SECTION I. On the Cauſe of the Inequality of the Land-Tax.

THE origin of the diſproportion of the charge of the modern Land-tax upon the home and re⯑mote diſtrict, is to be ſound in a very early period of our hiſtory; when the ſouth-weſt counties were ex⯑poſed to the deſcents of the French, and the weſtern and northern, to the predatory incurſions of the Welch and Scotch. Theſe hoſtilities expoſed them to fre⯑quent and conſiderable loſſes; and they could con⯑tribute very little to the charge of the general defence, after they had provided for their own. Hence it appears, in the old accounts of the Exchequer, that the northern and weſtern counties were always fa⯑voured in their charge to the ancient ſubſidies. And during the reign of Mary the Firſt, the whole counties of Northumberland, Cumberland, Weſtmoreland, the towns of Berwick and Newcaſtle, and the Biſhop⯑ric of Durham, were exempted from the payment [6] of theſe grants, on account of their vicinity to the Scotch. ^*

In the 17th and 18th of Charles the Firſt an aſ⯑ſeſſment of £ 400,000 was levied upon Land, ac⯑cording to the proportion of the old ſubſidies^†. Du⯑ring the civil war, the Exciſe had been the great re⯑ſource of the Parliament: but when the royal party was ſubdued, a Land-tax by monthly aſſeſſments was extended over the whole kingdom ^‡; the pro⯑portions of the old ſubſidies were adhered to as be⯑fore^§. It has been generally ſaid, that, by theſe aſſeſ⯑ments, the heavieſt charges fell upon ſuch diſtricts as had formed aſſociations in defence of Parliament: and this has been ſuppoſed to be the origin of the inequality of the modern Land-tax: but moſt coun⯑ties in England having been at ſome time or other aſſociated during the war, and by ordinances of the Lords and Commons at Weſtminſter,^** this ſuppo⯑ſition muſt be given up.

One cauſe of continuing the former proportions of this charge, was, that while the remote diſtrict had been much harraſſed by the hoſtile armies of both parties, the home counties, better covered by the forces of the Parliament, had enjoyed a greater de⯑gree of ſecurity. Hence aroſe a neceſſity of ſome temporary indulgence to the former; which was very commodiouſly, but perhaps not very politically con⯑ferred upon them, by continuing the old proportion of taxation.^** This mode of raiſing money by monthly aſſeſſments, formed part of the conſtant revenue of the State, until the Reſtoration: the remote counties however were indebted for this indulgence, in ſome meaſure, to the number and vigilance of the mem⯑bers [7] they returnd to the Houſe, as well as to the conſideration of their paſt ſufferings^*.

Theſe aſſeſſments were the baſis, on which the payments of the ſeveral parts of the kingdom to the modern Land-tax were determined; and to which they are "exactly"^† proportioned. This fact, for which we have cotemporary teſtimony, is in part the ſource of the popular error on this ſubject. Thus the diſproportion of the aſſeſſments of the common⯑wealth was the proximate, and that of the old ſub⯑ſidies the remote, cauſe of the preſent inequality of the Land-tax.

The plan of converting the monthly aſſeſſments upon land, into a pound rate, was firſt brought for⯑ward in that ſingular Convention, which received the name of Praiſe-God Barebones Parliament. They re⯑ſolved that the ſupply for the maintenance of the army ſhould be ſo raiſed; but the aſſeſſment was broken up, before that reſolution received the form of an ordinance or law^‡. That this new ſyſtem either was then, or afterwards became popular, is evident from its being carried into execution, the firſt year after the Revolution; for new ſchemes for raiſing money, which had not acquired an antecedent popu⯑larity, would not at ſuch a time have been embraced. Two ſupplies by a tax on land were granted in that year; the firſt at one ſhilling, and the ſecond at two ſhillings, in the pound. Their aggregate produce was £1,566,627: and at four ſhillings in the pound, the ſum collected would have been £2,088,836. The real produce of the tax at that rate in the year 1693, was £1,977,713^§. There appears therefore to have been a deficiency of £111,123 in the latter payment, which is thus accounted for: to the firſt, the inhabitants of the home diſtrict had aſſeſſed them⯑ſelves [8] more nearly to the true value of their eſtates: they afterwards "^*learned of their neighbours, to fa⯑vour themſelves in the levying of this tax." If any ſpecies of fraud admitted of defence, it might be ſaid, that they did not ſufficiently profit of the example they had before them.

The aſſeſſment of 1693 continues, with very little change, to be the ſtandard of the preſent time: though a certain part of this reduced amount has been ren⯑dered only nominal, in a very ſingular manner, by the ſubſequent extenſion of the tax to ſalaries and fees of office; which was certainly intended to pro⯑duce an augmentation of the revenue: its effect has however been contrary; for the entire ſalary is paid out of the Exchequer ^†; and the tax on each officer goes in aid of the ſum, at which the place where he reſides was before aſſeſſed; a relief where probably it is not wanted. Thus this tax is in no caſe an in⯑creaſe of the income of the public; and in ſome inſtances it actually diminiſhes it; for when the ſa⯑lary is ſmall, the officer is repaid out of the receipts of his own department^‡: thus the Treaſury pays part of the tax of all thoſe places, where officers with ſmall ſalaries reſide; and the neat revenue of the State becomes actually diminiſhed. What the loſs thus generated may amount to, I am unable to aſſign: the effective payment of every county will therefore be taken conſtantly to be the ſame as in the year 1693.

When this inequality originally took place, ſeveral reaſonings were made uſe of in defence of it, but of unequal validity. It was urged, that the owners of land in the remote diſtrict, could not pay an equal ſum in the pound out of their rents; ‘becauſe their [9] returns and markets were not ſo quick; and they taſted not that benefit of trade and greatneſs of London, in the ſame degree as the home coun⯑ties.^*’ It may very well be granted that, at the im⯑poſition of the Land-tax, the production of a farm of 100 acres in the remote diſtrict, ſold for leſs money, than that of another of an equal ſize in the home diviſion; in conſequence of which, the rent of the latter was greater then that of the former; and therefore that an equal tax could not equitably be impoſed upon equal quantities of land in each: but it by no means follows, that from equal rents, equally well paid, (which is for the preſent to be ſuppoſed) equal ſums ought not to be contributed to the public charge; whatever the local circumſtances, or the na⯑tural properties of the ſoil out of which they reſult, may be. For there is the ſame reaſon to admit a deduction upon account of one of theſe accidents in⯑ſeparably attached to the eſtate, as upon account of the other. The landlord who derives an income of £.100 a year, from a farm with a good ſoil, ſituated near an inferior market, is in the ſame circumſtances with reſpect to his ability to pay taxes, as another who receives the ſame rent from a farm, containing the ſame number of acres; whoſe ſoil is inferior, but which is ſituated in the vicinity of a good mar⯑ket: and if the latter were to plead for an abate⯑ment of a tax, confeſſedly proportioned to his in⯑come, becauſe it was derived from a tract of ſandy country, we ſhould ſmile at ſuch a plea, on ſuch an occaſion.

But another argument was urged, at the time of the impoſition of the land-tax, in defence of the ori⯑ginal diſproportion of the charge upon the two di⯑ſtricts; which, if the fact it reſts upon be admitted, [10] proves beyond diſpute, that the remote diſtrict ſtood then in need of conſiderable relief in ſome ſhape or other: and that fact is eſtabliſhed upon the fulleſt evidence. The landlords of the remote diſtrict al⯑ledged, that they ‘were not able to pay the ſame pound rate, becauſe their rents were not ſo well paid:’ ^* that is, loſſes of rent were more common among them, than in the home diviſion. Dave⯑nant, from whom this is extracted, when writing in favour of the equalization of the tax, gives this as part of the plea of the remote diſtrict; and does not diſpute the fact. This tacit admiſſion of it is a kind of hiſtorical evidence in its favour. He alſo informs us, that in the year 1665 it was evident that money was ſcarce in the northern and weſtern counties;^* a circumſtance which muſt have cauſed many delays and failures, in the payment of rent; and it will be ſeen preſently, that the relative depreſſion of the landed in⯑tereſt in thoſe parts of the kingdom, had increaſed be⯑tween that time and the Revolution. That failures in the payment of rent were then frequent in the weſtern counties particularly, and that the farmers were in great diſtreſs there, ſeems apparent from the teſti⯑mony of Mr. Locke.^†

But theſe accounts perhaps, without more ſubſtan⯑tial ſupport, would not be ſufficient at this time abſo⯑lutely to confirm the fact, on which the remote di⯑ſtrict then claimed the indulgence of the State: and we might be inclined to detract ſomething from their credit, upon account of that degree of doubt, with which ſuch complaints ought in general to be re⯑ceived: [11] but it is proved from the price of eſtates in 1666, that the rents were then very badly paid in the remote diſtrict: and on the ſame evidence it is to be ſhown, that from that year the ſecurity of pay⯑ment to the landlord, was relatively more and more declining until 1688; as appears from the increaſing ratio of diſparity of the value of equal incomes, and the increaſing difference of the intereſt of money made by purchaſes in the two diſtricts, at each of thoſe terms.

In the year 1666, the mean value of land, in the home diſtrict, was 19 years purchaſe;^* or an eſtate of £.526: 6s. a year, was in value £.10,000; and the intereſt of money made by ſuch purchaſe, was £.5·2631 per cent.

The mean value of land, in the remote diſtrict, was at the ſame time 15 years purchaſe;^† and the price of an eſtate of equal rent, £.7894: 14s. and the intereſt of the purchaſe money, £.6·6666 per cent.

Hence the proportion of the values of two eſtates, of equal rents, in the two diſtricts, was at that time as 10,000 to 7894; the difference of their ſelling prices, 4 years purchaſe, or £.2105; and the diffe⯑rence of the intereſt of the purchaſe-money, £1·4035 per cent.

Nothing but a general and great inſecurity in the payment of rents, could have cauſed ſuch important differences, or raiſed the intereſt, made by purchaſing land, above the legal rate on private ſecurities; for the rent of land is the moſt favourite ſpecies of in⯑come. Now to thoſe who then bought eſtates with an intention to reſide upon them, if the rents had been equally well paid, £.526 a year, in the further diſtrict, muſt have been of much greater real value [12] than the ſame ſum in the home diviſion, on account of the cheapneſs of markets. The ſituation would likewiſe have been recommended by another circum⯑ſtance: the ſtrength of the royal party laid here; and if we conſider their character as contradiſtin⯑guiſhed to that of their opponents, thoſe who were deſirous of mixing with a country life, the pleaſures of the livelieſt ſociety it affords, would certainly have thought this diſtrict, at leaſt, as eligible as the other. The faſhion for men of fortune to throng to the capital, was even then greatly increaſed, though not nearly ſo prevalent as it now is; and they had found the means of remitting their rents thither.^* In this reſpect an income from one part of the king⯑dom was nearly as convenient as from another. On the whole of theſe circumſtances, it appears, that equal rents, equally ſecure, ſhould at leaſt, at this period, have been of equal value in the two diviſions; and that nothing but a great hazard of failure of pay⯑ment, could have been the cauſe of the difference ſtated above. For there was at that time, in the home diſtrict, ‘a greater plenty of money than ſecuri⯑ties;’ ^† and if it had not been for this reaſon, it would have found its way to the market where the [13] beſt income was to be obtained for it; that is, where the intereſt, by purchaſe of land, exceeded the legal rate on private loans, by ⅔ per cent. It was ſeen be⯑fore, that in the year 1665, ‘money was very ſcarce in the northern and weſtern counties:’ ^* and here it is ſhown, that, in the remainder of the kingdom, there was more than could be employed.

At the Revolution, the average price of land, in the home counties, was 26½ years purchaſe;^† and the intereſt of money ſo made, £.3·7735 per cent. Hence the value of an eſtate of £.377: 7s. a year, was £.10,000 in the remote diſtrict; the value of land was 17½ years purchaſe;^‡ the intereſt made by money ſo employed, was £.5·7142 per cent. and the value of an eſtate of £.377: 7s. was £.6603: 14s. This rapid riſe (7½ years purchaſe, in 22 years) was cauſed by a ſingular fall of the rate of intereſt, which will be further noticed below.

If the ſecurity of the payment of rent, in the re⯑mote diſtrict, had not decreaſed from 1666 to 1688, the value of an eſtate, the price of which, in the home counties, was in the latter year £.10,000, would, in the remainder of the kingdom, have continued to be £.7894: 14s. It had fallen to £.6603: 14s. there⯑fore the increaſing inſecurity of the rents of that part of the country, had diminiſhed the value of landed perpetuities in the proportion of 7894·7, to 6603·7; or in that of 10,000 to 8364.

The increaſe of the inſecurity of the landed income, in the reſt of the kingdom, may be exhibited in an⯑other point of view; by aſſigning the proportion of its effect to ſink the price of eſtates, to that of the cotemporary fall of intereſt, intimated above, to raiſe them. If the hazard of the payment of rent, in both [14] diſtricts, had been the ſame in the ſecond town as in the firſt, the increaſe of the year's purchaſe, in each, would have been proportioned: hence, in the ſame time that the value of the land of the home coun⯑ties, increaſed from 19 to 26½ years purchaſe, in the remote counties it would have been augmented, in like manner, from 15 to (20.921) 21 years pur⯑chaſe. On the other hand, if the inſecurity of the payment of rent had increaſed in the ſame proportion as the rate of intereſt fell, or the year's purchaſe of the landed income roſe, whoſe degree of ſecurity was conſtant, which is here taken as having been the fact in the home counties; then the number of years purchaſe would have remained fixed; or fifteen times the rent have been the value of land in the remote diſtrict in 1666 and 1688. Again, which is a third caſe, if the hazard had increaſed, but with leſs cele⯑rity than the rate of intereſt fell, the value of land would have been ſomewhere between the two limits of 21 and 15 years purchaſe; whoſe difference is ſix years. Now in effect this caſe obtained, theſe lands had riſen to be in value 17½ years purchaſe, exhibit⯑ing an increaſe of 2½ years: it has been proved, that the undiminiſhed effect of the fall of intereſt, would have increaſed their value by 6 years purchaſe: a part of its efficacy, therefore, and which would (if it had operated unoppoſed) have raiſed them 3½ years purchaſe more, was counter-balanced by ſome de⯑preſſing cauſe; which, if acting alone, would have ſunk them by that amount: and no adequate cauſe can be aſſigned, except the increaſed hazard of the payment of rent. Hence, if the total efficacy of the fall of intereſt to raiſe the value of land, which took place in theſe 22 years, be conceived to be divided into 12 equal parts, the effect of 7 ſuch parts will be found to have been annihilated by the increaſing hazard of the payment of rent, or the forces of theſe [15] oppoſite cauſes to have been in that proportion; and the value of the eſtate to have been increaſed by the 5 parts only which remained uncounterbalanced.

The value of land in the remote diſtrict in the year 1666, was only 4 years purchaſe below that of the reſt of the kingdom: the difference had increaſed to 9 years in the year 1688: the difference of intereſt made by purchaſes, which in the firſt term was (£.1.4035) £.1⅖ per cent. nearly, had, in the ſecond, become augmented to (£.1.9407) nearly 2 per cent. The re⯑mote diſtrict was, therefore, relatively to the home diſtrict, in a ſtate of rapid decline, at the time the land-tax was impoſed; and the ſame is true, even of the value of land, though it exhibits a ſmall abſolute riſe.

It may not be here ſuperfluous to explain, by an inſtance, the terms abſolute riſe and relative fall; and how both may be underſtood to be applied to the ſame thing, at the ſame point of time: for this diſtinction is always material when the magnitudes which two or more ſubjects, increaſing with different degrees of celerity, attain, when compared at the be⯑ginning and end of a term of time. Therefore let there be ſuppoſed to be two bodies, abſolutely with⯑out weight; whereof the firſt is projected upwards, with two degrees of velocity, to continue uniformly the ſame; and let the ſecond be in like manner pro⯑jected at the ſame inſtant, with one degree of cele⯑rity: now all conſideration of weight, with reſpect to both, being out of the queſtion; at the end of a certain time, the ſecond will be below the firſt by a given diſtance; and at the end of double that time, by double that diſtance. Here the ſecond body, at all times, will have aſcended abſolutely; yet its diſtance below the firſt will be always ſuch, as it would have been if the firſt had remained at reſt, and the ſecond been projected in the oppoſite direction, with one [16] degree of uniform velocity, as before; therefore, con⯑ſidered with reſpect to the place of the firſt, it is ſaid to have been, at all times, relatively falling.

Some account of the cauſe of the increaſing inſe⯑curity of the payment of the rent of the remote di⯑ſtrict, may be given upon the authority of Mr. Locke. He deſcribes the artifices by which the purchaſers of the product of the farmer had, at the time of his writing his Tract upon Intereſt, been able to impoſe their own prices upon him, and compel him, beſide, to allow them long terms of credit, and the incapa⯑city of paying their rents, to which the farmers were thereby reduced: and he concludes, ‘If any one doubt of this, let him enquire how many farmers of the weſt are broke and run away ſince Michael⯑mas laſt.’ ^* From the whole of what he has ſaid upon this ſubject, it is evident that the ſame account is applicable, though perhaps in a lower degree, to the northern counties.

