſs they are commanded by Generals in whom they have a great confidence; but at this time they were under no command, and unable to advance further, they remained where they were, plundering their own baggage, and drinking brandy wherever they could find it. To encreaſe the confuſion, the wind blew the duſ [...] and ſmoke directly into their faces, while thei [...] cool enemies, by their King's directions, im⯑proved every advantage. The Ruſſians, now unable to diſtinguiſh friends from foes, attacked each other, and being at laſt wedged very cloſe their firſt and ſecond lines muſt have been totally [73] deſtroyed, had not their Generals with their unbroken cavalry, fallen upon the right wing of the Pruſſians, now fatigued with conqueſt and carnage, and favoured the broken Ruſſians ſo far as to give them an opportunity of forming anew, and marching to an advantageous ground. The loſs of the Ruſſians in this battle amounted to above 21,000 men, in killed, wounded and priſoners, amongſt whom were 939 officers. Ten thouſand were killed upon the ſpot, and the wounds of above 6000 more proved mortal. That of the Pruſſians did not exceed 2000 in the whole, and the Ruſſian military cheſt, and a noble train of artillery, fell into their hands.

The Ruſſian Generals having collected the broken remains of their army, gave orders for a retreat, and they marched to Landſperg on the frontiers of Poland, while their General in chief, Fermor, requeſted the King of Pruſſia for leave to bury the dead.

The glorious victory as was before mentioned, gave no relief to the King of Pruſſia; laurels and thorns grew on every ſide of him. He made diſpoſitions for improving his victory, but danger called his attention towards Saxony, where Mar⯑ſhal Daun, whom nature did not ſeem to ſit for offenſive meaſures in the field, unleſs he was either compelled to them by neceſſity, or invited by a certainty of ſucceſs, was encamped at Stol⯑pen to the Eaſtward of the Elbe; a ſituation in which he found more ſafety than glory, tho' it covered the operations of the Auſtrian arms under the Generals Harrach, de Ville, and Laudohn. The reſolutions of the Imperial court in all matters of war are taken with the utmoſt ſecrecy, and every miniſter and auli [...] Counſellor there, is either a General or a judge of Generals; ſo that it was next to impoſſible to pronounce whether [74] Daun's not proceeding to offenſive operations, in the abſence of his Pruſſian Majeſty, againſt Prince Henry in Saxony, over whom he had ſo great a ſuperiority, did not proceed from the ſelfiſhneſs of the court of Vienna. They had promiſed the King of Poland and all their allies, that the recovery of Saxony ſhould be the chief, if not the only object of the campaign; but it is preſumable that they would have been much better pleaſed to have recovered Sileſia. While Count Daun over-awed Prince Henry, and his Pruſſian Majeſty was employing his army againſt the Ruſſians, Laudohn lay upon the borders of Brandenburgh with the apparent intention of drawing the Pruſſian troops to the Northern, while Harrach, and de Ville acted in the Southern parts of that Province. The ſtrong fortreſs of Sonneſtein in the neighbourhood of Dreſden, which had long overawed Daun, ſurrendered in a very unaccountable manner after a few hours faint reſiſtance, with a garriſon of 1400 men, to the Auſtrian General Maguire, on the 5th of September. After this Daun propoſed to execute the plan he had formed in the beginning of the campaign, that of paſſing the Elbe and putting Prince Henry between his fire and that of the army of the Empire, and thereby cutting of the communication between the Prince and Dreſ⯑den; but his Pruſſian Majeſty was by this time, September 11, on the borders of Saxony. The terror of his approach obliged Laudohn to forego his advantages in the Lower Luſatia, and to fall back upon Daun, who was ſo far from executing his grand plan that he retired to Zittau, ſo as to have Bohemia at his back, while the army of the Empire remained inactive in the ſtrong poſt of Pirna which they had ſeized.

[75] All thoſe glorious ſucceſſes of his Pruſſian Majeſty, who in one campaign had performed actions that in other ages would have acquired Empires, gave him rather reſpite than ſecurity. The Swedes on hearing of his victory at Zorndorff had retired in diſorder, but ſtill kept their arms in their hands without evacuating his dominions. The Ruſſians had ſtill a ſtrong footing in the moſt populous parts of his territories, and he had no ſuperiority in Saxony but that of generalſhip and reputation. As no remarkable action hap⯑pened between him and his enemies till the 14th of October, we are in the interval to attend the operations of the French and the allies on the ſide of Weſtphalia.

Prince Ferdinand had made an admirable diſpoſition of his army along the Lippe, and the Prince of Yſenburg, with the few forces he had under him, maintained his poſts upon the Weſer; ſo that the French had hitherto made very little progreſs either againſt Heſſe or Hanover. The French therefore came to a reſolution of ſtrengthening the Prince de Soubiſe's army, ſo as to enable him to diſlodge the Prince of Yſen⯑burg from the Weſer, and to open a paſſage into the Landgraviate. Prince Ferdinand, aware of their intention, ſent the Prince a detachment under General Oberg; but after it had joined him, all the force of the allies in the Landgraviate did not exceed 15,000 men. They were attack⯑ed on the 30th of September at Lanwerenhagen by the Prince of Soubiſe, at the head of about 30,000, defeated, and forced to take ſhelter in ſome ſtrong grounds covered with woods in the neighbourhood, with the loſs of about 1500 men. Prince Ferdinand flow to their relief ſo critically, that the Prince was enabled to join him at Rheda. The defeat however enabled [76] the French to puſh their parties of light horſe to the very gates of Hanover.

The inſincerity of the court of Vienna, ap⯑peared now more glaringly. Daun inſtead of puſhing the advantage he had obtained at Hoh⯑kirch, by attempting the relief of Saxony, thro' his inactivity and the few motions he made, plainly evinced that all he intended was to cover the operations of the Auſtrian Generals in Sile⯑ſia, where they had already beſieged Neiſs a city 20 miles South by Weſt of Breſlau, and lying near the confines of the Auſtrian Sileſia. The point was embarraſſing to his Pruſſian Majeſty, whether he ſhould hazard a battle, leave Saxony expoſed, or march to Sileſia. He ſoon deter⯑mined his operations. Having received large reinforcements from his brother's army, he left his camp at Dobreſchtz the night of the 24th of October, and without oppoſition from the enemy reached the plain of Gorlitz; where he defeated a party of Auſtrians who wanted to fortify them⯑ſelves there. This march eaſed him of all ap⯑prehenſions from Daun's army, and, in fact, blaſted the laurels he had acquired at Hohkirch. Daun, as if aſhamed to be outwitted, ſent Laudohn to harraſs his Pruſſian Majeſty with 24,000 men, and ſtrong reinforcements to the Generals Harſch and de Ville, who had not only beſieged Neiſs, but blockaded Coſel. His Pruſſian Majeſty, notwithſtanding all thoſe impediments, conti⯑nued his march; and Daun ſeeing that he could not prevent the relief of Sileſia, on the 6th of November paſſed the Elbe at Pirna, and ad⯑vanced towards Dreſden, from which the Pruſ⯑ſian army, weakened by the detachments the King had drawn from it, had been obliged to re⯑tire to the Weſtward; but before Daun could cut off their communication with that city, as [77] the army of the Empire had cut it off from Leip⯑ſic, they threw themſelves into Dreſden all at once. Notwithſtanding, the advanced ſeaſon, three great ſieges were undertaken in Saxony; that of Dreſden by Daun; that of Leipſic by the imperial army; and that of Torgau by de⯑tachments from both.

By this time his Pruſſian Majeſty's approach towards Neiſs, the garriſon of which had de⯑fended themſelves with incomparable bravery ever ſince the 4th of Auguſt, on the 1ſt of No⯑vember, both raiſed that ſiege and the blockade of Coſel, and obliged the Auſtrians there to fall back upon Bohemia and the Auſtrian Sileſia. Upon this, his Pruſſian Majeſty again ſet out for Saxony, where Daun had beſieged Dreſden with 60,000 men. General Wedel, who had rid him⯑ſelf of the Swedes in Pomerania, defended Tor⯑gau, and drove the Auſtrians from it as far as Eulenburg. Count Schmettau commanded with an army of 12,000 men in Dreſden. The Elec⯑tors of Saxony had long been the patrons of in⯑genious arts and manufactures. Their ſubjects had rivalled the ancients in many curious works of the chiſel, the furnace, the laboratory, the needle, the loom, and the pencil, and they had greatly exceeded the Eaſterns, even the Chineſe themſelves, in their boaſted productions of Por⯑celane. The ſoil of the country, and the geni⯑us of the inhabitants, were wonderfully well adapted to the improvement of every manual art, and a long track of internal tranquility, while the flames of war raged all round, had ren⯑dered Saxony the paradiſe of Germany. Even the expence of its court, the moſt luxurious of any in Europe, had contributed to enrich the in⯑habitants, who gave ſpecimens of their wealth in the magnificence of their buildings. The [78] ſuburbs of Dreſden, where the moſt conſiderable nobility, merchants and manufacturers reſide, formed of themſelves a moſt ſuperb city; but unfortunately the builders of the houſes had not reflected, that it was poſſible ſome time or other Dreſden might be beſieged; for the platforms of the ſuburbs looked down on the battlements of the city.

Schmettau knew what advantage this circum⯑ſtance preſented to Daun, and that the ſuburbs were untenable. He gave Daun his option, either to ſee them in flames, or deſiſt from his operations. Daun threatened him with the con⯑ſequences of ſo barbarous a proceeding, and ſo contrary to the rules of war. Schmettau juſti⯑fy'd himſelf by neceſſity, which ſupercedes all other conſiderations, and by the duty he owed to his maſter, to whom alone he was accountable. Daun threatened to make him perſonally anſwer⯑able to himſelf; upon which Schmettau replied, that he not only would burn the ſuburbs, but if the city was attacked, that he would defend it ſtreet by ſtreet, and at laſt take refuge in the caſ⯑tle, where the Royal Family reſided, and defend that likewiſe. This anſwer being made public, brought the magiſtrates and the chief inhabitants upon their knees before Daun, and the Royal Family implored him with all the moving elo⯑quence of diſtreſs to change his reſolution, which, if executed, would leave them deſtitute of a habitation. Schmettau's anſwer was, that Daun, and not he, could grant their requeſt; and in⯑ſtantly ordered the houſes of the ſuburbs to be filled with combuſtible materials, and at three in the morning, November 10, they were fired, and the houſes in which they had been depoſited were reduced to aſhes.

[79] Though the fact of this conflagration is lite⯑rally as we have related it, yet it admits of many alleviations. Schmettau did no more than barely what he was compelled to by neceſſity. He even communicated to the magiſtrates and inha⯑bitants the time and manner in which he was to proceed, aſſiſted them in removing their goods, conſulted with them upon the moſt favourable way of executing his diſagreeable orders, which was done ſo gently, that not above two hun⯑dred and fifty houſes were conſumed; all which appeared afterwards from authentic evidences, judicially given by the magiſtrates of Dreſden, and the parties themſelves who were the chief ſufferers, and which were publiſhed by his Pruſ⯑ſian Majeſty's command, to confute the exag⯑gerated repreſentations of the court of Vienna and its allies on that occaſion.

In the mean while Marſhal Daun had returned to his almoſt impregnable camp at Stolpen, while the King of Pruſſia took poſt at Bautzen; a ſi⯑tuation by which he was enabled to act as he pleaſed on the ſide either of Miſnia or Luſatia, his right wing extending to Holkirch. By this poſition of the two armies, it appeared that the Marſhal intended to cut off the King's commu⯑nication with Sileſia, and the King to cut off that of the Marſhal with Bohemia. The ſitua⯑tion of his Majeſty, however, was, upon the whole, the moſt advantageous of the two. It will, perhaps, be ever a ſecret by what means Marſhal Daun came to have intelligence that the Pruſſians were more careleſsly encamped and more remiſs in their quarters than uſual. He had before concerted meaſures with the Prince of Deux Ponts, who commanded the army of the Empire, for a general battle, and in the dead of night, on the 14th of October, he ordered his [80] army to decamp in three columns, and to march by different ways with the utmoſt ſilence, ſo as all the three diviſions ſhould meet together near the Pruſſian camp at five in the morning. His orders were obeyed with aſtoniſhing ſecrecy and preciſion. The diviſions in falling in with one another formed a regular line of battle, and al⯑moſt inſtantaneouſly attacked the Pruſſian camp towards Holkirch, where it was weakeſt. When one reflects upon the bravery and diſcipline of Daun's army, and the advantages under which this attack was made, he is apt to be aſtoniſhed that a ſingle battalion of the Pruſſians ſhould eſcape. Not a ſhot was fired by any of the Pruſ⯑ſian out-guards, and their enemies were in the midſt of their encampment, while they imagined them to be lying at Stolpen. It is ſaid that Field Marſhal Keith had the day before pointed out ſome weakneſſes in their encampment, which might be the reaſon why he was the firſt Pruſ⯑ſian General officer who got upon horſeback and gave the alarm to his quarter. It is thought to be by his vigilance the army was ſaved; for the ſmall party under him gained time for their fellow ſoldiers to put themſelves under arms. The Marſhal, however, was killed upon the ſpot by two muſket balls, and the head of Prince Fran⯑cis of Brunſwick was carried off by a cannon ball as he was mounting his horſe. The death of thoſe two great officers, next in command as in merit to the King himſelf, ſeemed to por⯑tend the entire loſs of the army; but his Majeſty had by this time aſſembled ſome troops, and in perſon gave play to the Auſtrians till others were formed. He perhaps never had ſo difficult a part to act; for he did not now fight for victory, far leſs for glory, but for ſafety. He flew from poſt to poſt with that inconceivable rapidity and pre⯑ſence [81] of mind that ſo ſtrongly marks his charac⯑ter. As his right wing was in the greateſt dan⯑ger he reinforced it from ſome battalions from his left, and endeavoured to recover the impor⯑tant poſt of Holkirch, from which his troops had been beaten in the beginning of the attack. This reinforcement enabled him after four bloody charges to retake the poſt, but the Auſtrians, who were well acquainted with its importance, recovered it with a prodigious ſlaughter of their enemies, who in the mean time were on the point of overpowering General Retzow, who commanded the right of the Pruſſians. At laſt his Majeſty, after maintaining the fight for five hours, and loſing in killed, wounded, and pri⯑ſoners above 7000 of his beſt men, ordered a retreat behind his artillery, which was placed in the middle of the camp, and which with the help of his cavalry put a ſtop to all purſuit from the Auſtrians, whoſe killed and wounded a⯑mounted to above 5000. All the further conſe⯑quences of this bloody action were, that his Pruſſian Majeſty ſtill kept poſſeſſion of Brautzen, but extended his right wing towards Weiſſen⯑burg. The bare relation of this affair excites in the mind of the reader more exalted ideas of his Pruſſian Majeſty's abilities in war that can ariſe from the moſt ſplendid of his victories.

The Ruſſians had been ſo ſeverely handled at Zorndorff, that they remained in their camp near Landſperg without making any motion till the 21ſt of September, when they began their march towards Pomerania, and there laid ſiege to the town of Colberg. This place, though in⯑conſiderable in itſelf, was of infinite importance to the Ruſſians, by its being a ſea-port, from whence they might receive proviſions and rein⯑forcements, without being expoſed to the dan⯑ger [82] of ſtarving Brandenburgh, or to marches inſupportably long and laborious. Hitherto his Britannic Majeſty had ordered his Miniſter at the court of Peterſburgh to omit nothing that her Ruſſian Imperial Majeſty could reaſonably expect or deſire, to buy off her inveterate enmity towards Pruſſia, and he was not without hopes of ſucceſs. But the ſiege of Colberg proved to all Europe, not only that ſhe was immovable in her purpoſe; but that the Empreſs Queen was determined to ſacrifice the ſafety of Germany, and even of her own dominions to her reſent⯑ment, ſince nothing had at all times been deemed more impolitic in the Germanic ſyſtem, than to ſuffer the Ruſſians to get footing by ſea in the Empire. It was now more than ſuſpected that her Ruſſian Majeſty had far greater views than that of aſſiſting her ſiſter Empreſs, and that ſhe intended to take and hold. Colberg, though poorly garriſoned, and ſtill more weakly forti⯑fied, held out under Major Heydon, its Gover⯑nor, for 26 days, againſt an army of 15,000 be⯑ſiegers, who were at laſt ſhamefully obliged to quit their enterprize; but they revenged their diſgrace by perpetrating, wherever they went, the moſt unheard of inhumanities upon the de⯑fenceleſs inhabitants; for the ſeveral ſtages of their marches were traceable by fire ſmoke and ruin.

It was in vain for Daun while the flames were raging, as was before mentioned, to renew, as he did, his threats againſt Schmettau. Perhaps they proceeded not ſo much from concern for the ſufferers, as from his conviction that he would now find it extremely difficult, if not impracticable, to take the city. He accordingly, upon the approach of his Pruſſian Majeſty, de⯑camped from before Dreſden on the 17th of Nov. and the King on the 20th after joining his [83] troops under Count Dohna and General Wedel, made a kind of triumphal entry into Dreſden. When we reflect upon the vaſt provocations his Pruſſian Majeſty had received, the dangers and labours he had undergone, the blood and treaſure he had expended, and the inceſſant bodily toils he was every day expoſed to, but above all the exhauſted ſtate of his finances, we need not be ſurprized that he now forgot his uſual modera⯑tion. He declared that he would no longer conſider Saxony as a depoſite, but as a conquered country, and he inflicted ſome unbecoming ſe⯑verities to oblige the Magiſtrates and chief inha⯑bitants to draw upon their foreign correſpondents for large ſums for his uſe. The exacting thoſe impoſts, however, were not unjuſtifiable, if he conſidered Saxony as a conquered country. The queſtion is, whether it ſtrictly was ſo; he cer⯑tainly once had received it as a depoſite, and it did not appear, that either the King of Poland, or the inhabitants, had done any thing againſt him to change the tenure of his poſſeſſion; ſo as to conſtitute that kind of oppoſition which juſtifies conqueſt. Thoſe points, however, cannot be here diſcuſſed. It would be iniquitous to cloſe our Martial Review for this year without doing juſtice to the glorious actions performed by ſepa⯑rate commanders at ſea, the relation of which is, properly ſpeaking, unconnected with the plan of our narrative.

On the 28th of February the ſquadron under Admiral Oſborne, between Cape De Gatt and Carthagena, fell in with M. du Queſne in the Foudroyant of 80, the Orphcus of 64, the Oriflame of 50, and Pleiade of 24 guns, as they were ſailing from Toulon, in order to reinforce the French ſquadron under M. de Clue at Cartha⯑gena. They diſperſed and took different courſes [84] on ſeeing the Engliſh ſquadron. About ſeven in the evening, Capt. Storr, in the Revenge of 64, ſupported by Capt. Hughes in the Berwick of 64, and Capt. Evans in the Preſton of 50 guns, took the Orpheus, commanded by M. de Herville with 502 men. Capt. Gardiner in the Mon⯑mouth of 64, ſupported by Capt. Stanhope in the Swiftſure of 70, and Capt. Hervey in the Hamp⯑ton-court of 64 guns, about one in the morning, took the Foudroyant, on board of which was the Marquis du Queſne, Chief d'Eſcadre, with 800 men. Capt. Rowley in the Montague of 60, and Capt. Montague in the Monarch of 74, ran the Oriflame aſhore under the caſtle of Aiglos, where ſhe was ſaved only by the reſpect which the Engliſh had for the neutrality of the Portugueſe. One circumſtance in the engagement does immortal honour to the brave Capt. Gardiner, who loſt his life in it. It had been a vulgar notion that the ſuperior weight of metal which the French ſhips carry, rendered them an over⯑match for the Britiſh, even for thoſe of an equal number of guns. It was the apprehenſion of this that made Admiral Byng decline fighting Galiſſoniere in the Foudroyant, while Gardiner, who was then his Captain, publickly declared that he ſhould not be afraid to fight the Foudroy⯑out in an Engliſh 70 or 64 gun ſhip, and on this occaſion he was as good as his word, tho' it appeared upon an admeaſurement, that the Foudroyant, not to mention her vaſt ſuperiority in weight of metal and number of guns, was as broad as an Engliſh firſt rate, and 12 foot longer. After Captain Gardiner was killed in the be⯑ginning of the action, his firſt Lieutenant, Carket, took the command, and behaved ſo bravely, that after killing 200 of the Foudroyant's men, with the loſs of 150 of his own, he forced the French [85] ſhip to ſtrike. Before this could be done, Capt. Stanhope in the Swiftſure came up, but though a ſuperior ſhip to the Monmouth, M. du Queſne would acknowledge no other conqueror but Carket, to whom he politely reſigned his ſword.

This year likewiſe brought an account of a gallant action performed towards the latter end of the laſt by Captain Forreſt in the Weſt-In⯑dies, who with his Majeſty's ſhips Edinburgh, Dreadnought, Auguſta, and a ſloop, had blocked up the harbour of Cape Francois for ſome weeks; but on the 21ſt of October they were attacked by all the French fleet there, conſiſting of ſeven ſail of large ſhips, a ſchooner and a pilot boat, well manned with ſoldiers on board, and their full compliment of guns. The engagement was very hot for two hours and a half, and the French having loſt about 300 men, and as many wound⯑ed, were beat back to their harbour; but the Engliſh had ſuffered ſo much in their rigging and hulls, that they were diſabled from purſuing them.

On the 29th of May, the Dorſet, Captain Dennis, of 64 guns and 520 men, gave chace to the Raiſonable, a French 70 gun ſhip, with 630 men on board, commanded by the Prince de Mombazon, who, after having 61 men killed and 100 wounded, ſtruck to Captain Dennis, whoſe loſs was 15 men killed and 21 wounded. The Raiſonable was a new ſhip, and one of the fineſt in France. It may be proper here to ob⯑ſerve, that the taking of the Foudroyant and Raiſonable by ſhips of inferior ſtrength has ever ſince ſilenced the ridiculous boaſts of the French, who pretended that they were always an over⯑match for us when we were not ſuperior in ſhips, guns, and weight of metal.

[86] In Auguſt this year; the electoral finances of Hanover were ſo much exhauſted by the long continuance of the war, that his Britannic Ma⯑jeſty was obliged to have recourſe to a ſubſcripti⯑on for 200,000l. which was raiſed by way of loan in London in a few days, or rather hours. We mention this incident the rather becauſe it ſerves to remove a prepoſſeſſion as if his late Ma⯑jeſty had been in poſſeſſion of a vaſt perſonal eſtate, which he certainly was not, as he paid the full legal intereſt for the above loan. On the 16th of September the public was enter⯑tained with a magnificent diſplay of the cannon and mortars taken at Cherbourg, which paſſed in a grand proceſſion from Hyde-Park, through the city, to the Tower. We are likewiſe not to forget the trial and condemnation of one Henſey an Iriſhman, who pretended to be a Doctor of Phyſic, for treaſonably correſponding with the enemies of Great-Britain, whom he endeavoured to apprize, as far as his ſhallow in⯑formation could reach, of the deſtination of our fleets and armies. The government, however, found him ſo inſignificant in his profeſſion of a ſpy, that he was pardoned.

At the opening of the year 1759, the King⯑dom of Pruſſia was in the hands of the Ruſſians, and the Dutchy of Cleves in thoſe of the Au⯑ſtrians, but held by the French. His Pruſſian Ma⯑jeſty was in poſſeſſion of Saxony, and received from Great-Britain a ſubſidy of 750,000l. Not⯑withſtanding this, his ſituation was far from be⯑ing deſireable. Though he could raiſe money, he could not re-animate men, and the fine armies with which he had done ſuch wonders, were now no more; nor was he longer aſſiſted by the counſels of thoſe able Generals, whom fatigue, diſeaſes, and the fate of war, had carried off. [87] It was but a ſmall comfort to him that his ene⯑mies, the French particularly, were as much diſtreſſed as he was, and the general bankruptcy, which was then ſaid to prevail in France, was found to be little more than a fiction, invented by that court, to prevail with its ſubjects to re⯑pleniſh the royal coffers. The great, and in⯑deed the only, ſupport of his Pruſſian Majeſty was the wealth, the power, the ſpirit, and proſ⯑perity of Great-Britain, but even that could not penetrate into the internal parts of Germany, where Prince Ferdinand had failed in an at⯑tempt to diſlodge the Duke de Broglio near Ber⯑gen. In the mean while, Prince Henry of Pruſ⯑ſia commanded in Saxony, and his army entered Bohemia in two columns with great ſucceſs. General Hulſen, who commanded one of the columns, defeated a large body of Auſtrians at Paſberg, and made about 2000 priſoners, with the loſs of only 70 men, while the other co⯑lumn penetrated as far as Loboſchutz and Lei⯑meritz, and both returned to Saxony with hoſt⯑ages for the contributions they had exacted. After this the Prince entered Franconia by the way of Hoff, and defeated a body of Auſtrians and Imperialiſts under General Maguire. The conſequence was that the Biſhoprics of Bamberg and Wurtzburg were laid under contribution, and the Pruſſians, in taking poſſeſſion of Bam⯑berg, were guilty of ſome unjuſtifiable irregula⯑rities. During Prince Henry's abſence in Fran⯑conia, a body of Auſtrians penetrated into Sax⯑ony, and the Ruſſians advanced towards Sileſia, while the French, who had been greatly elated by defeating Prince Ferdinand at Bergen, made a moſt alarming proceſs in Heſſe, and in the Biſhopric of Paderborn.

[88] In the mean while, a ſquadron of nine ſhips of the line, with 60 tranſports, containing ſix regiments of foot, were ſent by the Britiſh Mi⯑niſtry to attack Martinico. The land forces were commanded by General Hopſon, an officer whoſe age and infirmities, as well as natural cau⯑tion, diſqualified him for ſuch a ſervice, and the ſea force was under the command of Commo⯑dore Moore. A landing was effected upon the iſland, but through ſome fatality, the cauſe of which has never yet been cleared up, the at⯑tempt proved ineffectual after repeated efforts. The troops, however, had the ſpirit to deſire to be led againſt the iſland of Guadaloupe, an object of as much importance as Martinico, though of leſs renown. It happened that General Hopſon, who was a very worthy man and good officer, died on the 27th of February, 1759, and his command devolved upon General Barrington, who, after ſurmounting difficulties almoſt incre⯑dible, on the firſt of May ſubjected the whole iſland and its dependencies to the Britiſh crown. Scarcely was the capitulation which effected this ſubjection ſigned, when M. Bompart, General of the French Caribbees, landed at St. Ann's, a port belonging to Guadaloupe, with 600 regu⯑lar troops, 2000 buccaniers, and a vaſt quantity of arms and ammunition. But this body hear⯑ing of the capitulation being ſigned, immediate⯑ly diſappeared, though had they landed but a few hours before, the ſubjection of the iſland by the Britiſh arms muſt, at leaſt, have been doubtful. On the 25th of May, the iſland of Marigalante ſurrendered upon much the ſame terms as had been granted to that of Guadaloupe.

It is more than probable that the great atten⯑tention which the French court gave to the af⯑fairs of Germany, contributed not inconſidera⯑bly [89] to the Britiſh ſucceſſes in America and the Weſt-Indies. This attention was ſo great, that after Prince Ferdinand's defeat at Bergen, they took Ritberg and Minden, with ſeveral other places of conſequence; and at laſt d'Armentieres, one of their Generals, beſieged and made himſelf maſter of Weſel, where the garriſon of 4000 men were made priſoners of war. The Marſhal Contades, a young officer, of ſome ſpirit but no great note, then commanded the French in Germany. He was a favourite of the Duke de Belleiſle, who directed all his operations, and who in July 1759, thought that the conqueſt of Hanover by the French, was an event not to be doubted of; and the moſt ſenſible people in England were not of a very different opinion. The ar⯑chives and moſt of the valuable effects of that Electorate were ſent to Stade, to be conveyed with the firſt opportunity to England, and the diſpoſition of the French army near Minden was ſuch as encouraged them to boaſt and believe, that the allied army under Prince Ferdinand would lay down its arms without a ſtroke. They were then encamped at Peterſhagen about nine miles from the French.