Hitherto we have conſidered only the argument in defence of the original diſproportion of the land-tax, drawn from the declining circumſtances of the remote diſtrict, at the time of its impoſition; but the following ſtate of the home diviſion gave no in⯑conſiderable addition to its weight: and of this there is the ſtrongeſt evidence, in the ſingular fall of the rate of intereſt upon loans, mentioned above; by which the value of lands, in the home counties, was in 22 years raiſed 7½ years purchaſe. In conſidering this fall, every thing which relates to the fluctuations of the rate in that term, which were themſelves very re⯑markable, will be omitted. Some years before the time of Mr. Locke's writing his Eſſay on Intereſt, ‘the ſcarcity of money made it, in England, really worth more than £.6 per cent.’ ^† but ſo early as [17] the year 1681, ſuch a decreaſe of the current intereſt had taken place, that the Eaſt-India Company bor⯑rowed conſiderable ſums of money at £.3 per cent. Houghton, who has preſerved this fact, adds, ‘that although he had ſecured the intereſt of one of the officers of the Houſe, to obtain that rate for a friend, he failed of ſucceſs; and that money was then currently lent at £4, 4½, and 5 per cent.’ ^* At the time of the Revolution, according to Davenant, ^† the greater part of the loans upon landed ſecurity, were at the two former rates.

This fall of intereſt is to be attributed, among other very accelerating cauſes, to the increaſe of our currency, at that time, by paper credit; which has been erroneouſly ſuppoſed by ſome not to have ex⯑iſted, or at leaſt to have been in a very circum⯑ſcribed ſtate before the Revolution. The ſhutting up of the Exchequer, in the year 1672, occaſioned the failure of many bankers; and by laying open their accounts, ſhew the extent which paper credit had then obtained. The circulating notes of one of them, on his ſingle ſecurity, exceeded £.1,000,000;^‡ but in 1688, it was ſo much further increaſed, ‘that by its means our rents and taxes were paid, and the bulk of trade here at home, carried on almoſt with⯑out the ſpecies of money:’ ^§ and Davenant, from whom this extract is taken, further deſcribes the ſtate into which it fell during the war of the Revolution, approaching to that of a total annihilation; and the firſt ſymptoms of its revival, as ſuch, after the peace of Riſwyck.

I have entered, with ſome detail, into this proof of the very flouriſhing ſituation of the home counties, and of the relative and increaſing decline of the re⯑mote [18] diviſion, at the time of the impoſition of the land-tax; becauſe it is ſtrongly connected to that in⯑equality of the aſſeſſments which has been perpetuated to this day; and it ſhews that they ſtood in need of ſome relief, though the remainder of the kingdom has cauſe to regret, that no other method was fol⯑lowed in affording aſſiſtance to them, than that which has been eventually ſo unfortunate to themſelves. In the courſe of theſe reſearches, two popular errors, in the hiſtory of our national wealth, appear like⯑wiſe to be done away: the one reſpecting the high rate of intereſt; the other, the extent of paper credit before the year 1688.

In theſe obſervations on the cauſes of the inequality of the land-tax, I have been obliged to go ſo far with this ſketch of a comparative hiſtory of the ſtate of the landed intereſts, in the two diſtricts, that there is but little required to bring it to its ultimate pe⯑riod; and therefore it ſhall be here given. The diſtant counties ſeem to have recovered a total equa⯑lity with the reſt of the kingdom, as early as the ac⯑ceſſion of George the Second. Guthrie informs us, that ‘in the year 1727, the value of the northern counties of the kingdom began to be better under⯑ſtood than formerly.’ ^* In the year 1729, the price of the land of England had increaſed to 25½ years purchaſe: this is given by Anderſon, a dili⯑gent collector of facts, as the general value of the whole kingdom.^† No diſtinction is here made of the prices of eſtates in the two diſtricts; and no traces of their diſparity, at any ſubſequent time, have oc⯑cured to me; I therefore conclude, that at this pe⯑riod a total equality had taken place between them. The national average price of land, in 1688, had [19] been 19⅜ years purchaſe nearly: it follows that this average had increaſed, in the interval between the two laſt-mentioned years, by 6⅛ years purchaſe; but that the value of land, in the home counties, having been 26½ rents, had fallen one, while the remote diſtrict had riſen in price, from 17½ to 25½, or 8 years purchaſe.

It remains only to account for this variation of the ſtate of the two diviſions: the inequality of the land-tax certainly much quickened the progreſs of the remote diſtrict, firſt to attain a level with the home counties; and afterward, in many circumſtances, a ſuperiority above them; but before it was impoſed, there were ſome natural cauſes in operation, which would have ultimately produced even the laſt of theſe effects, although its period had not been accelerated by an artificial cauſe in conſtant action; the oppreſ⯑ſion of the remainder of the kingdom with a double land-tax. So early as the 1636, the home counties had begun ‘to grub up their woods and diſpark their parks’;^* and carried that practice to a great extent. But the quantity of wood has been much more di⯑miniſhed ſince; and they are become in a manner tri⯑butary to the remote diſtrict for fuel. The coal trade, though by no means arrived at its preſent magnitude, was increaſing with rapidity at the time the Land-tax was firſt raiſed: inſomuch, that in the year 1695, it was found, that the quantity of coal conſumed in London, had been trebled of late years. Manufac⯑tures are attracted from one country to another by the cheapneſs of firing: and accordingly it was then laid down as a fact, "that of late years likewiſe" the north and weſt had acquired a greater proportion of trade, than the home counties.

SECTION II. The Arguments in favour of the Inequality of the Land-tax, ſtated and conſidered.

THE advocates for the continuance of the pre⯑ſent proportion of the charge of the two diſtricts to the Land tax, argue thus: ‘Its original eſtabliſh⯑ment was neceſſary; for if was founded on the dif⯑ference of their abilities to contribute to the public expences: the hiſtorical evidence on which this reſts admits of no diſpute. At preſent, the natio⯑nal intereſt, and the national juſtice, both urge its continuance; and the arguments for it, derived from each of theſe topics, are ſo cogent, that they deſerve to be ſeparately ſtated.’

‘How ſtrongly conſiderations of public intereſt and expedience, recommend the continuance of the old valuation, is thus made evident. No mate⯑rial increaſe of the charge of the tax upon the re⯑mote counties, can take place, without a corre⯑ſponding advance of rent; which muſt be followed, by a proportional increaſe of the price of the far⯑mers products: and as that diſtrict includes by much the largeſt part of the kingdom, a general increaſe of its rent will produce ultimately a general ad⯑vance of the prices of the firſt neceſſaries of life.’

‘But the effect of ſuch an innovation will not ter⯑minate here. The claim upon which it is to be introduced, reſts upon this principle; that the taxes upon rent ought always to vary with its amount, and be proportioned thereto. Hence every increaſe of rent, in every diſtrict, muſt conſtantly be accompanied with a proportional advance of the payment of the land to the State. A maxim [21] of taxation, which, whatever ſpecious pretences may be ſet up in its favour, has always produced the worſt effects, in thoſe counties where it has been carried into practice: in ſome of them, it has received the name of the Taille: and wherever it has been adopted, the ſpirit of improvement in agriculture has not only been extinguiſhed; but, in many inſtances, the art itſelf has gone backward. Thus the equalization of the tax will prevent the increaſe of product, which might otherwiſe coun⯑terbalance its effect upon prices.’

‘But the meaſure of the evils which will reſult from the ſubverſion of the old ſyſtem, appears only of its proper magnitude in its ſecondary con⯑ſequences; or when thoſe primary effects of it, already pointed out, come to operate in conjunction by preventing the increaſe of productions, phyſi⯑cally neceſſary to the ſubſiſtence of mankind, it puts a ſtop to the increaſe of population; and by its tendency to raiſe their prices, it perpetually takes ſomething more and more away, from the comfort and happineſs of the lower cloſs of people; which their numerous privations, brought on by the charges of the State, have already too much diminiſhed. The greateſt object of a moral policy (and nature and virtue admit of no other) is to augment the number of a nation, and to increaſe their comforts, in the utmoſt practicable degree. Now the effects of this novelty are directly re⯑pugnant to theſe great ends; and we cannot for⯑bear adding how even that empty and deluſive, but perhaps oſtenſible pretence to juſtice, on which it reſts as a foundation, has been lately in ſome de⯑gree done away. Every one muſt be convinced, that the houſe-tax is a land-tax diſguiſed under another name: by its impoſition, this charge upon the remote diſtrict has been effectively increaſed [22] ſince the firſt valuation; and at the ſame time brought nearer to that proportionality, inceſſantly demanded with ſo much clamour, and ſo little reaſon.’

Theſe are the arguments, to the conſideration of which, the remainder of this Section will be con⯑fined; but there is another conſtantly produced on this ſubject, upon which the greateſt ſtreſs is often affected to be laid: that all purchaſers of eſtates in the remote diſtrict, for a long ſeries of years, have paid an increaſed price for them; in con⯑fidence that the preſent proportion of aſſeſſments ſhould be continued to all future periods; and that it would he injuſtice to take from them, what they have paid a valuable conſideration for. This argu⯑ment will be more fully ſtated in the Fourth Section, and an anſwer to it given: no further notice will therefore be taken of it here. The conſideration of thoſe which precede it, is now to be entered upon.

They ſet out with a tacit defence of the continu⯑ance of the inequality, from a neceſſity which aroſe, from the peculiar circumſtances of the home diſtrict, at the juncture when it was ſuffered to take place. That they ſtood then in need of ſome relief, is not to be diſputed: and poſſibly the juſtice of that claim has been fortified with a new proof, in the preceding Section. Admitting it therefore in its full extent, it does not follow, that ſuch relief ought originally to have been extended to them, in a mode contrary to the firſt principles of taxation; nor (even that point be⯑ing gratuitouſly given up) that the relief ought to have been prolonged, beyond the neceſſity on which it was founded. Now all traces of the preexiſting depreſ⯑ſion of the remote diſtrict, had been obliterated ſo early as the year 1729; and the neceſſity, and the inequality, ought to have terminated together.

The ſecond plea urged is, that as the equalization [23] of the tax will encreaſe its charge, throughout the great⯑er part of the kingdom, it muſt effectively increaſe the national rent itſelf; and conſequently, the prices of the firſt neceſſaries of life.

In anſwer to this, I ſhall endeavour to ſhow, that it will neither effect rent nor prices. That it will not effect rent of land follows, firſt, from the nature of the ſubject itſelf; which is clearly laid down by Dr. Adam Smith, in his work on the Wealth of Nations.^* He informs us, that rent is always the largeſt part of the value of the product of land, that can be taken from the farmer; allowing him the ordinary profits of ſtock, after defraying his expences. Now this being admitted, in the latitude in which he has put it, that is, as a general principle; the rent muſt be already arrived at this height in the remote counties: no further riſe therefore can take place, merely in conſequence of the increaſe of the landlord's outgo⯑ing charges. For it will not create an ability in the tenant to pay him a greater ſum; that ability being no more affected, by the increaſe of the landlord's payment to the public, than by an equal diminution of his income by any other means; as, by the aliena⯑tion of part of his eſtate, equal in rent to the additi⯑tious part of the tax, in conſequence of his former extravagance. In either caſe, his wiſhes and efforts to enjoy the ſame neat income as before, will be equal; and the influence of his endeavours with his tenant, to raiſe his rent, becauſe his income is re⯑duced, will be equally efficacious. It is only an in⯑creaſe of the farmers product, or of the prices of that product, or both conjointly, which can raiſe the rent of any diſtrict. When that rent, and the value of the product, are once adjuſted to each other, the increaſe of the latter muſt always precede that of the former; as the cauſe muſt always precede its effect.

[24]But let it now be ſuppoſed, contrary to what has been ſhown to follow from the nature of the ſubject, that the rents of the remote diſtrict will be raiſed; and that the farmers will attempt to raiſe their prices, to reimburſe themſelves. There will be nothing in this advance, immediately to effect the rents or prices of the home diſtrict. Now the two diviſions of the kingdom have many common markets, foreign coun⯑tries, the metropolis; and all thoſe markets, in the interior parts of the kingdom, ſituated on their com⯑mon boundary line; and ſome miles within it, on each ſide. The farmers of the remote diſtrict carry their products, now, to all thoſe markets, as equal competitors to thoſe on the other ſide of the boun⯑dary. But if they raiſe their prices, they will be no longer able to ſupport that competition; or at leaſt their vent will be greatly diminiſhed. In either caſe they will be forced to keep a greater quantity of their com⯑modities at home, than formerly: and their home demand not being increaſed, the prices of their home market, inſtead of being ſupported at the new rate, muſt fall below that which took place before. Now an increaſe of rents can never ſubſiſt, with more cir⯑cumſcribed markets, and with declining prices: hence no advance can be put upon their rents, which ſhall diſable them to go into the markets common to the two diſtricts, at the ſame prices as their competitors: the intereſt of the landlords themſelves muſt pre⯑vent it; or in other words, they cannot raiſe their prices above the rate which would have taken place, if there had been no advance of rent.

But, beſide the gratuitous admiſſion of the poſ⯑ſibility of the rent being increaſed in the remote diſtrict, in conſequence of the equalization of the tax; let it laſtly be conceded, that the farmers will not be prevented from raiſing their prices, by the competition of thoſe of the home diviſion: and [25] let us enquire, what increaſe of the rate of their markets may now be expected to take place.

To equalize the tax upon the two diſtricts, the remote counties muſt have their rate increaſed one ſhilling and ⅘d. in the pound rent; or, £ 5:340:9⅗ per cent.^* On ſuch an advance taking place, when an eſtate is to be let, it follows from what is conceded, that the treaty, or (as it is called by thoſe who have written on prices and commodities) the alteration, will run thus. The landlord will ſay: ‘The decreaſe of my income by the new tax, is one ſhilling and ⅘d. in the pound; and you muſt increaſe the rent in the ſame proportion.’ To this the tenant will reply: ‘The markets are not advanced; nor will the land become more productive by virtue of the increaſe of the tax. The amount of my diſ⯑burſements, the annual intereſt of my capital, the value of my labour, and of my ſuperinten⯑dance, will continue undiminiſhed: and I muſt make the ſame profit for the immediate ſubſiſtence, and the future proviſion for myſelf and my family, as before. I therefore cannot conſent to any ad⯑vance, demanded upon that account.’ We have ſeen before, the nullity of the landlord's pretenſions, and the validity of the reaſons againſt them, urged by the tenant. But let it be admitted now that what is alledged on either ſide has equal force: hence the alteration will terminate, by the landlord's receding from half his additional demand, and the tenant ſub⯑miting to pay the additional tax, or to increaſe the rent 6⅖d. in the pound; that is (£2.67) £2:11:10⅘ per cent.^† Let the effect of this, on the general price of proviſions, be now enquired after.

It will be admitted without heſitation, that the price of the farmer's yearly product, if any variation [26] be made in it, will, after this advance of rent, con⯑tinue to bear the ſame proportion to his total annual diſburſements, that was found to take place in the year 1774. Theſe diſburſements are diviſible into two claſſes: the firſt increaſing immediately, by the increaſe of his rent operating alone; and the ſecond, comprehending wages, the wages of labour, ſeed⯑corn, and ſome other particulars; by the effect of an increaſe of prices of neceſſaries already eſtabliſhed; and following upon ſuch increaſe, either immedi⯑ately, or at the end of a term more or leſs remote. An increaſe of diſburſements of the latter kind, can⯑not impreſs a beginning of movement upon the market, or produce an initial riſe of prices; becauſe an effect cannot generate its cauſe. But if the far⯑mer's out-going expences of this ſecond claſs, be in⯑creaſed in conſequence of a preceding riſe of markets, occaſioned by an advance of rent; this may lay him under a neceſſity of making a [...]urther augmentation of his prices, or generate a ſecond addition to their rates. But this ſecondary addition cannot take place, until the firſt in order (the cauſe on which its exiſtence de⯑pends) is eſtabliſhed in the market. The point to be proved therefore, is, that ſuch initial advance cannot take place.

The expences of the firſt claſs, whoſe increaſe is, or may very probably be, immediately conſequent upon the increaſe of rent, are the pariſh charges, and the tithe: now let the former rent of the tenant have been £19·200,^* according to the average pro⯑portion, found to obtain throughout the kingdom; the ſum of this rent and thoſe two charges, would have been £21·436:^* and that ſum will be now increaſed in the ſame proportion the rent is increaſed; that is, £2·67^* percent as above, or by £0·572.^* [27] And all the farmer's annual diſburſements, including the maintenance of his family; which before amounted, according to the ſame average, to £60·331;† will now be augmented to £60·903; and the ſelling value of his total product muſt be increaſed in the ſame pro⯑portion. That value had before amounted to £72·826; and it muſt now become £73·516; that is, it will be augmented 18s. and 11d.½ per cent. The effect of this may be ſhown on the price of wheat, the article of his product the moſt neceſſary to general ſubſiſtence. Wheat at this time, is about 44s. the quarter; its price, with this augmentation upon it, will be £2. 2s. 5d1/250.^*

If all the farmers in the remote diſtrict were te⯑nants at will, according to the ſuppoſition on which we are now tacitly reaſoning; each of them would have his rent increaſed, in the firſt year of the in⯑creaſe of the tax, according to the proportion here given; and the aſſigned advance might juſtly in⯑deed be made general through the whole diſtrict. It ſeems however too minute to produce any effect in the market; as the loſs to the farmer would be the increaſe of the expence of production only; equal to about one third of the increaſe of the price above ſtated; and therefore leſs than two pence the quarter of wheat.