They who are converſant in hiſtory know, what a great ſhare fortune has in the moſt deci⯑ſive military operations, and how very apt man⯑kind is to attribute fortunate events to ſagacious foreſight and wiſe diſpoſitions. Without dero⯑gating from thoſe of Prince Ferdinand, we muſt be of opinion, that his glorious ſucceſs at the battle of Minden was, in the main, owing to cauſes he could not reaſonably foreſee.

On the 28th of July he detached the Heredi⯑tary Prince of Brunſwick with 6000 men, with orders to take a compaſs towards the enemy's left flank, and to cut off their communication [90] with Paderborn. Next day, Prince Ferdinand left his camp on the Weſer, but left a ſtrong body of his troops under General Waggenheim intrenched on the borders of that river, and ſup⯑ported with artillery. Thus the allied army i [...] fact was divided into three bodies, and the defea [...] of any of them probably muſt decide the fate o [...] the other two. The French thought nothing was more eaſy than to defeat the body unde [...] Wangenheim, by which Prince Ferdinand muſt be cut off from all communication with the We⯑ſer, and be thereby compelled to ſurrender at diſ⯑cretion. This was deemed to be the more prac⯑ticable, as Prince Ferdinand, with the diviſion under his command, was then ſuppoſed to be at Halen, by which poſition the French were in hopes of being able to cut off his communication with Wangenheim's corps, which was to be firſt attacked by the Duke de Broglio. Early on the 1ſt of Auguſt the French left their advantageous poſt near Minden, and advanced with the utmoſt aſſurance of having a cheap conqueſt of the divi⯑ſion under Wangenheim: but Broglio gaining ſome heights, was amazed at ſeeing the whole allied army drawn up in good order, ſo as to form in fact but one body. He advanced ſo far that he could not retreat without fighting, and the diſ⯑poſition of their army was ſuch as indicated that they did not expect to fight at all, their center being compoſed of their cavalry. The Engliſh infantry had at once the poſt of danger and glory. They were attacked by the French cavalry, which were deemed to be irreſiſtable, and were ſupport⯑ed by their infantry on the flanks; but nothing could withſtand the addreſs, courage, and intre⯑pidity of the Britiſh infantry, ſupported by a very few Hanoverians. Their boaſted cavalry gave way before the regiments of Walgrave and [91] Kingſley, nor was there a muſquet in the Britiſh army that was not choaked with the blood of their enemies; ſo irreſiſtably did they handle their bayonets. As ſoon as the French began to fly before the Britiſh fury, Prince Ferdinand, who certainly had no juſt reaſon to expect a victory, ordered the Britiſh cavalry to advance and com⯑plete the rout. The order was not preciſe, and, upon the face of the evidence given on the trial of the noble Lord who commanded them, could not be complied with without explanation, and while that was obtaining the French found means to retreat to Minden, but without being ſo totally defeated, as they muſt have been had the Britiſh cavalry acted. In the mean while, the detach⯑ment under the Hereditary Prince of Brunſwic, defeated a diviſion of the French army under the Duke de Broglio, and forced it to take refuge in Minden, by which the French loſt all their ad⯑vantageous poſts on the Weſer, and were obliged to reſign all the promiſing glories of the cam⯑paign. Their loſs on this occaſion amounted to about 7000 men, and that of the allies to about 2000, of whom about 1200 were Britiſh.

The eclat attending this battle made an im⯑preſſion on the mind of his Britannic Majeſty, which was by no means favourable for the noble Lord who that day commanded the Britiſh troops. Prince Ferdinand had in an oblique manner re⯑flected upon his backwardneſs, and the noble Lord was incautious enough to inſiſt upon a moſt unconſtitutional trial for diſobeying the orders of a General, who by the laws of England was not qualified to give him orders, though he had ſubmitted to receive them. The event of the trial was unfavourable for his Lordſhip; but with what juſtice let thoſe determine who at this day read it cooly and diſpaſſionately. We may ven⯑ture [92] to affirm that the victory of Minden was one of thoſe haſty, but happy, productions of a next to enthuſiaſtic valour; and owing to that rapidity of courage peculiar to the Engliſh, of which foreign⯑ers can have no idea, and which ſets at nought all ſyſtems of war.

It is with regret we mention, that the conſe⯑quences of the battle of Minden were not an⯑ſwerable to the amazing valour and conduct which obtained it. War is the trade of ſoldiers of fortune, and a gainful trade it is. Prince Ferdinand obliged the French to retire towards Caſſel, but it was the 11th of September before the inconſiderable caſtle of Marpourg ſurrender⯑ed to the allies, after having kept them at play ſo long, that, at the end of the campaign, the French found themſelves in a condition to begin another. Munſter ſtill continued in their hands, and Imhoff, a Hanoverian General, was detach⯑ed by Prince Ferdinand to beſiege it; but he was obliged to raiſe the ſiege by d'Armentieres. We are not authorized to make any reflections on the ſubſequent operations of this campaign. It is ſuf⯑ficient to ſay, that the deſpondency of the French is an evidence that the General of the allied army did not improve it to the full advantage which the Britiſh valour had thrown ſo unexpectedly in⯑to his lap. Contades and Broglio recriminated on each other, and d'Etrees, a General of greater experience and capacity than both, was ſent to their camp to prevent an open rupture; and to reduce the troops, who held their Generals in the utmoſt contempt, to their duty; which he effected at the mortifying expence of ſerving under his giddy-headed inferiors; an example which it is to be wiſhed might be copied by Bri⯑tiſh commanders.

[93] To do the French juſtice, they are ſeldom at a loſs for reſources. They had been unfortunate and diſgraced in Germany; but a maſterly and powerful invaſion of Great Britain, towards the cloſe of the year 1759, was to remedy all miſ⯑carriages. Three embarkations for that purpoſe were mentioned. One under Thurot was deſtined againſt Scotland. This Thurot was an intelli⯑gent, enterprizing adventurer, humane in his manners, and fortunate in his undertakings. His birth was obſcure, but his notions, at a time when a total degeneracy of the French prevailed, rendered, in France, thoſe abilities illuſtrious, which, in England, could not have intitled him to a lieutenancy on board a ſhip of war. The ſecond embarkation was to have been performed at Havre, and the other ſea-ports of Normandy, and was deſigned immediately againſt England. The third was to have been made from Vannes, in the Lower Brittany, under the Duke D'Ai⯑guillon, who, from his unmanly diſcomfiture of the Engliſh at St. Cas, had now acquired ſome reputation in arms. Thoſe appearances were threatening, and the more ſo, as Admiral Boſ⯑cawen, who commanded the Engliſh fleet in the Mediterranean, was obliged to ſail for Gibraltar to refit, and to leave the French ſquadron at Toulon at liberty to come out of that harbour. The French made the beſt of their opportunity, and ſailed under the command of M. de la Clue. Boſcawen ſailed Auguſt the 14th, and had with him fourteen ſhips of the line, beſides frigates. Thoſe under de la Clue were only twelve, but their force, upon the whole, far exceeded that of Boſcawen's ſquadron. They had arrived near Gibraltar, when the Engliſh Admiral, hearing of their ſailing, in two hours put to ſea, and overtook ſome of their ſhips at Cape Lagos in [94] Portugal, where, after an engagement, in which his coolneſs and intrepidity were equally remark⯑able, he gave them a total defeat. The Ocean and Redoutable, two of the beſt ſhips in the French navy, were run aſhore and burnt. The Centaure and the Modeſte, two other of their capital ſhips, were taken, and the others, with great difficulty, took refuge in the harbour of Cadiz.

This ſevere blow given to the French marine, did not deter them from their intended invaſion of Great Britain. A fleet was equipped at Breſt, of which M. de Conflans had the command, and which was to cover their grand expedition againſt England. This fleet, however, was blocked up by Admiral Hawke, who at the ſame time de⯑tached ſome ſhips to keep an eye upon Vannes, while Commodore Boys was ſtationed before Dunkirk, and Admiral Rodney bombarded Havre. All this happened in the depth of winter, when the French were favoured by a violent ſtorm, which forced Admiral Hawke from his ſtation off Breſt to run into Torbay with his whole fleet. The French loſt no time, but put to ſea on the 14th of November, which happened to be the very day on which Admiral Hawke left Torbay, and directed his courſe to Quiberon bay, where he expected the French fleet would rendezvous, and where, after meeting with various diſap⯑pointments through contrary winds, he at laſt diſcovered the head-moſt ſhips of the enemy bear⯑ing to the northward, between the main land of France and the iſland of Belleiſle. This hap⯑pened on the 20th of November.

It is evident from what followed, that the amazing intrepidity of the Britiſh Admiral and officers diſabled the French both as to courage and conduct. They had truſted to the danger of [95] the navigation, nor did they imagine that the Engliſh would dare to attack them on a coaſt to which they were ſtrangers, and which, beyond any almoſt of the known world, was full of ſhoals, ſands, ſhallows and rocks. Conflans, be⯑fore he could reſolve how to proceed, found him⯑ſelf defeated. In two hours after he was attacked by Hawke, two of his ſhips of the line were ſunk, and a third ſtruck. Hawke's great aim was at the Soleil Royal, the moſt capital ſhip in the French navy, and commanded by Conflans in perſon. He ordered the maſter of his own ſhip to paſs all the ſhips of the enemy, and to lay him along ſide the French Admiral, but be⯑fore that could be done, a French ſhip of ſeventy guns, which nobly interpoſed, was ſunk by one broadſide of his reſerved fire. In ſhort, had not the French been favoured by night, their whole fleet muſt have been deſtroyed or taken.

Seven of their ſhips, after throwing over-board all their guns, eſcaped into the river Vilaine, and about as many made for other ports. A dreadful hurricane blew during all the night after this action, and nothing was to be heard but ſignals of diſtreſs on all hands, friends and enemies being blended in one common danger. Com⯑mon humanity would have prevailed upon the Engliſh to have aſſiſted even an enemy amidſt ſuch indiſcriminate diſtreſs; but they perceived all efforts of that kind were impracticable, and could terminate only in their own ruin, without affording the ſmalleſt relief to the French; they were therefore obliged to wait for the return of day, and then they found that the French Ad⯑miral had run his own, and another capital ſhip, the Heros, on ſhore. His own ſhip was burnt by himſelf, and the Heros by the Engliſh. It was thought, that this action, in which the enemy [96] had four capital ſhips deſtroyed, one taken, and the reſt of their fleet diſabled, ſhattered, and diſperſed, would have been deciſive of all future marine operations between the Engliſh and their enemies. The public reſounded with exultati⯑ons on that account, and nothing but ſongs of triumph was to be read in our news papers.

An event which happened about the ſame time redoubled the exultations, as was before menti⯑oned. The French government authentically acknowledged itſelf to be bankrupt, and ſtopt the payment of no leſs than eleven funds, for which their public faith was engaged. As if that had not been enough, a kind of begging ordnance was publiſhed, for all perſons to bring in their plate to the mint; his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty began with his own, and affected to retrench his table, furniture, and plate, to thoſe neceſſaries, which a man of 200l. a year allows to his family in England. His example was followed by num⯑bers of his moſt zealous ſubjects; nor were even the church plate and ornaments ſpared.

It is true the money raiſed by this expedient fell ſhort of what might have been expected; but it is certain it did infinite ſervice to the French government. It awakened a ſpirit of what we may call compaſſionate loyalty, in the breaſt of its ſubjects, who now conſidered nothing but the undeſerved diſtreſs to which their ſovereign was reduced. Cities, Corporations, and Companies, poured in their voluntary contributions for re⯑pairing their marine, and their armies in Ger⯑many were recruited with greater facility and a leſs expence than ever; ſo that their force at the opening of the next campaign was far more for⯑midable than was expected. But this was not all. The Engliſh and their allies were impoſed upon, and thrown off their guard by this pretended ſhew [97] of poverty. The operations of the war lan⯑guiſhed, on a preſumption that the French could not continue it, and that they muſt of courſe agree to ſuch terms as Great Britain ſhould im⯑poſe. In all thoſe preſumptions we were de⯑ceived, for the French at the very time when they declared themſelves bankrupt, had eleven millions ſterling in ready money in their trea⯑ſury; but it is now time to viſit a quarter of the globe we have not yet touched on.

The race of Tamerlane and the Moguls have continued from the time of that great conqueror, after being expelled out of Tartary and Perſia, to govern India. Aurengzebe was the laſt Mo⯑narch who inherited the abilities of his great predeceſſors; for, after his death, an univerſal de⯑generacy took place; and, as is commonly the caſe with great Monarchies, thoſe provinces which were the moſt diſtant from the ſeat of go⯑vernment affected an independency upon the Em⯑peror, or, as he is called, the Great Mogul. In proceſs of time the Governors of thoſe pro⯑vinces, who are called Nabobs, were little more than nominally ſubject to the imperial authority, and they acknowledged that ſhadow of depen⯑dency, only becauſe it gave a ſanction to their own power. Amongſt the moſt formidable of thoſe Governors was the Nabob of Bengal, who upon a frivolous pretext raiſed a great army, and laid ſiege to the Engliſh fort of Calcutta, which the Governor and the principal Britiſh inhabi⯑tants there abandoned, by ſaving themſelves, and their moſt valuable effects on board the ſhips. The place, however, was bravely defended by Mr. Holwell; but on the 26th of June, 1756, it was taken by the Nabob, or, as he is called, the Subah or Viceroy of Bengal. This barba⯑rian, irritated by the oppoſition he had met [98] with, gave way to the inhumanity of his officers, who ſhut up 146 Britiſh ſubjects in a narrow pri⯑ſon, where after ſuffering the moſt excruciating torments by thirſt, and all kinds of agonies, no more than 23 perſons came out alive next morn⯑ing. Of thoſe who were ſaved, Mr. Holwell was one, and even the breaſt of the Subah ſeemed to be affected with their ſufferings.

The glory of the Britiſh arms in the Eaſt-Indies, was, however, ſoon retrieved. Admiral Watſon in the beginning of the year 1756 at⯑tacked and deſtroyed the reſidence of Angria the pirate, who had long been a declared enemy to the Engliſh. The Admiral afterwards ſailed with no more than three ſhips of the line from Madraſs, and, after touching at the port of Bala⯑ſore, he entered the Ganges, where by taking Buſbudgia fort he opened a paſſage to Calcutta, which he reduced in one day, as he did Hugly, another ſettlement higher up the Ganges. The Nabob drew together an army conſiſting of 10,000 horſe, and 12,000 foot; but on the 5th of February, 1757, they were defeated by a handful of Engliſh, and the Nabob was obliged to conclude a peace, by which our Eaſt-India company was reinſtated in all its priviledges and poſſeſſions, obtaining an immunity from taxes, and an indemnification for all they had ſuffered by the taking of Calcutta. It was very eaſy to ſee that this accommodation with the Nabob would laſt no longer than ſuited his own conve⯑niency, and that he would break it as ſoon as he had concerted meaſures with the French. The two Engliſh Admirals therefore, Watſon and Pocock, in conjunction with Colonel Clive who commanded the land forces, attacked Chandena⯑gore, the chief ſettlement of the French in thoſe parts, and lying further up the river than Cal⯑cutta [99] itſelf. Though the Engliſh fleet conſiſted of no more than three ſhips, and the land forces under Clive amounted only to 700 Europeans and 1600 black ſoldiers, yet they attacked the place. The French were prepared to receive them, and ſunk ſeveral large veſſels both above and below their forts; for there were four in the whole. The operations of the Engliſh, however, both by ſea and land, were ſo vigorous, that the gar⯑riſon capitulated in leſs than three hours on the 24th of March. Five hundred Europeans and 700 blacks ſurrendered themſelves priſoners of war; 183 pieces of cannon were taken, and a large ſum in ready money, with a vaſt quantity of goods, became the property of the captors. It was eaſy to perceive that the Nabob Suraja Doula, the ſame who the preceding year had occaſioned the maſſacre at Calcutta, was ſtill in the French intereſt. The ferocity of his man⯑ners had diſguſted even his own ſubjects, and as ſucceſs is the only title that thoſe Nabobs can ſhew for poſſeſſion, Jaffier Ali Cawn, then a prin⯑cipal officer in his army, and one who pretended a legal right to the Nabobſhip, put himſelf at the head of a confederacy againſt him, and applied to the Engliſh for aſſiſtance.

We have neither room nor inclination to enter upon particular diſcuſſions of right between the two rival Nabobs, who are before mentioned. It is certain that the Engliſh very wiſely agreed to aſſiſt Jaffier, with whom they entered into a treaty, and Colonel Clive immediately took the field in his favour. The Admiral, to encreaſe the Co⯑lonel's force as much as he could, undertook to garriſon Chandenagore, and lent him 50 ſeamen to ſerve as gunners, while a twenty gun ſhip was ſtationed above Hugly, to preſerve the communi⯑cation between the ſea and land forces. By this [100] time the Nabob Suraja had aſſembled an army of 20,000 men, which were attacked by Colonel Clive on the 22d of June, and entirely defeated. This aſtoniſhing event, Colonel Clive having with him fewer men than the enemy had Enſigns in the field, encouraged Jaffier, who had re⯑mained inactive in the late battle, openly to de⯑clare his pretenſions to the Nabobſhip, and on the 26th of the ſame month the Engliſh and his party marched to Muxadavat, the capital of Ben⯑gal, where Colonel Clive placed him in the ſeat of the Nabobs, and he received homages at Subah of Bengal, Bachar and Orixa. As to Suraja his rival, finding himſelf deſerted by his officers, he fled from the field of battle, but being taken priſoner, he was put to death, probably by the authority of the conqueror.

Thus, a few Engliſh gave a maſter to one of the richeſt, largeſt, and moſt populous king⯑doms in the world in about 13 days. The new Nabob thought he could not exceed in his gra⯑titude to his Britiſh friends; he concluded a per⯑petual alliance, offenſive and defenſive, with them; he enlarged the limits and the privileges of their Eaſt-India company, and diſtributed above 600,000 l. amongſt their troops and ſea⯑men, paying at the ſame time two millions ſter⯑ling, as an indemnification to the Eaſt-India company for their loſſes at Calcutta. Soon after thi [...], Admiral Watſon died, through the unwhole⯑ſomeneſs of the climate. The French, to re⯑trieve ſo many blows, fitted out a new armament under Monſ. d'Ache, who commanded their ma⯑rine, as did Lally, an officer of rank and expe⯑rience, the land forces, conſiſting of 2000 Eu⯑ropeans. It is probable the French thought that this great ſtrength would do more than retrieve their affairs in the Eaſt-Indies; but they were [101] miſtaken, for though they took the fort and city of St. David, yet Admiral Pocock, who com⯑manded the Britiſh ſquadron there, defeated them in two engagements, and cut off their commu⯑nication between their marine and land troops. The truth is, the French were not only diſpirited by their repeated misfortunes, but deſtitute of proviſions, money, and almoſt every thing, ex⯑cepting men, that could give ſucceſs to their ope⯑rations. Many of the Engliſh ſea officers, on the other hand, miſbehaved from very oppoſite motives; they were impatient to enjoy in their own country, the immenſe riches they had acquired, and this impatience relaxed their attention to diſcipline, ſo that the Admiral's efforts were ſometimes but ill ſeconded by his officers, which occaſioned ſome part of the French fleet to eſcape.

As to the land troops under Lally, their be⯑haviour was deſpicable beyond deſcription. Hav⯑ing no money to carry on his operations, he at firſt demanded a ſum from an Indian potentate called the King of Tanjour, and his requeſt being rejected, he beſieged that Prince's capital, but was driven from it, though it was little better than an open place, through the bravery of ſome Engliſh gunners. Meeting with this diſgraceful diſappointment, he ſought to repair it by ſeizing a Dutch ſhip, but with the conſent of the crew, where he found as much money as enabled him to undertake the ſiege of Madraſs or fort St. George. The place was defended by Colonel Draper and Major Brereton with ſo much ſpirit and courage, that Lally was obliged to abandon the ſiege, after lying two months before the place. The remonſtrances he ſent home on this occaſion, will paint the horror and uneaſineſs of his mind at the cowardice, corruption, and degeneracy of [102] thoſe he commanded; while the Engliſh not only triumphed over him, but reduced the opulent city of Surat, on the weſtern peninſula of India. On the 16th of April, 1759, our army took the field under Major Brereton, who poſſeſſed him⯑ſelf of the important town and fort of Conjive⯑ram, while Major Ford ſtormed and took the city of Maſulipatam. Thus a ſea-coaſt of 800 miles in extent, along a trading and manufactu⯑ring country, fell into the hands of the Engliſh while the trade of the French was confined to Pon⯑dicherry, and a few inconſiderable places in the neighbourhood. The coaſt thus acquired by the Engliſh, adjoined to the province of Bengal, out of which the French were entirely driven by Colonel Clive. Thoſe ſucceſſes, however, were ſomewhat ballanced by a repulſe which Major Brereton met with, in attempting to diſlodge Lally and his confederates from a ſtrong poſt he held under the cannon of a fort. This check, which happened in September, 1759, coſt the Engliſh between 3 and 400 killed and wounded. Lally, upon this, was preparing to beſiege Trichi⯑napoly, but Colonel Coote, on the 30th of No⯑vember following, took Wandewaſh, one of the moſt important forts on that coaſt, in three days time, and made the garriſon priſoners of war. Ten days after he took Carangoly, which he obliged the garriſon to evacuate. This great ſucceſs determined Lally to riſk a deciſive engage⯑ment, or to retake Wandewaſh, which he be⯑ſieged with 2200 Europeans, and between 9 and 10,000 blacks. Colonel Coote, however, came up with his army, conſiſting of about 17,00 Europeans and 3000 blacks, juſt at the time when Lally was about to ſtorm the breach he had made in the place. A battle enſued, in which the French ſuffered an entire defeat, with [103] the loſs of 1000 killed. In this battle Brigadier Ge⯑neral Buſſy, the Chevalier Godeville, Quarter-maſ⯑ter General, Lieut. Col. Murphy, and 11 inferior officers, were all wounded and made priſoners, and Lally now loſing all hopes of farther ſucceſs retired to Pondicherry. The loſs on the ſide of the Engliſh were 200 killed and wounded, and amongſt the for⯑mer was the brave Major Brereton. This victory gave vaſt credit to the Engliſh troops, becauſe it was obtained over a General of no ſmall reputation for his conduct and courage. The Engliſh loſt no time in purſuing their victory, for they marched directly againſt Chitiput, which they took, and then laid ſiege to Arcot, the capital of that vaſt province, on the 5th of February, and it ſurrendered the 10th, by which about 300 Europeans were made priſo⯑ners of war.

The ſea operations in the Eaſt-Indies were pro⯑ſecuted with equal ſpirit and ſucceſs. On the 4th of September, 1759, an engagement happened be⯑tween M. d'Ache, one of the beſt ſea officers of France, and Admiral Pocock, in which the former, though he had a great ſuperiority both in ſhips and guns, was, after a bloody diſpute of two hours, obliged to retire under the walls of Pondicherry. In this engagement, eight of the Engliſh ſhips ſuſtained the fire of the whole French fleet, con⯑ſiſting of 16 ſail. Of the Engliſh, 560 were killed and wounded, and above 1000 of the French. Po⯑cock, having refitted his ſhips, ſailed for Pondi⯑cherry, and was there joined by Admiral Corniſh. On the 5th of April following, the fortreſs of Ca⯑racal, with ſeveral places of ſmaller importance, were ſurrendered to the Engliſh, and thus the main power of the French in the Eaſt-Indies was ſhut up in Pondicherry.—We are now to attend the moſt mo⯑mentous ſcene that ever paſſed in North America.

The Britiſh miniſtry reſolved on the reduction of Quebec, the capital of the French empire there. For this great purpoſe, the command of the [104] land troops, which did not exceed 7000 men, was given to General Wolfe, and that of the ſea forces to Admiral Saunders. Sir William Johnſon had taken Niagara, and defeated the French, while General Amherſt had been ſucceſsful upon lake Champlain. About the 26th of July, the Britiſh fleet and army, after a proſperous navigation, came before Quebec, and both the General and Admiral made moſt excellent diſpoſitions for reducing it; but they were baffled by the caution of the French General Moncalm, who depended on the ſtrength of the place, and the inſurmountable difficulty of the Engliſh troops landing to attack it. So well was nature aſſiſted by art, that even Wolfe himſelf began to deſpair of ſucceſs, after being checked and repulſed. At laſt, by a train of ſtratagems, which we have no room to particularize, a landing was effected, but under greater diſadvantages than any we read of in hiſtory; for the Engliſh, after landing, were obliged to drag their artillery with them up a ſteep and dangerous aſcent, but gaining the top of the hill, they formed themſelves. Mon⯑calm was now forced to riſk a battle, in which the Engliſh were completely victorious, but loſt their brave General Wolfe, who was killed on the field of battle, and his ſecond in command, General Monckton, being dangerouſly wounded at the ſame time, the honour of completing the vic⯑tory was reſerved for General Townſhend, who drove the enemy from every poſt with the loſs of no more than 500 men, while that of the French amounted to 1500, amongſt whom was their Ge⯑neral Moncalm. Five days after, viz. September 18▪ the city of Quebec ſurrendered to the Engliſh troops.

The great object of the French in America▪ in the beginning of the year 1760, was the re⯑taking Quebec. It is certain, that the obſtruction [...] which General Amherſt had met with and his no [...] being able to give any aſſiſtance to the Engliſh at Quebec, was of infinite prejudice to our affairs [105] there. Beſides the other ſervices to which our fleet was appointed, the ſeaſon of the year ren⯑dered it impoſſible for our ſhips to continue lon⯑ger there. General Murray had been appointed Governor of that city, and having received all the ſtores and proviſions that could be ſpared him, the fleet left him with a garriſon compoſed of about 7000 men, who had no other dependance but upon their own courage. The Canadians knew that their troops after the battle of Que⯑bec had retired to the inland part of the country, where they could not be followed, far leſs at⯑tacked; they ſaw that not a ſingle ſhip of war had been left to aſſiſt the garriſon in caſe of dan⯑ger, and they were ſenſible not only that the Engliſh were greatly reduced in their numbers by ſickneſs and other accidents, but that the for⯑tifications of the city itſelf were untenable. With ſo many inviting appearances, Monſ. de Levi, who commanded the French at Canada, was en⯑couraged to hope that he might be able to recover the city. Had he attempted this by a reſolute coup de main, while the river was frozen, it is hard to ſay what the conſequence might have been. But either through his want of reſoluti⯑on, or being over-awed by Vaudreuil, who was the French Lieutenant-General of Canada, he loſt his opportunity, and having been contented to ſpend the dead of the winter in ſkirmiſhes, in which he had always the worſt, he reſolved to wait for the opening of the ſpring, when he could form a regular ſiege, before the place could receive any ſuccours from the Engliſh fleet. Mean while, it is perhaps difficult to account for the reaſons that prevented the garriſon from receiving ſome aſſiſtance from General Amherſt. Be that as it will, de Levi having aſſembled an army of 11 or 12,000 men, took the field on the 17th of [106] April, and being well provided with every thing for a ſiege, he ſent his proviſions, ammunition, and heavy baggage down the river St. Lawrence▪ under the protection of ſix frigates from 44 to 26 guns; by which he entirely maſtered the river, and after ten days march, his army appeared up⯑on the heights of Abraham, within three miles of Quebec.

The danger being preſſing, General Murray had only two things to determine, one was, to ſtand a ſiege within the ruined works of Quebec, and the other was to march out and fight the enemy. He choſe the latter, with equal ſpirit and prudence, as well knowing the ſuperiority of troops acting on the offenſive, and the great damp that a body of men receives by being ſhut up within almoſt defenceleſs walls, where they can hope for no relief or aſſiſtance. But to his great misfortune he was not able to bring to the field above 3000 men, after leaving a garriſon that was but juſt ſufficient to over-awe the inhabitants. He re⯑ſolved, however, to put every thing to the riſk, as he could depend on the goodneſs of the troops he commanded, and accordingly he left the city with 3000 men, and attended by about 20 field pieces. This daring undertaking ſeems to have ſtruck the enemy with ſome ſurprize. Their troops were advantageouſly poſted upon and under ſome woody eminences; but before they could put themſelves in a regular order of battle, their van, which was poſted upon the eminences, was at⯑tacked with ſo much fury by the Engliſh, that it was driven in the utmoſt diſorder, and with great loſs, upon the main body, which was drawn up in the valley below, and which was as yet un⯑broken. As this main body was compoſed of the flower of the French troops in Canada, they formed themſelves in columns, and received the [107] Britiſh troops with ſo hot a fire, that they were ſtaggered in their purſuit. The French endea⯑voured to improve the diſorder by forming them⯑ſelves into a kind of ſemicircle, by which they were in hopes to have encloſed the flanks of the Engliſh army, and even to have cut off its re⯑treat to Quebec. Nothing but the utmoſt intre⯑pidity on the part of the Engliſh could have ſaved them on this occaſion againſt an army that was almoſt four times ſuperior to them in num⯑bers. Farther reſiſtance would have been the worſt of madneſs, as they had already loſt 1000 men out of the 3000. Their retreat, however, was performed with great order and regularity, nor were they purſued, and though they were obliged to leave their cannon, they killed about 2000 of the French.