But it is only a part of the whole body of far⯑mers, whoſe terms will expire, and whoſe rents can be thus raiſed, in that firſt, or any ſucceeding year: a circumſtance which muſt be taken into the account. And therefore it is to be obſerved, that lands are let for different terms. Although there are ſome farmers who are tenants at will, by much the greater part of the land is under leaſe or article for a term cer⯑tain; as for 7, 10, 12, 14, or even 21 years. Let it be ſuppoſed that the term of all the contracts for the remote counties, is, on an average, ſeven years, [28] upon the equality of chance; the term of one farmer of ſeven will expire in any aſſigned year. Now the far⯑mer whoſe rent is raiſed at the Michaelmas immedi⯑ately following the augmentating of the tax, is juſtly entitled to ſell his commodities at the advanced rate ſtated above: but the remaining ſix farmers of every ſet of ſeven will be as well able to ſell at the old prices as before. Let us now take as an inſtance one of theſe ſets, ſuppoſing the rents of all the far⯑mers equal, and ſeek what effect the advance of the prices of the ſingle individual will have in market. Now it is evident it will be the ſame, as if we ſuppoſe the rent of the ſingle man above mentioned is ſeven times its former amount; but that it is raiſed only the ſame ſum as before. Now the quantity of his product being in the pro⯑portion of ſeven to one, he will be completely re⯑imburſed, by one ſeventh of the former rate of his advance on his prices; that is, by 3/7 of a penny on the quarter of wheat; or 2s. 8d. ½ per cent. on the ſelling price of all his commodities.

This is the rate of advance, averaged upon the whole diſtrict; which will reimburſe the general body of the farmers, at the old rate of profit, for the ad⯑ditional charge, the advance of rent in the firſt year will bring upon them: and it is too minute, for them to take any meaſures in that year to obtain it. If even the advance of rent had at this time fallen at once on the whole body, there is little probability that it would have diſturbed the rates of the markets: and that increaſe of charge falling on one ſeventh of their whole number only, in the firſt year of the augmentation of the tax, its effect is ſo far inſenſible, that it ſeems to leave no tendency to an advance of prices behind it. Things once fixed, completely reſiſt a ſmaller degree of force tending to a change. They in ſome meaſure reſemble heavy bodies at reſt; [29] which require a power of a certain magnitude to be applied to them, which muſt exceed what is ſufficient to counterbalance friction, or a kind of adheſion to their ſituation, before they can be put into motion. If the increaſe of the rent had taken place all at once, it would moſt probably have paſſed off, without any effect on the market prices; but its whole power up⯑on them will be divided into ſeven parts, each ta⯑king place at diſtant intervals. And in this caſe, we may fairly recur to the former illuſtration, and ſay: If we admit that a certain force, when applied to a body all at once, may be capable of overcoming this reſiſtance of coheſion; and to produce a ſmall, but almoſt imperceptible movement in it; yet if this moving power be divided into many parts, and each applied in ſucceſſion, the effect of each will be ſuc⯑ceſſively loſt, before the application of the next, and no movement ultimately produced.

The next objection in order, is, that if the tax be from time to time augmented, it will degenerate into that ſpecious of impoſition upon land, which is called abroad the Taille, which has, in every country where it has been adopted, been found to obſtruct all in⯑creaſe of the quantity of land brought into cultiva⯑tion, and thoſe improvements which augment the product of land already cultivated. Thus, by pre⯑venting the multiplication of the neceſſaries of life, it deprives the lower claſs of people of a liberal ſupport; and even, by a diminution of its numbers, makes a waſte of human life.

In oppoſition to this, it muſt be proved that every plan for augmenting the land-tax, does not terminate in ſuch a ſyſtem; and to do this, it is neceſſary to lay down the following preliminary diviſion of the ſubject. The effect of the riſe of the tax may be different, as it takes place after improvement of the annual value of land, either immediately, or at the [30] end of ſome definitive term of time. It may alſo differ, when land is to be improved by the capital of the tenant, or that of the landlord. The combina⯑tion of theſe circumſtances, affords four diſtinct caſes for our conſideration.

Let us firſt examine the two caſes, where the riſe of the tax immediately accompanies the advance, of the improving value of the land; not entering at preſent into any conſideration of the means of car⯑rying ſuch a meaſure into execution. The greater part of the improvements of the value of land is, ef⯑fected at the expence of the tenant: this therefore is the caſe firſt conſidered. In order to be induced to undertake it, he muſt have a leaſe at a fixed rent, for a conſiderable term of years. But here the land⯑lord may have frequently a temporary intereſt againſt ſuch improvements, and conſequently againſt grant⯑ing all ſuch leaſes, of the ſame duration as the term of the contract, and of no ſmall magnitude. This will be a great check upon long and improving leaſes: for while the value of the eſtate is increaſing, the tax will be perpetually increaſing; and the landlord's groſs rent remaining fixed during the whole term, his neat income will be perpetually decreaſing. We know how a ſmall preſent intereſt can counter⯑balance a great advantage, if remote. But the im⯑mediate intereſt here treated of, is not a ſmall one. When the improvements of the tenant are ſpirited and judicious, and he has a long term before him (the only thing which can call forth ſuch vigorous and beneficial exertions from him), the annual value of the land may come to be doubled, or more than doubled, during its ſubſiſtance; and the tax increaſing with that value, cauſe a very ſenſible diminution of the landlord's neat income. And ſometimes he may even find himſelf in conſiderable embarraſſments, throughout the whole remainder of the term, after [31] theſe improvements ſhall have become fully effective: and it is the intereſt of the tenant to make them ſo, as ſoon as poſſible. In this caſe, the landlord will not always find the preſent uneaſineſs of his ſituation, counterbalanced by the reflection that he, or per⯑haps his heirs, will, at a remote period, reap a great advantage by an advance of rent. If the increaſe of the tax ſhould therefore follow, directly upon the increaſe of the annual value of land, ſuch leaſes, it may be preſumed, would be leſs frequently granted.

When the landlord is at the expence of the im⯑provement, he is not expoſed to the hazard of theſe inconveniencies. At his contract for a leaſe for any term of years, he will obtain an increaſe of rent, in proportion to the ſpeculated value of his improve⯑ments: this will conſiſt of the annual intereſt of the capital he advances; an annual profit upon it, of the nature of a commercial profit; and the amount of the expected increaſe of the tax. Theſe points he muſt have a reaſonable proſpect to ſecure; or he muſt act without a motive, or on the abſtract conſi⯑deration of public good only. But in this caſe, ‘the landlord would certainly be leſs diſpoſed to im⯑prove, when the ſovereign, who contributes no⯑thing to the expence, was to ſhare in the profit of the improvement.’ Hence the progreſs of culti⯑vation, as far as it depends upon the capital of the land-owner, might receive ſome little check, but by no means ſo conſiderable as that pointed in the firſt caſe.

But admitting that augmenting tax, immediately upon every increaſe of the annual value of land, may be attended with ſome conſequences that are ineligi⯑ble, and ſome difficulties in execution; it does not thence follow, that a territorial valuation, once eſta⯑bliſhed, ſhould remain invariable to the end of time; eſpecially, if in its origin it was oppreſſive and une⯑qual: [32] or, according to what has been laid down by ſome on this head, that ſuch valuations ſhould not be reviſed, above once in a century at moſt; although it is to be curſorily obſerved here, that even admit⯑ing the laſt principle, a century is ſo nearly elapſed ſince the eſtabliſhment of the tax, that the home di⯑ſtrict may now reſt its claim to equalization upon it.

It remains now to conſider, whether, if the in⯑creaſe of the land-tax ſhould follow that of the rent, at any aſſignable term or diſtance of time, it would produce the bad effects inſeparably attached to that levy called a Taille. This inquiry likewiſe involves two caſes: but before they be ſeparately gone into, the ſuppoſition on which they both of them depend, that ſuch an increaſe of the land-tax is practicable, muſt be examined. The proof that a meaſure is practicable, ought certainly to precede the conſide⯑ration of its expedience.

If ever there ſhould be an attempt made, to intro⯑duce a permanent correſpondence between the tax and the value of the land, the oppoſition to it will endeavour to make a vigorous ſtand upon this point; and ſuch erroneous opinions have, by ſome anticipation, been inculcated reſpecting it, that many of thoſe moſt eſſentially intereſted in its defence have ſometimes ſeemed diſpoſed to give it up. I ſhall therefore begin this examination, with a maxim drawn from the code of political morality. If men would but dedicate half that exerciſe of the underſtanding, to reduce what is juſt to a practicable form, which they apply to ſupport inſtitutions which reſt upon no proper baſis of principle; employing all the indirect policy, and perplexed patchwork of expedients, to make them rub on without any violent ſhock or ob⯑ſtruction; they would generally find their work nei⯑ther difficult, nor its event doubtful. What is juſt, has in its own nature a ſtrong tendency to become [33] practicable; and almoſt to find the way to become effective itſelf. It wants but few helps and previous arrangements; and thoſe, a very moderate degree of circumſpection will eaſily ſuggeſt. Temper it only with ſo much indulgence to the perſonal intereſts which ſeem attacked by it, as you well can without defeating its end (and that power is ſeldom greatly circumſcribed), and you muſt ſucceed. The narrow and awkward ground, which you force thoſe who op⯑poſe you to take, and the ſhame of making a per⯑ſevering and decided ſtand upon it, half diſarms them to your hands.

That adjuſtments of the advance of the tax to the advance of the rent, may be reduced into practice, has been fully ſhown by Dr. Adam Smith;^* and how the latter may be always diſcovered. But to antici⯑pate all objections to the gradual increaſe of the tax, the rent of the laſt paſt leaſe or contract might be made the value taxed in every year; not the preſent exiſting rent, which ſeems ſo far to diminiſh the temptation and facility of fraud, as almoſt to anni⯑hilate it.^† In what manner a ſimilar and equivalent [34] indulgence is to be extended to thoſe who occupy their own lands, has been explained by the ſame writer.^*

It appears that, under theſe modifications, the tax may be made to increaſe with the ability of the con⯑tributors, without great difficulty. The inquiry is now to be reſumed, whether being conſtantly ſo aug⯑mented, it will nor be followed with the bad effects of a Taille: and here let it be firſt ſuppoſed, as be⯑fore, that the improvement is to be made by the te⯑nant; and that it is a great and ſpirited operation, requiring the advance of a large capital. For if it be [35] found that the gradual advance of the tax, as deſcribed above, will be no obſtruction to a greater improve⯑ment, it cannot be requiſite to ſhow in particular, that it will be no impediment to others, upon a leſs extenſive ſcale. The general circumſtances of ſuch undertakings, as far as they affect the queſtion, are theſe: the land is to be taken, as having been let be⯑fore at a moderate rent, according to its former condition: its advance to the in-coming tenant will be either nothing, or very ſmall, on account of the great expence he muſt incur in the propoſed improve⯑ments he will alſo take [...]are to ſecure himſelf a ſufficient term; to pay him the inſurance of his hazard, and to enable him to reap the profit of his ſpirited in⯑duſtry. Now during this term, which muſt be con⯑ſiderable, if any ſmall advance of the rent had been acceded to by him in the begining of it; the tax will be aſſeſſed to its former, not its preſent amount, ac⯑cording to the leading principle of its augmentation, deſcribed above. At the end of the term there will be a ſecond contract; when the eſtate will be let to the full of its improved value, or nearly ſo. And during its ſubſiſtence the tax will become increaſed, in pro⯑portion to the augmentation of the rent, by the firſt leaſe only; which advance, it was ſhown, could not be very conſiderable. And at this rate the valuation will remain fixed, during the whole of the ſecond term: and ultimately, at the end thereof, or at the begin⯑ning of the third leaſe, the tax will be raiſed to cor⯑reſpond to the ſecond rent, or the improved value of the land.

Let us now ſearch, what there is in theſe circum⯑ſtances to hinder an improvement, which would take place if the tax were fixed. If, contrary to the plan here traced out, the great augmentation of the tax were to take place, immediately with that of the rent, at the expiration of the improving leaſe; the farmer [36] would not have been originally deterred from accept⯑ing it, by the conſideration that an addition would be made to his landlord's outgoing charges, at the in⯑ſtant his preſent connection with him was to termi⯑nate. He will know that at the end of the leaſe, if he think ſo long beforehand of treating again for the farm, that the landlord will get as much for the improved value of it, as he will be able to pay, or nearly ſo; and that he can get no more. And as that future addition to his rent muſt depend upon other circumſtances, he will not at all conſider, how one eighth or one tenth of it will be drawn out of his landlord's ſtrong box, at the end of fourteen or twenty-one years to come.

Yet it is here admitted, that the great improvement of the value will be taxed immediately at the termi⯑nation of the firſt letting; whereas, according to the mode ſuppoſed to be followed, that material aug⯑mentation of the tax correſponding to it, will not take place until the end of the ſecond leaſe. The increaſe at the end of the firſt, being proportioned to the firſt augmentation of the rent, which muſt have been either ſmall or nothing, on account of the ex⯑pence of the farmer at his firſt improvement; the augmentation of the tax correſponding to that im⯑provement, will only commence with the third leaſe. Now no man will carry his ſpeculations to a futurity ſo remote, as, previous to entering on a contract for a farm ſuſceptible of ſuch improvement, to conſider on what terms he could obtain a third leaſe; or what his landlord's aſſeſſment to the taxes would be in⯑creaſed to at the end of that length of time, to which the ſecond will extend. As to the ſmall advance to be made at the beginning of the ſecond term, if any, it has been already ſeen, that a much greater would then produce no effect.

It remains to be examined, how far the increaſe of [37] the tax, thus modified, will be a check upon the ſpi⯑rit of improvement in the landlords. And let it be ſuppoſed here, that the augmentation of the tax will ultimately be an eighth or a tenth of the increaſe of the annual value of the land. In fact, the average effective tax of the kingdom does not exceed a fif⯑teenth of the rent; when its nominal rate is four ſhil⯑lings in the pound. When the tenant improves his land upon a long leaſe, he knows he ſhall, at the end of the term, be obliged to pay an advance of rent equal to that of the value of the land, or very nearly ſo: yet this does not now hinder him from making ſuch improvements, at his own expence. When it is done by the landlord, he obtains immediately an in⯑creaſe of rent in conſequence of it, equal to the value of the improvement: and the tax will take from him, but an eighth or tenth of the augmentation of that annual value, at the end of the ſame term, at which the whole would be taken by the riſe of rent, from the improving farmer. Hence, if giving up the whole of the augmented value, at the expiration of the leaſe, do not hinder the farmer's improvement; one eighth, or one tenth, being taken from the addition to the landlord's rent at the ſame term, will produce no effect.

It has been urged by one writer, that the houſe-tax is in its nature a land-tax; and conſequently, having been laid upon the remote diſtrict long after the im⯑poſition of the former, its original degree of inequa⯑lity no longer ſubſiſts. He might have proceeded to confirm his acute concluſion, with the mathematical axiom—That if, to unequal magnitudes, equal magni⯑tudes be added, the quantities ſo increaſed, will ap⯑proach nearer to the ratio of equality, than the two firſt. I will not expoſe to poſthumous cenſures, the well-earned reputation of a man eminent in his own laborious branch of ſcience; in which he rendered [38] to the public the greateſt ſervices, by quoting him by name, or referring to the books from which ſuch an imbecility is copied. The anſwer is contained in a few words: the houſe-tax is general, and at the ſame rate throughout the whole kingdom, including the home diſtrict; and therefore the payment of it does not exempt any other diſtrict from paying its equi⯑table proportion to any other tax.

SECTION III. On the Probability that the Amount of the Land-Tax muſt be increaſed at a very near Period.

THE foundation on which the reſult of all inquiry into the probability of the future increaſe of the charge of the land-tax, ought to reſt, muſt be found in its general nature, and the exiſting circumſtances of the State. In the conſideration of the nature of a land-tax, ſome principles will be laid down, tending to ſhow that it is, caeteris paribus, to be preferred, perhaps, to all others. The natural limitation of thoſe principles will alſo be afterwards added, though not neceſſary to the points to be proved: for general principles, which differ from univerſals, by being limited by an internal neceſſity, or external circum⯑ſtances, are frequently ſet up as ſuch, or abuſively confounded with them; but they ought never to be brought forward, without duly ſpecifying the point at which they ceaſe to be applicable, unleſs it is well known or ſelf-evident.

Taxes are eſtabliſhed, as well for the purpoſe of political regulation, as effective revenue: ſuch as at once anſwer both theſe ends, are the beſt. Now a land-tax is an effective and ſumptuary tax, and un⯑equalled [39] in the degree in which it poſſeſſes theſe two properties: for no plan for collecting a revenue, from the great incomes derived from monied capitals, or the annual fund of expenditure of the more opulent traders, has been hitherto carried into execution with ſucceſs.

It is obſerved, by a political writer of the firſt eſtimation, that as productive ‘capital is the ſource of induſtry, ſo revenue is the ſource of idleneſs.^*’ The glitter, the magnificence, and ſometimes the diſſipation of the opulent proprietor of land, becomes the example of thoſe who derive great incomes from other ſources; and they ſeem to undergo ſomething like the reverſe of improvement in the tranſplanting. The greateſt number of theſe copyiſts, like thoſe who propoſe ſplendid, but faulty originals, as models, ex⯑hibit their faults, at ſecond-hand, ſomething in⯑creaſed; and the effects of the other parts, not a little diminiſhed. If the luxuries of this claſs could be reached by a tax, the moral benefits to ſociety would be great; and, perhaps, no permanently uſeful in⯑ſtitution of policy ever exiſted, which did not draw that conſequence after it. But to drop the conſidera⯑tion of what ſeems, but perhaps only ſeems, un⯑attainable; we may obſerve, that drawing an effective revenue from land, attacks this progreſs of luxury at its very ſource, and greatly retards, though it can⯑not totally counteract it. There is a conſequence of this which deſerves attention.