All the flattering proſpects which had been en⯑tertained in England concerning the conqueſt of Canada, ſeemed now to vaniſh. General Mur⯑ray, after the defeat before-mentioned, was thought to be irretrievably undone, eſpecially as there was no Britiſh fleet at hand to aſſiſt him in time; but he was ſo far from loſing his ſpirits that they ſeemed to be redoubled by his difficulties. He ſupplied by his activity and diligence the weakneſs of the fortifications and army, while the French, ſen⯑ſible of what importance time was to them, opened trenches before the place the very night of the battle. Here it appeared of how much importance practice is in the art of war, and how little any people can be ſaid to be ſelf inſtructed as to its operations. The French are thought to have a natural genius for the defence or attack of places; but they were ſuch aukward engineers before Quebec, that it was the 11th of May before they could bring two batteries to bear upon the place, and even then their fire was moſt miſerably ſerved. [108] This gave the Engliſh General farther time to prepare for its defence, and 132 pieces of can⯑non were mounted upon the ramparts; but this numerous artillery was deſtitute of hands to ma⯑nage it, and great part of it muſt have been uſe⯑leſs in caſe of a warm attack, which was every day expected; ſo that conſidering the diſpropor⯑tion of numbers, it is thought that nothing but the appearance of a Britiſh fleet, of which there was little or no likelihood, could ſave the place.

At laſt on the 9th of May, two days before the batteries were opened, a veſſel arrived in the ba⯑ſon with an account that Lord Colville, who commanded a ſmall ſquadron of Britiſh ſhips at Hallifax, had entered the river St. Lawrence, and would in a few days ſail to their relief. On the 15th a ſhip of the line, and another frigate ar⯑rived likewiſe, and the two frigates, as being fitteſt for that ſervice, were ſent againſt the French ſquadron that lay above the town, which commiſſion they executed ſo completely, that in a few hours the French ſhips were deſtroyed, taken, or diſperſed. Levi imagined from the manoeuvres of the two frigates, that a ſtrong fleet was at hand to ſupport them, and upon that preſumption he threw up the game as being loſt, by raiſing the ſiege with diſgrace and precipitancy, and leaving behind him all his artillery. The people of England ſcarcely had heard of the danger which Quebec was in, when they re⯑ceived an account of its being delivered. The tranſition from triumph to conſternation, and from that to joy were ſo rapid, that the public had no time for condolence, till they had occa⯑ſion for congratulation. Upon the whole, the campaign of Quebec is a reproach both to the courage and conduct of the French, and will be a laſting monument of their inferiority in both [109] to Britons. They had every thing requiſite that could contribute to a long defence, and a vigo⯑rous oppoſition. Their ſituation was ſo advan⯑tageous, they had deemed it impregnable, and neglected to fortify the only paſs by which the Engliſh could poſſibly fight them with the ap⯑pearance of equality. Their numbers were ſu⯑perior, they fought pro aris et focis, in ſight of their wives and families, with a town ſtrongly fortified on their ſide; they were commanded by a General (Montcalm) whom they had often boaſted to be one of the ableſt in the world; yet when they came to action, their reſiſtance was ſo feeble, that their enemies wiſhed they had given them more room for glory, by rendering their victory more difficult. Their behaviour under Levi was ſtill more contemptible. And thus a country, which their own writers had always re⯑preſented as being equal in extent to that of the old Roman Empire, fell in a few weeks under the power of his Britannic Majeſty. But we are now to attend the operations of the war in Eu⯑rope.

In the beginning of the year 1760, the affairs of Europe preſented themſelves with a very unac⯑countable aſpect. The allies under Prince Fer⯑dinand, without receiving any remarkable check, repaſſed the Rhine and the Lippe; he main⯑taining his ground in the deſerts of Weſtphalia, but abandoning the country of Heſſe, and ſcarcely able to cover Hanover; which the French Gene⯑ral Broglio, nothwithſtanding the advantages he received at Bergen, could not enter. No deci⯑ſive event had followed the victory of Minden, one of the moſt glorious that is to be found in hiſtory. The King of Pruſſia's ſituation was equally unaccountable, for, without commit⯑ting any blunder or miſtake in his conduct, he [110] now was fallen into diſtreſs. Thoſe conſidera⯑tions created many melancholy reflections in England. The nation ſaw that the immenſe ſub⯑ſidies which his Pruſſian Majeſty had received had indeed ſuſpended his fate, but had not given him ſuperiority. The flattering ideas which we formed of the weakneſs of the French, the Auſtrians and the Ruſſians, from their repeated defeats, had deceived us, and it ſoon appeared that their reſources in men were inexhauſtible. The Em⯑preſs Queen was now obliged to exhert that ſtrength, which ſhe had before ſpared, through the aſſiſtance of England. The territories which were believed to be ruined, while ſhe was re⯑ceiving the Britiſh ſubſidies, were now found to be rich and flouriſhing, both in men and money. Though the court of Peterſburgh could not ſome years before march a battalion to the aſſiſtance of Great Britain, nor even put their troops in motion, without being previouſly ſubſidized, yet, now that the quarrel was their own, they could undertake the moſt tedious and hazardous marches, and fill the plains of Germany with above 100,000 fighting men, and when theſe were de⯑ſtroyed, replace them with as many. Some peo⯑ple of diſtinguiſhed rank at the Britiſh court re⯑flected with the moſt bitter regret upon thoſe matters, and were of opinion that the King of Pruſſia could ſupport himſelf without our ſubſi⯑dies, as well as his two antagoniſts did.

Whatever were the thoughts of the Britiſh patriots upon the ſubject, as was before mention⯑ed, yet they had many reaſons for concealing them. His Majeſty was now grown ſo venerable in the eyes of the people, that they would have thought it worſe than ſacrilege to have interrupt⯑ed his aged hours by an unſeaſonable, however rational, oppoſition, and it was known that [111] the affairs of Germany were always uppermoſt in his heart. The ſucceſſes of Prince Ferdinand, which were rather ſplendid than ſolid, had im⯑preſſed the publick with a high opinion of his martial abilities, and they flattered themſelves that every campaign would be deciſive in his favour, if Great Britain continued to ſupport him. The miniſtry continued to inforce and improve the ſame way of reaſoning. And thus very few either within or without doors had the courage to declare their real ſentiments.

It could not, however, be diſguiſed that the weight of the war in Europe lay upon England, tho' ſhe had immediately very little intereſt in the event. This conſideration, which was too glaring to be concealed, induced the Britiſh Miniſtry to offer to open a negotiation, but however ſincere they might be, it is certain that his Pruſſian Ma⯑jeſty was by no means ſo when he compiled with it. The two Empreſſes and France, not to mention Sweden and Poland, tho' they could not flatly reject ſo plauſible a propoſition, were very little diſpoſed to accept of it, and threw ſuch a damp upon all the expedients propoſed by the neutral powers, particularly King Staniſlaus and the Dutch, that the propoſal came to nothing.

The winter of the year 1759 Germany ſuffered greatly from cold and ſcarcity of proviſions, which drove the poorer ſort of the inhabitants into the armies of their ſeveral maſters; ſo that thoſe of the Empreſs Queen were now more numerous than ever. Tho' Great Britain was not afflicted with the like calamities, yet her peo⯑ple, in their private capacities, ſhewed a regard for and ſent a relief to their troops in Germany and America, that can be matched in no other coun⯑try. Some private gentlemen formed themſelves into a ſociety for that purpoſe; and in the be⯑ginning of January, beſides other generous pro⯑viſions [112] for the widows and orphans of our ſoldiers, they ſent abroad 6000 flannel waiſtcoats, 6000 woollen caps, 6000 half gaters, and 5000 pair of woollen gloves; and the donations of the govern⯑ment were equally liberal. Our army in Germany having ſuffered greatly in the preceding campaign, fix regiments of foot, commanded by Major Ge⯑neral Griffin, were ſent to reinforce it, and were followed by Elliot's light horſe, ſo that in the beginning of the campaign, the Britiſh troops in Germany amounted to 25,000 men; a greater army of Britons than had ever ſerved in one place, and at one time, under King William, the great Duke of Marlborough, or indeed under any Engliſh General for two centuries before.

The French were equally alert in their en⯑deavours to make the campaign deciſive. Broglio, who had received a Marſhal's baton of France, continued to command; he had got the ſuperio⯑rity over all his antagoniſts, and his army was reinforced to the amount of 100,000 men, the fineſt troops in France, while Count de St. Ger⯑main, with whom he was upon but indifferent terms, was at the head of a ſeparate body of 30,000 on the Rhine, that no diſagreeable effect might ariſe from any miſunderſtanding between the two Generals. Towards the end of January the Landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel died. His death created many melancholy apprehenſions with re⯑gard to the future conduct of his ſon and ſucceſſor, but they were ſoon diſſipated; for that Prince, notwithſtanding the ſtrong prepoſſeſſions that lay againſt him, exceeded even his father, in his zeal for the Proteſtant cauſe, by adding conſiderably to his troops that were in the ſervice of Great-Britain.

The Swedes, who continued to be a party in the war, tho' always unſucceſsful, had been ex⯑tremely [113] troubleſome to his Pruſſian Majeſty. They had ſuffered but little upon the main, and the people being in general bent on recovering the countries that had been diſmembred from the crown of Sweden, ſerved with chearfulneſs, tho' under the diſadvantage of being very ill commanded. The King of Poland, Elector of Saxony, would willingly have appeared to decline any ſhare in the war, but he was obliged by the Queen of Hungary, and his own family, as well as by the Empreſs of Ruſſia, to ſuffer a body of Saxons to ſerve in their armies. The Duke of Meck⯑lenburgh Schwerin, tho' a Proteſtant Prince, en⯑tered into all the ſchemes of France and Auſtria, for which he was ſeverely chaſtiſed by his Pruſſian Majeſty, to whom we are now to return.

He had in the beginning of the war boaſted, with great juſtice, that he had ſeven Generals under him, who were not to be parallelled in all Europe; but in a few years all of them were cut, off, without a poſſibility of their being replaced; for tho' one genius may ſucceed another, yet nothing but practice can ſupply experience. He however ſtill kept up a creditable appearance, and from time to time publiſhed ſuch accounts of his reſources and troops, as gave the world very high ideas of his power. His ſucceſſes were not anſwer⯑able to thoſe reports. He performed prodigies, but he could not act impoſſibilities. The Swedes▪ the French, the Ruſſians, and the Auſtrians were ſtill in the field in the beginning of the year 1760, and tho' ſingly they were no match for his troops, yet upon the whole he ſuſtained great loſſes by the continued repetition of their attacks. The Swedes invaded the open county of Pomerania; the Ruſſians had an eye upon Colberg, becauſe it gave them a port in the Baltic, and the poſſeſſion of it would have ſaved them the march [114] of many hundred miles. He had all the extenſive countries of Saxony and Sileſia, which border upon the almoſt inacceſſible mountains of Bohemia to cover, while the eaſtern part of his dominions was next to defenceleſs. Sileſia is a ſtrong and fertile country, but the manners and maxims of his Pruſſian Majeſty are far from being of a conciliat⯑ing nature to a people, who for many centuries were taught to look upon the houſe of Auſtria as their lawful ſovereigns, ſo that it may be ſaid with great truth, that nothing but force can keep them in awe.

Such was the ſituation of that Prince in the beginning of the year 1760; and a more uncom⯑fortable one can ſcarcely be conceived. He had nothing but empty fame, and the applauſe of news writers, to counterbalance millions of dan⯑gers and diſappointments he was every hour expoſ⯑ed to, excepting the immenſe ſubſidy he had from England. It would not perhaps be too bold to ſay that this ſubſidy, every thing conſidered, brought upon him all the misfortunes he after⯑wards met with, becauſe he depended too much upon it for the continuance of a war, to which his power was by no means equal. At the time we now treat of he ſeemed to be ſomewhat ſenſi⯑ble of this, for he formed a plan of operations that were entirely defenſive. To give the reader an idea of his ſituation, is impoſſible, farther than by acquainting him that his brother Prince Henry, commanded an army about Frankfort on the Oder, in order to protect Sileſia, the New Marche of Brandenburgh, and Berlin, which, conſidering its importance, is one of the moſt defenceleſs places in Europe. He himſelf in the mean time lay in a camp moſt judiciouſly choſen between the Elbe and the Mulda, in an almoſt impregnable ſituation, with 250 pieces of can⯑non [115] in his front. The conveniency of this poſi⯑tion was the greater, as he was by it enabled both to receive and ſend ſuccours to his brother.

His Pruſſian Majeſty, however, was deceived in all his deſigns. The Auſtrians were ſuperior to him in force, and almoſt equal in diſcipline and courage. Laudohn, a General who had hi⯑therto made but an indifferent figure, was by the policy of the court of Vienna ſet up as the rival of Count Daun, whom the Empreſs Queen con⯑ſidered as a great General, but too inactive, too cautious, and too unenterprizing. The character of Laudohn was the reverſe. His Pruſſian Majeſty had placed one of his Generals, Fouquet, in whom he had great confidence, near Glatz, ſo as to ſerve as an intermediate aſſiſtance, either to himſelf or to his brother Prince Henry, ac⯑cording as circumſtances ſhould preſent them⯑ſelves. Laudohn's manoeuvres impoſed upon his Pruſſian Majeſty and all his Generals, and were ſo myſterious, that Fouquet believing his inten⯑tion was to beſiege Schweidnitz, left Glatz un⯑covered, upon which Laudohn made himſelf maſter of Landſhut, and Fouquet in a moſt un⯑ſoldier-like manner abandoned the protection of Schweidnitz, and marched towards Landſhut, from whence he drove the Auſtrians.

This was what Laudohn had foreſeen and ex⯑pected, and in the mean time he ſecretly made ſuch diſpoſitions, that Fouquet was in effect ſur⯑rounded without a poſſibility of being relieved, while he was obliged to detach 2000 out of the 15,000 men he commanded to preſerve his com⯑munication with Schweidnitz. It happened at this time that the Auſtrians were animated with a more than ordinary reſentment againſt the Pruſſians, nor could all the precautions which Fouquet had taken to fortify his camp withſtand [116] it. The Auſtrians knew of the maſterly diſpo⯑ſitions their General had made, and that they muſt depend upon their own courage for ſucceſs. Their behaviour was equal to their high expecta⯑tions, and it is hard to ſay whether the attack or the reſiſtance was the moſt glorious, but the Auſtrians were ſuperior not only in their numbers but in their condition. The Pruſſians had lain long on the defenſive, and had been but poorly ſupplied with proviſions, and conſequently low in ſpirits. The Auſtrians, on the other hand, had lived in free quarters, and were in want of nothing that could give them either ſtrength or courage. Notwithſtanding all thoſe diſadvantages, the Pruſſians behaved with admirable reſolution, and maintained to the laſt every poſt they poſſeſſed, till they were driven by main force from one en⯑trenchment to another, and at laſt 4000 of them being killed, the remainder, who amounted to almoſt 8000, were obliged to ſurrender priſoners of war, with 58 pieces of artillery, beſides co⯑lours, though it was ſaid the Auſtrians loſt 12,000 men.

It is remarkable in this war that his Pruſſian Majeſty, who we have ſome reaſon to believe ſu⯑perviſed the accounts of all his campaigns, found means to exaggerate the loſſes of his enemies, and in a ſurpriſing degree to extenuate his own, ſo that, candidly ſpeaking, the true ſtate of his affairs were known only by the conſequences. But the defeat of Fouquet could neither be con⯑cealed nor palliated, and its effects appeared in every department of the war. Laudohn took one part of Glatz by ſtorm and the other by ca⯑pitulation▪ though it was defended by 2000 men and above 100 braſs cannon. This, perhaps, was not the greateſt loſs. The important ſitua⯑tion of the place, and the prodigious magazines [117] it contained were irretrievable, and Sileſia was now open to be penetrated by the Auſtrians.

Thus the city of Glatz was, to the Auſtrians, the firſt fruits of this complete victory, which, from the place near which it was fought, is called the battle of Landſhut. His Pruſſian Majeſty knew nothing of the prodigious loſs he had ſuffered till he had heard that Laudohn was preparing to beſiege Breſlau, the capital of Sileſia, and by far too capacious either for its fortifications or garriſon. All that he could do was to purſue a plan like to that of Laudohn, but ſtill more myſte⯑rious, which was ſuggeſted by his own genius, ever fertile in expedients. All Europe gave him up as loſt, and the diſcontented in England be⯑gan, notwithſtanding all the public prepoſſeſſions in favour of his Pruſſian Majeſty, to complain that we had gone too far in ſupporting him, as his ſyſtem either of offence or defence was equally impracticable, and that our perſeverence in his cauſe would hurt us, without being of any benefit to him.

They were ſoon undeceived. As it was natu⯑ral to expect that he would endeavour to retrieve his affairs in Sileſia, the defence of which was his main point, he made preparations for that pur⯑poſe. Daun, who commanded not only his own army but in fact that of the Empire, had not the leaſt doubt of his intentions, and leaving Ge⯑neral Lacy in Saxony, followed his Pruſſian Ma⯑jeſty through Luſatia. In this march the great foreſight and penetration of his Pruſſian Majeſty eminently appeared. Daun's great object was to outmarch him. He had taken the ſouth road, and the King after paſſing the Elbe and march⯑ing through a woody country was on the north⯑ward; ſo that he had the diſadvantage of Daun in what we may call their race to Sileſia. Daun [118] knew this, and availed himſelf of his ſucceſs by accelerating his motions; ſo that he gained two full days march of his Pruſſian Majeſty, reached Gorlitz, and proceeded with great rapidity to Lau⯑ban. This was what his Pruſſian Majeſty ex⯑pected and wanted; and he had the admirable addreſs to appropriate to himſelf the advantage of Daun's two days march; for he inſtantly fell into the route by which Daun had advanced; and paſ⯑ſing the Spree at Bautzen he appeared before the gates of Dreſden; ſo that the war now aſſumed another aſpect.

The King of Pruſſia though he could not cope with Daun's, the Imperial, and Lucy's army, was ſuperior to the two latter, ſo that the firſt was obliged to retreat and the other to change its ſituation, and the King of Pruſſia being joined, according to previous, but eventual, orders, by his Generals Hulſon and Ziethen, left Prince Henry, who was at Glogau, at liberty to act as occaſion ſhould require, while he himſelf formed the ſiege of Dreſden.

We are here to obſerve that every plan concerted by the court of Vienna, is, like the laws of the Medes and Perſians, unalterable, and the devi⯑ating from it, if not attended with ſucceſs, be the motives ever ſo rational, has often proved fa⯑tal to their Generals. The Empreſs Queen to pleaſe her ſiſter of Ruſſia, and out of mere de⯑cency, had inſtructed Daun in the campaign to make the preſervation of Dreſden his capital ob⯑ject. He was then in Sileſia, where he durſt not for the reaſons I have given, purſue his advan⯑tages; and aſtoniſhed as he was at his Pruſſian Majeſty's maſterly conduct, he found himſelf, againſt his better judgment, obliged to return to Saxony that he might preſerve Dreſden; and his return left Prince Henry at Liberty to move to⯑wards [119] Sileſia. All the motions of this campaign had hitherto been ſo ſkilful, that the reader, who underſtands the game at cheſs, can ſcarcely fail to find out the ſimilarity. The King of Pruſſia made the moſt ſurprizing and the fineſt moves; but Daun ſhewed himſelf to be as ſure a player. His return from Sileſia was much more quick than was expected from his phlegm and regula⯑rity; for on the 19th of July he and his army appeared within a few miles of Dreſden.

His Pruſſian Majeſty, however, did not fail to avail himſelf to the utmoſt of the ſtart he had gained. He beſieged Dreſden, which was de⯑fended by General Maguire. The operations of the ſiege, unleſs we were to recount particulars, can convoy no new inſtruction to a reader who can form an idea of the moſt determined attack on the one ſide, and the moſt intrepid defence on the other; and the ruin of the fineſt buildings that any city in the world contained, by the in⯑ceſſant fire from three batteries of cannons and mortars; while each party equally practiſed every art and manoeuvre uſual in ſuch caſes. The ap⯑proach of Count Daun ſerved to redouble the fury of the Pruſſians, but at the ſame it confirmed and encreaſed the reſolute intrepidity of the be⯑ſieged, eſpecially when Daun found means, as he did, to throw into the place 16 battalions during the night of the 21ſt. After ſuch a reinforce⯑ment, and while three armies were in the neigh⯑hood (for the army of the Empire and that under Lacy had returned by this time) it would have been worſe than madneſs for his Pruſſian Majeſty to continue the ſiege, and therefore he raiſed it, but without moleſtation from his enemies. Thus ended this mighty trial of ſkill between great genius and great ſagacity, and each ſupported by a proportionable degree of courage and experi⯑ence; [120] ſo that on the whole we may allow the conduct of the Pruſſians was the moſt brilliant, and that of the Auſtrians the moſt ſolid; but in the main, if any advantage was gained, it lay on the King's ſide, though in fact the great game that was played between them remained ſtill pre⯑carious.

Laudohn, who was all this while in Sileſia, truſted to his being joined by the [...]ſſians, but through their unwieldineſs and irregularity they did not arrive ſoon enough to make the campaign deciſive on that ſide. Being ſtill, however, in hopes of their junction, on the 1ſt of Auguſt he had his cannon and mortars in condition to play from their batteries upon Breſlau. Count Tauenzein commanded for his Pruſſian Majeſty in that city, and a kind of military ceremonial at firſt paſſed between the two Generals. Laudohn partly in civility, partly in compaſſion, took pity upon Tauenzien's weakneſs and that of the place, and employed various arguments, which had more the air of a French than a German General, to perſuade him to accept of an honourable capitu⯑lation. Tauenzien was too obſtinate and too un⯑polite to believe one word he ſaid, and thus after they had fought through all the weapons of ſol⯑dier-like courteſy they drew the ſword, and no⯑thing was wanting that could do honour to the beſieged or the beſiegers. For a relation of what paſſed on this occaſion we muſt refer our readers to what we have juſt now ſaid concerning the ſiege of Dreſden. Laudohn from hoſtilities re⯑turned to compliments, and was anſwered only by reproaches for doing the ſame thing againſt Breſlau that his Pruſſian Majeſty was doing againſt Dreſden, that is ruining the town with⯑out damaging the fortifications. Mean while there was no account of the approach of the [121] Ruſſians, but on the 5th of Auguſt an account came that Prince Henry was within a few miles of the Auſtrian camp, which induced Laudohn in a kind of a regular hurry to break up the ſiege.

A philoſophical reader (if any ſuch I have) will here make a pauſe and reflect on the extreme folly and cruelty of the greateſt and moſt hu⯑mane Generals. His Pruſſian Majeſty avows himſelf to be a philoſopher, and therefore he may be ſaid to be a profeſſor of humanity. Count Daun is remarkable for coolneſs, placability, and his not having the leaſt tincture of harſhneſs in his temper, even to his enemies. Yet what de⯑vaſtations, what bloodſhed and what inhumani⯑ties did not each of them this campaign commit, without either of them bettering his ſituation! The reader will pardon this reflection, which may not ſuggeſt itſelf during the piece-meal read⯑ing of news papers, but appears in full force, when, as in theſe pages, they are brought into one point of view.

The operations between the French and the allies this campaign were far from anſwering the great preparations and reinforcements which both ſides had made and received. The truth is, at the opening of the campaign the chief buſineſs of both armies was to eat rather than to fight, and all the motions of all their parties were to⯑wards getting a meal rather than a victory. The winter had been ſevere, the country conſumed, and the ſpring late; calamities that were in com⯑mon to both, and each had a kind of fellow feel⯑ing for the other. The reader muſt have a per⯑ſonal view of the country before he can judge of the ſituations of the allies, eſpecially the Engliſh, the great, and indeed the ſole dependence of their army. When the rigour of the ſeaſon abated, [122] the ſuperior providence of the French over our German commander appeared, for, while they lay in their cantonments, they were ſupplied with pro⯑viſions from the Rhine, the Mayne, and the Moſelle, while the allies were diſabled by want and indigence to undertake any enterprize that was worthy the immenſe expence to Great Bri⯑tain at which they were ſerving. All that is worth mentioning was performed by the young hereditary Prince of Brunſwick, who laid Fulda under contribution, and expelled the French from it at the head of ſome Britiſh troops. Happily for the allies, a miſunderſtanding prevailed be⯑tween the two French Generals, Marſhal Brog⯑lio and Count de St. Germain. Inſtead of the one advancing by Munſter and the other through the Landgraviate of Heſſe, and leaving ſtrong poſts to the eaſtward of the Weſer, operations that might have proved fatal to the allies, the whole of their grand army united into one body; a meaſure ſo diſcordant with the original and in⯑deed rational plan of their operations, that St. Germain, who is ſaid to have the trueſt military genius of any French officer, was diſguſted, but, at firſt, without retiring from his command. Not⯑withſtanding this, the French took Marburg and Dillenburg, the firſt on the 30th of June, the latter on the 16th of July, and made the garri⯑ſons of both priſoners of war. The inactivity of the German General in this perillous ſituation is a little unaccountable, but the hereditary Prince, at the head of ſome Britiſh regiments, endea⯑voured to retrieve it. The French had hitherto moved in two bodies, and that under St. Ger⯑main was known to have advanced to Corbach, ſo that the Prince reſolved to attack him, and to drive him from that poſt. But by this time the junction of the French was formed, and the [123] Prince inſtead of encountring 10,000 foot and 17 ſquadrons of horſe, which were the number St. Germain commanded, fell in with the whole French army, and that too with ſuch reſolution, as rendered his retreat, after he had diſcovered his miſtake, almoſt impracticable. Nothing but the valour of the Engliſh could have remedied this miſtake. The French were freſh, numerous, and well formed. The Germans, both horſe and foot, gave themſelves up to a deſpondency (to call it no worſe) which threatened a total rout, while the French were every moment pouring in reinforcements, chiefly of cavalry, to complete their deſtruction. In this deſperate ſituation the Prince put himſelf at the head of Bland's and Howard's dragoons, who ſoon check⯑ed the ardour of the French cavalry, covered the retreat of the Germans, and thus ſaved the army at the expence of 900 men killed, wounded, or taken priſoners, and 15 pieces of cannon, which were left in the field of battle, beſides a wound which his Serene Highneſs himſelf received.

The allies, during the action as was before mentioned, after retreating towards the Dymel, were encamped at Saxenhauſen. Military men were amazed that Broglio did not purſue his ad⯑vantage, nor can the reaſons of his inactivity be, to this day, accounted for. The Hereditary Prince unjuſtly charged himſelf with being the author of a defeat, which did him and the Engliſh ſo much honour, and formed a daring reſolution to repair it. He knew that Glaubitz, a French General, was at the head of a conſidera⯑ble detachment, which were marched towards Zegenhagen in Heſſe, to make himſelf maſter of that important poſt. For this purpoſe his Serene Highneſs put himſelf at the head of ſix German battalions, two brigades of hunters, a regiment [124] of Huſſars, and Elliot's regiment of light horſe. The laſt regiment had been raiſed only in the preceeding ſpring and winter, and had been form⯑ed chiefly out of Engliſh journeymen, who rather choſe to ſerve in the army than ſubmit to, what they called, the unjuſt demands of their maſters. Not a man amongſt them had ever been before in the ſervice, but they liked it ſo well that they were ſoon diſciplined, and made an excellent ap⯑pearance, ſo that the Hereditary Prince choſe them to form part of his detachment. He was at this time above 60 Engliſh miles diſtant from Glaubitz, which rendered the latter perfectly ſecure. The Prince, however, led his detach⯑ment, unperceived, within ſight of his camp, and after reconnoitring it, he formed the plan of the attack, which was of a very extraordinary nature. The ſituation of the enemy was ſuch as to be inacceſſible on their left, but by making a detour of two leagues through woody uneven grounds, and the right was ſecured by mountains. The Hereditary Prince undertook in perſon the at⯑tack of the left. He left that of the right to his infantry, who were obliged to climb up moun⯑tains, to come at their enemy. Both charges were ſo vigorous and ſo unexpected, that both ſucceeded. The enemy in a manner was routed before Glaubitz had time to form them; but they were routed with very little loſs, and the advantage of their ſituation was ſuch that their main body retired from one wood to another, while the Prince was unable to bring up his fatigued and harraſſed infantry to the purſuit. It was on this occaſion, that Elliot's horſe per⯑formed ſervices that would have done honour to a regiment of the beſt veterans in Europe. The Prince in perſon led them on, and they alone entered the wood, where their addreſs and diſcipline [125] was equal to their intrepidity. The enemy unable to reſiſt them were charged and penetrated five times; by which a party of 500, being ſeparated from the reſt, threw down their arms and ſurren⯑dered themſelves priſoners. A great deal, howe⯑ver, remained ſtill to be done before the victory could be complete. A regiment of the enemy's huſſars was entirely cut in pieces; and the main body, which had taken poſt in the wood, being in like manner ſurrounded, found themſelves likewiſe obliged to give up their arms, but not till after a great ſlaughter. The priſoners made on this occaſion, beſides Glaubitz himſelf and a Prince of Anhalt, were 177 officers, and 2482 private men, nine pair of colours and ſix pieces of cannon were taken; ſo that upon the whole it was with regard to the captures, one of the moſt extraordinary actions ever known. The Hereditary Prince loſt no more than 79 men, but, of thoſe, 71 were Elliot's light horſe.

Prince Ferdinand remained all this time in his camp at Saxenhauſen, but after this action he moved to Kalle near Caſſel. Upon this, the French, who were very numerous, divided them⯑ſelves into three armies. One of them, which had formed their reſerve, conſiſting of 35000 men, paſſed the Dymel at Stalbergen under the Chevalier de Muy, who had ſucceeded St. Ger⯑main in his command; another body, which was their main army, advanced under Broglio himſelf to Kalle; and the third, under Prince Xavier of Saxony, took the route of Caſſel. From thoſe motions it was plain the French Generals meditated ſome important blow, and Prince Ferdinand at all events thought it his beſt courſe to paſs the Dymel and fight de Muy. On the 31ſt of July, the allies, having paſſed the river, and formed upon the heights of Corbach, [126] came in ſight of the French, who were poſted to great advantage at Warbourg. It would be pre⯑ſumptuous in us to cenſure the operations of great Generals, but we cannot help being of opinion, that ſomething was wanting to ſupport the attack made on this occaſion. The Hereditary Prince turned the left of the enemy in two columns, ſo as to attack them in flank and rear with his uſual briſkneſs; but the French were ſo well reinforced that he could do nothing effectual. In the mean while, Prince Ferdinand ordered ſome detachments to attack the French bridges over the Dymel to the right, and he himſelf ad⯑vanced to charge the enemy in front. It muſt be acknowledged, that thoſe diſpoſitions, had they been properly ſupported, muſt have been deciſive in favour of the allies; but the flower of their army, which conſiſted of the Engliſh, were five miles behind, ſo that tho' the French, by the efforts of the Hereditary Prince, began to give way on that ſide, yet their main body was at liberty to retire, without putting it into the power of the infantry of the allies to engage them, nor indeed did their commander in chief ſeem to have been very forward to riſk his Ger⯑man troops. By his own account ſent to his late Majeſty, it is certain, that his attack upon the enemy's front was very feeble, and as he himſelf acknowledges, was unſupported by the infantry, ſo that the heat of the day fell upon the Engliſh, whoſe cavalry came all the five miles upon a full trot under the Marquis of Granby and Generals Moſtyn, and while General Waldegrave did all he could to haſten the march of the infantry, Captain Philips brought up the Britiſh arrillery on a gallop. But tho' our na⯑tional troops were thus beyond all precedent ex⯑peditions, yet they could not prevent the enemy [127] from making their retreat good over the Dymel. The charge, that was made upon them by the Britiſh cavalry, was ſo gallant, as to evince their ardour for retrieving that glory which they had been deprived of at Minden, tho' their foot, many of whom dropt down in the moraſſes, through which their long fatiguing march lay, could not ſecond them. The French, in their account, pretend, that the brigade of Bourbon checked the Britiſh cavalry, that the allies were greatly ſuperior in number, that the Hereditary Prince in turning their left was favoured by a fog, and that the battle continued without ad⯑vantage to either ſide four hours. But it is evi⯑dent, even from their own narrative, that they employed moſt of that time in making preparations for a retreat, which with great difficulty they effected over the Dymel, and that, upon the whole, they thought themſelves victorious, becauſe they were not completely defeated. In this battle, the great loſs fell upon the Engliſh, of whom about 600 were killed, wounded, and miſſing. But the total loſs of the allied army was not pub⯑liſhed, probably becauſe it would have diſcovered the great diſproportion between the ſufferings of the Engliſh and thoſe of the Germans. The French in their account pretended, that the loſs of the allies were ſuperior to theirs. But that could not be the fact. Beſides great numbers of French that were drowned in paſſing the Dymel, 1500 were left dead on the field of battle, and as many were taken, together with ten pieces of cannon.

The battle of Warbourg, the reader will per⯑ceive, was more glorious than it was advantage⯑ous to the Engliſh and their allies. The Cheva⯑lier de Muy commanded but one of the three French armies; but the other two, without re⯑ſiſtance, [128] became maſters of Munden, Caſſel, Gottingen, Eimbach, and Ziegenhagen, where they made a great number of priſoners, and got conſiderable magazines. Thus, though the allies gained a battle, they loſt a province, the whole Landgraviate of Heſſe being now in the French poſſeſſion; nor was it clear, that, before the end of the campaign, they might not become maſters of Hanover itſelf; while all that Prince Ferdi⯑nand gained was to ſecure his poſts upon the Dy⯑mel, and preſerve his communication with Weſt⯑phalia, the loſs of which muſt have been of the worſt conſequence to him, conſidering the ſitua⯑tion of the two armies. The abilities of the German General on this occaſion were highly extolled; but, perhaps, the preſervation of Ha⯑nover was owing chiefly to its miſerable exhauſted ſtate, which rendered it incapable of maintain⯑ing an army.

His Pruſſian Majeſty, all this while, had the ter⯑rible junction of the Ruſſians with the Auſtrians and Imperialiſts hanging over his head. One body of the former had already entered the fron⯑tiers of Sileſia, another had penetrated into Po⯑merania, where they prepared to lay ſiege to Colberg, and the whole of them had laid under contribution vaſt tracts of his Majeſty's beſt pro⯑vinces. Laudohn ſtill continued the blockade of Neiſs and Schweidnitz, his army was powerful, and 22,000 Swedes had begun their operations, while his Majeſty's main enemy Daun was lying in wait for an opportunity to finiſh all his hopes. His Pruſſian Majeſty in this diſtracted and diſ⯑couraging ſituation had recourſe to expedients, which neceſſity alone can ſuggeſt, and ſucceſs juſtify. Marſhal Daun was then at Bautzen, without dreaming that his Pruſſian Majeſty would undertake impoſſibilities, for ſo they muſt be [129] thought by all the known rules of war-making. The King, finding he could effect nothing in Saxony, on the 30th of July decamped and took the rout of Meiſſen, and without our tracing his various motions, in five days time he marched near 200 miles, at the head of an army encum⯑bered with a numerous artillery and 2000 wag⯑gons, and he paſſed the Elbe, the Spree, the Neiſs, the Queiſs, and the Boher, with one Auſtrian army on one ſide of him under General Reid, near Bautzen, another behind him under General Laſcy, and a third in front, under General Beck; and all this without oppoſition. After this aſtoniſhing rapidity, it may, perhaps be unneceſſary to add, that during his progreſs he obtained many, not inconſiderable, advantages over the Auſtrian Ge⯑nerals.

In an undertaking like this, it is proper not only to recount the facts, but to obſerve what we may call the military rationale of great events. Count Daun, as we have mentioned, was ſtill at Bautzen, with an intention to penetrate into Sileſia, and to join Laudohn, in which caſe, the often attempted junction of the Auſtrians with the Ruſſians, muſt have been effected. Laudohn, whoſe army was every day receiving ſtrong rein⯑forcements, had been, for ſome time, with difficul⯑ty, kept in play by Prince Henry; but the delay of a few days muſt have rendered the match un⯑equal, as the Ruſſians were every hour advancing. Daun was aſtoniſhed at the eſcape, for ſo we may call it, of the King of Pruſſia, but prepared to follow him. His Majeſty encamped at Lignitz, but found himſelf in danger, after all, of miſſing his great aim, which was that of engaging Lau⯑dohn before the armies under Daun and Laſcy could arrive to his aſſiſtance, which they did be⯑fore his Majeſty could find that opportunity. But [130] ſtill Daun and Laudohn occupied different camps, the one on his front, and the other on his rear. They had taken poſſeſſion of an extent of a very ſtrong country, no leſs than 30 miles, along the Katſ⯑bach, from Parchwitz to Coſſendan, and had filled it with lines and redoubts, ſo that the whole appeared as one continued fortification, nor could his Pruſſian Majeſty, with all his ſkill, fall upon a way of attacking one army without being expoſed to be ruined by the other. He was again in one of thoſe ſituations that had ſo often diſtreſſed him. It is unknown to the public, whether he owed his deliverance on this occaſion to his own wonderful ſagacity, which ſuggeſted what he himſelf would do, had he the ſame ad⯑vantages, or whether he was not favoured by pri⯑vate intelligence. Both might be true. Daun was tempted by the occaſion which preſented it⯑ſelf, and reſolved to become the aggreſſor. He concerted a plan with Laudohn and Laſcy for attacking his Pruſſian Majeſty, while the Ruſ⯑ſians, to the number of 24,000 men, having thrown bridges over the Oder, were to paſs it that very day under Count Czernichew. His Pruſſian Majeſty ſaw that his enemies could not ſurround him, without their making one of thoſe movements he had ſo long wiſhed for. On the very night, when the Auſtrians had propoſed their great ſtroke, he privately decamped from Lignitz, and removed to a ſtrong paſs by which he knew Laudohn's diviſion muſt march.

Every thing ſucceeded to his wiſh. Daun exe⯑cuted his part of the plan with profound ſilence in the night time, but found the enemy decamped, and ſoon had certain indications that they were en⯑gaged with Laudohn. It was thought, at his own court eſpecially, that if he had made a vigo⯑rous attack on the rear of the Pruſſian army it [131] might have been totally defeated. But this opi⯑nion probably did him injuſtice, for his Pruſſian Majeſty foreſeeing ſuch an attack, had guarded his rear with very ſtrong entrenchments. In the mean while, Laudohn had paſſed the Katſbach, and proceeded as far as Pſaffendorf in his march to Lignitz, where he was in hopes of aſſiſting at the mortal blow his Pruſſian Majeſty was to re⯑ceive. The break of day-light, and the diſ⯑ſipation of a very thick fog, preſented to his eves a moſt dreadful proſpect, which was that of the whole Pruſſian army drawn up in array of battle, with a ſtrong artillery on its front, and poſted to great advantage. This was the morn⯑ing of the 15th of Auguſt, but the aſtoniſhment of Laudohn neither daunted his courage, nor diſ⯑ordered his judgment. Finding he could not re⯑treat, he formed his army with admirable pre⯑ſence of mind, and a moſt terrible battle enſued, in which his Pruſſian Majeſty in perſon was ex⯑poſed equally with the meaneſt ſoldier; his cloaths being ſhot through in ſeveral places, and a horſe killed under him; ſo that it might be ſaid he then fought not for dominion but ſafety. Nothing, perhaps, but his own perſonal intrepidity could have gained him the victory. His veteran Generals were all dead or killed, and his troops were but newly raiſed; but they were brave and faithful. His example inſpirited their efforts, and Laudohn, without loſing any of his military reputation, retreated to the Katſbach with the loſs (as to the Auſtrians themſelves gave out) of 6000 men killed, wounded and taken priſoners, though the Pruſſians gave out he loſt 10,000. Two Ge⯑nerals and 84 officers were amongſt the priſoners, and the trophies which fell to the victors were 82 pieces of cannon, and 123 pair of colours. The [132] loſs of the Pruſſians was ſaid to have been 5000 killed and 1200 wounded.

Though the loſs of the battle, as has been before hinted, muſt have been fatal to his Pruſſian Majeſty, it did not prove ſo to the Auſtrians, whoſe Generals received daily rein⯑forcements, and encouragements from their So⯑vereign. Daun, though he could not ſucceed in Sileſia, turned his arms towards other objects. He detached Prince Lavenſtein and General Beck, with part of his army, to encourage the Ruſſians to advance. But the terror of the battle of Pſaffendorf, had made ſuch an impreſſion upon them, that they had repaſſed the Oder, and were then marching Northwards. This did not hin⯑der Daun from blockading Schweidnitz, and his Pruſſian Majeſty having, by this time, joined his brother at Newmarche, detached General Goltze to obſerve the motions of the Ruſſians, while he himſelf defeated the corps of Auſtrians under General Beck, and obliged Daun to raiſe the blockade of Schweidnitz, and to retreat precipi⯑tately towards the heights of Landſhut. In Saxony, General Hulſen, on the 20th of Auguſt, had an action with part of the Imperial army, which attacked him with great fury, in order to cut off his communication with Torgau. The engagement was hot, and Hulſen diſcovered great military abilities, for, beſides the killed, he made 41 officers and 1200 men priſoners, with very little loſs to himſelf. But he could not avail himſelf of this victory; for he was obliged to retreat, leaſt the grand army of the Imperialiſts ſhould cut off his communication with the Elbe. By this retreat he loſt his communication with the King, whoſe mind and army was diſtracted amidſt a variety of objects. The Ruſſians were now marching through the Lower Sileſia. The Au⯑ſtrians [133] found no reſiſtance in Luſatia, and Saxony, notwithſtanding all Hulſen could do to defend it, was upon the point of being loſt to the King. Such was the ſtate of his Pruſſian Majeſty's affairs towards the cloſe of the campaign. He had defeated his enemies, without finding he had leſſen'd their numbers. He had gained victories, but had reaped no advantages, and all the pro⯑digies of valour he had performed, did no more than juſt ſave him from perdition. But the ſitua⯑tion of his Pruſſian Majeſty's mind is beſt deſ⯑cribed in the following letter, which he wrote to the Marquis D'Argens, the author of the Jewiſh Spy, and one of his literary favourites, which letter bears in its ſtile and compoſition undoubted marks of its authenticity, which was verified by other inconteſtible evidence.

Some of the belligerant powers at laſt began to reflect, with horror, upon the dreadful butchery their armies were committing in Germany, where they had no original, or immediate, concern. The French had attacked, as we have already ob⯑ſerved, his Britannic Majeſty's electoral domini⯑ons, only in conſequence of their American quarrel. Great Britain was only conſequentially and out of gratitude engaged to protect them, and yet their two armies had acted with the ſame ſanguinary diſpoſitions, as if they had been princi⯑pals in fighting pro aris et focis. The Ruſſians could at beſt be conſidered as auxiliaries to the Empreſs Queen, yet their devaſtations in Ger⯑many exceeded thoſe of all the other powers; and the Swedes, though impotent, were ſtill numerous enough to make head againſt the piti⯑ful number which his Pruſſian Majeſty had to op⯑poſe them, and to eat up the unhappy country. None of thoſe pacific ſentiments, however, were publickly avowed by any party, but they ſeem to have been manifeſted by their conſequences.

[136] The public of England were every day in ex⯑pectation, that after the French had made them⯑ſelves maſters of Munden and Gottingen, the [...] would have penetrated into Hanover, which they might eaſily have done. But they had many reaſons for declining ſuch a ſtep. In the firſt place, as we have already hinted, the country was ſo exhauſted, that it could not have maintained them. In the next, ſuch an attempt, if ſucceſsful, was incon⯑ſiſtent with their real plan. The Britiſh parlia⯑ment began already to be uneaſy about the waſte of their blood and treaſure in Germany; and had Hanover been completely conquered, no pretext could have been invented for detaining their ar⯑my there, which was the great point France had in view. A remarkable languiſhment, however, followed it, between the two armies who were encamped on each ſide of the Dymel, after the battle of Warbourg, for a whole month. This in⯑action was diſagreeable to the genius of the Here⯑ditary Prince, who appears to have made war in earneſt, without any lucrative views of continu⯑ing his appointments, or the mean ones of ſpar⯑ing his Germans. It is true, the great opinion he experimentally entertained of the Britiſh valour coſt our countrymen dear, and was favourable to the Germans, but he always ventured his own per⯑ſon equally with that of the meaneſt Engliſh ſoldier, and they followed him with pride and alacrity. While the armies lay in this ſtate of inaction, he underſtood that 2000 French occupied the town of Zierenberg, and he reſolved to ſurprize them. He accordingly poſted a body of troops between that place and Dierenberg, to cut off all commu⯑nication between the two camps of the enemy. He next made the proper diſpoſitions for ſecure⯑ing his retreat, in caſe of a repulſe; and at the head of his remaining foot, moſt of which were [137] Engliſh, on the 5th of September, they ſet out in three diviſions for Warbourg, and by two next morning they were before Zierenberg. But not⯑withſtanding all the precautions that had been taken for the ſilence of their march, they were diſcovered by a party of dragoons, who fired upon them and ſpread an alarm. On this occaſion, the intrepidity and good diſcipline of the Engliſh foot did them great honour. Contrary to the uſual character of their nation, of being too ready to fire, they made uſe of their bayonets only. With them they drove the enemy's picquets, who were on their guard, before them; ſome entered the town at the ſame time with the fugitives, others were employed in putting the guard to the ſword, and others in forcing open the gates, till at laſt, all entered the place, and, without firing, they proceeded in firm order to the church-yard, which the main body of the enemy poſſeſſed. The noiſe they made was ſo little, and the night ſo dark, that the French took them to be their own picquets, and ſuffered them to draw up near them, but they were attacked and totally diſ⯑perſed by the Engliſh with their bayonets on their muſquets. In vain the French attempted to fly from the gate. They were every where oppoſed, purſued, ſlain, or taken priſoners. Every quar⯑ter of the town was filled with blood, confuſion, and tumult, but the Engliſh were victorious thro' all. They neither killed nor took priſoners any of the inhabitants who had not weapons in their hands, and far from being intent on plunder, they even refuſed to accept of the gratuities which the townſmen offered them to ſpare their perſons and properties. The whole action of this noble and well conducted expedition laſted but about an hour, at the end of which, the Prince found him⯑ſelf in complete poſſeſſion of the place, having [138] taken two pieces of cannon, and made 36 officers and near 500 private men priſoners. He then conſidered the danger of remaining with ſo ſmall a force, ſo near the enemy's main body, and re⯑gained his former camp without loſs or moleſta⯑tion.

Here we find it again neceſſary to interrupt the courſe of this narrative, by obſerving, that the intrepidity which the Engliſh uniformly diſ⯑played, and the ſucceſs which attended all their operations during the courſe of this war, com⯑pared with the little effect produced by ſuch ama⯑zing exertions of courage, ſufficiently prove, that there was ſomewhat amiſs, and too dilatory in the original plan of every campaign, which no valour or partial ſucceſs could remedy. The ad⯑vantage gained at Zierenberg was glorious and cheap, for it coſt them no more than 10 men, and yet, if we except the reputation the Engliſh gained by it, it was dear when we conſider its conſequences. The gallant Prince found, as he might eaſily have foreſeen, that he could not keep the place, and by quitting it, he loſt all he had obtained, excepting a few priſoners, who were burdenſome to maintain. The public, however, had the ſatisfaction to ſee Prince Ferdinand put his Germans in motion, in order to attempt to interrupt the communication between the French and the Rhine, and the Mayne eſpecially with Franckfort. As to Hanover, it lay quite neglected by both parties. The French had their reaſons, as we have already ſeen, for not penetrating fur⯑ther into it than Gottingen, and the allies pre⯑tended that they could not, without hazarding the intire loſs of their army, attempt to diſpoſſeſs them either of that city or of Caſſel. Bulow, a Hanoverian General, was diſpatched with a ſtrong detachment to make inroads into Wetteravia, [139] and the ſouthern parts of Heſſe, which he did with ſo good ſucceſs, that he puſhed on towards Marbourg, which town he ſurprized, and de⯑ſtroyed in it the French ovens with conſiderable magazines of proviſions, beſides carrying off their cloathing and military ſtores. He at laſt proceeded towards Frankenau. The French all this while beheld his progreſs with an air of ſe⯑curity, as thinking it was always in their power to check him. The matter became now to be ſe⯑rious, as they began to feel ſome inconveniences in their communication with Franckfort. Stain⯑ville, one of their beſt Generals, on the 13th of September, attacked the rear of Bulow's detach⯑ment as it was paſſing the river Orck, and not only defeated it, but in all probability would have cut off the whole body, had not the active He⯑reditary Prince, hearing of his danger, made a forced march of five German miles, and arrived to his relief. This obliged Stainville to retire to a ſtrong camp, where he could not be attacked with any probability of ſucceſs. In the mean while, a feeble effort was made under General Wangenheim, another of the allied Generals, to force the enemy to abandon Gottingen, but on the 19th of September, after he had paſſed the Weſer, he was obliged to repaſs it with very conſiderable loſs, and not quite to the advantage of his military character. It muſt be acknow⯑ledged, that in all thoſe ſkirmiſhes and expediti⯑ons, the French ſhewed a vigilance and an atten⯑tion to their plan of operations, far ſuperior to thoſe of the allies; who either had concerted none that was regular, or were entirely directed by the motions of their enemy. The latter, on the 20th of September, in conſequence of their defenſive ſcheme, retired towards Caſſel, where they fortified themſelves, while Prince Ferdi⯑nand [140] ventured to do nothing, but to advance ſo near them as to obſerve their operations.

More active, and indeed unexpected ſcenes of war preſented themſelves upon the Rhine, and almoſt on the frontiers of the dominions of the States Generals, where the Hereditary Prince appeared to the ſurprize of all Europe, who thought he had been in the further part of Heſſe. It would exceed our propoſed bounds, ſhould we deſcribe the particulars, by which this emergen⯑cy, as we may call it, was effected. It is ſuffi⯑cient to ſay, that he had under him 20 battali⯑ons and 10 ſquadrons, which he divided into two bodies. One of thoſe paſſed the Rhine at Roe⯑root, on the other ſide Duſſeldorp. The other diviſion, which marched by the way of Munſter, paſſed a great way below at Rees, which lies al⯑moſt half way between Cleves and Weſel. Thoſe two detachments, notwithſtanding the diſtance of the places, paſſed the Rhine about the ſame time, and their manoeuvres were conducted ſo, as, in a manner to cloſe upon the French. Every thing ſucceeded as had been projected. As they advanced to their intended junction, all the French poſts along the Rhine, with all other boats, fell into the Prince's hands, by which he was enabled to carry over his artillery and the whole of his troops; ſo that meeting with no oppoſition, his detachment again ſeparated, and on the 3d of October, one diviſion took poſſeſſion of Cleves, and three days after, of its caſtle with 500 men; while another laid ſiege to Weſel and attacked it with great fury.

The rapid ſucceſs of this expedition did not prevent its giving riſe to many conjectures, and ſome cenſures, with regard to its utility to Great Britain. Moſt people thought that it had been formed to favour, in conjunction with a ſtrong [141] armament which was fitted out at Portſmouth, a powerful diverſion on the ſide of the Auſtrian Netherlands, which might have obliged the French to deſiſt from forming an army on the Lower Rhine, by which Broglio muſt have be⯑come maſter of Hanover. But this ſuppoſition was chimerical. Hanover had, at this time, in fact, nothing to fear, for, as we have often hinted, Broglio might have become maſter of it when he pleaſed. We are therefore to look elſe⯑where for the motives of this famous expedition.

It is certain, that is was not difficult to foreſee there would be great claſhings in the court of Great Britain, concerning the vaſt expence of blood and treaſure in which ſhe was involved by the German war. Of all the loſſes his Pruſſian Majeſty had met with, that of his countries on the Lower Rhine gave him the greateſt concern, on ſeveral accounts. He had many reaſons to ſuſpect that a ſtrong party in the Engliſh Miniſtry were for a ſeparate peace with France, and that the laſt convention concluded between him and his Britannic Majeſty on the 9th of November 1759, began to be greatly condemned, chiefly on account of its fourth article, by which his Britan⯑nic Majeſty tied himſelf up from concluding any kind of peace, without the full conſent of his Pruſſian ally. He was ſenſible, as afterwards proved to be the caſe, that if a ſeparate peace between Great Britain and France was ſet on foot, it would not be in the power of the former, to put him by any treaty, in poſſeſſion of thoſe countries which were held by the French, only in truſt for the Empreſs Queen. At the ſame time, we are to obſerve that the ſubjects of the States General had not behaved towards Great Britain, with ſuch gratitude and attention as intitled them to extraordinary conſideration from [142] our crown. Upon the whole, therefore, it is moſt rational to think, that the irruption of the Here⯑ditary Prince (as was before mentioned) into the territories of Cleves and Gueldres, was ſecretly concerted between his Pruſſian Majeſty, and the Britiſh court, and happy had it been for this nation, if it had been as ſucceſsful, as it was bold, ſpirited and well conducted. As to the prepara⯑tions made at Portſmouth they were diſavowed to be intended againſt the Auſtrian Netherlands, and their real deſtination has never been pub⯑lickly owned. But it is certain, that had they proceeded to the recovery of Neuport and Oſtend, and even to overawe ſome of our allies, a more popular ſervice, at that time, could not have been undertaken by a Britiſh Miniſtry.

Unforeſeen accidents diſappointed the full effect of the Prince's irruption. One part of his troops was employed in the ſiege of Weſel, on the right of the Rhine; while another covered it on the left. The ſiege was carried on with great reſolution, and ſanguine expectations were form⯑ed of its ſucceſs, by the ſtrong reinforcements that were expected. The vaſt rains that fell ſwelled the rivers, and not only put a ſtop to their progreſs, but rendered the Prince's communica⯑tion with the beſiegers over the Rhine, extremely difficult. Thoſe prodigious inundations and falls of rain, gave time for the Marquis de Caſtries to draw together from Heſſe and the Low Countries an army of 30 battalions and 38 ſquadrons, with which he advanced to Rhinberg, which lay in the very heart of the Prince's late acquiſitions, and drove the allies, with ſome loſs on both ſides, from their poſts there. He then turned to the left towards the convent of Campen, where he formed himſelf very advantageouſly. The Prince had now apparently only two objects to purſue, [143] he muſt either fight this ſuperior army in a pitch⯑ed battle, or abandon the ſiege of Weſel. His genius ſuggeſted to him a medium. For relying on the known valour of the Britiſh troops, which as uſual, formed the flower of his army, he re⯑ſolved upon a ſurprize, and for that purpoſe, on the 16th of October at ten at night, he began his march. Fiſchers famous body of irregulars lay between him and the French camp. Some ſhots were exchanged, the French were alarmed, and inſtantly drew up in a wood. By this time it was five in the morning, but the ſight of the advantageous poſition of the French, far from daunting the Engliſh troops, ſeemed to inſpire them with freſh valour. The action with in⯑ceſſant firings, and repeated attacks on the wood, continued from five in the morning to nine at night. This perſeverance may be called obſti⯑nacy by ſome, and madneſs by others. The Prince animated the troops by his own example, but he was diſabled by his horſe being ſhot under him, and he himſelf receiving a wound; ſo that he was obliged to order a retreat, which perhaps he might have done long before, without any imputation either upon his courage or conduct. The Britiſh troops were the chief, if not the ſole, ſufferers in this deſperate action, but the death of none of them was more lamented both in Germany and England than that of the Lord Downe. He ſeemed to be born for ſocial and gay life, but the war no ſooner broke out, than he applied himſelf, with a moſt ſurpri⯑zing progreſs, to the moſt laborious duties of a military life. He formed in the country, where he had intereſt, a handful of his friends and de⯑pendents, by his own pains and example, to the exerciſes of war, in which they were as complete as the beſt regulars in Europe, and he had the [144] glory to die as a voluntier at their head. The loſs of the Engliſh in killed and wounded were 1190, and about 500 were made priſoners. After the ſlaughter of ſo many brave men, in a battle which ought to have been fought by others, it is but a poor comfort for an Engliſh reader to be told that the loſs of the French was much greater, though it is ſome to reflect, that the Britiſh va⯑lour had impreſſed the enemy with ſuch ideas, that they durſt not follow their victory, for ſuch, indeed, it was they had obtained.