In the natural hiſtory of human ſociety we find, that when it has once attained to a ſtate of manly elegance, it paſſes on next to refinement; and ulti⯑mately to a vitiated and effeminate voluptuouſneſs. Whatever is noble and excellent muſt decline in each ſtep of this fatal progreſs; and even whatever tends to [40] accelerate the tranſactions of ſociety, from the firſt to the ſecond of theſe ſtates, muſt be numbered among the greateſt evils; whatever retards it, among the greateſt benefits to mankind. It is like a medi⯑cine which would prolong the continuance of youth and manhood, and ſuſpend the approach of the im⯑becility and miſeries of old-age. And I add, that a ſober philoſophy may prepare ſuch a tincture for ſociety, though not for the individual: though there is nothing more deleterious, than the preparations which pretend to theſe properties, which are to be found in the laboratories of ſome great modern chy⯑miſts.

The luxuries of a wealthy ſociety are the cauſe of this progreſs. It is always the object of that of to-day, to paſs the bounds of that of yeſterday: and whatever checks it in its courſe, at leaſt retards the celerity with which ſociety is gliding down this de⯑ſcent; and lengthens out the exiſtence of its arts, its manners, and its morals.

The tendency of a tax on land to produce this be⯑neficial effect, is evident: by abſorbing a juſt part of the income of the proprietor, it diminiſhes the ſtrength of the primary cauſe of theſe ſucceſſive de⯑generacies in the ſtate of ſociety. It is to be ob⯑ſerved on the other hand, that whatever makes his capacity of expence increaſe, with greater celerity than his rent, will anticipitate the terms of thoſe changes, and conſequently be pernicious: the circumſtance here taken as a ſuppoſition only, will be afterward found to exiſt.

There are further conſiderations which ſhow the rent of land to be a more proper ſubject of taxation than moſt others: and one is, that to make a due pro⯑portion of the public charges fall upon it, leaves the quantity of comfort and enjoyment, remaining to ſociety after ſuch a tax, the greateſt poſſible; as no [41] way has been diſcovered to come at the great monied incomes; which, therefore, are not here to be con⯑ſidered: for the deduction of the ſame proportional part from the incomes of any two men, are here ſup⯑poſed equally to diminiſh their capacity of acquiring the cuſtomary comforts of their ſituation. A tax ex⯑cluſively falling upon land, affects only a claſs of men which is, upon the average, extremely opulent: but in caſe the ſame money were levied by a general tax, the lower orders of the people would have been obliged to pay their ſhare to it, and their comfort would have been diminiſhed, in the proportion which the annual ſum ſo taken from them bears to their annual income: but as it is now paid by the opulent proprietors of land, their enjoyments will be dimi⯑niſhed, only in the proportion the ſame ſum bears to their great annual income; that is, indefinitely leſs; or the comfort enjoyed by the whole ſociety, conſi⯑dered as an aggregate, remain much greater. It is evident likewiſe, that it tends to render the en⯑joyments of the ſeparate claſſes of ſociety more equal.

A tax on land tends alſo to render the inequalities of rank and fortune leſs glaringly offenſive to thoſe whom civil ſociety, by the operation of its very na⯑ture, has ſubjected to numerous and afflicting priva⯑tions of the enjoyments of life. For if we ſuppoſe the preſent land-tax taken off, a greater and more pa⯑rading diſplay of the diſparity of the circumſtances and ranks of the claſſes of civil ſociety, would take place: and the irkſome ſenſe of it in the inferior or⯑ders, muſt be aggravated in proportion; a ſenſe, which enters perhaps for no inconſiderable part of the calamities of that claſs, whoſe feelings of their own ſtate will always be numbered among the objects moſt worthy of reſpect, by a wiſe and benevolent legiſlature.

[42]But it may be made evident, that the landlords cannot be charged with more than a certain part of the public burthens, by a tax on their eſtates, with⯑out the injury extending beyond themſelves, and af⯑fecting the intereſts of ſociety. They contribute to the general taxes; to many they pay as much, and to many, more than their relative proportion: there are ſome likewiſe to which their contributions, for cer⯑tain cauſes, are leſs. But, upon the balance, their other taxes will be found to be at leaſt in proportion to their total incomes; and the land-tax to be purely an additional charge, exceeding that proportion^*; and ſuch payments neither can or ought to be carried beyond a certain extent.

For the ability of paying theſe addititious charges, muſt be confined to that claſs of the landed men, whoſe circumſtances are ſo eaſy, that they can commodiouſly ſubſiſt upon their incomes: and let it be admitted, that this may be extended ſo low, as to take in that order of men, which Mr. King, in arranging the na⯑tion into claſſes, denominated freeholders of the better ſort; whoſe income from land, at this time, upon an average, may ſomewhat exceed £.180 a year; and which was valued by him, in 1688, at £.91: and let it be admitted, that the incomes of the different claſſes of ſociety bear the ſame proportion now, each to each and to the whole, which he found to take place in 1688. If this amount be divided into a thouſand equal parts, the income of the more opulent land⯑lords is 218^†; of the labouring people, 207^†; and of the remainder of the ſociety, including the mer⯑cantile and monied intereſts, 574^† ſuch parts. The income of the lower claſs, as exhibited here, falls ſhort of, rather than exceeds, its preſent proportion, [43] according to ſome accounts which have fallen into my hands. It is nearly in the proportion ſhown above, or 218 thouſandth parts of the whole which they pay by the general taxes. That denomination is here given to the remainder of our taxes, which are pay⯑able by the people in general, including the propor⯑tion of land, and not by the latter excluſively.

Now the total amount of the general taxes is £.15·162 ms. ^*: and the part thereof paid by the great landed proprietors, proportioned to their in⯑come, is £.3·312 ms.^* Moreover, the total land-tax being £.1·962 ms. its proportional charge on this claſs is £.1·434 ms.^† and their total payment to all taxes £.4·746 ms.^† exceeding their proportional charge, in the ratio of 14,330 to 10,000^†.

This exceſs is greater in the home diſtrict, leſs in the remote, than the average here aſſigned; and if the land-tax were equalized, the whole claſs of the land-owners would contribute to the expence of the State, in the ſame proportion as thoſe of the home diſtrict pay at preſent. The ſum of the taxes, on the income of land, would become five ſhillings and five-pence in the pound; and on all other incomes, on an ave⯑rage, three ſhillings and three-pence and one third:^‡ or the former would be to the latter, as five to three.

But by carrying this ſyſtem too far, the opulence of this claſs will become more reduced than is conſiſtent with the general intereſt of ſociety. When every man is taxed according to his income, the pro⯑portional power of every claſs, which depends very much on the exiſting diviſion of property, remains unaltered. Now the inequality of its preſent divi⯑ſion is natural, as far as human ſociety, of which it is the neceſſary conſequence, is natural: hence that [44] proportion of power in the different claſſes is natural; and a diminution of that of the upper-claſs of too great magnitude, places ſociety in an unnatural ſitua⯑tion, and draws a long train of calamities after it. For hereby the ſpirit of ſubordination is undermined, and almoſt annihilated; and its place muſt be ſupplied by ſomething elſe, to preſerve public order as before: as much reſtraint as is thus taken off from the indi⯑vidual, muſt be added again by the coercion of new and ſtricter laws; the increaſe of which is always inimi⯑cal to perſonal liberty at leaſt. The rigours of the municipal laws in republics, and ſome ill-conſtructed mixed governments, furniſh us with ſtriking ex⯑amples of this. It has ariſen from their being obliged to diminiſh the natural influence of ranks by artificial reſtraints, as being inimical to the principle on which they are founded.

But it is not hereby meant to be maintained, that the opulent land-holders ought not to pay any ad⯑dititious tax; and particularly, that the amount of the tax cannot be now increaſed, until it bears the ſame proportion to their rent, which took place in the beginning of this century; actual experience having proved the contrary: or that the landlords of one part of the kingdom cannot bear the ſame proportional charge as thoſe of the other.

Theſe reaſonings, ſhowing that the tax may juſtly be increaſed, are nearly of the ſame force to prove that it will; unleſs an inability of the contri⯑butors can be admitted, or that the State will not, for a conſiderable period to come, want ſuch an aug⯑mentation of revenue. For whoever has conſidered the progreſs of taxation in this century, and a great part of the laſt, will admit, that to prove the one, is nearly to prove the other. But leaving theſe general topics, more particular conſiderations are now to be brought forward, in ſupport of this poſition.

[45]Since the year 1700, the taxes paid by the other claſſes of ſociety have increaſed in burthen, though not in the ſame degree as in charge; becauſe their annual income, in the ſame period, have greatly in⯑creaſed. For if their income had remained fixed du⯑ring this term, and the taxes paid by them been trebled, their burthens would have been trebled: but if this income be conceived, in the ſame time, to have become doubled; at the end of it, every equal charge would have been borne with twice the facility; and their burthens, inſtead of increaſing in the pro⯑portion of three to one, would have been augmented only in that of three to two, or become only half as much again. This illuſtrates, though it does not give an accurate meaſure of the increaſe of the burthen of all taxes, excluſive of that on land, on all the con⯑tributors during the preſent century.

On the other hand, if the taxes had remained fixed, and the income of the contributors had been doubled, their burthens would have been reduced one half.

It is in this mode, though not in the ſame degree, that the advances of rent has been perpetually dimi⯑niſhing the burthen of the land-tax. The average increaſe of actual rent has been nearly three-fourths per cent. annually, from the year 1700 (the firſt term for which an average land-tax, for peace and war, or its periodical average can be aſſigned) to the year 1792. Or, more accurately, every pound rent had, in that term, been increaſed to £.1·9745^*. And if the tax had increaſed in the ſame proportion, its burthen would have perpetually remained fixed. Now, in the year 1700, the periodical average of the tax (that of the city of London being excluded) was [46] £.1.3148ms.^* and thus augmented it would have become £.2.596ms.^† Its amount at 4s. in the pound, the nominal rate of the preceding peace, is £. 1.675ms.^‡ therefore, if an addition of £.921,000 ^‡ were now made to the tax, it would only bring the burthen of the contributors back to an equality with that of the year 1700. And here it is to be obſerved, that this addition is far leſs than the preſent defalcation of the remote diſtrict.^‖

But as the burthens of the other claſſes of ſociety have continued increaſing, and that with a very con⯑ſiderable degree of celerity; they have a right to demand from the proprietors of land, that, by their particular tax, they would again contribute to the increaſed public expence, at leaſt in the old propor⯑tion to their incomes; and that ſome remedy ſhould at length, though late, be applied to a ſyſtem of taxation, by which, while the proportion of their own burthen to the expence of the State is perpe⯑tually increaſed, that of the land-tax of the opulent country gentry is perpetually diminiſhing: and they will add, that the experience of the beginning of the century pointed our that the land could very well bear the burthen then laid upon it. Juſtice and policy redemand it; and there ſeems a conſiderable probabi⯑lity that the demand muſt be attended to.

For an additional argument for it, of great weight, is to be drawn from the progreſs of the debt, and the neceſſity of putting a ſtop to it. This will be fully laid open in the proof of the following pro⯑poſition: that the equalization of the land-tax will be very nearly an adequate remedy to this evil, and put it abſolutely in our reach, with a ſmall additional exertion. To demonſtrate which, it becomes neceſ⯑ſary [47] to determine the amount of a ſinking fund, which will effect this great purpoſe.

Our preſent efforts to put a ſtop to the increaſe of the debt, although very inadequate, greatly exceed whatever were made at any former term; and form no weak preſumptive proof, that we may expect from the ſpirit of the times, and it may be juſtly added of the Adminiſtration, that when it is ſeen with what facility this firſt ſtep to ſecurity can be obtained, it will not be neglected.

We are now to proceed to the inveſtigation above mentioned. Omitting fractions, it may be taken, that the average length of a term of war is eight, and of peace ten years^*. Nor ought it to be aſ⯑ſumed, that in future the duration of peace will ex⯑ceed that of war, in a greater proportion. In ſub⯑jects of ſuch conſequence to a State, it is beſt to err on the ſafeſt ſide; and we are to give way to no de⯑luſive imaginations, that the future courſe of things will be better than what we have experienced in the laſt 100 years; for it is ſo far back that theſe averages extend. The preſent ſemi-chaotic ſtate of Europe will not permit us to indulge in ſuch agreeable but vi⯑ſionary expectations: and in a few months we have ſeen a new and great republic riſe, the vices of whoſe internal conſtitution are ſuch, that foreign wars will become neceſſary to it, to obtain ſome re⯑ſpite from internal commotion. This is very clearly illuſtrated, by the conſequences which always at⯑tended the heterogeneous and diſcordant conſtitution of the republic of the Romans; a much more moral people. A ſtate of hoſtilities, almoſt continual, was the only remedy to the diſcord of peace: it was by foreign wars only that they enjoyed, at any time, the deluſive appearance of a hollow truce at [48] home, with no principle of union within; the State fell to pieces, when there was no external force to compreſs its repulſive parts together: it fell, for want of an enemy; and the tyranny of a deſpot ſucceeded the alternate tyrannies of the great and the mob. The new republic has the ſame diſorders, but in a more malignant degree; and it poſſeſſes only the ſame terrible means, to patch up the blotches and ulcers, which its radically vitiated conſtitution will be perpetually producing and reproducing.

Theſe conſiderations will not give us leave, eſpe⯑cially at preſent, to think the chances of the dura⯑tion of peace to be increaſed, or tending to increaſe. Eighteen years is therefore here aſſigned, as the length of a period of one war and one peace taken together; as the diſtance from any aſſigned year of peace, to the ſame year in the next peace: and let it be ſup⯑poſed, that a term of peace, now exiſting, will con⯑tinue five years; it will be followed by a war of eight years, of which the extraordinary expence will be taken at eighty millions. The five firſt years of the following peace will complete the period: and if the debt, at the beginning and end of that period, be equal; or the capital paid off in the two halves of the terms of peace, be equal to the new capital ge⯑nerated by the intermediate war; the progreſs of the debt will be completely ſtopped, and no more.

The fund applicable to the diſcharge of the debt, which will effect this purpoſe, may be called the ade⯑quate fund, to diſtinguiſh it from ſuch as ſuffer the debt to continue to increaſe; and alſo thoſe whoſe product is ſo great, as to afford a remiſſion of taxes under certain regulations.

If an adequate fund were to be this applied to the reſtraining the progreſs of the debt, directly at the commencement of a term of peace, taken to con⯑tinue ten years, or another immediately at the com⯑mencement [49] of a war, whoſe duration would be eight years, it is evident their amounts muſt differ. The fund which would be neceſſary in the middle of a term of peace, as being nearly the mean of theſe charges, is the moſt proper for our preſent pur⯑poſe: its amount and operations are therefore to be here ſhown^*.

The mean rate of intereſt in the ſtock market, during each year of the two half terms of peace, is taken at 4 per cent. or the value of the conſolidated 3 per cent. £.75^† per cent. their neat average for nine years, ending with the year 1791, was £.70.52^†.

Now if, five years before the actual commence⯑ment of a war, the State be poſſeſſed of a ſinking fund, amounting to £.3.485ms.^‡ ſuch a fund, un⯑der the moſt probable conditions which can be aſ⯑ſigned, will be, what is here called, an adequate fund. For firſt, this ſum annually applied to the reduction of the 3 per cent. capital, will be aug⯑mented at the rate of 4 per cent. annually; and will, in five years, have furniſhed £.18.876ms.^‡ in money, for that purpoſe; by which a capital of £.25.168ms.^‡ will be bought up, and the fund, at the end of the firſt peace, amount to £.4.2399ms.^‡

A term of war of eight years is now to be ſuppoſed to follow: in which let it be admitted, that the ex⯑traordinary expences will amount to £.80 ms.; that the average price of the 3 per cent. ſtock will be [50] £.56·64;^* and its rate of intereſt, £.5·295^† per cent. And the ſyſtem of the management of the land in war, which has lately been eſtabliſhed, being ſuppoſed to be uniformly followed; its annual product is to be ſubſcribed by the commiſſioners of the land, to the loan of each year; for which they are to receive an annuity, raiſed by new taxes; the perpetuity of which ſhall be equal to the perpetuity of the omnium, ob⯑tained by the lenders of equal ſums of money; that is,^‡ £.5⅔ per cent. Thus £.41·471 ms.^§ (being the produce in money of the fund ſo augmented, in eight years) will be advanced by the Commiſſioners, for the ſervice of the war: and at the commencement of the peace, its annual amount becomes augmented to £.6·593 ms.^‖

The ſum neceſſary for the ſupport of the war is taken at £.80 ms: and as £.41·471 ms. is the ſum furniſhed by the public Commiſſioners, the loans of the private creditors muſt amount to £.38·528 ms ^¶: and this will generate a new capital of £.72·771 ms.^¶ in the 3 per cents.

In the firſt two years of the following peace, the product of the fund being annually increaſed, at the rate of 4 per cent, will be in money £.35·710^**; which will have extinguiſhed a capital of £.47·613 ms.^**, in the 3 per cents.

In the laſt five years of the foregoing peace, it has been ſeen that a capital of £.25·168 ms. had been in like manner paid off by the fund; and in the firſt and ſecond terms taken together, a capital of (£.25·168 ms. × £.47·613 ms.) £.72·781 ms.^†† or it pays off, in one complete period, the new debt gene⯑rated [51] therein: and the capital of the debt, at its ter⯑mination, is preciſely equal to its amount at the be⯑ginning. The fund, therefore, becomes what is here called an adequate fund.

An equalization of the land-tax, which would pro⯑duce a million and a ſmall fraction annually, in ad⯑dition to our preſent ſurplus, would be a very good approach to ſuch a fund: and it may be carried into execution, without making the tax perpetual, by veſting a further part of the old ſinking fund in the commiſſioners, equal to the increaſe of the tax; and voting the latter, annually, to the current ſervices, to make up the deficiency in the proviſion for them, which will ariſe from this appropriation: nothing is hereby altered of the conſtitutional nature of a land-tax; as it continues to be voted annually, and to be applied to current ſervices only. It is thus indeed to be conſidered, as indirectly applied to the augmenta⯑tion of the fund: and in this ſenſe, its augmentation thereby is to be always here underſtood.