The ſiege of Weſel became now impracticable to be carried on, and the hourly increaſe of the waters, had the Prince delayed repaſſing the Rhine, muſt have rendered his retreat ſo like⯑wiſe. He ſeized the firſt opportunity, and his manoeuvres were ſo well concerted, that the French did not attempt even to diſturb his rear, notwithſtanding the vaſt ſuperiority they had over him in all reſpects, but that of courage. We ſhall perform the diſagreeable taſk, before we leave the operations of the allied army this year, of following them into their winter-quarters, which proved more fatal to them than the cam⯑paign itſelf, ſevere as their hardſhips had been during it, and unequal as the ſhare of ſervice was, which they had undergone. Upon the re⯑turn of the Hereditary Prince to the allied army, the blockade of Gottingen was attempted, and continued from the 22d of November to the 12th of December following. The operations that preceded this ſiege was as languid as they were indeciſive. A Hanoverian General attempted to take Heydemunden, but failed of ſucceſs in a moſt unaccountable, if not ſhameful, manner; and the Freneh defended Gottingen ſo bravely, that the blockade was raiſed. Soon after, both armies rather ſlipped, than marched, into winter-quarters. [145] Prince Ferdinand made his as com⯑fortable as he could, by having behind him a country not quite exhauſted, and by giving large premi⯑ums to the country people for ſupplying his camp with proviſions. The winter quarters of the Britiſh troops were in the city and biſhopric of Paderborn, the moſt exhauſted place, of the moſt exhauſted country in Europe, for ſuch Ger⯑many then was. Their miſerable condition was encreaſed by the extortions and villanies of their Jewiſh and other contractors, and the whole was crowned by the difficulties of the roads through the late rains. The conſequences were, that diſtreſſes and diſeaſes of all kinds broke in upon them, and carried off a prodigious number both men and horſes, while their miſeries were em⯑bittered by ſeeing the French in a moſt advan⯑tageous poſition, where they received, by the Rhine and the Maine, all the comforts of life.

While our army abroad remained in this un⯑comfortable ſituation, the great and unexpected event of the death of George the 2d happened, on the 25th of October 1760, between the hours of ſeven and eight in the morning, in the 77th year of his age, and the 34th of his reign. His death was occaſioned by a rupture of the ſub⯑ſtance of the right ventricle of his heart, which was uncommonly dilated▪ and which, by ſtop⯑ping the circulation, put an immediate end to his life, without the ſmalleſt apparent pain. For ſome years before, he had few or no illneſſes, but ſuch as were incident to his advanced age, and his death depended ſo entirely upon natural cauſes, which appeared at the time of his body being open⯑ed, that it is in vain to ſeek for any other. The laſt queſtion he ever aſked was, in the morning of his death, when he enquired what quarter [146] the wind was in, and expreſſed ſome anxiety about the ſailing of his fleet.

The uncommon term of life which he enjoyed, which was longer than that of any of his pre⯑deceſſors, was owing to his temperance, ſobriety, and regularity. If he had fits of paſſion, they were ſo ſoon over, that they may be ſaid rather to have circulated his blood, than to have diſ⯑ordered his conſtitution, and he was bleſt with a peculiar magnanimity, that quickly got the bet⯑ter of any feelings from the blows of fortune; though he had ſhewed a ſincere concern at the death of his Queen, and was ſuſceptible of the tender, as well as the violent, paſſions. To his domeſtics he was a conſtant and an eaſy maſter, and in private he gave them leſs trouble than any gentleman of five hundred pounds a year would have given his. He was a Prince of indefatigable ap⯑plication to buſineſs, and had numerous private correſpondents whom he directed and anſwered with his own hand, for he was generally ſtirring at ſeven in the morning, and was employed till near nine in writing letters. By this means, he came to the knowledge of many important par⯑ticulars in the courts he was concerned with, and it was thought, he had the beſt intelligence of any man in England. Sometimes, however, he was impoſed on, though, upon the whole, it coſt him vaſt ſums. He was equally juſt to his pri⯑vate as public, engagements. He hated lying, and deteſted cowardice. In his private oeconomy he was moſt exact, and in his perſonal expences more frugal, than became a great King. He may be ſaid to have been rather magnanimous than generous. He looked upon the many exorbiant abuſes and impoſitions that prevailed in his court, as the lawful perquiſites of his ſtate officers and their dependents, and never encouraged any ſe⯑vere [147] reformation of his public expences. From this principle, he ſuffered himſelf in ſome parti⯑culars to be ill treated, and in others to be ſerved with ſcarcely the decency, far leſs the magnifi⯑cence, that ought to appear in a royal palace.

As the head juſticiary of his people, he was ſcrupulous of blood, and has been often known to inform himſelf minutely of the circumſtances of the trial, before he ſigned the ſentence, but this tenderneſs never led him to break into the great lines of either public or private juſtice. He was ſo conſcious of the difficulty he had to reſiſt ap⯑plications in capital matters, that he formally de⯑clared, upon the ſuppreſſion of the rebellion of 1745, that he ſhould be directed by his council as to the puniſhment of the offenders, and it is ſaid, he ſtrictly adhered to this reſolution. His perſon, though ſcarcely of midling ſtature, was erect and well made. His air beſpoke him to be a King, and there was a dignity even in the neg⯑ligences of his dreſs. That he had great natural courage, would be ridiculous to doubt, and he was himſelf a moſt excellent General. But we muſt now attend the moſt public parts of his cha⯑racter, in which he will appear, every thing con⯑ſidered, ſuperior to the moſt glorious of his pre⯑deceſſors.

He came to England with ſtrong prepoſſeſſions and ſome prejudices, as to parties and public af⯑fairs. It was not without reaſon, he thought he had been ill treated by the tories, and that Queen Anne had encouraged a faction in favour of the Pretender. He had been bred up with the higheſt opinion of the meaſures formed by King William againſt the power of France, and he had ſerved under the moſt illuſtrious Generals of that con⯑federacy. He thought, that the ſupport of the houſe of Auſtria againſt that of Bourbon ought [148] to be the ruling principle of every German pa⯑triot, and it was ſo much his own, that even after he came to the crown, he voluntarily ventured his perſon at the head of an army in that cauſe; and this, together with the vaſt ſubſidies he and his Parliament granted to the heireſs of the Auſ⯑trian ſucceſſion, enabled her to maintain it, other⯑wiſe ſhe muſt have loſt it. Notwithſtanding many provocations he received from her obſtinacy and inveteracy againſt the King of Pruſſia, during the courſe of that war, he never would have abandoned her, had ſhe not abandoned every principle of juſtice, honour, and policy, in join⯑ing with France, the hereditary enemy of his own and her dominions. His attachments to his elec⯑torate, ſtrong and natural as they are acknow⯑ledged to have been, gave way on the ſame oc⯑caſion; a ſignal proof of the rectitude of his heart, as well as the ſoundneſs of his judgment. Tho' the chief imputation upon his reign is the above⯑mentioned attachment, yet if we ſhould candidly examine it, it would be found to ſpring from the concern he took, in preſerving the independency of the Germanic conſtitution, with which he was perfectly well acquainted, and upon which he thought the liberties of all Europe depended. If he erred in this, he erred in common with the greateſt patriots and politicians, that this, and the four preceding ages have produced, even in England itſelf.

His conduct as a King of Great Britain was irreproachable, for he ſuffered on many occaſions his public duties, to get the better of his private affections. By the mere force of good ſenſe he guided parties, by ſuffering them to think that they were guiding him; for, during the long courſe of his reign, he never once failed attaining the favou⯑rite objects he kept in view. He had the hap⯑pineſs [149] to live till he ſaw national parties aboliſhed in his regal dominions. This, towards the lat⯑ter end of his reign, rendered his natural diſpo⯑ſition practicable, mild, and indeed amiable, and thoſe qualities every day grew, by the encreaſe of his ſubjects affection to his perſon and family, which they procured him. This was the true ſource of that unexampled unanimity, which during the latter years of his reign, rendered him one of the greateſt monarchs that ever ſat on any throne.

Having ſaid thus much, we may almoſt venture to pronounce, that he died in the height of his happineſs, as well as of his glory. Had he ſur⯑vived a few months, his ſatisfaction muſt have been embittered, by the growing diſcontents of his ſubjects, at the ſufferings of their brave countrymen in Germany, as well as the prodi⯑gious expences and ſubſidies paid to maintain that war. The enemies of his government, during the firſt twelve or thirteen years of his reign, ac⯑cuſed it of ſcandalous corruption at home, and in⯑glorious inactivity abroad. We ſhall not vindi⯑cate his then Miniſter, further than by repeating what he ſaid himſelf, that when he came to pow⯑er, ſuch was his degeneracy of the Engliſh, that he was obliged to bribe them even to their duty. That our foreign inactivity was inglorious, is far from being clear; but it is certain, that during that inactivity, the commerce of Great Britain was ſilently rooting itſelf through all quarters of the Globe, and produced thoſe glorious fruits which we reaped when activity became neceſſary. Before we cloſe this part of his character, it is but doing it common juſtice to obſerve, that his electoral dominions, againſt the general opinion, were irreparably injured by the acceſſion of his [150] family to the crown of Great Britain, and this may ſerve as an apology for any little partialities he ſhewed his ſubjects there, by ſometimes keep⯑ing his court at Hanover.

The polite arts flouriſhed in England during his reign, tho' they were but little indebted to his encouragement. Beſides German, French and Italian, he had no mean knowledge of the Latin, and could converſe in the Engliſh tongue, but he read his ſpeeches to parliament with a bad grace, and in a diſagreeable tone. He encou⯑raged a ſtrict, but not a ſevere, far leſs a cruel, obſervance of military diſcipline, and he loved thoſe Generals, as well as Miniſters, whoſe years approached neareſt to his own. But he often employed thoſe who were much younger, and till he did ſo, it cannot be ſaid, that his armies were in any excellent condition. He was as pla⯑cable in his public, as he was in his private, re⯑ſentments. Though he hated France, yet he never manifeſted that hatred indecently, and when he came into a good underſtanding with his ne⯑phew the King of Pruſſia, he talked of him, as if there never had been the leaſt difference be⯑tween them. When the party, that had given him the greateſt uneaſineſs in his royal dominions, came into power, (which ſome of its leaders cer⯑tainly did againſt his inclination) he ſeemed to have loſt all remembrance of what had paſſed; and at the ſame time he never altered his counte⯑nance or manner towards thoſe Miniſters and officers of ſtate who had been removed. Not⯑withſtanding all this, he was much ſubject to perſonal prepoſſeſſions, which he never was at pains to conceal, for he ſeemed to catch them by impulſe. But they ſeldom were known to be attended with conſequences to the prejudice of their objects. His temperance and frugality in⯑duced [151] many to think he died rich, eſpecially as he had a large privy purſe; but that was far from being the caſe. The money and effects of every kind, that he left behind him, were of very little value, which muſt be owing to his private boun⯑ties. But I am now to return to the main ſubject of this review, by reſuming the hiſtory of the Pruſſian and Auſtrian war.

It is more than probable, that the preſent King and his Miniſters, upon his Majeſty's acceſſion to the throne, had ſecretly reſolved to bind up the wounds of England and Europe, and to cloſe the ſcene of blood; but to do it in a way that was conſiſtent with their own, and the national ho⯑nour. An immediate publication of ſuch a reſo⯑lution muſt have been attended with the worſt effects both at home and abroad, as it muſt have damped the intereſts of his Pruſſian Majeſty, and of our proteſtant allies in Germany. Therefore, on the 18th of November, when the Parliament met, his Majeſty declared he would continue the war, till he ſhould obtain a ſafe and honourable peace. This declaration gave great ſpirits to his Pruſſian Majeſty, who was at this time in the ſouthern parts of Sileſia, while a great body of Ruſſians under Count Czernichew, had entered the new Marche of Brandenburgh, and 15,000 Auſtrians propoſed to meet them under the Ge⯑nerals Lacy and Brentano at the gates of Berlin, the whole amounting to 40,000 men. The Pruſ⯑ſian Generals Hulſen and Werner, after a variety of rapid marches and artful movements, endea⯑voured to cover that capital; but their whole force did not amount to 16,000 men; ſo that all they could do was to make a faint oppoſition to the advanced body of the Ruſſians under Count Tottleben, and to retreat, after throwing into the city three incomplete battalions. Thus his [152] Pruſſian Majeſty's capital, the proud the envied ſeat of arms and arts, adorned with all the im⯑provements and beauties, that a long ſeries of wiſe princes could give it, the populous reſidence of the popiſh, as well as the reformed religion, was in a manner abandoned to the power of in⯑veterate enemies, and barbarous conquerors, who were pleaſed with the near proſpect they had of plundering one of the fineſt cities in the world. The inhabitants were manufacturers, ſhopkeepers, merchants and artiſts, but they knew nothing of arms, and gave themſelves up to total deſpondency. The garriſon was weak and became priſoners of war; ſo that the former had now nothing to depend upon to ſave them from the worſt of fates, but the mediation of the foreign Miniſters reſiding at Ber⯑lin. This proved far more effectual than was expected. A free exerciſe of religion was granted to the inhabitants; they were to be protected in in their perſons and effects, and it was agreed that the Ruſſian irregulars ſhould not enter the city. Notwithſtanding thoſe favourable terms, great exceſſes were committed. The regulars, who marched in, deſtroyed the magazines, the founda⯑ries, and all the warehouſes of military ſtores, of which they ſeized immenſe quantities, beſides artillery and arms. The contributions that were demanded amounted to a regular kind of plun⯑dering the city. Eight hundred thouſand guilders were ordered to be immediately paid down, and a further contribution of 1,900,000 German crowns was impoſed, and it was with the utmoſt difficul⯑ty that the officers were able to preſerve a tolera⯑ble degree of diſcipline amongſt the barbarians.

The public, conſidering the exaſperated ſtate of the Auſtrians, was ſurprized that the inhabi⯑tants of Berlin had ſuffered ſo little as they did. [153] We may partly account for this by the great in⯑dulgences, and freedom they enjoyed in that city, which made it the reſidence of ſtrangers of all re⯑ligions, and from all parts of Germany; ſo that it is eaſy to be ſuppoſed, the Auſtrians, (officers as well as ſoldiers) who entered it, had many friends and relations there. This account is the more probable, as both Auſtrians and Ruſſians were guilty of the moſt ungenerous and unmanly depredations upon the royal palace. Like true deſcendents of the Goths and Vandals, they plundered the royal palace of Charlottenburg, deſtroyed the furniture they could not carry off, defaced, the paintings, and broke in pieces the noble collection of antique and other ſtatues that had belonged to the Brandenburg family, and particularly that made by the famous Cardinal Polignac. The Queen's caſtle of Schonhauſen, and that of the Margrave Charles of Fredericks⯑field experienced the like treatment. Amidſt the numerous hoſt of barbarians, one General was found who deſerves a better epithet. This was Prince Eſterhaſi, who took poſſeſſion of the pa⯑lace of Potſdam, his Pruſſian Majeſty's ſans ſouci. All the ravage there committed was, that the Prince in viewing the apartments, took into his cuſtody the picture which he was told bore the greateſt reſemblance to his Pruſſian Majeſty, and two German flutes which he uſually played on, and even that, not without aſking the leave of the keepers of the palace.

On the 13th of October, Berlin was evacuated after groaning for four days under the ſcourge of the Auſtrians and Ruſſians, who left Branden⯑burg little better than a deſert, having deſtroyed the country and carried off all the horſes and cattle they could find. The conſequence of this blow upon his Pruſſian Majeſty was, that having no [154] army in Saxony, his enemies after leaving Ber⯑lin, recovered all that electorate, while Stainville at the head of a detachment of Broglio's army, laid Hulberſtadt under contribution, and the Ruſſians laid ſiege to the important ſea-port of Colberg. The Swedes, all this while, were ad⯑vancing in the weſtern Pomerania, and in Sileſia. Laudohn inveſted the fortreſs of Coſel. In ſhort, upon the whole, his Pruſſian Majeſty's affairs ſeemed to be now more deſperate than ever. When his enemies took the cities of Wittemberg, Meiſſen, Leipſic, and Torgau, he loſt all his im⯑menſe magazines of ſtores, and he himſelf was cloſely watched by a far ſuperior army, under the moſt vigilent general of his age, Count Daun, without his knowing where to take his winter quarters; ſo completely had his enemies ravaged his dominions. He had made ſome movements towards the relief of his capital, and upon its being evacuated, he paſſed the Elbe the 25th of October, as Daun did the ſame day. Soon after his Majeſty was joined by his Generals, Hulſen and Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg, but found himſelf under circumſtances in which he could get relief only from deſpair. His was not of the blind, furious kind; his diſpoſitions were as wiſe as his conduct was intrepid. Daun, that he might cover Leipſic and Torgau, had fallen back upon the latter, and his Pruſſian Majeſty ſaw him en⯑camped at the head of 80,000 men, ſecured on the one ſide by the Elbe of the other by Moraſſes, hills and woods, with 200 pieces of cannon in his front, where alone he could be attacked. His Pruſſian Majeſty, undaunted by that dreadful ob⯑ject, acquainted his troops in perſon, on the 3d of November, that he would that day ſet them an example to conquer or die. He gave General [155] Hulſen the command of his right wing, with or⯑ders to take poſt in a wood to the left of the Auſtrians, and there to wait till the battle ſhould begin. General Ziethen with the left wing, was to attack the right of the enemy, while the King was to make the grand charge in the front. Theſe diſpoſitions directed Daun in his, and he made them in a maſterly manner. Ziethen began the attack, upon which his Majeſty haſtened his march. The ſituation of both armies was ſuch, ac⯑cording to the accounts publiſhed at Magdeburg, that either the Pruſſian right or left muſt take the enemy in their rear, and ſo prevent their afford⯑ing any aſſiſtance to that part of their army, where the main attack was to be made. It would be miſpending the readers time to think of deſcribing a battle ſo extenſive and complicated, as this was, in which, even they who were preſent, diſagree as to their ſeveral relations. It is allowed on all hands that his Pruſſian Majeſty, rapid and intre⯑pid as his charge was, was three times repulſed with great ſlaughter; but General Ziethen having beat the right wing of the Auſtrians, made him⯑ſelf maſter of ſome advantageous eminences, and galloping up with a ſtrong body of horſe to ſuſ⯑tain the infantry, the latter, notwithſtanding their prodigious loſſes and fatigues, returned once more to the charge, and proved victorious. The enemy was every where routed with vaſt ſlaugh⯑ter after a continued engagement, from two in the afternoon to nine at night, when the Auſtri⯑ans were obliged to repaſs the Elbe, which they did in excellent order.

This battle was the moſt important of any his Pruſſian Majeſty had yet gained, and coſt him the deareſt, but it was attended with the moſt won⯑derful, though favourable, circumſtances for him. [156] He had loſt in killed and wounded about 10,000 of his beſt men, beſides 3000 who were made priſoners. The loſs of the Auſtrians in men was not greater. The Pruſſians, however, made about 8,000 priſoners, amongſt whom were four Generals, and 216 other officers, and were in poſſeſſion of the greateſt number of warlike trophies taken from the enemy. Both ſides ſeem to agree that the Pruſſians victory was owing, next to their own valour, and that of their King, to a wound which Count Daun received in the thigh, and which obliged him to retire from the field of battle, and to leave the command to Ge⯑neral O'Donnel, who ordered the retreat. The pitchy darkneſs of the night was equally favour⯑able to both armies, fatigued and exhauſted as they were.

The court of Vienna was ſurprized, aſtoniſh⯑ed, and aſhamed at this ſudden reverſe of fortune. In vain did the Miniſters of the Queen in publi⯑cations of every kind, endeavour to extenuate their loſs, and to magnify that of their enemy; all they could do was to keep up the deſponding ſpirits of their allies. They could not diſſemble that, beſides all the other diſadvantages the Pruſ⯑ſians lay under in the attack, the Auſtrians were 30,000 ſuperior to them in the field, ſo that the palm of generalſhip and diſcipline was by the public voice adjudged to his Pruſſian Majeſty, who received a contuſion in the breaſt, and dur⯑ing the hotteſt of the action, expoſed his perſon, as if he had known himſelf to be immortal. But the conſequences decided beyond all diſpute the vic⯑tory to be in his favour, for he recovered all Saxony but its capital, and he was in no condition to be⯑ſiege that, becauſe Count Daun had poſted all his army, which was ſtill more numerous than that [157] of the Pruſſians in that city, or in cantonments round it. In the mean time the Pruſſian Gene⯑ral Werner had, after the evacuation of Berlin, been ſent with a body of troops into Pomerania, where he obliged the Ruſſians to abandon the long continued ſiege of Colberg, and after de⯑feating the Swedes in the weſtern parts of that province, he forced them to fall back upon Stralſund, and to abandon the whole of the Pruſ⯑ſian Pomerania. On the ſide of Sileſia, Laudohn was obliged to raiſe the ſiege of Coſel to abandon Landſhut, and to retire into the Auſtrian Sileſia, while the Ruſſians had entirely evacuated the other parts of his Pruſſian Majeſty's dominions, and the army of the Empire, about the ſame time, retired into Franconia.

His Pruſſian Majeſty loſt no advantage that could poſſibly be drawn from his victory at Tor⯑gau, as was before mentioned. Pretending to have received great provocation, he taxed the circle of Leipſic alone, not only in its ordinary revenue, and in vaſt magazines of proviſions, but in two millions of crowns for the enſuing year, a contribution, which London itſelf, the richeſt city in the world, would have found dif⯑ficult to raiſe. All the other parts of Miſnia were taxed in the ſame proportion, and, eſtimating the Saxons as beaſts of burden, he made the raiſing 20,000 of them, for recruiting his army, a part of their contributions. But no country ſuffered more from his Pruſſian Majeſty's ſucceſſes, than the dominions of the Dukes of Mecklenburgh, which were ſo unfortunately ſituated, with re⯑gard to thoſe of Pruſſia, that they were deprived of relief from their allies. The treatment which thoſe Princes met with, and the hardſhips in⯑flicted on their ſubjects, were, perhaps, more [158] than ſevere, and are ſaid to have drawn from the pen of a young Princeſs, who now fills the moſt auguſt throne in the world, a pathetic repreſenta⯑tion of her family and country's ſufferings, which touched even his Pruſſian Majeſty, but made much deeper impreſſions in the breaſt of another, and a greater royal perſonage, to whom the letter was communicated. Such was the ſituation of affairs on the continent of Europe, at the cloſe of the year 1760, that of the Pruſſians was indeed be⯑come better, but that of the Britiſh troops was very undeſireable, while the Auſtrians and the French, by preſerving their communications, the former with the Elbe, and the latter with the Rhine, enjoyed comfortable winter quarters.

We are now to attend the motions of a ma⯑rine Don Quixote. Thurot had all the enter⯑priſing, genius, the valour, the generoſity, and even the magnanimity of that celebrated knight errand. His birth was obſcure, if not fabulous, and his outſet into the world romatic. He, how⯑ever, raiſed himſelf by a ſeries of bold, but for⯑tunate adventures, to the notice of the French miniſtry, who appointed him to the command of five frigates, with 1270 land ſoldiers on board. During the equipment of thoſe frigates of Dun⯑kirk, various were the conjectures of the public, which probably never was determined any fur⯑ther, than that Thurot ſhould make a landing on ſome part of Ireland, which ſhould be moſt con⯑venient for favouring the grand expedition under Conflans. On the 5th of October, 1759, the five frigates eſcaped the Engliſh fleet, in a hazy night, out of Dunkirk; in ten days they reached Gottenburg in Sweden, and after that, Bergen in Norway, but not without ſuffering ſo much by ſickneſs and ſtreſs of weather, that Thurot was obliged to ſend his beſt frigate back to [159] France. Sailing from Bergen, he was, for almoſt three months, buffetted about the ſeas, and loſt one of his remaining frigates, which has never ſince been heard of. In vain he attempted to land near Derry in Ireland, and, on the 16th of February, he was obliged to put into the iſle of Ilay, one of the Hebrides of the coaſt of Scot⯑land, where he refitted his ſhips, and paid, even to profuſion, for ſome proviſions and cattle they took in. The accounts he received of the defeat of Conflans appeared to him ſuſpicious, and did not deter him from purſuing his courſe towards Ireland, where, on the 28th of February, he landed his troops, which were now reduced to 600 men, at Carrickfergus; but, by draughts from the ſeamen, he made a ſhift to muſter up about 1000 on the breach, and with them he pro⯑ceeded to attack the town, which was defended by Colonel Jennings, with about four compa⯑nies of new raiſed men, deſtitute of cannon and with very little ammunition. The Colonel, how⯑ever, made the beſt defence he could at the gate of the town, till his ammunition being ſpent, he drew off his men towards the Caſtle, which, like the town wall, was old, ruinous and untena⯑ble, ſo that his men were obliged to ſurrender themſelves priſoners of war. After this, Carrick⯑fergus, becauſe its magiſtrates refuſed to comply with Thurot's demands of wine and proviſions, was plundered, and Thurot re-imbarked his men for France.

The Duke of Bedford was then Lord Lieute⯑nant of Ireland, and receiving early intelligence of Thurot's deſcent, he diſpatched an expreſs to Kinſale for three Engliſh frigates, who lay there to ſail in queſt of Thurot. One of thoſe fri⯑gates, commanded by Captain Elliot, carried 36 guns, the other two, 32 each, and ſo great [160] was their diſpatch, that they came up with Thu⯑rot in ſight of the Iſle of Man. Here the aſcen⯑dency of the Britiſh, over the French maritime genius, was fully proved. Thurot's ſhips were of greater force, and he fought with a great ſu⯑periority of numbers on his ſide. He had every motive that could animate a brave man to exert his utmoſt, which indeed he did, for he was kil⯑led in the diſcharge of his duty, and all the three ſhips, being taken by the Engliſh, were carried into Ramſay bay in the Iſle of Man. Thurot was lamented, leſs, perhaps, by his countrymen, than his enemies, who had often experienced his humanity, as well as his courage; and thus the on⯑ly inſult, that his Britannic Majeſty's European coaſts had ſuffered during the war, was amply revenged.—We are now to attend America.

After the French had been forced to raiſe the ſiege of Quebec, Vaudreuil the Governor of Canada took poſt at Montreal, where he aſſem⯑bled all his force, with the appearance of prepar⯑ing for a deciſive effort. Finding the Canadians were diſcouraged, he had reſource to circulating, by his letters to them, the meaneſt lies, on the prodigious ſucceſſes of the French arms through all the quarters of the globe, to keep up their ſpirits, while the difficulty of entering Canada, he thought, would put the Britiſh troops under ſuch difficulties as would render all attempts againſt Montreal fruitleſs, at leaſt for that cam⯑paign.