The amount of an adequate ſurplus fund being £.3·485 ms. a year, the exiſting fund, which very little exceeds 1½ million, muſt be admitted to be to⯑tally inadequate; and if the conſideration of our pre⯑ſent ſafety does not impoſe upon us a neceſſity of augmenting it inſtantly, the time in which that neceſ⯑ſity ſhall ſpeak in a more imperative tone, is not far diſtant; but the ſame exertions, at both periods, will not produce equal relief in equal times: the ultimate burthens of the State, and the time they muſt con⯑tinue, are increaſed by every delay of effectual mea⯑ſures.

This ſtate of our affairs, therefore, calls for every juſt and practicable addition to be made to our in⯑come; and an augmentation to the land-tax evidently comes under that deſcription.

[52]Whatever ſhows that ſuch a ſacrifice, on the part of thoſe who ought to make it, is leſs than at firſt ſight it appears, is an argument which enforces the claim upon them: it adds the whole of its proper weight to the conſideration of neceſſity; and thus increaſes the probability that it muſt take place, though in⯑directly, not in a minute degree. It may be there⯑fore proper to be ſhown, that, upon a ſuppoſition that an adequate fund be eſtabliſhed, part of which ſhall be effectively formed by an augmentation of this tax, it will effect the total value of the eſtates out of which it iſſues, and the neat annual income of the pro⯑prietors, much leſs than at firſt ſight it may appear to do.

That the ſelling price of eſtates will be hereby very little, if at all, decreaſed, is thus ſhown: although their neat rents be at firſt diminiſhed, yet, by the operation of ſuch a fund, the rate of intereſt muſt be much reduced; and the year's purchaſe of neat landed income will be increaſed in the ſame proportion. Hence, the reduction of the market value of ſuch eſtates will be ultimately inconſiderable: and it much concerns thoſe perſons, on whom the augmentation of the charge of the tax will fall, well to examine, whe⯑ther by the application of ſuch a fund, and the conſe⯑quent fall of intereſt, more may not be gotten than loſt upon this head.^*

It may be ſaid, that the increaſe of the tax is an uncompenſated reduction of the neat income of the landlord: but the very act of giving up a ſmall part of it impreſſes a very ſtrong tendency upon the re⯑mainder [53] to increaſe; for that increaſe will always be the conſequence of improvements of the ſoil, or aug⯑mentation of demand; and both theſe muſt follow, in a certain degree, the fall of the rate of intereſt. The price of improvement of land is the intereſt of the money ſunk in it: and whether it be effected by the capital of the farmer or the landlord; when it be⯑comes cheaper, the landlords will be able to draw into their own pockets a greater proportion of the annual value of theſe improvements, ſuppoſing the number of ſuch undertakings not augmented; but the increaſed facility of them will likewiſe augment their numbers. Again, from the ſame common ſource of proſperity, the traders and commercial men will become able to be better cuſtomers for the products of the ſoil, or an augmentation of demand for them take place; the ſecond pre-diſpoſing cauſe of an increaſe of rent: the joint effects of both may very ſoon reſtore to the landlord no ſmall part of what the tax initially takes from him; or he may ultimately, and at no very diſtant period, find his temporary ſacrifice entirely repaid; and when the urgent neceſſities of the State call for it, it may be expected, that the voice, even of a ſelf-intereſt, very ſlightly counterbalanced by any better principle, would be almoſt ſilent againſt it.

But ſhould the tax be increaſed, without augment⯑ing the appropriated ſinking fund, there will be no tendency in its effects to reimburſe the landlord for the diminution of his income: and a reſource, almoſt ſufficient to ward off all the new difficulties the debt will involve us in, and in time to free us from the old, will be loſt to us for ever, and leave nothing which a well-grounded hope can ſubſtitute in its place.

Nor can it be ſaid, that the addition to the tax thus applied, is locked up from the ſervice of the public, when any exigence requires it. The new [54] ſyſtem of the application of the ſinking fund preſerves to the State the command of its own money at all times, and under ſuch conditions, that its alienation increaſes its efficacy. Thus a defect of its original inſtitution is converted into an advantage. The preſent ſurplus retards the increaſe of debt, but does not put a ſtop to it; and, without the eſtabliſhment of an adequate fund, the annual charges of the State muſt continue to increaſe to the moſt oppreſſive magnitude, by the increaſe of the public annuities. The beſt and rea⯑dieſt ſource of augmentation for the fund is that of the land-tax; and the juſteſt mode of effecting that, is by equalization: that meaſure would place us in the immediate reach of the great object here treated of; for if it be once obtained, the tax which would pay the intereſt of the loan of a ſingle year of war, will make the fund adequate.^*

The juſtice of the claims of the reſt of the nation upon the land-owners, for an increaſe of the amount of the tax; the magnitude of that evil to which it will provide almoſt an adequate remedy; and the urgent neceſſity for ſuch a remedy; afford preſump⯑tions which riſe almoſt into proof, that the time when it will take place is not very remote: what they want of abſolute evidence, will perhaps be nearly ſupplied by the following conſiderations.

The average nominal rate of the tax, in four ſuc⯑ceſſive terms of peace, ending with that of 1763, was [55] 31.955^* pence; and of the four laſt terms of war, 4s. in the pound: and we may look on the eſtabliſhed proportion of its charge in war and peace to be as the numbers 48, and 31.955, reſpectively. Thus its nominal rate, during the preſent peace, having been uniformly 4s. in the pound, in the next war it will exceed ſix ſhillings by a ſmall fraction, and the addi⯑tion to its annual charge become £.1.011,381: and it may be obſerved here, as on a former occaſion, that it will be ſeen in the next Section, that if the whole of this addition be levied, excluſively, upon the remote diſtrict, it will ſtill contribute to this tax leſs than its proportional charge.

Beſides theſe arguments, deduced from the nature of a land-tax, the equity of the meaſure, and the ſtate of our finances, to ſhow that an augmentation of amount is very probable; ſeveral authorities to eſtabliſh the ſame point might be doubtleſs found by any perſon who ſhould ſearch for them. At the con⯑cluſion of the late war, and during the term at the beginning of the preſent peace, in which a ſettled gloom ſeemed to hang over us, ſome ſober and tem⯑perate men began to declare their opinions of the neceſſity of its augmentation. Baron Maſeres, who certainly applied himſelf with much ability and atten⯑tion to inveſtigate the effects of the ſinking fund, on ſeveral capitals of our heterogeneous maſs of debt, concludes his reſearches, by affirming, that it would become neceſſary to increaſe the land-tax, if the revenue ſhould fall ſhort two millions of what the exigencies of the State might require; and he takes it for granted, that ſuch an addition to our income would be wanted. ^†'There is reaſon,' ſays this writer, ‘to apprehend, that it will be neceſſary not only to continue the land-tax at 4s. in the pound, but even [56] to increaſe it to double its preſent quantity, or to four millions a year.’ ^* It is here evidently ſeen to what quarter men, well verſed in theſe ſubjects, look forward themſelves, and direct the attention of the trading and monied intereſt, for the next aug⯑mentation of public revenue.

Though the opinion of Baron Maſeres, that the amount of the land-tax will probably be doubled, when a new neceſſity ſhall call for an increaſe of the public revenue, may be diſputed; yet a leſs augmen⯑tation would ſeverally affect the intereſts of the home counties: and whenever again we ſhall be engaged in a war, a great addition muſt be made to it. The opinions long ſince advanced by men of eminence will then form the general ſentiment, and be carried into effect: and it is probable, that if the preſent valuation be continued, the nominal rate will be about ſix ſhillings in the pound, for the reaſon given above. I know very well, that there is much ridicule fre⯑quently attached to the ſuppoſition, that plans of ſpeculative men, buried in the duſt of a library, will ever influence the important tranſactions of the poli⯑tical world, or produce events on which the fate of great claſſes of men, or even great nations, ſhall de⯑pend; and that to conſider, and be prepared before⯑hand, as to what part we ſhall act, when we ſee ſuch ſcenes to be approaching, is ſomething even beneath the folly and dotage of timidity. It would be eaſy to multiply examples, to ſhow, that the confidence which gives birth to ſuch maxims, has been very fre⯑quently ill-founded: and the aſtoniſhing events of the laſt 20 years will not lend it any great ſupport; at leaſt, [57] it will not be derived from the revolutions of America, of France, or of Poland.

In Davenant's Eſſay on Foreign Trade and Plan⯑tations, he has preſerved the heads of a plan which fell into his hands, for the general government of the colonies which were then planted.

Five of the articles it contained, were as follows:^*

That the colonies of Boſton, Connecticut, Rhode Iſland, New York, the Jerſeys, Penſylvania, Mary⯑land, Virginia, and Carolina, ſhall appoint deputies, to meet annually, or oftener.

That this meeting be called the Congreſs, and be held in the moſt central colony—New York.

The Congreſs is, among other things, to be em⯑powered to decide in all differences between province and province;

To conſider of ways and means to ſupport the union and ſafety of the provinces againſt their com⯑mon enemies;

To allot and proportion the quota of men and money of each province, to be furniſhed againſt the common enemy.^†

The ſeizure of the church property in France, which has terminated in the ruin and exile of the greater part of the Gallican clergy, preſenting to every country in Europe, but perhaps more particu⯑larly to this, the melancholy ſpectacle of numbers of men, reſpectable for their virtues, their literature, their rank, fallen, and as it were fallen in a day, from eminence, from affluence, and from a liberal com⯑petency, [58] into a ſtate ſo hopeleſs, and ſo helpleſs, all its circumſtances conſidered (the commiſeration they inſpire us with being excepted), that no other claſs of men can perhaps be involved in the like calamity. This ſeizure is the tranſcript of a plan, brought for⯑ward in the aſſembly of the States at Pontoiſe, in the minority of Charles IX. The original, deſtined to be the ſource of ſo much iniquity and miſery, is pre⯑ſerved to us, in the 27th book of the hiſtory of that excellent magiſtrate De Thou. A long-continued war, and the prodigality of the Court, had exhauſted the treaſury, and involved the Crown in great debts. The aſſembly went into the ſubject of ways and means, to diſcharge them: the reſumption of pro⯑fuſe grants and penſions was not forgotten; but the capital reſource was the ſeizure of eccleſiaſtical pro⯑perty.^* ‘The revenues reſulting from the ſecular juriſdictions of the clergy were to be confiſcated; and many things were propoſed, detrimental to the ſacred order; one fourth of every benefice of 500 livres, a third of every benefice of 1000, and one half, if it amounted to 3000 livres of yearly in⯑come, was to be taken away, and paid into the treaſury. If the annual produce was 12,000 livres, 3000 only were to be left to the former poſ⯑ſeſſor: the remainder was given to the king. The rents of all the convents of the Carthuſians, the Maturins, the Celeſtins, the Miniens, and of all the nunneries, were to be ſeized to the king's uſe, reſerving to their members ſufficient ſuſtenance. All the real eſtates of the biſhops and canons were to be ſold, with an exception of the château, or capital manſion, in which they reſided: this ſale, [59] it was computed, would raiſe 1,200,000 livres.^* The intereſt of one third part of the purchaſe money was to have been reſerved to the late pro⯑prietors of ſuch eſtates; which would have been as productive as their former rents: the remainder was to have been applied to diſcharge the crown debts: thus the royal income would have been in⯑creaſed, and the nation for ever freed from thoſe taxes with which they were then ſo much op⯑preſſed.’

Even while I am writing, the new partition of Poland adds one more to theſe memorable inſtances. King Staniſlaus, in a tract on the liberum veto, and the anarchy of the country, has this remarkable pre⯑diction. ‘We ſhall be the prey of ſome famous conqueror, or perhaps the neighbouring powers will come to an agreement for the partition of our ſtates.’ ^†

The remote ſources of ſome great inſtitutions, which have been uſeful, or of a more dubious nature, might be here added: but it is not our preſent bu⯑ſineſs to multiply hiſtorical anecdotes of any deter⯑minate deſcription.

The remote ſources of ſome great inſtitutions, which have been uſeful, or of a more dubious nature, might be here added: but it is not our preſent bu⯑ſineſs to multiply hiſtorical anecdotes of any deter⯑minate deſcription.

SECTION IV. On the Meaſure of the Diſproportion of the Charge of the Land-Tax, on the Home and Remote Diſtricts, and its Conſequences.

IN the firſt Section it was ſtated, that the kingdom is, with reſpect to the land-tax, to be conſidered as ſeparated into two great diviſions; the home diſtrict comprehending the 11 home counties, with that of Middleſex, all conſideration of London being here excluded; and the remainder of England and Wales, called the remote diſtrict. It is generally known, that the land-tax upon the home diſtrict much exceeds its due proportion, as determined by the annual rent of each. The meaſure of that exceſs is firſt to be made the ſubject of conſideration.

The proportion of the contents, or number of acres of each diſtrict, is very nearly known: but, if the value or fee ſimple^* of each be taken as its contents, that of the remote diſtrict will be ſtated too high. Again, the number of houſes in each, at the Revo⯑lution, is known with ſufficient accuracy: and the remote diviſion has relatively increaſed in population ever ſince, to a great degree. It has likewiſe, in the [61] ſame term, increaſed in manufactures with a much greater celerity than the home diviſion. If therefore the taxable value of the diſtricts be computed from the proportion of their population in 1688, that of the remote diſtrict will be conſiderably leſs than the truth. In the firſt caſe, there will be an error of exceſs in its value, and in the ſecond, of defect: and it is here aſſumed, that theſe errors counterbalance each other: hence it is determined, that the value of the home is to that of the remote diſtrict, as 10,000 to 31,814.^* The proportion of their values is all that is here required to be found, as it ſerves the ſame purpoſes, in the preſent inquiry, as their abſolute amounts, if known.

By other independent methods it is found, that this proportion is ſufficiently near the truth; and they afford collateral ſupport to it.

Davenant, in his eſſay on Ways and Means, written in 1695, lays it down, that the remote counties were then to be eſteemed and valued as three fourths of the kingdom. In the firſt Section it is fully ſhown how much their value has relatively increaſed ſince: it is matter of common notoriety. If therefore, when the rent of the home diviſion is taken as 10,000, that of this diſtrict be taken as 31,814, the latter may ſeem rather to be leſs than greater than the truth. The land-tax paid by the home diſtrict (London excluded) is £.652,275:^‡ and according to the proportion here given, the remote diſtrict ought to pay £.2,075,100:^‡ the real payment thereof is £.1,038,184,^‡ which falls ſhort of its equitable and juſt contribution, £.1,036,916.^‡ This defalcation may be ſtated in another point of view: thus its proportional payment ^† [62] being £.10,000, its effective charge is £.5002 only: and for every ſum of £.10,000 thus paid, the juſt charge amounts to £.19,989.

We ſhall now inquire, what is the effective charge of this tax in the pound, upon the actual income of real eſtates, in the two diſtricts, when the nominal charge on each is four ſhillings.

The income of ſuch eſtates is of two kinds; rent of ſuperior condition, as rent of land; or of inferior condition, as that of buildings and mines. The ſum of each of theſe is ordinarily ſtated as the national rent; and may properly be called a mixed rent, on account of the nature of the ſubjects out of which it ariſes. The market values of all the eſtates of two diſtricts of conſiderable extent may not be as their incomes, the rate of intereſt being in each the ſame; becauſe one may contain a greater proportion of rents of the inferior condition than the other. Hence the ability of ſuch a diviſion of a country to contribute to a land-tax, will not always be in the preciſe pro⯑portion of its mixed income, but of its ſelling price: or, which is the ſame thing, it will be as the annual rent of ſupeior condition, which might be purchaſed for that price. To determine the proportion of the ability of the landlords of a diſtrict to pay any tax, its mixed income ought to be ſo reduced; a transfor⯑mation which is employed in other parts of this in⯑quiry: but we are now to find the proportion the actual tax bears to the actual income, that is, the mixed income; the law by which it is impoſed, bear⯑ing no reſpect to the nature of the ſubject out of which any rent ariſes.

Excluding London, the mixed rent of both diſtricts, in 1792, amounted to £.25.525 ms.; and that of the home diſtrict, to £.6.104 ms. And the land-tax on this part of the kingdom being £.652,200, the charge in the pound was 2s. 1 2/4d. very nearly. The rent in [63] the remote diſtrict was £.19.421, its land-tax £.1.038,100, and the rate in the pound 1s. 0¾d. very nearly, or half the former only. The average of the whole kingdom, without London, is 1s. 3¾d. ^*

Beſide the peculiar tax paid by the landlords, a part of all other taxes is paid out of their income or rents; and as theſe do, or may, affect all income in general, from whatever ſource derived, they are here called general taxes. Now the part paid out of the rents of the two diſtricts, is to their whole charge, as that rent to the whole national income: hence the amount of theſe general taxes being £.15.162 ms.^†, their charge upon the provincial proprietors of land is £.4.1827 ms. or 3s. 3⅓d. ^‡ in the pound rent.

[64]Hence the charge of all taxes in the home diſtrict is 5s. 5d. ^* in the pound; and in the remote diviſion 4s. 41/7d. ^*: therefore, by the inequality of the aſſeſſment of the land-tax, the burthen of the home diſtrict ex⯑ceeds its true proportion, in the ratio of 5 to 4. It is alſo ſomewhat greater than that proportion of their income which political arithmeticians have laid down as a limit of what a country can pay in taxes, in the the time of peace, without ceaſing to increaſe in riches.^†

The payments of the rents of the home diſtrict to all taxes is £.1.6525 ms.^‡; and the equitable pay⯑ments of the remote diſtrict, in proportion to its value, would be £.5.2572 ms.:^§ its actual payment is £.4.2205 ^‡ ms. which falls ſhort of its due contribution, by £.1.0367 ms.^§ nearly the ſame ſum as before aſſigned; and their proportional is to their real charge, as 12.456 is to 10.000.^‖

The conſequence of this diſparity, to the kingdom in general, and the home diſtrict in particular, offer themſelves next to our examination. The firſt branch of theſe conſiderations will be entered upon by the proof of the following propoſition.

If the remote diſtrict had conſtantly contributed in their juſt proportion to this tax, and the ſum by which it would have been thereby increaſed, had been ap⯑plied to the purchaſe of 3 per cent. ſtock; it would at this time have extinguiſhed a capital, nearly dou⯑ble that of the preſent redeemable debt, after a due and even liberal allowance had been made for the dif⯑ficulties that part of the kingdom laboured under, at the Revolution, and perhaps for ſome following years.

[65]The average nominal rate of the tax, ſince its firſt eſtabliſhment, has been 3s. and 3 [...]/8d. in the pound, very nearly;^* and its annual average product in Eng⯑land, £.1.6116. Now, its actual charge to the re⯑mote counties is to that on the whole kingdom, as 1.0381 to 1.9777.^† Therefore, the annual average charge upon them has been £.845.930: but that actual charge is to the proportional charge, as 10.000 to 19,989. The amount of the latter would have therefore been £.1.690,990. The difference of theſe two payments, or £.845.060 is the fund, which would thus have been applicable to the reduction of the 3 per cent. capital.

The term of its operation is next to be fixed; and in aſſigning it, due allowance is to be made for the diſtreſs under which it has been ſeen that the remote diſtrict laboured at the Revolution, and for ſome years after. It was above ſhewn, that in the year 1729, all traces of the former depreſſion of the value of eſtates in the diſtrict had become obliterated, or 36 years after the impoſition of the tax: but at the very beginning of the term, the payment of the re⯑mote counties was greatly below their abilities of contributing to the public charges: and it may be taken, that their eſtates roſe to an equality of value with thoſe of the home diſtrict, by equal degrees, in equal times: and if their firſt payment, which was ſo inadequate, had been fully proportioned to their ability at that time, by the nature of their progreſſive recovery, as above deſcribed; if they had paid the full tax the laſt half of the term, or 18 years, and their initial aſſeſſments without increaſe, for the firſt half thereof; a due allowance would have been made for their temporary diſtreſs: but in the circumſtances which took place, this allowance is much more than [66] adequate. From the whole term of a century, there⯑fore, the period during which the land-tax has ex⯑iſted, 18 years is to be deducted; and the re⯑mainder, 82 years, is the period in which the fund of £. 845,060 (to have been gained by the equalization of the tax) would have been applicable to the extinc⯑tion of the debt.

The third factor to be aſſigned, is the rate of inte⯑reſt at which the fund would have operated in ſucceſ⯑ſive periodical publications. We have the price of the 3 per cent. ſtocks from the year 1731 incluſive, to this time; and taking, as before, the average inte⯑reſt of the ſtock market, during the preſent peace, at £. 4, that of the laſt 62 years was £.3·562 per cent.: during the firſt 20 years of this term, that rate was ſtill higher; but the permanent rate here aſſumed is £. 3½ per cent. It is to be noted, that hereby the amount of the fund for the whole term will not be inconſiderably leſs than the truth; the intereſt at which it would have accumulated in the firſt 20, and the laſt 10 years, having exceeded £. 3½ per cent.

The amount of an annuity of £. 1 in 82 years, at £.3½ per cent. is £.451·20; and of an annuity of £.845,060, £.381·29 ms. And intereſt being at £.3½, or the value of the 3 per cents. £.855/7; that ſum of money would have extinguiſhed a capital of £.444·83 ms. of ſuch ſtock.

Nor can it be ſaid, from the experience of the fate of our ſinking fund, that ſuch an additional ſum, if put under the like appropriation, would not have been applied for that purpoſe; for, during the preſent cen⯑tury, the mean annual expences, and the charge of the peace eſtabliſhment, have increaſed very nearly in the ſame proportion. And this ſeems to be derived from a neceſſity, impoſed upon every member of the European republic of States, which will not ſubmit to be degraded below its former relative rank therein; [67] which is founded on great advances in ſtrength and opulence, which moſt of them have made in the preſent age. By an unfortunate ſyſtem of policy, the nation has never provided an increaſing revenue for this increaſing charge; and thus the product of the ſinking fund has at length been almoſt totally abſorbed by the increaſing charge of the peace eſta⯑bliſhment. The errors, and perhaps the delinquence of Adminiſtrations, may at ſome periods have contri⯑buted toward it; but this impolitic national parſimony, much more: nor are the marks of criminal profuſe⯑neſs, which appear upon the face of the public accounts, ſo frequent in the middle and at the con⯑cluſion of the laſt hundred years, as at the beginning: and perhaps no reaſon can be aſſigned, to ſhow, that, if the amount of the ſinking fund had been £.850,000 a year more, this ſurplus would have been gra⯑tuitouſly flung away; and if only one half of it had eſcaped from the influence of peculation and miſma⯑nagement, our preſent debt would have been nearly annihilated.

But the inequality of the land-tax has likewiſe con⯑tributed its ſhare to another great evil: it was not without its effect, and that perhaps a very conſiderable one, in producing the civil war of the colonies, and diſmembering the empire: for it cannot be doubted, that a ſuſpicion of the equity with which the Britiſh Parliament would exerciſe the power of taxation, was one of the leading cauſes which brought on the reſiſt⯑ance, which terminated in that great revolution. And if no other American made up his opinion on this head, from the diſparity of the land-tax of England, Dr. Franklin at leaſt did. ‘He always uſed to quote the continuance of the land-tax, upon its preſent very unequal footing, as a proof of the very little regard that was had to juſtice and common-ſenſe, [68] in our national deliberations.’ ^* This argument muſt have full weight with thoſe who think the coloniſts would have concurred in any mode of con⯑tributing to the expences of the united empire; which they were aſſured, from the eſtabliſhed character of equity in the legiſlation, would not have been attended with practical oppreſſion and inequality: for they would not have hazarded a civil war, for abſtract principles, when they had a ſufficient moral proba⯑bility, grounded on their confidence of the long unimpeachable juſtice of that aſſembly, in whom the power would be, that theſe abſtract principles would never produce an additional burthen to them in their operation; and, on the other hand, temperaments would have been eaſily diſcovered, and conceded to with the ſame facility, to have obtained their con⯑tributions, without any contravention to thoſe prin⯑ciples.

The effects of this inequality, upon the home di⯑ſtrict in particular, are now to be ſtated. Here it will not be ſufficient to examine ſimply the force by which theſe counties are depreſſed: for its conſe⯑quences depend, not only on its magnitude, but on the ſtrength of the ſubject on which it operates: therefore, after diſcuſſing the general effects of the diſparity, other circumſtances are to be pointed out, which, operating in conjunction with them, tend greatly to increaſe the relative depreſſion of the di⯑ſtrict.

Beſide the abſolute definition of the property of the the home diſtrict, by the diſproportionate aſſeſſment of the tax, as a ſecondary conſequence, it produces an effective, and a very important balance of pay⯑ment, againſt the leſs, and in favour of the greater diviſion of the kingdom.

[69]When money is brought by taxes into the treaſury, much of it again returns into the country, for ſeveral purpoſes; to pay the intereſt of the public creditors; for the ſubſiſtence of troops, the purchaſe of ſtores and commodities; and on divers other accounts. Now it may very well be admitted, ſums ſo returned into the two diſtricts, are as the landed capital of each: the ſum of theſe diſburſements in both will evidently exceed £.1·6903 ms.^*, the amount of the provincial tax: but firſt let it be conſidered as exactly equal thereto, being diſtributed to both in the proportion laid down. The ſhare of the remote diviſion will be £.1.2860 ms.^*; and that of the home diſtrict, £.404,300.^* The former ſum exceeds the remit⯑tance of that diſtrict to the treaſury, on account of the land-tax, by £.247,970^*; and the latter falls ſhort of the tax on the home diviſion, by the ſame ſum: or it is an effective balance, increaſing annually the money of one diſtrict, and decreaſing that of the other.

Now let the annual diſburſement of government exceed the ſum aſſigned, by any given amount: ſuch exceſs muſt be derived from the general taxes, which are equally levied in both diſtricts; and the money returning to each, according to what is above laid down, will be proportional to its landed capital, or its prior charge to thoſe taxes, but leſs than the amount thereof; becauſe all the expences of govern⯑ment are not internal. Hence, conſidered by itſelf, this ſecond reflux of money cannot generate a balance in favour of either of them: it is only a propor⯑tional reſtoration of part of the money of both. It therefore cannot diminiſh the wrong balance aſſigned above.

[70]Such balances may exiſt between province and pro⯑vince, as well as between independent kingdoms, and, in like manner, muſt be ultimately paid by the precious metals. That we may judge of its conſe⯑ſequence, let its amount be compared with that part of our annual gain by foreign trade, which preſents itſelf firſt to every one's imagination, who thinks upon the increaſe of national opulence: I mean that part of the precious metals gained by the general balance of trade, which forms the annual increment of our national ſtock of coin. That we have, on an average of many years, an annual reſting balance of this kind, notwith⯑ſtanding the great diminution of corn which muſt be occaſioned by our wars, and the more latent cauſes of decreaſe, will not, I think, at this time, be brought into diſpute. Now the larger this ſum is ſtated to be, the leſs will the comparative loſs of the home diſtrict appear, from the adverſe balance above pointed out. In 1750, Mr. Andrew Hooke publiſhed his Eſſay on the National Debt and Capital; which is mentioned by Sir John Sinclair^* as an "admirable" work. The great foundation on which all his computations are built, is the annual increment of the national coin: this he ſtates at £.164,772^† yearly. Thus the balance againſt the home diſtrict, generated by the inequality of land-tax, exceeds the part of our foreign balance of trade, by which the coin of the kingdom is increaſed, by £.83,198, being more than one half thereof.

This annual increment of the coin of £.164,000 a year, is the baſis on which the increment of our cur⯑rency [71] is founded; which is the ſum of our circulating paper and coin; for a part of this new coin being withdrawn, and locked up in the cheſt of the banker, enables him to increaſe the currency by three or four times its amount in paper: and thus the market for all our commodities is ſupplied with the repreſenta⯑tive ſigns of real value, although both their quantities and their nominal prices are perpetually augmenting. This apparently minute annual increment of the na⯑tional ſtock of coin, is the ſtream that has led the national capital, in every ſtage of its progreſſive growth; and it is ſufficient to have increaſed it to that magnitude it has attained. The inequality of the land-tax, which has generated a balance againſt the home diſtrict of £.247,000 a year, muſt have greatly retarded it in its courſe of proſperity, during the whole term it has operated: although the counties included in it, ſhould be admitted to have derived an equal, or perhaps a ſuperior ſum, annually from ſome other quarter; for even in this latter caſe, a part of that annual ſuperlucration of the diſtrict, equal to this balance, would be annihilated by it, or would be rendered what has been called a lucrum ceſſans; which is always in effect equal to a damnum emergens.

In the proceſs to determine the adverſe balance againſt the home counties, by the inequality of the tax, it has been ſhown, that its amount upon the pro⯑vinces, when its nominal rate is 4s. in the pound (a charge now become permanent) is £.1.6903 ms.: of which ſum, the proportional ſhare of the remote di⯑ſtrict is £.1.2863 ms.; and of the home diſtrict, £.404,300. I ſhall here ſo far make a digreſſion, as to draw a corollary from this, connected with the general ſubject, though not with the particular matter of this Section.

Hence a method is eaſily deduced, to equalize the burthen of the tax, and ſtill retain the old valuation of [72] the diſtricts, and this may be done by adopting a counter-inequality^* of the nominal rates at which the two diſtricts are aſſeſſed, ſo adjuſted as to be reciprocal to the inequality of the valuation; by which the pay⯑ment of each diſtrict is rendered proportional to its value. The new rates are found thus: the product of the tax on both remaining fixed at its preſent amount, the proportional contribution of the remote diſtrict is £.1.286 ms.: now, at the nominal rate of 4s. in the pound, the ſum raiſed therein is £.1.0381 ms; and at the nominal rate of (59.455d. =4s. 11½d.) 5s. in the pound, the total collected by the diviſion would amount to that proportional pay⯑ment.

Again, at the nominal rate of 4s. in the pound, the ſum of £.652,270 is raiſed in the home counties; the valuation of which being continued, and that reduced to (29.752 pence or 2s. 5¾d.) half-a-crown in the pound, the amount of the tax would be reduced to £.404,333; its proportional part of the total now paid by both.

This ſeems to hold out a very eaſy mode of doing an act of ſubſtantial juſtice to the oppreſſed diſtrict; and, at the ſame time, of avoiding the natural diffi⯑culties, and the artificial obſtructions which might be flung in the way of a new valuation: but the groſs inequality being thus removed, the great maſs of in⯑tereſt, which oppoſes the introduction of a more per⯑fect ſyſtem of levying this tax, would be much re⯑duced, if it did not fall with it: and in a little time, every ſubordinate inequality would follow the fate of the great one, which at preſent covers and protects them all.

[73]To return to the immediate ſubject of the Section: The burthen of this diſparity on the home diſtrict has been conſidered in ſome material points of view; but if all of them had been exhauſted, only one half the inquiry is finiſhed. The meaſure of the power which is to ſupport that burthen, remains to be ſought after; and this power may be conſidered either abſolutely or relatively.

Now there are ſome natural circumſtances reſpect⯑ing the two diſtricts, whoſe primary and ſecondary effects neceſſarily give a great ſuperiority to the remote diviſion: it includes the coal countries; the direct and primary conſequence of which (the wood in the home diſtrict being reduced to almoſt nothing) is to form another balance of payment in their favour. But the ſecondary effects of this natural inequality of the diſtricts, in reſpect to firing, extend much fur⯑ther: it lays the manufactures of the one under great diſadvantages; and gives a ſuperior facility to the extenſion of thoſe of the other: in the home diſtrict it has the moſt hurtful effect on the morals and induſtry of the labourers in agriculture: and while, from the increaſe of its coal trade, and that of its manufactures, the ſhipping of the remote diviſion has received a great augmentation, that of the home diſtrict has ſuffered a cotemporary decline; and each in a degree which, prior to actual experience, would have been held far to exceed any bounds of probable expectation. This ſource of ſuperiority, derived from nature on the one ſide, and of relative depreſſion on the other, are the moſt cogent arguments againſt ſuffering the continu⯑ance of any other diſparities, generated by artificial and inequitable ſyſtems of policy; ſuch as the conti⯑nuation of a tax of double burthen upon the diſtrict, in the leſs fortunate natural ſtate.

But I muſt conſider more in particular each of theſe circumſtances, which add to the weight of this unjuſt [74] burthen: their importance to the general argument is ſuch, that they are not to be paſſed over in a bare ſummary enumeration.

With reſpect to the balance againſt the home diſtrict by the coal trade, it may be ſaid, ‘that if their wood be cleared off the ſoil, it is becauſe they find their gain more by reducing it into cultivation: hence they are able to pay for their coal, and afterward derive a greater profit from their land than before.’ To this it muſt be anſwered, that the whole advan⯑tage it might reap, if they could obtain their firing out of the bowels of their own ſoil, is diminiſhed by the price of the coal remitted out of the diſtrict; and that land brought into cultivation in the other diviſion occaſions no drain of money for firing: on the con⯑trary, they keep that whole ſum at home; and their capital is perpetually increaſing, by the expence of their neighbours in this article, for the price of the coal and its freight.

The expence of this fuel to the conſumers in the home counties, conſiſts of the following parts: its value at the pit; a duty of "more than ſixty per cent." on that value^*; the freight; mercantile pro⯑fit; and inland carriage. Firing is neceſſary for the ‘comfortable ſubſiſtence of many different ſorts of workmen, who work within doors’ ^*: and manu⯑facturers have always gradually migrated into countries where fuel is cheapeſt, when there has been no great diſparity of other circumſtances. To this cauſe the de⯑preſſion of many branches of the manufactures of the home diſtrict is to be aſcribed, which formerly flouriſhed there: and that part of the kingdom may have long occaſion to regret the loſs of the bill brought into the lower houſe by the preſent miniſter, a few years ago, laying a tax on coal at the pit's mouth. If it had [75] been withdrawn on being carried coaſtwiſe, it would have formed an equalizing and protecting duty, and given ſome remedy to its natural diſadvantages.

If this difference of ſituation affect the ſubſiſtence of one claſs of the labouring poor in the home di⯑ſtrict — the manufacturers, and attack the very exiſtence of the manufactures themſelves; it produces effects no leſs fatal to the morals and induſtry of an⯑other—the workmen in huſbandry. Before wood was almoſt extirpated there, the labourer could purchaſe firing; or, as it was of little value, much was given him: its ſcarcity has diminiſhed very much, if not annihilated, this ſupply from the liberality or ſuffe⯑rance of his ſuperiors; and its price renders him more ready to ſteal, than able to buy. He goes out in the night in ſearch of it; and opportunities frequently preſent themſelves to him, at the ſame time, of ma⯑king other depredations: and the wood-ſtealer is thus tempted to become, and frequently does become, a robber of a ſtill more dangerous character. This is one great inductive cauſe of that profligacy which the poor are arrived at in the home diſtrict; and from which I conclude, that cheapneſs of firing has greatly tended to preſerve thoſe of the remote diviſion. It is well known how much the flouriſhing ſtate of a country depends upon the morals of the lower claſs: and in the home diſtrict there is every cauſe in action to bring them into a ſtate of degeneracy which can operate in the remainder of the kingdom, with almoſt an additional neceſſity impoſed upon them, by the dearneſs of fuel, of beginning the practice of night ſtealing.