On the 21ſt of June, Mr. Amherſt, who com⯑manded in chief the Britiſh forces in America, left Shenectady, and on the 9th of July, he ar⯑rived at Oſwego, where, on a review of his army, he found it to amount to 10,000 men, of whom 1000, a ſight never known before, were Iroquois, brought by Sir William Johnſon to fight in a [161] Britiſh quarrel. Before Sir William Johnſon left Shenectady, he had ordered General Murray to advance with all the force he could ſpare from the garriſon of Quebec, towards Montreal, while Colonel Haviland was to ſail from Crown Point, and after taking poſſeſſion of the Iſle au Noix, to proceed to Montreal likewiſe. On the 10th of Auguſt, Amherſt's army embarked with its baggage, ammunition, and artillery, on the lake of Ontario, the moſt numerous body, per⯑haps, that ever traverſed in boats ſo prodigious an expance of water. Good fortune, and good con⯑duct, equally befriended him. He took Swe⯑gatchie and inveſted L'Iſle Royal, in the river of St. Laurence, the forts of which ſurrendered to him on the 25th of Auguſt. Having made all the proper arrangements in that iſland, which is of the utmoſt importance for commanding the Lake, as well as ſecuring the Britiſh frontier, he pro⯑ceeded to the moſt difficult part of his expedition, that of encountering the rapid falls of the river St. Laurence, between L'Iſle Royal and Mon⯑treal. Amherſt ſurmounted even that difficulty, with the loſs of many of his veſſels, but no more than ninety lives; and on the 6th of September, his army came in ſight of Montreal, the ſecond city of importance for ſtrength, ſituation and riches in the French America. The very day that Amherſt landed here, General Murray landed from Quebec, and next day Haviland from the Iſle au Noix; ſo great was the preciſion with which this expedition was planned and executed.

After ſurmounting ſuch incredible difficulties, and arriving before Montreal, the Britiſh Gene⯑rals ſcarcely thought the reduction of that place [...]o be an object of their concern. Vaudreuil ſur⯑rendered it, and the garriſon were ſent priſoners to France on condition of their not ſerving again [162] that war. Nothing, in the ſucceſs of this expe⯑dition, covered the Britiſh Generals with ſo much glory, as did the humanity which attended their conqueſts. Except at the Iſle Royal no blood was ſpilt, and it was with the utmoſt reluctance that General Murray in his march from Quebec, found himſelf under a neceſſity of giving orders for ſetting on fire ſome villages whoſe inhabitants were in arms againſt him. At Montreal no per⯑ſon was injured. The Britiſh Generals relieved the miſery of the Canadians, by giving them food, and notwithſtanding all the provocations they had received during the courſe of the war, from the treachery of the French, they employed their ſoldiers in defending them, from the ſcalping knives of their own, the neutral, and the Britiſh ſavages, who know no ties of obedience or gra⯑titude but conqueſt.

During the reduction of Montreal, which com⯑pleted our conqueſt of all Canada, a Britiſh ſquadron under Lord Colville, commanded the mouth of the river St. Laurence, which three French frigates, with about 20 ſail of ſhips, loaded with troops and military ſtores for relieving Mon⯑treal, obſerving they put into the bay of Chaleurs, but being diſcovered, their whole armament was taken by the Lord Byron, a Captain of one of the Britiſh ſhips.

The French were equally unſucceſsful in their other ſchemes upon the vaſt continent. Having, by means of their miſſionaries, a much greater power, than the Engliſh have over the minds of the ſavages, they had debauched the Cherokee In⯑dians into their intereſt, and there was reaſon for believing, that the Creeks, another very power⯑ful nation, would follow their example. What⯑ever flattering pictures philoſophers or philoſophi⯑cal hiſtorians may exhibit of human nature in [163] its moſt ſavage ſtate, there is reaſon to believe from repeated experience, that the American In⯑dians in general, have no ſentiments but thoſe of cruelty, revenge and rapine, which they never ſail to gratify; and that they are to be awed only by force. Mr. Lyttleton, who was the Governor of Carolina, knew this, and in October, 1759, he marched with about 1100 regulars and provin⯑cials, 300 miles into their country, lying be⯑tween Keeowee and Charles Town. The bar⯑barians, thus ſeeing their perſons and poſſeſſions ex⯑poſed to immediate deſtruc [...]ion, humbled them⯑ſelves before the Governo [...], and agreed to all the terms he impoſed. They even put into his hands ſuch of their countrymen as had been guilty of the greateſt barbarities and murders upon the Engliſh, and gave him 22 hoſtages for their per⯑formance.

Mr. Littleton having, as he had reaſon to think, been ſucceſsful in his expedition, returned to his government: but no ſooner was his back turned, than the very ſame Savages blocked up Fort Loudon, and attempted to take Fort Ed⯑ward. General Amherſt, hearing of this, ſent Colonel Montgomery to relieve thoſe two Britiſh forts, and to chaſtiſe the barbarians, with a re⯑giment of Highlanders, a battalion of Royal Americans, ſome grenadiers, and the provincial troops. Upon his entering the country of the Savages, he burnt one of their capital towns conſiſting of about 200 houſes, and making war after their own manner, he ſpread terror and de⯑ſolation wherever he came. He marched on to the middle Cherokees, and in his progreſs fell into an ambuſh, where he had 20 men killed and 80 wounded. Though the enemy in this ſkirmiſh loſt 80 men, beſides a conſiderable town, yet the Colonel perceiving that he muſt every day meet [164] with ſuch encounters as he advanced, found it ne⯑ceſſary to retreat to Fort St. George, from whence he went to New York, to rejoin the grand army; but left behind him 400 men for the protection of the province. But by this time the garriſon of Fort Loudon having conſumed all their proviſions was obliged to come to a capitulation, Auguſt the 7th, with the barbarians, who moſt infamouſly broke it by butchering all the officers but one, and by carrying ſuch of the ſoldiers as they did not kill into the moſt miſerable of all captivities. We are now to take a long ſtride from America to Aſia.

On the 16th of April, 1759, after the ſiege of Fort St. George had been raiſed, Major Brereton took the town and fort of Conjioeram; as Major Ford did by ſtorm the city of Maſulipatam; while Colonel Clive drove the French out of the rich province of Bengal. Thus the Engliſh company was poſſeſſed of the commerce of a vaſt trading and manufacturing country on the coaſt of Coro⯑mandel, while that of their enemies was confined almoſt to Pondicherry alone. In September, Major Brereton at the head of about 12,000 men, was defeated with the loſs of 3 or 4000 killed and wounded, by an army of French and Indi⯑ans; and the French General Lally threatened the ſiege of Trichenopoly. In the mean while, Colonel Coote, with all the troops he could aſ⯑ſemble, took Wandewaſh in three days, making the garriſon priſoners of war; and in four he be⯑came maſter of Carongoly, and obliged the gar⯑riſon to march out of the place. Thoſe two places were taken, the firſt on the 30th of Novem⯑ber, and the laſt on the 10th of December. Upon this Lally laid ſiege to Wandewaſh, a place of the utmoſt importance to either party, and pro⯑bably would have retaken it, had not Colonel [165] Coote, with inconceivable diligence marched to its relief. This brought on a battle. Lally's army was compoſed of about 2200 Europeans and between nine and 10,000 blacks, that of Coote amounted to about 1700 Europeans and 3000 blacks. The victory fell to the Engliſh after a bloody diſpute; for the French were totally routed and their camp and artillery were taken. Of the French army about 1000 were killed and wounded, and amongſt the priſoners was Brigadier General Buſſy, who was reckoned the richeſt ſubject in the world; the Chevalier Godeville, quarter-maſter General, and Lieutenant Colonel Murphy. Of the Engliſh, 200 were killed and wounded, amongſt the former was the brave Major Brereton, and 70 of their black ſoldiers were ſlain or wounded.

This important victory did great honour to Colonel Coote as a commander. It opened his way to Chittiput and Arcot the capital of the province; both which places were reduced by the Engliſh, and in the latter 300 Europeans were made priſoners of war. On the 4th of Septem⯑ber, Admiral Pocock defeated the fleet of M. D'Ache the French Admiral, and obliged him to take ſhelter under the walls of Pondicherry. This naval victory was the more glorious to the conqueror as D'Ache was not only a moſt excel⯑lent officer, but commanded a fleet far ſuperior to that of the Engliſh in the number and largeneſs of men and ſhips, as well as the weight of metal. In this fight, which continued very hot for above two hours, eight Engliſh ſhips ſtood the fire of 16 French, and loſt 560 men, while the loſs of the French was 1000, and the veſſels on both ſides were diſabled; D'Ache retired under the cannon of Pondicherry, where Pocock, after he had re⯑fitted his ſhips, braved and blocked him up. Soon [166] after, upon the junction of Admiral Corniſh with Pocock on the coaſt of Coromandel, the French ſhips found means to eſcape, and ſome of them ſaved themſelves, it was thought, by ſailing to the iſland St. Mauritius, for they diſappeared from thoſe ſeas. The conſequence of this was, that Admiral Corniſh and Major Monkton took poſ⯑ſeſſion, on the 5th of April, of the important for⯑treſs of Carcal; and thus the French power on that coaſt was confined to Pondicherry, and a few other inconſiderable places.

Pondicherry is a noble ſtrong town, four leagues in circumference, and about 40 miles diſtant from the Engliſh ſettlement of Madraſs. The French at this place had been accumulating wealth for many years; and it was now the center of all the riches in thoſe parts, being well provided with artillery and military ſtores. The officer, who commanded the garriſon, was Lally an Iriſhman, or of an Iriſh family, a man, whimſical, haughty and ill fitted for either ſuperiority over, or ſociety with, the wealthy, diſſolute, proud, ſelfiſh French Aſiatics. At the ſame time he was ſober, faithful, brave to exceſs, and an excellent diſciplinarian. When the ſiege of Pondicherry was reſolved on, the garriſon conſiſted of about 1500 European regulars; and Lally, who had the utmoſt abhor⯑rence for the profligacy and impiety of the mer⯑chants and inhabitants, obliged many of them to do duty likewiſe, when Colonel Coote and Admi⯑ral Stevens, the firſt by land, the other by ſea, in⯑veſted the place. It was ſurrounded by adjacent fortreſſes, which in former ſieges had given us great trouble, but were now eaſily reduced, as the neigh⯑bouring country was in the hands of the Engliſh. The approaching rainy ſeaſons, and Lally's known character for reſolution, rendered a regular ſiege unadviſable, and a blockade by ſea and land, for [167] obvious reaſons, was reſolved on. This block⯑ade was ſupported and aſſiſted by proper batteries, which continually harraſſed the garriſon and were daily, though inſenſibly, drawing near to the place, but were incommoded by the rainy weather.

Thoſe kind of operations continued for ſeven months, the batteries being ſometimes ruined and ſometimes repaired by the indefatigable perſeve⯑rance of the Engliſh, in both which they were equalled by the French. The Engliſh, however, had the comfort to reflect, that, amidſt all their hardſhips and labours the purpoſes of the block⯑ade were ſtill going on; and that the French with⯑in the place were reduced to live on dogs, cats, elephants and camels, and that even thoſe loath⯑ſome kinds of food muſt, if the blockade continued, fail them in a few days. The French ſeldom loſe their hopes. They comforted them⯑ſelves with the thoughts of being relieved by their fleet; but a ſtorm which happened on the firſt of January 1761, gave them a much better grounded aſſurance of deliverance. This ſtorm deſtroyed four Engliſh ſhips of the line and drove the reſt from the blockade. Upon this Lally, the day after, wrote a letter to Raymond the French reſident at Pullicat, in which letter he in a manner annihilates the Engliſh fleet. His beginning and concluding ſentences may give the reader ſome idea of this General's ſanguine impetuoſity. He begins, The Engliſh ſquadron is no more, Sir. He concludes, in ſhort, riſque all, force all, attempt all, and ſend us ſome rice, ſhould it be but half a garſe at a time. His hopes were ſhort lived. In four days after the ſtorm, and before the garriſon could receive the ſmalleſt ſupply, Admiral Stevens again appeared before the place and renewed the blockade with 11 ſhips of the line and a frigate; [168] and a large battery was advanced within 450 yards of the rampart.

The garriſon had now only three days miſerable proviſion to ſubſiſt on; but this wretchedneſs made no impreſſion upon the diſpoſition of Lally. He continued at beſt paſſively ſullen, pretending, that the Engliſh breaches of faith diſabled him from treating with them. At laſt, however, a ſignal for ceſſation was made, and the principal of the Jeſuits with two civilians, but without any apparent authority from the Governor, were ſent out to treat with the Engliſh. As this deputa⯑tion had no legal commiſſion to treat, the Engliſh knew not well how to behave; but being given to underſtand that they would meet with no op⯑poſition from the Governor, they took poſſeſſion of the place and all its immenſe riches; and thus, excepting the unimportant ſettlement of Makie on the coaſt of Malabar, which was ſoon after reduced, the whole trade of the vaſt peninſula of India, the richeſt of any in the known world, fell into the hands of the Engliſh, through the unparallelled intrepidity and perſeverance of their officers and ſoldiers. But we are now to give an account, before we cloſe the hiſtory of this war, of an internal revolution in India which threat⯑ened to deprive us of all our amazing ſucceſſes.

The famous Timur Beg or Tamerlane, at the head of his ſavage Moguls, a hideous race, conquered India and its vaſt peninſula, which he left to a branch of his family. That branch fail⯑ing, another which was driven out of Buckharia, and from thence to Perſia paſſed the Ind; and ſuch was the veneration of the inhabitants for a deſcendant of Timur Beg, that he mounted the throne of his anceſtors under the appellation of the Great Mogul, which is there ſynonimous with that of Great Conqueror; and for ſome years [169] he and his proſperity made uſe of none but Mo⯑gul guards, by which they eſtabliſhed a moſt un⯑bounded deſpotiſm over their Indian ſubjects. Though neither they nor the Moguls are very nice in matters of ſucceſſion, yet it has been al⯑ways found neceſſary for the ſucceeding Empe⯑rors there, ever ſince the days of Aureng Zebe, to claim ſome kindred with the Timur Beg blood. At the time we now treat of, the Marat⯑tas were the military force of India, and having depoſed the late Great Mogul, his ſon Sha Zad⯑dah aſſumed that title, but his authority was diſ⯑puted by ſome provinces. Being ſupported by Mr. Law a French officer, nephew to the cele⯑brated Miſſiſſippi Law, at the head of about 200 French fugitives, he made great progreſs in aſſerting his title, and at laſt Law perſuaded him, at the head of 80,000 of his country troops, and, what he had a much greater dependence on, the 200 French, to march againſt the Engliſh in Bengal. They were met by 20,000 of the ſame country troops and 500 Engliſh under the com⯑mand of Major Carnac, who in a pitched battle entirely defeated them, and made the young Mo⯑gul, and his General Law, priſoners, the very day on which Pondicherry was ſurrendered.

The fortune of the Engliſh prevailed equally in other parts of India. Jaffier Ali Cawn who had, in the manner already related, been raiſed to the Nabobſhip of Bengal, grew intoxicated with his power, even to a kind of phrenzy, which loſt him the protection of the Engliſh, who obliged him to reſign his government in favour of his ſon in law, which he did without reſiſtance. This new Nabob confirmed and encreaſed the Engliſh privileges in Bengal to ſuch an extent as drew upon them the jealouſy of the Dutch, which [170] occaſioned ſome very diſagreeable conſequences from an actual invaſion of that country by the Dutch, with a deſign, as is ſaid, utterly to ex⯑tirpate the Engliſh in Bengal. They were, how⯑ever, repelled by the valour of the Engliſh, and the matter is now under a civil deliberation, which makes it improper for a Martial Review. During thoſe tranſactions in India the Count D'Eſtaign, a French officer, with no more than two frigates of ordinary force, by his valour, conduct and ac⯑tivity, reflected reproach upon his countrymen in all other parts of the globe. In October 1759, he deſtroyed the Engliſh ſettlement of Bender Abaſſi in the gulph of Perſia. After that, he re⯑duced Bencoolen in the iſle of Sumatra, where we carry on great trade, eſpecially in pepper, and ruined all our forts and ſettlements there. This enterpriſing adventurer afterwards fell into the hands of the Engliſh, and has been accuſed of committing all thoſe hoſtilities while he was there, priſoner on his parole. Though we can ſay nothing poſitively as to that fact, yet we appre⯑hend it muſt be either falſe or miſ-ſtated, becauſe the Britiſh government ſuffered him to return to France without ranſom, and he has, ſince the ſignature of the late preliminaries, been nominated to their chief command in India. And here we cloſe our Review of the war in that country and return to Europe.

During the winter of 1760, and the beginning of 1761, the French winter quarters on the Lower Rhine, in Heſſe, and upon the frontiers of Ha⯑nover were not only ſecure but plentiful; while thoſe of the allies were the reverſe. Diſcontents in England concerning the management of the Ger⯑man war had now riſen to a greater height than ever, and Prince Ferdinand, notwithſtanding the [171] rigour of the ſeaſon, drew his troops together on the 9th of November, and began his march in three diviſions. The hereditary Prince and the Marquis of Granby, left the country of Heſſe to the Eaſtward, at the head of the right diviſion, General Sporken penetrated into Thuringia with the left, and our German General with the center marched directly towards Caſſel. It is incon⯑ceivable what Prince Ferdinand could mean by ſuch a plan of bold operations. The French could have no rational expectation of them, and as they were executed with amazing rapidity and ſpirit, their army was thrown into a conſternati⯑on, which bore ſome ſymptoms of a total rout, The hereditary Prince and the Marquis of Gran⯑by, who were moſt advanced, ſtruck the firſt blow; but the former was repulſed before Fritzlar, and Breidenbach a Hanoverian General loſt his life in attempting to ſurprize Marbourg; both checks being attended with a conſiderable loſs on the part of the allies. Fritzlar, being again attempted by cannon, ſurrendered on the 15th of February; and the Marquis of Granby, after reducing the adjacent forts, puſhed forward at the head of the Engliſh cavalry with ſo much ſpirit, that vaſt ma⯑gazines of the French fell into the hands of the al⯑lies, which kept the horſes, perhaps the men, alive in that exhauſted country. The French would gladly have fired thoſe magazines, but were ſo cloſely purſued that they had no time, and they fell back almoſt to the Mayne.

Thus far this unintelligible attempt (as was be⯑fore mentioned) ſucceeded beyond any reaſonable expectation; but the wiſeſt heads amongſt the French officers gave themſelves but little concern with regard to the ſequel. The ſiege and reco⯑very of Caſſel was Prince Ferdinand's great ob⯑ject, [172] but an object in all probability unattainable at that ſeaſon of the year, as the garriſon was extremely ſtrong, and Marſhal Broglio, though he had retreated towards Frankfort, hung over him with a ſuperior army, and had now recalled to his aſſiſtance the detachments he had ſent to the Lower Rhine. Thoſe rapid ſucceſſes of the allies, for Sporken was victorious on his ſide, led them into many miſtakes, for while they were driving the French from their cantonments and weak paſſes, they left behind them large tracts of unguarded country, and places provided with garriſons in number and ſtrength almoſt equal to armies. All the allies had hitherto acquired was by coups du main, but the ſiege of Caſſel was now regularly formed, and Marpurg and Ziegenhagen blockaded by them, and Prince Ferdinand made ſuch a diſpoſition as was beſt ſuited for carrying on the ſiege of Caſſel under the direction of the Count of Lippe Schoumbourg, and watched the motions of the Marſhal Broglio. But all thoſe diſpoſitions, however plauſible, were found to be fundamentally wrong. Sporken, though he had been ſucceſsful, and had driven the French back to Bamberg, had his retreat cut off with conſider⯑able loſs by the Count de Vaux the French go⯑vernor of Gottingen, who likewiſe took the town of Duderſtadt, ſo that Sporken was obliged to rejoin the main army under Prince Ferdinand, where his preſence now became neceſſary. The ſtrong poſts of Marpurg and Ziegenhagen lay to the rear of the allied army, and in their front they had the collected ſtrength of Marſhal Broglio, and all this while the important ſiege of Caſſel was going forward.

Broglio, having laid his plan of operations, at⯑tacked the advanced parts of the allies under the [173] Hereditary Prince near Grunberg, which, conſiſting of Heſſians, Hanoverians, and Brunſwickers, whom he entirely routed making 2000 priſoners. Upon receiving this ſevere blow, the allies abandoned the ſiege of Caſſel, after 27 days open trenches. The blockade of Ziegenhagen was broken up, their other poſts abandoned, and having once more evacuated Heſſe, they fell back upon the Dymel near to their former quarters. Upon the whole, the allies by this unaccountable expedition acquired only ſomewhat to eat, and could be ſaid to fight, not ſo much for territory or glory, as for victuals; and all the good reſulting from it, was, that it coſt the French ſome time to repair their maga⯑zines.

An expedition was at this time equipping in England, that if poſſible, was more unaccount⯑able than Prince Ferdinand's irruption into Heſſe. This was againſt the wretched barren iſland of Belleiſle lying on the coaſt of France, and upon which, 5000 inhabitants may be ſaid, rather to breathe, than to live, in miſerable huts. It has, however, a ſmall fortified city, called Palais, which was defended by a garriſon under the Che⯑valier de Croix. This expedition, againſt a place that never could be of uſe to England, aſtoniſhed all Europe, as the very expence of the equipment amounted to a greater ſum than fifty times the value of the fee ſimple of the whole iſland, if ſold, could have produced. The command of the ſea armament was given to Commodore Kep⯑pel, that of the land to General Hodgſon. Our troops, in attempting firſt to land, met with a bloody repulſe. On the 25th of April, they made their landing good. The ſiege of Palais was formed, and after ſome diſagreeable incidents, which happened to our troops, the place, on the [174] 7th of June, capitulated. The city of London in compliment to their favourite miniſter, ad⯑dreſſed the King on this occaſion, while, thinking men ſaw with regret ſo much Britiſh courage, blood, and treaſure, employed on ſo worthleſs an object.

By this time▪ the negotiations for peace had been ſet on foot between the courts of London and Verſailles; and the irruption of Prince Ferdi⯑nand into Heſſe was no longer a myſtery. A ne⯑gotiation at Augſburgh, for which the plenipo⯑tentiaries of the belligerent powers had been named, was ſtill depending, but it was foreſeen, that the variety of their claims and intereſts would either prolong the conferences to an unmeaſure⯑able, and indeed an indefinite, length, or render them entirely fruitleſs, and therefore a ſeparate negotiation between France and England was thought more practicable. Of thoſe two powers, the French miniſtry was unanimous, but inſidi⯑ous; that of England was divided. The French earneſty deſired peace, and would have made al⯑moſt any conceſſions to have obtained it, but the character of the Britiſh miniſter, who maintained his credit by the ſucceſs and continuance of the war, gave them but ſmall proſpect of ſucceſs; they therefore turned their eyes to Spain. They repreſented to his Catholic Majeſty, who was himſelf extremely well diſpoſed to adopt the doc⯑trine, the danger which the houſe of Bourbon was expoſed to, by the prevalence of the Britiſh arms, and the unavoidable ruin of the Spaniſh empire in America, if the war would continue, unleſs his Catholic Majeſty would interpoſe and take part with France. Charles of Spain, natu⯑rally inclined to peace, and to the enjoyment of the vaſt treaſures he was every day amaſſing by [175] his late ſucceſſion to the crown of Spain; but fearing that the Engliſh would proceed to the conqueſt of St. Domingo, and afterwards to that of Mexico and Peru, by which his empire muſt be in a manner annihilated, he with great reluc⯑tance and ſecrecy entered into a treaty with France, which is now well known by the name of the family compact. By this treaty, the con⯑tracting parties guaranty each others dominions; and each takes a common concern with the other in all matters relating either to peace or war.

The Engliſh miniſter ſhewed more art in diſ⯑covering, than he did ſagacity in preventing, this treaty, by which France was ſure of being ſupplied with money, the only ingredient ſhe wanted for making war, her country being full of men, and the ſeaſons that year remarkably fa⯑vourable and fruitful. A ſmall ſhare, however, of pliancy, on the part of the Britiſh miniſter, would have prevented his Catholic Majeſty from complying with a meaſure, to which he was ſo averſe, as that of entering into the war. But from what appears to the public, no ſtep was taken to make him eaſy or to remove his appre⯑henſions. On the contrary, after the Britiſh miniſter had a moral certainty of the family com⯑pact being concluded, though not publiſhed, he puſhed for an immediate war with Spain without farther ceremony, and for intercepting their trea⯑ſures on the return of their ſhips to Europe.

We have already mentioned the diviſions of the Engliſh adminiſtration, the ſtate of which it is now proper to explain. His Majeſty, with equal wiſ⯑dom and tenderneſs for his people, indulged them in the favourable opinion they had of his miniſter, whom he continued in his poſt, but he ſoon found a total diviſion between him and the reſt [176] of his council, the Miniſter's brother in law ex⯑cepted. It will, appear a problem to future times, whether the miniſter had within him a ſerious con⯑viction of the expediency, if not neceſſity, of de⯑claring war againſt Spain, or whether, foreſeeing that ſuch a meaſure could not be complied with, he made uſe of the noncompliance, as a handle for being rid of an adminiſtration, which he was conſcious he could no longer carry on with credit. Be that as it will, it is certain his Majeſty's other mini⯑ſters of all denominations were unanimouſly for opening a negotiation. The miniſter was obliged to ſeem to comply, but it is pretty plain from the manner of carrying it on, that he was far from being in earneſt to complete it. Buſſy, who had by office-buſineſs, wriggled himſelf into ſome con⯑ſideration at the French court, was ſent to Lon⯑don, becauſe he had been there before, and had a few paltry connections with the Engliſh. The negotiations between him and the Britiſh miniſter were opened, and at firſt promiſed fair to ſuc⯑ceed, but miniſterial craft on the one ſide, and more than miniſterial haughtineſs on the other, blaſted them.

Buſſy, a low-bred clerk, without abilities to conduct a negotiation that required all the pow⯑ers of policy, thought it ſufficient if he plied the Britiſh miniſter with the common places of com⯑pliments and ſoothing expreſſions. The genius of the other diſdained thoſe mechanical arts, which the court of Verſailles, and ſome, perhaps, at that of St. James's, thought to be eſſentials. Buſſy from the manner and anſwers of Mr. P—might have foreſeen this; but as his capacity reached no farther than forms, and the ſervile ob⯑ſervances of inſtructions, he was puzzled, and never was there more weakneſs diſcovered in any [177] negotiation, than was manifeſted in this, on the part of France, though, perhaps, that court was not alone to blame. It is certain that the French from the commencement of the negotiation treated under the wings of Spain, whoſe affairs were managed by a miniſter of a ſtill more nar⯑row capacity, and, if poſſible, of a meaner ori⯑ginal than even Buſſy himſelf. Being by Birth an Italian, he had been ſerviceable to his Catholic Majeſty, who employed him in the affairs of Spain, where he found himſelf bewildered, but his vanity, impelled, perhaps, by a ſuperior in⯑fluence, became at laſt his ruling direction. For the court of Madrid muſt make a capital figure; and againſt every principle of policy, decency, and indeed common ſenſe, Mr. Buſſy was obliged (for in charity we muſt think him ſo) to preſent to the Engliſh miniſter, what he called, a private memorial, intimating that his Catholic Majeſty ſhould be invited to accede to the guaranty of the treaty, and that his concerns likewiſe ſhould be included in ths negotiation. Thoſe were com⯑prized under three heads. Firſt, ſatisfaction for Spaniſh captures made by the Engliſh flag, for which there was little or no colour of complaint. Secondly, the claim of the Spaniards to fiſh upon the banks of Newfoundland, a claim of which the foundation of it is a ſecret; and we are glad that we can oblige the public with ſome account of it.

Newfoundland is not the moſt inviting country in the world, and has occaſionally paſſed through ſeveral hands. Nothing is more indiſputable, than that the original right of it, by diſcovery, belonged to the crown of England, ſo far back as the reign of Henry the 7th. But the climate was ſo uninviting, that the Engliſh, though they [178] never made any formal ceſſion of it, about the year 1570, neglected it ſo greatly that the Biſcay⯑ners, or, as they are called, the Guipuſcoans, for the benefit of the Spaniſh lent-obſervers, fiſhed on the banks of Newfoundland, and other⯑wiſe carried on a conſiderable trade there in furs and ſkins, till in the year 1579, the Engliſh re-aſſerted their right to the place, and in the year 1583, Sir Humphrey Gilbert, a Devonſhire gen⯑tleman, took an excluſive poſſeſſion of it by a commiſſion under Queen Elizabeth.

Notwithſtanding thoſe facts are inconteſtable, the Spaniards never loſt ſight of the right of paſ⯑turage they pretended to on this ſea-common, the moſt fertile and profitable of any in the world. They mentioned it at the treaty of Utrecht, where it was not thought worthy of a ſerious diſcuſſion, and it remained dormant till, to the amazement of the world, it was revived in the negotiation at London in the year 1761, between Mr. Pitt and Mr. Buſſy.

The third claim that Spain entered on this oc⯑caſion was reaſonable and well founded, and it regarded the logwood trade on the bay of Cam⯑peachy. This trade had been long an object of conteſt, and a report of the Engliſh board of trade, in 1718, had given the Engliſh as good a right to it as the Spaniards. The latter, how⯑ever, never was ſatisfied with this report, and to ſay the truth, the foundation of it was a little more than dubious. As the Engliſh, however, had been long in poſſeſſion of that trade, the court of Spain was willing to allow them the benefit, but not the right, of preſcription, and inſiſted upon the demolition of the Engliſh ſettlements and for⯑tifications, that had been erected on the bay of Honduras, upon Spaniſh territory.

[179] Such was the ſubſtance of this famous ſecret memorial, which the Britiſh miniſter treated with an indignation and contempt, beyond, perhaps, what a Burleigh or a Walſingham would have ex⯑preſſed. The event was, that though the nego⯑tiation ſtill went on with a variety of altercations and conceſſions, the particulars of which are fo⯑reign to this work, yet it was eaſy to foreſee that the treaty muſt, in the end, prove abortive, if Mr. P—continued to have the ſole direction of it. This produced many ſtrong debates in the cabinet, where Buſſy's conduct was totally con⯑demned, eſpecially as a perſon of quality and conſideration then reſided at London, as an Am⯑baſſador from his Catholic Majeſty, who, how⯑ever, ordered that miniſter to juſtify all that Buſ⯑ſy had done; but in a manner that might give as little offence as poſſible to the Britiſh miniſtry. There is even ſome reaſon for believing, that if the court of Verſailles did not diſapprove of Buſſy's proceedings, they, at leaſt, were ſorry for it.

On the other hand, his Britannic Majeſty's privy council, and all his other miniſters did not think that this faux pas was of conſequence enough to blow up the whole negotiation. The ſpirit with which Mr. P—acted was now known to the public, and ſo much applauded, that he was then become more popular than ever. He therefore, backed by his brother in law, renewed his efforts for a war with Spain. The point was debated ſolemnly and ſeriouſly, and threw the reſt of the King's ſervants into great perplexities. His Majeſty diſcovered a viſible backwardneſs to the propoſition, which was likewiſe oppoſed by the other miniſters, while the miniſter's influ⯑ence with the public was ſo great, that, could they have avoided it, they would not have [180] broken with him; but at laſt ſuch a breach be⯑came neceſſary.

We do not hazard too bold a conjecture, when we ſay, that ſuch a neceſſity was mutual. The miniſter grew every day more and more con⯑vinced that he could not carry on the war, and that his manners were diſguſting to his fellow counſellors, and, therefore, he wanted but a pre⯑text for breaking with them. The wiſer and the more ſedate part of the latter, were ſecretly re⯑ſolved upon peace, and, let the conſequences be what they would, to take out of his hands a nego⯑tiation, which, it was plain, he never intended, ſhould be ſucceſsful, for he was even heard to complain of his being forced into the few preli⯑minary conceſſions he had already made to France, and which the public ſeemed to diſlike; ſo very tender he was of his popularity. It was not long before they met each other half way; for the ne⯑gotiation between England and France took a new turn. The latter refuſed to abandon their allies in Germany, and inſiſted upon the reſtitu⯑tion of the captures made at ſea before the decla⯑ration of war. The Britiſh miniſtry were highly ſenſible that their obſtinacy was in a great mea⯑ſure owing to the encouragement they had re⯑ceived from Spain, and reſolved to break off the negotiation, as they could find no other means of taking it out of Mr. P—'s hands. Mr. Stanley, who had negotiated the Britiſh affairs at Paris, was recalled from thence, as Buſſy was from London; but ſtill Mr. P—kept in his hands the direction of the war, and now matters came to a criſis. He continued to urge the neceſſity of an immediate declaration of war with Spain, and his arguments were plauſible and popular. They were grounded upon the danger of the family⯑compact, [181] the provocations which Spain had already given to Great Britain, upon the practicability of intercepting their Weſt-India treaſures; and he endeavoured to ſhew that we could, with very lit⯑tle more expence, carry on the war againſt both powers, than what it coſt us ſingly againſt France.

His Majeſty's other miniſters differed from him for many prudential conſiderations, but agreed with him in acting with firmneſs and ſpirit, if Spain, after proper repreſentations being made, ſhould perſiſt in joining France. They inſiſted upon the general connections which England ought always to have with the Spaniſh Monarchy; that an attempt to intercept their treaſures was not only precarious, but would render all the reſt of Europe either our open or ſecret enemies, and though ſucceſsful, would hurt ourſelves more than any other nation. Upon the whole, the ſenſe of the council was to apply, previous to a breach with Spain, every wiſe but vigorous expe⯑dient to prevent it. The miniſter, upon thoſe and other arguments ariſing from the inability of the nation to maintain a general war, declared, that as he was called to his poſt by the voice of the people, he conſidered himſelf as their miniſter; and that he was reſolved to retire from all public buſineſs, if his meaſures were not followed by an immediate declaration of war againſt Spain. His ſpeech was reſented by the other Counſellors, and by none more than the Earl of Granville, Preſident of the council, who had always been noted when out, as well as when in power, for the vigour, if not the violence, of his meaſures; and the words of his anſwer, the authenticity of which ſeems to be eſtabliſhed, are ſaid to have been as follows. ‘I find the gentleman is determined [182] to leave us, nor can I ſay I am ſorry for it, ſince he would otherwiſe have certainly compelled us to leave him; but, if he reſolved to aſſume the right of adviſing his Majeſty, and directing the operations of the war, to what purpoſe are we called to this council? when he talks of being reſponſible to the people, he talks the language of the houſe of commons, and forgets, that at this board, he is only reponſible to the King. However, though he may poſſibly have con⯑vinced himſelf of his infallibility, ſtill it re⯑mains that we ſhould be equally convinced, before we can reign our underſtandings to his direction, or join with him in the meaſure he propoſes.’ This ſpeech was, from the ac⯑quieſcence and approbation it met with from all the reſt of the council conſidered as their ſenſe; and their opinion was honoured with the counte⯑nance of the greateſt character in the nation, who declared, that had his council been as unanimous in following, as they were in rejecting, his mini⯑ſters ſentiments, he would have found himſelf un⯑der great difficulties. Soon after Mr. P—and his brother in law reſigned their places, and with⯑in a day or two the London Gazette announced Mr. P—'s reſignation and that his Majeſty had, in conſideration of his great ſervices ſettled upon him a penſion of 3000l. a year for three lives; and that the title of an Engliſh barony was con⯑ferred upon his lady and her iſſue.

Had the government of England been threat⯑ened with immediate diſſolution, it could not have created a more general conſternation, than this reſignation did in the minds of the public; but a little reflection ſoon recovered them. It was remembered, that the Miniſter's late continental meaſures were direct violations of thoſe profeſſi⯑ons, [183] for which the voice of the people had called him to power. That, by accepting the penſion and the title, he laid himſelf under the tacit obligations of honour and gratitude, not to diſ⯑treſs, and even not to oppoſe, his Majeſty's mea⯑ſures; and many went ſo far as to ſay, that he had exchanged his power for the penſion and the title; and had in fact bartered away the intereſts of the people. Though the laſt accuſation againſt him was certainly unjuſt and groundleſs; yet it had its weight with many zealots, who think they never can be wrong if they oppoſe a court. Other conſiderations had their weight with more ſenſible people. The Britiſh miniſter, at the court of Spain, gave great hopes, that his Ca⯑tholic Majeſty's miniſtry inclined to avoid the war, and to ſettle matters by an amicable accom⯑modation. Men of ſenſe and reflection could not conceive that it became any miniſter to aſ⯑ſume to himſelf a dictatorial power at his Ma⯑jeſty's council-board, that was equally unconſti⯑tutional as inſolent; and they were confirmed in this opinion by the following letter, which was publiſhed as authentic in the Public Ledger, and which never was diſowned to be ſuch, either by the miniſter or his friends.

[185] The miniſter's conduct was generally con⯑demned, not ſo much for the matter contained in the letter (as was before mentioned) as for the manner in which he expreſſed himſelf; and ſome conſtrued it as a diſreſpectful appeal to the pub⯑lic from the crown, after the almoſt unparallelled obligations he lay under to his Majeſty. The wording of the letter, to ſay the beſt of it, was certainly incautious, and his aſſailants from the preſs had ſo greatly the advantage of him, that a mighty breach was made in his popularity. He was now blamed by ſome of his beſt friends for the conceſſions he had made to France in his ne⯑gotiation with Buſſy; and all that could be urged in the abatement of the charge, was, that he had been forced into thoſe conceſſions. The reply was ready. If he ſuffered himſelf to be raviſhed in the one caſe, why not in the other? Why was he ſo uncomplying with Spain and ſo very tame with France?

The Earl of E—was appointed ſecre⯑tary of ſtate in his room, and the new miniſtry gave out, that they were reſolved to proceed with the ſame, if not greater, firmneſs, both with re⯑gard to France and Spain, as Mr. P—had done. It ſoon appeared that the latter had ſent very pro⯑per inſtructions to the Earl of Briſtol, his Bri⯑tannic Majeſty's Ambaſſador at the Spaniſh court, and that his Lordſhip had executed them with great abilities and punctuality. He gave Mr. Wall the Spaniſh miniſter, to underſtand, that the Britiſh court entirely rejected the claim of the Spaniards upon part of the Newfoundland fiſhery. That the Spaniſh captures, complained of, muſt be adjudged by the courts of Admiralty and appeal in England, and that the right of cutting logwood in the bay of Honduras never [186] would be given up on the part of Great Britain Wall diſclaimed all intention that the court of Madrid had to offend that of London by the me⯑morial preſented by Buſſy, but intimated, that the engagements entered into by both courts, and the advantages offered by France to Spain, had cemented their intereſts. He refuſed explicitly to give up any of the claims of Spain, but inſi⯑nuatd that, in the main point of diſpute between them, the logwood trade, the intereſt of England, might be gratified, provided the honour of his Catholic Majeſty was conſulted by a demolition of the ſettlements, which the Britiſh had forcibly made in that bay, and complained of the tri⯑fling the Engliſh had made uſe of in that impor⯑tant point, during a ſix years negotiation upon it. The new Britiſh miniſtry gave ſome ear to his anſwers. But the intereſts of the French court, aſſiſted by a general opinion, that Great Britain was unable longer to carry on the war, prevailed. In the mean while, the war in Ger⯑many took an unfavourable turn for England; the Spaniſh Flota arrived ſafe in their ports; and his Catholic Majeſty highly reſented the indig⯑nant manner in which the offer of his medation had been treated by the late Britiſh miniſter; and then the connections between France and Spain, by the family-compact were openly avowed. The Earl of Briſtol's inſtructions from the new Bri⯑tiſh miniſtry, was to demand, in a diſpaſſionate but earneſt, manner, an immediate and categori⯑cal anſwer, whether ſuch a treaty, as public fame reported, exiſted between Spain and France, and whether Spain would aſſiſt France in a war with Great Britain.

The Earl of Briſtol was ſufficiently apprized of the truth, but punctually performed his inſtruc⯑tions, [187] and then Mr. Wall, who ſeems, on this occaſion, to have been under ſome controul, en⯑tirely altered his language and behaviour, and ac⯑knowledged, that his Catholic Majeſty conſider⯑ed the ſucceſſes of England in America as ſo many preludes to his own ruin, and that he was reſolved to be no longer paſſive. All the reaſon⯑ings which the Britiſh Ambaſſador urged for a further explanation, was in vain, and he received new inſtructions to declare that if the Spaniards did not diſavow their intentions to aſſiſt France, the court of England would conſider ſuch a refu⯑ſal as a declaration of war. Mr. Wall's lan⯑guage, was, if poſſible, more haughty than be⯑fore. He ſaid, that war had been declared by the ſpirit of pride and diſcord reigning in the Engliſh government, and the attack they had made on his Catholic Majeſty's dignity; and that the Earl of Briſtol might depart when and in what manner he thought proper. His Lordſhip accordingly immediately retired from Madrid, December 17, 1761, and the Spaniſh Ambaſſa⯑dor in like manner took leave of London.

Soon after, declarations of war were publiſhed by the courts of London and Madrid, and its operations ſeemed to threaten a general conflagra⯑tion in the conſequences. During the negotia⯑tion, both parties thought they would get the bet⯑ter terms of peace, the more vigorouſly they car⯑ried on war; but the French in this reſpect had a vaſt ſuperiority; for though the allies had great⯑ly incommoded and retarded them by burning their magazines, yet the defeat of the Hereditary Prince at Stangerode, their raiſing the ſiege of Caſſel, the evacuation of the country of Heſſe, the loſſes and fatigues they had ſuffered, and va⯑rious other untowardly accidents, having obliged [188] them to repaſs the Dymel, the French, in the mean while, recruited both their magazines and armies. The month of June, however, was far advanced, before Broglio could draw his forces to the field from Caſſel and its neighbourhood, when he moved towards the Dymel to join Sou⯑biſe. General Sporken was poſted ſo with a ſtrong detachment in the front of the allied army, as to be able to diſpute the paſſage of the Dymel; but, on the advance of Broglio, he attempted to retire, though with conſiderable loſs, for beſides the killed, 800 were made priſoners, 19 pieces of cannon, 400 horſes, and above 170 waggons were taken by the enemy. The allies endeavoured to extenuate this loſs, but it appeared too plain, by the French paſſing the Dymel and ſeizing War⯑burg, Dringleburg, and Paderborn, and by Prince Ferdinand falling back upon the Lippe and taking poſt between Ham and Lipſtadt, by which he was in hopes of cutting off Soubiſe's communication with the Rhine. The allies being thus advan⯑tageouſly poſted, Broglio durſt not march to⯑wards Hanover, but reſolved, after he had joined the Prince de Soubiſe, which he did at Soeſt, to attack the allied army. Their diſpoſitions ſoon convinced Prince Ferdinand of their intention, and he called in all his parties. His firſt care was to ſecure the communication between Lip⯑ſtadt and Ham, and his left wing took poſt be⯑tween the Lippe and the Aaſt. The body of the army occupied the height of Wambeln, and the Prince of Anhalt the ground between Illingen and Hohenover. Lord Granby kept this poſition upon the heights of Kirch-Denkern, and Lieu⯑tenant General Wulgenau, who was encamped upon the heath of Untrup, marched by his right to approach the village of Kirch-Denkern. The [189] avenues and poſts on the little rivers Aaſt, and Sultzbach, were guarded by the piquets of the army. While thoſe diſpoſitions were planning, on the 15th of July, at ſix in the evening, the enemy diſlodged Lord Granby's advanced poſts, and attacked his camp in a ſtrong body. It had been before concerted, that Wulgenau ſhould ſupport him, and Prince Ferdinand ordered the Marquis to maintain his ground to the laſt extre⯑mity, till he was joined by Wulgenau, which his Lordſhip did ſo gallantly, that, notwithſtanding the fury of the French attack and their ſuperio⯑rity of numbers, the enemy was repulſed, the battle having continued till it was quite dark.

Next morning at three o'clock, the battle be⯑gan a freſh, and Wulgenau's corps appeared to be the chief object of the French, whoſe right was commanded by Broglio, as their center and left were by Soubiſe. The firing continued very hot for five hours, without the enemy obtaining any advantage. About nine the French ſeemed inclined to erect a battery on an expoſed emi⯑nence, which commanded the Marquis of Gran⯑by's camp; upon which, Prince Ferdinand, af⯑ter ordering a body of reſerve under Sporken to advance, which they did, commanded an imme⯑diate attack, before the enemy could reſolve on what to do. They reſolved on a flight, and their right wing retired with precipitation, their cen⯑ter and left, which never, properly ſpeaking, had been engaged, otherwiſe than by a cannonade from the other ſide of the Sulzbach, followed the example of their right, and thus the allies re⯑mained maſters of the field of battle, but the na⯑ture of the ground not ſuffering their cavalry to act, they were obliged ſoon to diſcontinue the purſuit. The enemy left their dead and wounded [190] with ſome pieces of cannon; and Maxwell's ſin⯑gle battalion of grenadiers took the regiment of Rouze, conſiſting of four battalions, with its can⯑non and colours. Upon the whole, the loſs of the French in killed wounded and priſoners, was ſaid to be 5000, while that of the allies amounted only to 300 killed, 1000 wounded, and 200 taken priſoners.

It happened during the courſe of this war, by a ſeeming fatality, that the defeats the French received, ſerved, upon the whole, to advance their affairs. It is true, Broglio and Soubiſe endea⯑voured to throw upon one another the blame of the late diſgrace they had received at Kirch-Den⯑kern. The former accuſed the latter of being too late, and the latter the former of being too precipitate, in the attack, but their ſervice did not ſuffer. Their loſs of men was ſoon repaired, that of the allies was irreparable. Their army again divided; Soubiſe at the head of one part of it croſſed the Lippe, intending to beſiege Munſter, as Broglio's diviſion did the Weſer, with a ſeem⯑ing intention to penetrate into Hanover. The allied General was obliged to follow their exam⯑ple; he himſelf obſerved the motions of Broglio, while the Hereditary Prince was ſent to co [...]er Munſter. Broglio avoided a battle, but many ſkirmiſhes happened, in one of which, the brave young Prince Henry of Brunſwick brother to the Hereditary Prince, was mortally wounded. Thoſe actions were generally in favour of the allies, whoſe ſucceſſes were owing to the bravery of the Britiſh troops under the Marquis of Granby. The French received a conſiderable check near Warburg, and might then have fought on equal terms, but they ſtill declined it, as if their inten⯑tion had been to waſte the allied troops by ſkir⯑miſhes [191] and fatigues, in which they ſucceeded but too well. Mean while, the Hereditary Prince, ſeeing Soubiſe more in earneſt to beſiege Mun⯑ſter, than Broglio was to march into Hanover, attacked Dorſten on the 30th of Auguſt, and obliged the garriſon to ſurrender priſoners of war. Upon this, Soubiſe gave over thoughts of be⯑ſieging Munſter and retired from the Lippe. Prince Ferdinand, on the other hand, ſeemed to threaten, by advancing into Heſſe, to ſtop all ſupplies from that country to Broglio's army; up⯑on which the latter returned to Heſſe, as the Prince did to Paderborn. After this, the Heredi⯑tary Prince, who had rejoined his uncle, made an irruption into Heſſe, and deſtroyed the ene⯑my's magazines as far as Fritzlar; while Brog⯑lio, on the 25th of October, entered the foreſt of Hartz, where he took and deſtroyed the ſtrong caſtle of Schartzels and levied ſevere contributi⯑ons on a large tract of country; but the allies received a ſtill more conſiderable check by Prince Xavier of Saxony taking Wolfenbuttel after five days bombardment. The French then drove the reigning Prince of Brunſwick from his capital to Hamburgh, where he met the reigning Landgrave of Heſſe, who was under the like unfortu⯑nate circumſtances. Prince Ferdinand, per⯑ceiving the uninterrupted progreſs of the French to the eaſtward of the Weſer, diſpatched his ne⯑phew the Hereditary Prince to relieve Brunſwick, which was now inveſted by Prince Xavier. The Hereditary Prince, being joined by General Luck⯑ner, who was detached with the cavalry towards Pein, attacked the enemy, drove them out of their entrenchments, and forced them, not only to raiſe their ſiege, but precipitately to abandon Wolfenbuttel with a very conſiderable loſs of men and cannon.

[192] The French were not ſo unſucceſsful in Weſt⯑phalia, which the Prince Soubiſe ravaged, and where, after taking Oſnabourg, he gave that city and its miſerable inhabitants up to the pillage of his ſoldiers. About the ſame time, a body of French light troops appeared before Embden, which was garriſoned by no more than 200 Bri⯑tiſh invalids, whom the inhabitants refuſed to aſ⯑ſiſt in defending the place, and which was given up, after capitulating for favourable treatment. This capitulation was infamouſly broken, and the French, not only put that city, but the great⯑eſt part of Eaſt Frieſland under the moſt uncon⯑ſcionable contributions. Thoſe oppreſſions proved in the end as impolitic as they were unjuſt, for they exaſperated the boors of the country ſo much that they took up arms, and drove the French out of Embden. In the mean while, the Prince of Condé with another detachment of Soubiſe's army, took Mappen, a place of ſome conſe⯑quence, on the Ems, where the allies had ſome magazines. They had, however, far more con⯑ſiderable ones in Bremen, a city of the ut⯑moſt importance by its ſituation on the Weſer, becauſe from it the Engliſh were ſupplied with all their ſubſiſtance. The French attempted to enter it, but were repulſed, and the garriſon, which was before but ſmall, was reinforced. As to the reſt of the operations in Weſtphalia and Heſſe this year, they were various, briſk, and greatly to the honour of the allied officers, par⯑ticularly the Marquis of Granby and the other Engliſh Generals. But the French being ſo nu⯑merous, though they were beaten in almoſt every encounter, nothing deciſive followed upon them; and therefore the nature of our deſign does not ſuffer us to particularize them. It is ſufficient to [193] ſay, that the Hereditary Prince poſted himſelf ſo as to ſecure the coaſt of the Weſer, and inceſ⯑ſantly alarmed the French by detachments, till the enemy went into winter quarters, as he him⯑ſelf did ſoon after. His head quarters were fixed at Hilderſheim; thoſe of the Hereditary Prince at Munſter. The Britiſh cavalry wintered in Eaſt Frieſland and their infantry in the biſho⯑pric of Oſnabourg, while the French quartered 20,000 troops in the country of Heſſe.

Though the Britiſh miniſtry, during their ne⯑gotiation with France, had refuſed to abandon his Pruſſian Majeſty, yet the very treating on ſuch a point gave him apprehenſions, and his in⯑telligence was too good for him not to foreſee, that England would ſoon alter her ſyſtem with re⯑gard to him. He therefore reſolved to act on the defenſive. He had an army under Prince Henry ſtrongly entrenched at Leipſic in Saxony. Daun was encamped near Dreſden, as his Pruſſian Ma⯑jeſty was near Schweidnitz. General Tottleben led one diviſion of the Ruſſian army towards Po⯑merania, as Butterlin did another into the Upper Sileſia, where, being joined by Laudohn, all that country was laid under ſevere contributions. About the 1ſt of Auguſt, a body of Ruſſians ap⯑peared before Breſlau, which they cannonaded, but all the various arts, marches and counter⯑marches of Laudohn, could not draw his Pruſ⯑ſian Majeſty from his advantageous ſituation. In Pomerania, Tottleben loſt his command for ſe⯑cretly correſponding with his Pruſſian Majeſty; and was ſucceeded by General Romanzow, who formed the ſiege of the important town of Col⯑berg by land, while a fleet of 40 ſhips at⯑tacked it by ſea. The place however had been lately fortified, and the Prince of Wirtemberg, [194] a Pruſſian General, was entrenched under its cannon with 6 or 7000 men. To ſave Colberg, the key of his Pruſſian Majeſty's dominions on the north, he detached General Platen to deſtroy the Ruſſian magazines in Poland, and then to continue his march towards Pomerania. Platen performed the ſervice with great ſucceſs, and the Ruſſians, to preſerve their remaining magazines, without which they knew they could not ſubſiſt, left Sileſia and returned to Poland. From thence, after ſecuring his magazines, Butterlin carried fire and ſword into the Marche of Brandenburgh, and directed his courſe towards Pomerania. All his Pruſſian Majeſty could do, was, to detach Ge⯑neral Knoblock after him, that he and Platen might diſtreſs their convoys.

His Majeſty, by this time, began to be in want of proviſions in the ſtrong camp he ſtill preſerved near Schweidnitz, and made a motion towards the Oder, thinking himſelf ſo ſecure of Schweid⯑nitz, that he had withdrawn 4000 of his garri⯑ſon. Laudohn ſiezed the critical moment with the greateſt rapidity, yet caution. His troops ad⯑vanced to the four quarters of the town; clap⯑ped their ſcaling ladders to its walls, and a ma⯑gazine blowing up, became maſter of the place. About 3000 Pruſſians in garriſon were made pri⯑ſoners on this occaſion, with the Governor, Lieu⯑tenant General Zaſtrow, and large ſtores both of artillery and meal fell into the hands of the conqueror, who effected this amazing coup de main with the loſs of no more than 600 men, of whom 300, with as many Pruſſians, were killed by the blowing up of the magazine. His Pruſſian Ma⯑jeſty behaved with his uſual firmneſs under this heavy blow. "It is fatal, ſaid he, but we muſt en⯑deavour to remedy it". His letter to General [195] Zaſtrow was as follows, ‘We may now ſay, what Francis the Firſt of France wrote to his mother, after the battle of Pavia. We have loſt all except our honour. As I cannot com⯑prehend what hath happened to you, I ſhall ſuſpend my judgment, the thing is very extra⯑ordinary.’

Colberg ſtill continued to make an obſtinate reſiſtance, but General Platen, who had joined the Prince of Wirtemberg, in endeavouring to open a way for the Pruſſian reinforcements under Knoblock, was beaten by Romanzow; upon which, Knoblock, with 2000 men under his command, ſurrendered themſelves priſoners of war. A ſtorm had driven the fleets of Ruſſia and Sweden from their ſtation before Colberg; but that procured the place no relief, and it was now viſible that famine and the Ruſſians, whoſe num⯑bers amounted to 50,000 men, muſt force it to ſurrender. This was ſo much the opinion of the Prince of Wirtemberg, that he broke through the Ruſſian army, and left Colberg to make its own terms; and its brave Governor Heyde, after a noble defence of ſix months, with his garriſon, became priſoners of war. The Ruſſians, by taking Colberg, which fell into their hands December 16, were now maſters of the Baltic; and were no longer under a neceſſity of depending upon precarious ſupplies of proviſion from Poland, while his Pruſſian Majeſty ſeemed now undone beyond all poſſibility of recovery, when all of a ſudden he was relieved from the bittereſt diſtreſſes he had ever yet experienced by the death of his moſt determined enemy the Empreſs of Ruſſia, which happened ſoon after he loſt Colberg.

The critical and indeed providential event was as fortunate for Great Britain as it was for his [196] Pruſſian Majeſty. The court of Vienna at f [...]rſt affected to give out, that the new Emperor of Ruſſia would purſue the ſyſtem of the late Em⯑preſs, but a few days undeceived the public. Mutual Embaſſies paſſed between the two courts of Peterſburgh and Berlin, and Czernichef, the Ruſſian General in Sileſia, having orders to re⯑treat towards Poland, began his march accord⯑ingly. Soon after, it was publickly known, that his Imperial Majeſty of Ruſſia was determined totally to reverſe the maxims of his immediate predeceſſor, and an entire ceſſation of hoſtilities between the two courts ſoon after took place.

The court of Great Britain, who had hither⯑to been hampered between its own intereſts and the ties of honour due to the diſtreſt ſituation of his Pruſſian Majeſty, ſeeing with pleaſure that he was eaſied of the weight, which, ever ſince the commencement of the war, had turned its ſcale againſt him, began now ſeriouſly to think of de⯑livering itſelf from the heavy burden of his Pruſ⯑ſian Majeſty's ſubſidy. There was the greater reaſon for this, as we were now, in fact, entering upon two freſh wars, one by ſea, and another by land, but both againſt Spain, who had already marched their troops towards Portugal. The grounds of this invaſion were as infamous as any that hiſtory can produce. Neither France nor Spain ſo much as alledged any provocation that had been given them by the King of Portugal, and they attacked him for no other reaſon, but becauſe he would not break with Great Britain, by ac⯑ceding to the family-compact. The Pruſſian mi⯑niſters, both in Germany and England, made a great noiſe when it was intimated to them that their maſter's ſubſidy would be no longer paid; but as neither they nor their maſter had a ſhadow [197] of complaint of failure in engagements by the Britiſh miniſtry, the affair, as we ſay, went off. In the mean while, the good effects which his Pruſſian Majeſty reaped from the friendſhip of his Imperial Majeſty of Ruſſia daily appeared, for a ceſſation of hoſtilities was concluded between the troops of Pruſſia and Sweden, while the Spani⯑ards were redoubling their preparations by ſea and land to invade Portugal, and even threatened Gibraltar itſelf.