The laſt diſparity of the two diviſions to be treated, is in the quantity of their ſhipping; that of the home diſtrict having decreaſed with great rapidity, while that of the other has been conſtantly and greatly aug⯑menting.

[76]This is to be ſhown from the tonnage of Engliſh ſhips cleared outward, in the year 1750 and 1772. two terms ſufficiently remote; and the only terms for which I have been able to diſcover proper data, to found any compariſon upon. And it will be after⯑wards ſhown, by general reaſoning, that the conclu⯑ſions to be derived from them, will very well apply to the preſent purpoſe.

The ſhipping of the out-ports, are here only to be taken into the account; excluding that of the port of London. And the materials for their compariſon, obliges us to divide the tonnage into two parts; not correſponding to the two diſtricts, but approaching to ſuch correſpondence as near as may be. The firſt diviſion contains the four greater out-ports of White-haven, Liverpool, Newcaſtle, and Briſtol; the ſecond, the remaining ports of the kingdom, being all the ſmaller out-ports: after that account is ſo ſtated, it will be ſhown that all its conſequences may be ſtrict⯑ly applied to the ſmaller home ports; that is, all the ports of the home diſtrict, excluſive of London: and moreover, that they would hold good a fortiori, if the account could be more exactly drawn out; or that the decreaſe of the ſhipping of the home diſtrict, eſtimated both abſolutely and proportionally, would by ſuch more accurate account appear to be greater than that here to be exhibited.

The abſolute decreaſe of the ſhipping of the ſmaller ports, is firſt to be ſhown. There were cleared out⯑ward, from all of them taken together, in the year 1750, 264,073^* tons of Engliſh ſhipping; and in 1772, 156,499 ^* tons only: they had therefore decreaſed 107,574 tons,^* in twenty-two years. To [77] apply this loſs to a proper meaſure, familiariſed to the conception of every man, as far as it can be, by being frequently made the ſubject of converſation: in the very ſame term of twenty-two years, the ton⯑nage of Engliſh veſſels annually cleared outward, in⯑creaſed 107,063 tons. Thus if theſe ports had been able to preſerve their ſhipping, without augmenting it a ſingle ton, the increaſe of our veſſels for com⯑merce, and our naval force (great as it actually was) would have been doubled: and half the augmenta⯑tion of our marine ſtrength, from the proſperity of the five great ports, was annihilated by the decline of the ſmaller taken conjointly.

Having ſtated the abſolute loſs, the celerity of this decline is now to be fixed. Taking therefore the tonnage of the ſmaller out-ports in 1750, as 1000; that of 1772 will be found to be as 5926:^* or they had loſt ⅖ of their whole ſhipping in twenty-two years. The proſperity of the four great out-ports, and the ſevere reverſe of ſituation of the remainder and ſmaller, exhibit an unparalleled and afflicting contraſt. The tonnage of the former increaſed in the ſame time from 199,338 to 361,604 tons; or by 162,066 tons; in the proportion of 10,000 to 18,122:^† while the moſt diſtreſſed commercial State in Europe did not, in the ſame period experience any calamity, to be put in competition with the decline of the latter. It argues ſomething deleterious and fatal, either natural or ar⯑tificial, or both, to their commerce, depreſſing it du⯑ring the whole of the term.

Although no extracts of regiſters can be here pro⯑duced, to ſhow upon which of the ſmaller ports the whole of this calamity fell, yet every general reaſon points out, that the total of it is excluſively to be carried to the account of thoſe of the home diſtrict; [78] the increaſe of ſhipping of ſome of the ſmaller ports of the other diviſion, at leaſt counterbalancing, pro⯑bably much exceeding ſome decreaſe, which might be experienced by others: becauſe thoſe cauſes, then known to exiſt in this kingdom, adequate to the pro⯑duction of ſo great an evil, or even capable of reſtrain⯑ing a courſe of proſperity, were limited in their ope⯑ration to the home diſtrict excluſively. For although that diſtrict, beſide its diſproportionate charge to the State by the land-tax, is further exhauſted by paying an annual balance to the other counties, which this firſt oppreſſion draws after it, as its neceſſary conſe⯑quence (a balance which conſiderably exceeds the annual increment of the national coin) there is ſu⯑peradded to this, a ſecond and much greater, on ac⯑count of coal: and the ſcarcity of fuel, which has thus rendered the home diſtrict tributary to the reſt of the kingdom, is a circumſtance, which has gene⯑rated much depravity in the village poor; laid a new tax upon the productions of agriculture; and tended, not a little, to retard its improvements, and the in⯑creaſe of its products. And to the effect of the ſame cauſe is further to be added, that by promoting the migration of ſome of our manufacturers, and reſtrain⯑ing the extent of others, it has produced the ſame melancholy conſequences on the labouring inhabitants of our greater towns and cities, as on thoſe of the villages; increaſing the preſſure of their neceſſities; and, by perpetual intermiſſions of employment, relax⯑ing their habits of induſtry, and giving birth to, or increaſing thoſe of the worſt nature.

In this account are to be found, proximate as well as remote cauſes of deſtruction of commerce, and the conſequent decreaſe of ſhipping: theſe having ex⯑iſted excluſively in the home diſtrict, the whole of their effect muſt have taken place there. And it ap⯑pears highly probable, that the account above given, [79] does not ſhow the whole of their loſs in ſhipping: for, from their natural and artificial advantages, it ſeems abſolutely neceſſary to admit, that the ſmaller ports of the remote diviſion taken collectively have made ſome increaſe to their tonnage; counterbalancing in part the decreaſe of the others. This rate of augmen⯑tation may certainly be taken equal to that of the ave⯑rage increaſe of the national ſhipping, as retarded by the loſſes of the home diſtrict; for their advantages are above the general average; and it may with the greateſt moderation be aſſumed, that as the four great out-ports, all ſituated in the remote diſtrict, have in twenty-two years increaſed in tonnage, in the propor⯑tion of 18122, to 10000,^* ſo that of the other ports alike ſituated, and partaking the ſame common advan⯑tages, have, in the ſame time, increaſed in the pro⯑portion of 11755 to 10000 (which is the average rate of increaſe of the tonnage of the whole kingdom) or with ſomething leſs than one fourth of the celerity of the former.

But if it be contended that even this rate is too much, let the tonnage of theſe ſmaller ports, taken col⯑lectively, be now admitted to have increaſed with any celerity, leſs that here mentioned: the augment it has received muſt be ſomething; and the decreaſe of the tonnage of all the ſmaller ports of the kingdom, taken together, will have been diminiſhed by that in⯑creaſe: therefore the decreaſe of that of the other ports, that is, thoſe of the home diſtrict, will be equal to the total decreaſe of this tonnage, 107,574 tons, with that ſmall augment added to it. The decreaſe of their ſhipping therefore, as above repreſented, is leſs than the truth: whence it follows, that the celerity of its decline is much leſs than the truth. For in 1750, the tonnage cleared outwards from the ſmall [80] home ports, muſt have been leſs than 264,073 tons,^* the total for both diſtricts: its decreaſe alſo exceeded 107,574 tons. Hence, by the nature of proportion, it muſt have decreaſed from the year 1750 to 1772, with a greater celerity, than that defined by the ratio of 264,073 tons, to 156,499 tons, or of 10000 to 5926.^*

If the ſhipping of ſmaller remote ports be ſuppoſed to have been ſtationary, neither increaſing nor dimi⯑niſhing; the decreaſe of the annual tonnage of the ſmaller home ports will remain as firſt ſtated: but, from the nature of proportion, the celerity of their decline, as given above, will be below its true mag⯑nitude.

There is one caſe indeed, in which the celerity of the decline of the ſhipping of the home diſtrict, will be accurately defined by that proportion, that is, if one equal decreaſe had taken place, at the ſame time, in the remote diviſion. But this ſuppoſition is extremely improbable; for it may be preſumed, that, in the hiſto⯑ry of commerce, there is not to be found an inſtance of a great diſtrict, which had once acquired a con⯑ſiderable quantity of ſhipping, if it had not loſt its induſtry, or did not labour under any particular cir⯑cumſtances of adverſity, where that ſhipping was found to have been decreaſing, in long terms of time. It has always been progreſſive throughout Europe in general, where the exiſtence of ſuch cauſes to retard it have not been extremely evident.

Laying now aſide, all further conſideration of the abſolute quantity of its decreaſe; it is to be obſerved, that the celerity of the decline of the ſhipping of the ſmaller home ports, can be exaggerated by the eſtimate given above, upon one ſuppoſition only: and that is, that a more rapid decline has taken place in [81] the ſmaller ports of the other, in a time when every cauſe of ſuperiority was operating in their favour: an aſſumption too abſurd to be conſidered.

It is concluded hence, that the decreaſe of the ſhipping of the ſmaller home ports, and the celerity of its decline, great as it is repreſented above, rather falls ſhort of, than exceeds the truth; and that, al⯑though this point is eſtabliſhed only upon general reaſoning, which is certainly inferior in concluſiveneſs to the proof ariſing from actual regiſters of tonnage, yet theſe general reaſons have great cogency, are founded upon well-known facts; and there appears nothing of the like kind to be ſet againſt them, to ba⯑lance them; and they can only be ſet aſide, by the production of copies of the entries of ſuch regiſters.

It may be ſaid, ‘that the ſtate of the ſhipping of England may have been very much altered, be⯑tween the year 1772 and this time; and that the ſmaller home ports may have recovered in a great part their relative proportion.’ Now, on an ave⯑rage of three years, ending in 1774, the tonnage of all our ſhips in foreign commerce was 979,263 tons;^* and in the like term, ending in 1783, 933,785 tons. This ſhows a decreaſe of 45,478 tons;^* and exhibits no appearance of an increaſe of ſhipping in any part of the kingdom: and the probable preſumption is, that it would not have ſprung up in a time of gene⯑ral decline, in a diſtrict which every thing tends to depreſs: and if ſuch be the fact, it can be proved by the evidence of the regiſters alone. It is beſide to be added, that thoſe cauſes which produced the de⯑creaſe of ſhipping from 1750 to 1772, muſt have been ſince removed, before its progreſs could have been even ſtopped; and a much greater change muſt have taken place, before their antecedent effect could [82] have been in any degree recovered. Of either of theſe great revolutions, no ſingle veſtige has occurred to me.

The proportional payment of the home diſtrict to the and-tax is, £2·075,100:^* and its effective pay⯑ment being £1,038,184, ^* the defalcation amounts to £1,036,916.^* I therefore now proceed to ſhow, that it is poſſeſſed of the full ability to make up that deficiency.

This might be in general terms inferred, from the great increaſe of the commerce of that part of the kingdom, juſt before inſtanced; but it may be more directly proved, from particular and independent evidence, that, after ſuch augmentation of the tax, their burthen would not be equal to that of their ac⯑tual contribution to it at its firſt impoſition; on the contrary, that a further addition of £99,400 a year to this proportional payment, muſt be made to bring it to ſuch equality; and, as they were able to ſup⯑port the original charge, and rapidly emerge from a ſtate of comparative depreſſion into that of a decided ſuperiority over the remainder of the kingdom, that they are poſſeſſed of the full ability now, to make good their defalcation to the proportional payment.

The burthen of a tax upon all income of the ſame condition, as before defined, is the proportion the an⯑nual charge of the tax bears to the annual amount of the income: thus a double ſum taken from a double income, and a treble ſum from a treble in⯑come, conſtitute equal burthens; and ſo on, for any other equimultiples of tax and income.

In 1693, the land-tax, amounting annually to £ 1,038,184, was laid on this diſtrict. In ſixteen years of the firſt twenty, the charge was the ſame, or at 4s. in the pound: for three years at 3s; and the [83] remaining year at 2s. At the Revolution, or five years before its commencement, the remote diſtrict was in a ſtate of relative decline; which appears even to have been advancing upon it, with great celerity. Yet the progreſs of this decline became retarded; it ſtopped entirely; "the ſtate of manufactures began to ſhift;"^* the lands in the other parts of the kingdom had fallen not very inconſiderably; and thoſe of the remote diſtrict advanced to a perfect equality in value with them, ſo early as the ſixteenth year after the expiration of the firſt twenty. It is to be concluded therefore, that during that term of twenty years, the burthen of the land-tax did not exceed the meaſure of that ability, which the diſtrict then poſſeſſed; and that the ſame burthen would at preſent be attended with no oppreſſion to them.

Our inquiry therefore muſt be directed to diſcover, what charge, in the year 1793, would be equal in burthen to the actual payment of the diviſion, in the year 1693.

The taxability of any income is (every thing elſe being alike) as its ſelling value. From a revenue of £1000 a year in land, or what is called here, income of ſuperior condition, a larger ſum may be drawn in taxes, than from the ſame rent in buildings, or in⯑come of inferior condition. Or if an income of the latter kind be reduced in the proportion which its proper number of years purchaſe bears to that of an eſtate in land, the reſulting amount will be part there⯑of, which appears to be juſtly the ſubject of taxation. Thus having given the national rent of land, and of eſtates of inferior condition; the whole may be re⯑duced into an income, all the equal parts of which ſhall be of equal value, and equitably pay the ſame rate in the pound to a tax. The value of theſe rents [84] in 1688, and 1774, are ſeverally given. It appears from their amount, that the national rent, during thoſe eighty-ſix years, increaſed very nearly ¾ per cent. ^* annually: and ſuppoſing it to have continued to be augmented at this rate, until the year 1793, the taxable national rents of 1693 and 1793 were £12·451 ms.^* and £26·085^* ms. reſpectively

The wealth of the remote, has evidently increaſed with greater celerity, than that of the home diſtrict; and conſequently the advance of the rent thereof ex⯑ceeded the average rate of the whole kingdom. But let it be admitted to have increaſed at an equal rate only; it follows, that the taxable income of eſtates of this diviſion, has increaſed, from the year 1693 to 1793, in the proportion of 26·085 to 12·451; or in that of £0,174,500, to £1,038,184. But this lat⯑ter ſum was the amount of the payment of the remote diviſion to the land-tax in 1693: now the experience of that time demonſtrated, that it was able to bear ſuch a burthen, for nearly twenty years ſucceſſively, and, during that term, to recover in a great meaſure from very depreſſed circumſtances, and make large ſteps in the road by which it has ſince led to a high degree of proſperity: and the former ſum, £2,174,500, being the payment of equal burthen, the inhabitants of that part of the country are now equally well able to bear it. Their proportional payment was before ſhown to be £2,075,100, which falls ſhort of the tax of equal burthen, by £99,400^† a year. Reaſons of very great validity muſt be pro⯑duced by the poſſeſſors of land in the remote diſtrict, to oppoſe to the claims of their countrymen for re⯑dreſs or equalization: and I will here put the defen⯑ſive argument, in which they ſeem to repoſe the moſt confidence, in as good a light as I am able to place it.

[85] ‘From the original impoſition of the Land-tax (and a whole century has now elapſed ſince that time) all contracts for eſtates in this diſtrict, have been made in full confidence, that this proportion of payment would be perpetual. It is not a few individuals whoſe intereſt are ſacrificed to this in⯑novation but the whole body of purchaſers of land, for that whole term; who in number perhaps ex⯑ceed three fourths of the cotemporary purchaſers in the kingdom. All theſe, by one act, will be ſtripped of a property for which they have paid a fair value, and in which they thought themſelves ſecured by the public faith. It has certainly been tacitly gi⯑ven; but it has been ratified as often as the preſent and original proportion has been re-enacted, which has been an annual practice of the ſame continu⯑ation as the tax. And hence the State is become as firmly pledged, by theſe repeated acts, as by the moſt expreſs promiſe: for a legal right, the moſt abſolute and plenary, both to benefits and exemptions, may be founded on long continued cuſtoms; and every good ſyſtem of laws, recog⯑nizes ſuch cuſtoms as a foundation of civil right: all invaſions upon them have always been dili⯑gently repreſſed in the common courts, where the maxim, quieta non ſunt movenda, has conſtantly been had in reverence. But this cuſtom is of a higher nature: it is the cuſtom of the legiſlature; and the cuſtom of parliament is the law of parlia⯑ment, which is paramount to all its ordinary acts, and a fundamental part of the Conſtitution; limiting even that power, which limits every thing elſe.’

To this it is anſwered, that the facts alledged are not true: and admitting their truth, the concluſion muſt then reſt entirely upon ſome other aſſumptions, uſed in conjunction with them in the courſe of the [86] argument, which are totally repugnant to the firſt principles of ſociety.