The defection of Ruſſia from the Imperial and French courts damped neither of thoſe powers. In Germany, the French made preparations for bringing into the field, the next campaign, 140,000 troops. Thoſe of her Imperial Majeſty were equal, and his Pruſſian Majeſty augmented his army to 150,000 men; but it is now time to attend the progreſs of the Britiſh arms in Ame⯑rica. Next to the conqueſt of Quebec, that of Martinico was thought to be of the greateſt con⯑ſequence to England, and ſome thought that it even ought to have the preference on many ac⯑counts. Great difficulties had been foreſeen in completing the undertaking, ariſing chiefly from the bad ſucceſs of the former attempts upon that iſland, and our ignorance of its ſtrength and ſi⯑tuation. When it was determined the conqueſt of it ſhould be attempted, General Monkton was appointed to the command of the land forces, as Rear Admiral Rodney was to that of the ſea. On the 5th of January, 1762, the whole armament moved from Barbadoes, and, on the 7th, anchored at St. Anne's bay in Martinico. When our troops landed, they found the iſland full of gul⯑lies that were difficult of acceſs, guarded by bat⯑teries and redoubts, and themſelves precluded from all intelligence, ſo that the conqueſt of the [198] iſland appeared to be a matter of great difficulty. The enemy was poſſeſſed of two ſtrong poſts, to⯑gether with Mont Tartenſon leading to Fort Royale; but being beaten from both, by the va⯑lour of the Britiſh troops, they retired to Mont Garnier, a poſt ſo ſtrong, that they thought it im⯑pregnable. They were, however, driven from it by the Britiſh grenadiers, and after that, they were beaten from poſt to poſt till the citadel of Fort Royale was ſurrendered, and La Touche, the French Governor, after leaving a garriſon in Fort Royale, retired to St. Pierre, and then the whole iſland of Martinico ſurrendered by capitu⯑lation to the Britiſh arms, on the 7th of Febru⯑ary. This conqueſt was followed by the reduc⯑tion of the iſle of Grenada, by Commodore Swanton, and Brigadier General Walſh, which was effected without the loſs of a man. Thoſe amazing ſucceſſes did great ſervice to the reputa⯑tion of the new Britiſh miniſtry; and juſtified the promiſes they had made, that the reſignation of the late miniſter ſhould rather forward than retard the proſecution of the war, but they had a ſtill greater object in view, which was no leſs than the conqueſt of the Havannah itſelf; an undertaking ſo arduous, that Britons alone could have thought of it. The honour of this bold project was diſ⯑puted by ſome of the partizans of the late mi⯑niſtry; but the merit of carrying it into execu⯑tion, undoubtedly, was due to the new one. They thought a peace deſireable, and that nothing could bring it about ſo effectually as a blow that might diſable both France and Spain from carry⯑ing on the war.

As no meaſure ever was entered into with a more general approbation of the public, ſo the miniſter very honeſtly and very wiſely united the [199] cabinet in the ſame ſentiments. The nomina⯑tion of the chief land officers, and the operations of the expedition, were left to a royal perſonage, who was an excellent judge of both, and the Earl of Albermarle was pitched upon to be com⯑mander in chief of the army, as Sir George Po⯑cock was of the fleet. Under his lordſhip acted his brother Major General Keppel; another brother, Commodore Keppel, commanded un⯑der Sir George. The miniſtry ſeemed to take a pride in omitting nothing that could make this expedition ſucceſsful, and on the 17th of Febru⯑ary, Sir George Pocock took leave of his Ma⯑jeſty, and ſet out for Portſmouth to imbark the troops. On the 7th of March, the fleet paſſed by Plymouth, and on the 16th of June, an account came to England of the Admiral having ſailed, with the men of war and tranſports, the 16th of May, from Martinico to the Havannah. A long ſilence with regard to this expedition ſucceeded, which greatly embarraſſed the public of England, but in September, an account came by a gentle⯑man who left the Havannah the 18th of July. By it, we were informed, that two days before our fleet arrived there, two Dutch ſhips got in with pow⯑der and warlike ſtores; and that our troops took two waggons laden with money, going from the town to the mountains, where all the nuns, prieſts, and other people had retired. That the Spaniſh fleet at that place conſiſted of ſeven ſhips of 70 guns, and three of 60, having on board 5340 ſeamen, 1460 ſoldiers; two of 60, juſt launched, one rigged but not manned, and that Don Lewis de Velaſco, Captain of the El Bayna of 70 guns, commanded in the Moro caſtle. All this intelligence happened to be pretty near the truth, only the Spaniſh naval force was in reality greater than we knew of. After this, the public [200] apprehenſions encreaſed from the profound ſilence that was obſerved with regard to the ſiege, the reaſon of which ſoon appeared. For the caſtle El Moro, being the capital defence of the place, it had been agreed upon, between the General and the Admiral, to diſpatch no accounts till that was reduced, as they were morally ſure the town and the other forts muſt ſoon follow. At laſt, on the 30th of September, letters from the Earl of Albermarle and Sir George Pocock arrived at the Secretary of State's, and the Admiralty Office, dated Auguſt 21, with an account, that the Moro Fort was taken by ſtorm, on the 30th of July, by his Majeſty's troops under Major General Keppel, who commanded the attack. ‘Our mines, ſaid the Earl of Albermarle in his let⯑ter to the Earl of Egremont, were ſprung about one o'clock and a breach made juſt practicable for a file of men in front. The enemy was drawn up on the top of it in force, with a ſeeming determination to defend it. The attack was ſo vigorous and impetuous, that the enemy was inſtantaneouſly drove from the breach, and his Majeſty's ſtandard planted upon the baſtion. I did not ſend a particular expreſs with this good news to your Lordſhip, becauſe I flattered myſelf, that what has hap⯑pened would ſoon be the conſequence of our ſucceſs at Fort Moro. On the 11th in the morning, by a ſignal from the fort, we opened our batteries againſt the town and Punta fort. The guns and mortars were ſo well ſerved by the artillery and ſailors, and their effect ſo great, that in leſs than ſix hours, all the guns in the fort and north baſtion were ſilenced. The governor hung out the white flag, and beat a parley, and, at the ſame time, ſent out [201] an officer to propoſe a ceſſation of arms for twenty four hours, in order to prepare the ar⯑ticles of capitulation.’

This good news diſſipated the gloom, and the melancholy apprehenſions of the public, and the miniſtry ſeemed now to triumph over all oppoſi⯑tion. All this while, his Catholic Majeſty was making the moſt vigorous preparations for the en⯑tire conqueſt of Portugal, and the command of that expedition was given to the Marquis of Ser⯑ria; while the French army was advancing to ſecond his motions. Upon this, his moſt Faithful Majeſty recalled his miniſters from the courts of Madrid and Verſailles, the Marquis of Serria entered the Portugueſe territories on the 7th of May, and rather ſeemed to make a tour than a campaign, ſo cowardly was the behaviour of the Portugueſe. Unfortunately for England, his moſt Faithful Majeſty's ſeverities, however neceſſary they might have been, againſt his great⯑eſt ſubjects, had raiſed up a great ſpirit of diſaf⯑fection againſt him, and many, even of thoſe who were intruſted with military commands, were in the intereſts of Spain. The firſt place in Por⯑tugal which the Spaniſh General attacked was Miranda, and, while they were preparing a bat⯑tery to act againſt it, a fire broke out in a maga⯑zine in the town and blew it up. Though hoſ⯑tilities had not been then begun, this event had determined Don Bento Joſeph Fagueredo, gover⯑nor of the place, to deſire the Spaniards would not proceed in their operations, and to ſurrender him⯑ſelf priſoner of war with his garriſon. Four bat⯑talions of the Iriſh brigade, aſſiſted by the regi⯑ment of Galicia, entered through two breaches made in the walls by the exploſion; while the regiment of Numantia and Merida dragoons en⯑tered [202] by the gates, under the orders of Don Riſaguero Lieutenant General. They found in Miranda, excluſive of the ſtaff officers of the place, twenty other officers, fifteen ſerjeants, one drummer, and 324 ſoldiers of the regiment of Braganza, together with two troopers, one offi⯑cer of artillery, fifteen mattroſſ [...]s, and three engineers; the other officers and ſoldiers on guard were almoſt all buried in the ruins of the magazine, and it is computed that 500 perſons periſhed there, including the inhabitants. This acquiſition was ſucceeded by the ſurrender of Bra⯑ganza, which the garriſon, conſiſting of five com⯑panies of foot abandoned, as the garriſon of Chaves, though compoſed of 2000 men, did that place; and the conquerors found Moncorſo eva⯑cuated not only by the military, but the civil power. The Spaniards then proceeded againſt Almeyda, where they met with a ſmall check from the Portugueſe militia. But by this time the Britiſh auxiliaries had landed, and Crauford's regiment having joined the Portugueſe army, they took a poſition for cutting off the return of the Spaniards to their own country, flattering themſelves that the invaders, being preſt for want of proviſions, muſt ſoon retreat.

But, at this juncture, the French auxiliaries were marching to ſupport the Spaniards, and the Eng⯑liſh under the Count la Lippe, had taken the field for the Portugueſe, while the Spaniards were making themſelves maſters of Salvaterra, and the caſtle of Segura; and the French on their part met with as little oppoſition. Thus, the whole kingdom of Portugal was on the point of falling a prey to her enemies in the moſt ſhameful daſtardly manner that we meet with in hiſtory, when ſhe was ſaved by Britiſh arms and [203] Britiſh councils. Count de la Lippe reſolved to open his operations, by exhibiting a ſpecimen of Britiſh courage, that ſhould aſtoniſh the Spaniards, and encourage the Portugueſe. He detached Brigadier General Burgoyne with his regiment and 17 companies of grenadiers, to make an attack on Valencia d'Alcantara, from whence they diſ⯑lodged the enemy ſword in hand. The Spaniſh regiment of Seville was entirely deſtroyed, a Major General, a Colonel, a Captain, five Lieu⯑tenants, three ſtands of colours, and all the private men were taken who eſcaped the ſword. The loſs of the Britiſh troops on this occaſion were no more than Lieutenant Burk of Colonel Frederick's, one ſerjeant and three private killed; two ſerjeants, one drummer, and 18 private wounded. After this, the Engliſh and Portu⯑gueſe entrenched themſelves about eight miles from Abrantes, the paſs for Liſbon; being de⯑termined there to wait for the Spaniards.

But all the exertion of the Britiſh courage and diſcipline could not inſpire the Portugueſe with courage, or even reconcile them to the Britiſh, whom they treated, not as their deliverers, but their enemies. Count de la Lippe complained of this to his Portugueſe Majeſty, but all he could do was, to threaten his Generals and Officers for their diſobedience. This ſeems to have had ſome kind of influence, for, on the 6th of Oc⯑tober, at Villa Velha the Portugueſe troops ſhewed ſome degree of ſpirit, when the Gene⯑rals Townſhend and Burgoyne ſurrounded a large body of Spaniards there, and forced them to ſur⯑render priſoners. Some very hot encounters afterwards happened, in which the Britiſh cou⯑rage, as uſual, diſtinguiſhed itſelf, and effectu⯑ally defeated the ſcheme the Spaniards had [204] formed, of paſſing over the Tagus into the pro⯑vince of Alentejo. After that, they were obliged to retire from Caſtello Branco, and repaſs the mountains which ſeparate the provinces of Eſtre⯑madura and Beira. But we are to obſerve, that by this time, the peace was looked upon to be in forwardneſs between Great Britain and France.

The more diſcerning part of the public, per⯑ceiving that nothing obſtructed its final conclu⯑ſion, ſo much as the incertainty both courts were under with regard to the affairs of America. The news of the reduction of Martinico had not yet arrived in Europe, and the Britiſh expedition a⯑gainſt the Havannah was no ſecret to the pub⯑lic. The French, who treated ſeparately from Spain, affected to give out, that they were ready to grant the ſame terms which they had offered before, whether the expedition againſt Martinico was ſucceſsful or no. But the Britiſh miniſtry reſolved to wait the event, and to act accordingly. They carried their views farther than their pre⯑deceſſors had done for the ſecurity of the Britiſh colonies in North America, which they thought muſt be precarious, without a much larger extent of territory, than what the French had yet of⯑fered; and unleſs they obtained the free naviga⯑tion of the Miſſiſſippi. They thought, when they had obtained that, their back ſettlements were im⯑pregnable to the power of their enemies, and that every thing was provided for, that their co⯑lonies in thoſe parts had ſo long required, and la⯑mented that they were not able to obtain. Theſe advantages, they reaſonably imagined, muſt be greatly improved, in caſe the expedition againſt the Havannah ſhould prove ſucceſsful; but it muſt be obtained, if it ſhould not.

[205] The conqueſt of Martinico did not forward the concluſion of peace ſo much as was expected. The French grew ſullen at their loſs and diſ⯑grace, and the eaſy purchaſe the Engliſh had made of the fineſt poſſeſſion in America; while the court of London, on the other hand, thought that the conqueſt of Martinico intitled them to inſiſt upon higher terms than before. Thus the ſecret negociations between the two courts grew more perplexed, and poſſibly would have been ineffectual, had not his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty been inflexibly determined to have peace at any rate, and given his miniſters orders accordingly. The majority of his council oppoſed this pacific diſpoſition, and the court of Madrid inſiſted up⯑on his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty's waiting for the reſult of the Engliſh expedition againſt the Ha⯑vannah, which they conſidered to be more ro⯑mantic and impracticable than any of the many adventures of their own knight errant.

But all remonſtrances were in vain, and the preliminaries being agreed upon, the Duke de Ni⯑vernois was appointed Ambaſſador from his moſt Chriſtian, to his Britannic Majeſty; and the Duke of Bedford was, by his Britannic Majeſty, on the 4th of September, appointed his miniſter plenipotentiary to the court of France. While thoſe pacific meaſures were carrying into execu⯑tion, the Britiſh troops were undergoing the moſt fatiguing ſervice, any body of men ever experi⯑enced, in the ſiege of the Havannah, but with ſuch perſevering intrepidity, that, on the 29th of September, the Captains Harvey and Nugent brought to St. James's, an account of its ſur⯑render, and preſented to his Majeſty the colours taken in the place. As the particulars of this me⯑morable ſiege are heavy and unentertaining, it may [206] be ſufficient to acquaint our readers, that many of our braveſt ſoldiers and ſailors died before the place, through the inclemency of the climate, and that it was at laſt taken, after ſtorming the breach our troops had made in the Moro Caſtle, where the brave Velaſco its Governor was killed; and that the other forts and the town ſurrender⯑ed by capitulation. But though the negotiations and treaty of peace, between France and Eng⯑land, had relaxed, and at laſt extinguiſhed the war between thoſe two powers, they as yet had no effect on the war between his Pruſſian Ma⯑jeſty and the Empreſs Queen. The Britiſh troops, in the beginning of the year, ſtill remained in Germany, and Prince Henry of Pruſſia opened the campaign in Saxony, with ſome advantages over the army of the Empire. The allied army under Prince Ferdinand aſſembled in its canton⯑ments, and ſent for 12 battalions from their army on the Lower Rhine, while the war continued in Sile⯑ſia between his Pruſſian Majeſty and the Empreſs Queen, who threatened to lay ſiege either to Neiſs or Glogau. The Ruſſian General Bran⯑demer met with a ſevere defeat near Chemnitz, but in return Prince Henry took Freyberg, every where defeated the Auſtrians, and made upwards of 7000 of them priſoners, with all their artil⯑lery, waggons, and ammunition. In the mean while, his Pruſſian Majeſty obliged Count Daun to retire to the mountains on the frontiers of Bo⯑hemia, and his affairs were in the full career of ſucceſs, when he received the aſtoniſhing news that his friend and ally the new Emperor of Ruſ⯑ſia was depoſed and murdered. From this time his Pruſſian Majeſty reſolved to act on the defen⯑ſive, but had the good fortune to retake Schweid⯑nitz, in which was a garriſon of 8000 men, [207] commanded by Count Guaſco. Here we may fairly cloſe the hiſtory of his Pruſſian Majeſty's military operations, during the laſt campaign of this war. All that ſucceeded were merely pre⯑cautionary, but were conducted with ſuch judg⯑ment, as terminated in his concluding with the court of Vienna, a moſt glorious peace, and en⯑tering with the Empreſs Queen into connexions, ſo ſtrict and intimate, that we can ſcarcely per⯑ſuade ourſelves they had ever been at war.

However dazzling this good fortune of his Pruſſian Majeſty, it is moſt certain, that it was entirely owing to the friendſhip of the court of England. While the negociations for peace were in ſuſpence, the Britiſh Generals in Ger⯑many received orders to act with redoubled vi⯑gour. In conſequence of this, Prince Ferdi⯑nand, on the 4th of June, attacked the French in their camp of Graebenſtein, under the Mar⯑ſhals D'Etrees and Soubiſe. Four different at⯑tacks were made. The firſt under General Luck⯑ner, one under General Sporken, one under Prince Ferdinand himſelf who attacked the cen⯑ter, and the laſt by the Marquiſs of Granby. The three laſt Generals paſſed the Dymel, tho' from different quarters, almoſt at the ſame mi⯑nute; and had it not been for the intrepidity of Monſ. de Stanville, a French officer, who put himſelf at the head of the flower of the French infantry, their whole army muſt have been de⯑ſtroyed; an undiſputed victory, however, fell to his Britannic Majeſty's troops, who did not loſe above 300 men. The loſs of the French was immenſe. The fine body of infantry under Stan⯑ville, by favouring the retreat of their cavalry, was entirely deſtroyed or taken priſoners, except⯑ing [208] two battalions that fled, and it was upon all hands agreed, that the victory, in which 2570 French priſoners were made, was in a great mea⯑ſure owing to the gallant behaviour of the Mar⯑quiſs of Granby, at the head of the Britiſh troops. We are only to add on this occaſion, that the French infantry conſiſted of 100 battalions, and the Engliſh had no more than 60.

After this victory, part of the French army retired precipitately over the Fulda, and there en⯑camped themſelves under the cannon of Heſſe. On the 23d of July, the Hanoverians and Heſſi⯑ans paſſed the Fulda, and beat the right of the French army under the command of Prince Xa⯑vier. On which occaſion, the French again owed their preſervation to the courage and con⯑duct of their General Stanville. Various ope⯑rations then ſucceeded; but the Prince of Con⯑dé, having, without the knowledge of the Here⯑ditary Prince, been reinforced by the two French Marſhals, beat his ſerene highneſs, who, beſides the Germans, had with him Elliot's dragoons and the piquets under Lord Frederic Cavendiſh. In this action, the Hereditary Prince was wounded, and the loſs of the allies in killed, wounded, and priſoners, amounted to at leaſt 1500 men; but by the good diſpoſitions of Prince Ferdinand, their enemies were prevented from purſuing their advantage.

Mean while, Prince Ferdinand laid ſiege to Caſſel, which was obſtinately defended by Monſ. Dieſbach, the French commandant, but was at laſt obliged to ſurrender, in conſequence, as we ap⯑prehend, of orders from his court, who had now fully ſettled the preliminaries with Great Britain. While this ſiege was carrying on, one of the moſt deſperate actions, that had happened during [209] the whole war, paſſed at Amoeneburg (which was in poſſeſſion of the allies) between the French and the Marquis of Granby, in the night between the 20th and 21ſt of October. The intention of the French was to diſlodge the allies from that town, againſt which they raiſed ſome batteries in the night near a mill. The firing alarmed Lord Granby. He marched with all his troops to the relief of the place as the French did with all theirs to ſupport the attack, and the latter at laſt brought out 20 pieces of artillery. The moſt dreadful cannonading, conſidering the ſmallneſs of the poſts, that ever was known in the military art, enſued. The allies maintained the redoubt, and the French the works they had raiſed at the mill. The enemy fired from their great artillery upon the redoubt, at the diſtance of no more than 300, and with their ſmall arms, at that of 30 paces. Fifty pieces of cannon were em⯑ployed, the execution of which was confined to a ſpace not exceeding 400 paces, and for 15 hours, the firing both from the great and ſmall arms had not the ſmalleſt intermiſſion. No fewer than 17 complete battalions were ſucceſſively employed in relieving the troops that defended the redoubt, and thoſe who came lateſt, were obliged to raiſe a parapet of dead bodies for their defence. The French at the ſame time attacked Amoeneburg, and after being three times repulſed, the garriſon ſurrendered priſoners, which put an end to this bloody action. As to the loſs, it very probably was diminiſhed on both ſides; for the allies gave out that they had not above 800 killed; but the French themſelves, two of whoſe Generals were dangerouſly wounded in the action, did not deny that their loſs was much greater. This, as it was the moſt bloody, was the laſt action of the war; [210] for, on the 15th of December, a convention was ſigned at Brucker's Muhl upon the Oh'me, be⯑tween the Generals Howard and Guerchy, au⯑thoriſed by his ſerene highneſs Prince Ferdinand, and the French Marſhals, for an immediate ceſ⯑ſation of hoſtilities between the Britiſh and French armies, who were upon the point of ſe⯑parating, in order to march into their reſpective winter quarters. Never was there a more ſud⯑den and more pleaſing tranſition from enmity to eſteem, than ſucceeded the ſignature. The French and the allies ruſhed into mutual em⯑braces, and nothing was heard but the moſt rap⯑turous admiration of the valour of the one from the mouths of the other. Several days were ſpent in magnificent and ſocial entertainments, given by the one army to the other, from the commander in chief to the meaneſt ſubaltern. And, to the honour of the Britiſh troops, we muſt obſerve, that on their return home, they re⯑ceived the thanks of the States-General them⯑ſelves, through whoſe dominions they paſſed, for their ſobriety, regularity, and punctual payment of whatever they were furniſhed with, in that republick.

The loſs of the Havannah gave a moſt dread⯑ful blow to the intereſts of Spain, and ſuch as that court believed impoſſible to have happened, yet the new Britiſh miniſtry to make good their profeſſions upon the reſignation of Mr. Pitt, that they would carry on the war with more vigour than ever, if Spain ſhould force them to declare it, reſolved to attack Manilla, one of the Philippine Iſlands, an enterprize till then deemed impracticable by any European power. Every one knows how inacceſſible thoſe iſlands which extend from North lat. 6, to near 20; [211] and from Eaſt lon. 114, to 126, are to all but the Spaniards, which, ever ſince their diſcovery under Philip the Second, from whom they take their name, they have induſtriouſly concealed from the reſt of the world, as being the moſt re⯑condite ſtore houſes of their wealth. Thoſe iſlands, are ſaid to be 1200 in number, the chief, which belongs to the Spaniards is Lu⯑conia, and contains the city Manilla, the ſeat of the Spaniſh Viceroy. Without entering into any geographical deſcription, which does not belong to this work, the city of Manilla is rich, populous, and ſtrong, and, all the time of the expedition we are now to treat of, was thought to contain immenſe quantities of treaſure. The command of the land forces, appointed to re⯑duce it, was given to Colonel William Draper, who had ſignalized himſelf on many occaſions in the Eaſt Indies. The embarkation was made at Madraſs, and the forces conſiſted of the 75th regiment with a company of the royal artillery, while the ſettlement at Madraſs furniſhed 600 Sea-poys, a company of Cafres, one of Topa⯑zes, two companies of French, who had inliſted in their ſervice, and ſome unarmed Laſcars for the uſe of the artillery. This little army was reinforced by rear Admiral Corniſh, who com⯑manded the ſea forces, with a fine battalion of 350 ſeamen and 270 marines; ſo that the whole force for the land operations amounted to 2300 men, which were all that could be ſpared from the neceſſary protection of Madraſs. The ſhips em⯑ployed upon the expedition, were the Elizabeth, Grafton, Lenox, Weymouth, and Argo, who were diſpatched before with Commodore Tidde⯑man; and on the firſt of Auguſt, they were fol⯑lowed by the Norfolk, Panther, America, Sea⯑ford, [212] South-ſea caſtle ſtore ſhip, Admiral Ste⯑vens's ſtore ſhip, and the Oſterly a company's ſhip, under the command of Admiral Corniſh; two Eaſt-India ſhips ſerving for tranſports. Nothing remarkable happened till, on the 23d of Sep⯑tember, they anchored in Manilla bay, and the Colonel, after landing his men and artillery un⯑der a fire of the frigates, which diſperſed the Spaniards who were aſſembling in great num⯑bers, on the 25th, poſſeſſed themſelves of an ex⯑cellent poſt, which not only covered the landing of their ſtores, but ſecured their communication with their ſquadron. The Engliſh troops, how⯑ever, ſuffered greatly from the rains, and the per⯑petual ſurf on the ſhore rendered the landing of the artillery and ſtores a matter of great diffi⯑culty. The perſeverance and intrepidity of the Engliſh troops got the better of all obſtacles, and the Spaniards were driven from their advanced poſts into the town, after a reſiſtance that gave the Engliſh no high ideas of their courage.

The pride, ignorance, and cruelty, of the de⯑fendants, are ſcarcely to be credited. Their Archbiſhop was their governor and commander in chief; but ſo weak a man, that when ſome foul weather began to riſe which incommoded the Engliſh, he publickly declared to his people, that the angel of God was about to diſperſe and deſtroy the Engliſh, as he had done the hoſt of Sennacherib. When ſummoned to ſurren⯑der, he in return adviſed the Engliſh to deſiſt from their undertaking, becauſe his city was impregnable. Ten thouſand neighbouring In⯑dians, the moſt cruel and barbarous people under the ſun, were introduced into the city, which was in a manner open to them, the handful of Eng⯑liſh being able to inveſt but a very ſmall part of [213] it. The fierceneſs of the Barbarians was re⯑markably diſplayed in the following tragedy. The governor's nephew had been taken in the bay by the Engliſh, and his excellency ſent a flag of truce requeſting the favour that he might be ſet on ſhore, which was accordingly granted; and Lieutenant Fryar, the General's own ſecre⯑tary, was appointed to conduct him to the city. In their way thither, they met with a large party of the garriſon, intermingled with Indians, who moſt inhumanly murdered Lieutenant Fryar and mangled his body in a manner too ſhocking ſo be related, and at the ſame time mortally wounded the gentleman, while he was endeavouring to ſave his conductor. The weather and rains con⯑tinued ſtill to be ſo unfavourable to the Engliſh, that the Archbiſhop truſted to the elements for his deliverance; while the Indians in their ſallies, though ſlightly armed, fearleſsly ran up to the very muzzles of their enemy's pieces, and expired like wild beaſts gnawing the bayonet that gave them death. At laſt, after ſurmounting incredible difficulties, and the Spaniards conti⯑nuing ſtill obſtinate, though not brave, a breach was made, which the Engliſh reſolved to ſtorm. This was done with ſuch amazing ſpirit and ra⯑pidity, that the Spaniards made no effort of re⯑ſiſtance, ſo that the Engliſh were afraid the ene⯑my had ſome mines in reſerve to ſpring; but without reaſon. The chief reſiſtance they met with was at the royal gate, where a hundred Spaniards and Indians, who refuſed to ſurrender, were put to the ſword, and about 300 were drowned in attempting to paſs the river. At laſt, the governor and principal officers, who had re⯑tired to the citadel, which was in a good poſture of defence, ſurrendered at diſcretion; and thus [214] the abſolute reduction of the place, with its nu⯑merous artillery and ſtores, was effected. If the treaſure found here by the Engliſh was not ſo great as expected, it was owing to the unavoid⯑able misfortune they were under of not being able to inveſt the place; by which, their enemies were at liberty to diſpoſe of their treaſure and effects as they pleaſed. To make them ſome amends, however, during the ſiege, Captain Parker in the Panther made prize of a rich Aca⯑pulco ſhip, valued at three millions of dollars; and the Admiral and General reduced the enemy to the neceſſity of offering our forces an honour⯑able and beneficial capitulation, which they ac⯑cepted, very fortunately for them, and for us, as the places would otherwiſe have been given up, without redemption, by the following treaty.