It is laid down as a fact in this argument, that all purchaſers ſince the eſtabliſhment of the tax, have been made in full confidence that no equalization would in future take place. To this it is replied, that the expectation of the purchaſers on this head, could not amount to ſuch a confidence. Our anceſ⯑tors in the home diſtrict, before the impoſition of the tax, made their reſpective purchaſes, without any compenſation for a perpetual charge upon their pur⯑chaſed income, of double the magnitude which the new land-owners of the remote counties will have to pay, after the equalization has taken place. I re⯑peat the words, of double the magnitude; for the queſtion being here of purchaſed income only, by the equalization they will loſe a part of ſuch income, equal to one half only of that taken away from our anceſtors, at the original impoſition of the tax: and this is the whole purchaſed income, the tax after, equalization will take from them; the part thereof paid by them at preſent not being purchaſed income. For at the treaty for the ſale of the eſtate to each in⯑dividual, its amount was deducted out of its income, and no money paid for it; and their expectation, that the whole of their purchaſed income would be liable to no tax, muſt have been weakened, by their knowledge that the State had formerly taken from the perſons they repreſent, the ſame quantity of pur⯑chaſed income which is now required for the equa⯑lization; and from the proprietors of the home di⯑ſtrict, the double of that quantity. Their expectation therefore of continuing to enjoy the whole of their purchaſed income untaxed, muſt be leſs than that entertained by our anceſtors, prior to their having experienced ſuch an aſſeſſment; and even the ex⯑pectation the latter might form, muſt have fallen very [87] ſhort of the meaſure of full confidence, pretended to by the purchaſers of the home diſtrict; as, in the courſe of more than fifty years before the land-tax took place, occaſional aids of great amount, under other names, had frequently been levied upon land. The confidence therefore under which they pretend to have purchaſed muſt have been diminiſhed, by the experience of the former failure of a confidence, bet⯑ter founded, in the caſe of the home diſtrict. It therefore could not be what they ſtyle it, a full con⯑fidence. And it may be added (though it depends upon a principle to be proved hereafter) that they muſt always have ſuſpected, that the inequality of the land-tax muſt ultimately be remedied; becauſe, in counties where the greater outlines of a moral policy are upon the whole well preſerved, no exemption flagrantly abuſive can ſubſiſt to all perpetuity: and that ſuch forms of government, by their own internal vigour, ultimately purge off all real feculencies.

But if we examine this full confidence which has perpetually exiſted, a little more cloſely, we ſhall come to its true nature: it is a new ſpecies of full confidence, which has ſubſiſted under a conſtant ex⯑pectation, entertained in both parts of the kingdom, that it would ultimately fail. The ſubject of Baron Maſeres's work on annuities, makes him a very good authority on this head; he has beſide paid conſide⯑rable attention to it: by him we are informed, that ‘the perſons who have been lightly taxed, have al⯑ways feared; and thoſe who have been heavily taxed, have always hoped, that the Parliament would, one day or other, have ſufficient regard to juſtice to correct this groſs inequality.’ ^* It follows that the purchaſers of eſtates in the remote diſtrict did not, at the time of purchaſing, regard that part of their [88] income which an equalization would take from them, as a certain and perpetual annuity; but as a contin⯑gent income only, which muſt ceaſe on the happen⯑ing of a certain event, which was ſo probable in their opinion, as to be the object of conſtant fear. Now nobody can imagine, that the ſame number of years purchaſe would be paid for an income or part of an income, which it was always feared might be taken from the purchaſer, as for an abſolute perpetuity; there muſt have been ſome difference in the purchaſe-money. Now this difference allowed to the buyer, was the value of the increaſe againſt the contingency happening; or, the income ceaſing by the equali⯑zation of the tax. And this is effectively the ſame thing, as if the purchaſer had paid down the whole value of that income; out of which a ſum equal to the then reputed value of the hazard, had been re⯑paid to him by the ſeller, as a proper equivalent to the loſs of it, when it ſhould happen: all ſuch purchaſers in the remote diſtrict, have therefore the conſideration for this addition to the tax in hand; or it has been paid to thoſe of whom they are the re⯑preſentatives; whole virtual engagements, binding the income, they muſt abide by: and it muſt be admitted, that theſe purchaſers, either by themſelves or their repreſentatives, have one with another been permitted to enjoy this contingent annuity, a much longer term than they could have expected; for if no ſecond ſale of the ſame eſtate had taken place, during the whole century the diſparity has ſubſiſted, the pur⯑chaſer and thoſe claiming under him, will, according to the equality of chance, have been in poſſeſſion of this beneficial contingency fifty years; and taking repeated ſales into the queſtion, the term may pro⯑bably have been about thirty-five, or forty years.

But let it be now ſuppoſed, that all theſe contracts for the purchaſe of land, were actually as improvi⯑dently made as they were ſtated to be: join to this [89] the well-known fact, that Parliament has adhered, du⯑ring a whole century, to the ſame proportion of aſſeſſ⯑ment: yet this will not ſerve as a foundation, to prove ſuch a cuſtom as is alledged; granting all that is laid down in law books upon the validity of cuſtom: for it is ‘an eſtabliſhed maxim of the law, malus uſus abolen⯑dus eſt;’ ^* an inequitable cuſtom muſt be aboliſhed. The Act of 1693 eſtabliſhed the inequality, and ſuch an act it is itſelf, among the enumerated proofs that cuſtom is invalid; ‘ſince the ſtatute itſelf is a proof of a time when ſuch cuſtom did not exiſt:’ ^† and the like may be ſaid of the 99 ſubſequent acts, every one of which is a full and diſtinct proof of its non-exiſtence at the time it was paſſed; and this is the total ſupport their claim of cuſtom derives from the original proportion of aſſeſſment having been 99 times re-enacted: beſide, if, at any time during the whole period, the faith of Parliament had been expreſsly pledged to the remote diſtrict, for the con⯑tinuance of their exemption, and not tacitly and by implication, it would have deſtroyed the analogy ſet up between this cuſtom and a legal cuſtom, as it would have ſhown it to have been not ‘compul⯑ſory;’ ^‡ an eſſential property of a legal cuſtom, but voluntary.

As the continuance of the immunity contended for, fails of all ſupport from its analogy to a legal cuſtom; its only remaining defence muſt reſt upon the principles of natural equity.

Let us therefore examine, how far it can be re⯑conciled to the firſt principles on which human ſociety is formed, and on which it continues to be kept to⯑gether. Theſe are always clearly diſcoverable, by the fiction of a number of wiſe and well-diſpoſed indivi⯑duals, [90] who were before independent of each other, meeting to form a compact to enter into ſociety; and all diſguiſe of their ſentiments and circumſtances being out of the queſtion, by the deſcription of the individuals forming ſuch a meeting, the want of each individual, for the protection of all the reſt, and his deſire to obtain it, would be really and ap⯑parently equal; and every one would readily and honeſtly engage to contribute to the protection of all the reſt, by preſtations, bearing the ſame pro⯑portion to his ability, or conſtituting equal burthens to him;^* for there exiſts no ground, in the caſe de⯑ſcribed, why leſs or more than that proportion ſhould be either required or accepted of, or engaged for by any one.

That the burthens of every member of the ſame community be equal, is therefore the firſt principle on which human ſociety is founded; and that com⯑pact is violated, when any one refuſes to take his proportioned ſhare in the aggregate burthen: it is of moral obligation as long as he enjoys the pro⯑tection of the ſociety or nation; and ſuch obligation, a ſeries of infractions of no length, although it may very well ſuit the iniquity of ſelf-intereſt to call it a cuſtom, can invalidate: moral obligations cannot be preſcribed againſt. No abſolute and declared act of any legiſlature can cancel the firſt article of this primitive convention. Parliament, therefore, is not competent to pledge the national faith, even by an expreſs law, that the tax ſhould not be equalized; and it will not, I ſuppoſe, be pleaded, that that auguſt aſſembly could tacitly contract ſuch an en⯑gagement on the part of the nation, when an expreſs [91] declaratory law to that purpoſe would, in itſelf, be null and void.

Upon the grounds of the objection, advanced by the remote diſtrict, againſt an equalization of the tax, it might be likewiſe proved, that ſuch tax ought never to be laid in countries where it has not been laid before; and where it has, that it ſhould be immediately repealed: for, prior to the introduction of ſuch a tax, every purchaſer of an eſtate would have paid the full market value of its clear income, and of every part thereof; and the tax will take from him an income he has purchaſed under the full ſecurity of enjoying it; a ſecurity more complete, and much higher in degree, than the land-owners of the remote diſtrict can entertain. This being an abſolute injuſtice, ſuch a tax ought not to be introduced; and where it is already eſtabliſhed, the evil ought to be remedied as faſt as poſſible; and, with very little trouble, it might be ſhown upon the ſame ground, that every other tax ought to be repealed.

There is a very numerous claſs of proprietors in the remote diſtrict, who poſſeſs eſtates which have been in their families for the whole [...]erm of the ex⯑iſtence of the tax; during which, a double charge has fallen upon the income of thoſe of the home counties. If the former were to reſt the continuance of this inequality upon their own intereſt, they would want even a verbal pretenſion to reſiſt the claims made upon them. Injuſtice does not like, however, to go quite bare-faced; ſhe will rather make uſe of any flimſy tatter, almoſt tranſparent, to veil her⯑ſelf with. Some of the old hereditary proprietors, it may be preſumed, t [...]ke up the argument here con⯑ſidered for this reaſon; others join them who never examine what they have conſtantly heard repeated, and what their ſelf intereſt makes them wiſh to be true; and many who examine no old opinions at all: [92] theſe unite to give this miſerable ſhadow of a pre⯑tence for the continuance of oppreſſion and injuſtice, weight and currency; and together with thoſe whoſe claims to indulgence they avow themſelves to defend, they form a great majority of the landlords of the remote counties; that is, of three quarters of Eng⯑land. Yet if this argument, in its beſt form, were propoſed to any ſenſible man, who was not previouſly acquainted with it, and with the intereſts and pre⯑judices which combine to ſupport it, and he was told at the ſame time, that it was the language held by a large party of well-informed men in England, he would be apt to ſuſpect the veracity of the relation.

Hitherto the difference of the charge of the land-tax of the home diſtrict, and that of the whole of the remote diviſion, has been conſidered; it remains only to draw a compariſon of the former, with a part of the latter, the county of York. The actual and proportional payment of that county to the land-tax, and its rate in the pound, are the only points to be conſidered.

Following the proceſs laid down at the beginning of this Section, it appears that the rent of the home diſtrict is to that of the county of York, as 10,000 to 4034; the actual payment of the home diſtrct, to the land-tax, is £.652,275; and the proportional payment of the county, £.263,120; its actual pay⯑ment is £.91,620; and the defalcation, £.171,500.^*

This proportional charge is to the actual payment, as 10,000 to 3481; and for every £.10,000 paid by the county to this tax, the proportional charge is £. 28,719: the tax upon the home counties is 2s. and 1 1/ [...] d. and upon the county of York 8d. and 9/10^† in the pound.

SECTION V. On the Addition to be made to the Number of the Repreſentatives of the Home and Remote Diſtricts, according to the Plans for the Alteration of the Con⯑ſtitution of the Houſe of Commons, propoſed in 1785 and 1790.

IN conſidering the conſequence of the plans for a change of the election of the Commons, I con⯑fine myſelf to thoſe brought forward in the years 1785 and 1790: as it is probable, from the great celebrity of their movers, that on a future occaſion either one or the other will be revived; or ſome third ſcheme brought forward, compounded from both. The firſt was introduced into the Houſe by Mr. Pitt, in the year 1785; the ſecond, by Mr. Flood, in 1790, whoſe name certainly retains great weight, with thoſe who now call for this great alteration in the Conſtitution; and of the outline of which Mr. Fox declared, that ‘it was the beſt he had ever heard ſuggeſted upon the ſubject.’ ^*

I ſhall begin with a very ſhort analyſis of each of theſe plans.

That of Mr. Pitt ^† conſiſted of three parts, as fol⯑lows—The ſuppreſſion of ſome ſmaller boroughs, which ultimately were to have been about fifty in number: this was to have been done by the pur⯑chaſe of the right of election of ſingle boroughs, whenever the conſent of two thirds of the electors was obtained for its ſurrender.

[94]The firſt ſet of boroughs to have been disfranchiſed, was in number thirty-ſix: and ſeventy-two members were to be added to the repreſentatives for counties, in ſuch proportion to each, ‘as the wiſdom of Par⯑liament might preſcribe:’ and copyholders were to have been admitted to the right of voting, in all the counties.

After this part of the plan had been fully exe⯑cuted, the rights of election of other boroughs were to have been bought up, and transferred to large towns at preſent unrepreſented. As it was ſuppoſed, that the new members would ultimately amount to about a hundred; the number of the ſecond claſs of boroughs to have been ſuppreſſed, would have been nearly fourteen; and in populous towns, where the num⯑ber of electors are very few, that franchiſe was to have been extended to all the inhabitants.

By this plan, the number of members in the Houſe of Commons would have remained unaltered; ſtrict regard being had to the article of the Union on this ſubject.

That of Mr. Flood ^* conſiſted of a ſingle article only—That a hundred new members ſhould be ad⯑ded to the Houſe, to be elected by the houſeholders of the counties.

By the firſt, if executed in its full extent, about fifty boroughs would have been ſuppreſſed: by the ſecond, they are all ſuppoſed to continue in the poſſeſ⯑ſion of their franchiſe. According to the former, ſome greater towns, now unrepreſented, were to have the privilege of returning members to Parliament; the number of theſe members would have been about twenty-eight: by the latter, no new grant of this kind was made. And laſtly, by the ſcheme of 1785, the members of counties were to have been increaſed [95] by ſeventy-two; and by a hundred, by the plan of 1790: but by both, the right of voting is extended to electors of new deſcriptions; and the number of members who would have obtained ſeats upon abſo⯑lutely new appointments, by the firſt, is the ſame as that which would have been added to the Houſe by the ſecond of theſe ſchemes of alteration.

The ſeveral parts of each of them, and the cir⯑cumſtances connected with them, which tend to af⯑fect the balance of power in the repreſentation of the two diſtricts, are now to be made the ſubject of diſ⯑quiſition.

The continuance or the ſuppreſſion of the elective franchiſes of the boroughs, will produce ſome dif⯑ference in the effects of the alteration of the Lower Houſe, upon this balance. It will therefore be ſhown that there is no probability that in future ſuch ſuppreſſion will take place; for it is by no means certain that it would have been affected, if the Bill of 1785 had been paſſed into its original form: but it is more clearly evinced by the following argument. It will be oppoſed by all thoſe who wiſh to uphold the preſent conſtitution of the Houſe; and they will be ſupported in their oppoſition (judging from what is paſt) by the moſt effective advocates for a change.

And firſt, it is by no means certain that the elec⯑tive franchiſes of certain boroughs would have been bought up and ſuppreſſed, if the Bill of Mr. Pitt in 1785 had paſſed into a law.

For, prior to the ſuppreſſion of any borough, the Bill made it requiſite that two thirds of the electors ſhould ſignify, in a preſcribed manner, their aſſent to reſign their elective franchiſes. This act indeed would become binding upon the whole; and they were to receive a compenſation for their ſurrender, which [96] would, upon an average, have amounted to £27,777 to each borough.^*

But we cannot but perceive there was, by this plan, much left to chance in the ſuppreſſion of the bo⯑roughs It was poſtponed to an indefinite period; and Mr. Pitt admitted, that ‘the operation of the ſcheme would not have been immediate, at leaſt in its fulleſt extent.’ It was declared however, that the benefit of the plan was expected to be felt, before the expiration of the Parliament then newly aſſembled. When Mr. Flood propoſed his plan in 1790, he obſerved on this head, ‘that the purchaſe muſt be ſlow and uncertain, and that the worſt boroughs, thoſe of Government, would never reſign.’

There is a very great party in the Houſe, who ſupport the boroughs as part of the exiſting Conſtitu⯑tion: and when their ſuppreſſion is again moved (judging from what is paſt), we may pronounce, they will be joined by a very effective body of the advo⯑cates for a change; namely, thoſe who ſhall follow on this ſubject the former ſentiments of Mr. Fox; and (as we are not to preſume on a change of opinion in any man, till we have ſome evidence of it) by that great leader of Oppoſition himſelf. The outline of Mr. Flood's plan has been given before he propoſed the admiſſion of one hundred new members for counties into the Houſe, to be elected in a manner he deſcribed, and to leave the boroughs in their preſent ſtate. Mr. Fox owned ‘that he thought its outlines the beſt he had ever heard ſuggeſted upon the ſub⯑ject.’ ^†

But nothing could tend to give more ſtability and permanence to them, than the effect of ſome of the [97] principles laid down by him upon this ſubject, in 1785. He contended that the franchiſe election was a pub⯑lic truſt, and not a property; which therefore the public had a right to reſume, without any pecuniary conſideration. If it be admitted that the principle contains an abſtract truth, no abſtract propoſition can be laid down, tending to raiſe a ſtronger barrier againſt all attempts to get rid of the boroughs. It precludes all treaty between the electors, and all other perſons intereſted in the thirty-ſix boroughs, and the State; and by alarming all the reſt, it muſt have united them in a much firmer combination in the general defence. He likewiſe laid a further difficulty in the way of the meaſure; arguing on the princi⯑ples of thoſe who conſider the right of voting for a repreſentative as a property, he did ‘not heſitate to declare, that he would never agree to the purcha⯑ſing from the majority of the electors, the property of the whole.’ ^* In requiring a perfect unanimity of the whole body of the electors of a borough, the difficulty of obtaining a voluntary reſignation of their elective powers, was increaſed to the utmoſt; and when in the ſame debate he honoured with ‘his par⯑ticular approbation, that principle which, by a di⯑minution of members for boroughs, tended to in⯑creaſe the proportion of knights of the ſhire,’ ^* one is a loſs to conceive, by what practical means he could give it effect; nor, unleſs he looked upon it as a po⯑litical impoſſibility, can this decided praiſe which he has given to the abſtract principle, be reconciled to his declaring afterward the outlines of a plan from which it was expreſsly excluded, the beſt he had ever heard ſuggeſted upon the ſubject.

The name of Mr. Flood itſelf, independent of this approbation, will influence many in favour of this [98] diſtinguiſhing part of his ſcheme; and a great claſs of the ſupporters of the change, become ſupporters of the continuance of the elective franchiſe of the bo⯑roughs.

The qualified ſyſtem, however, which he endea⯑voured to introduce, bore a nearer reſemblance to that of the late Lord Chatham, than he ſeemed diſ⯑poſed to admit. The plan of that nobleman, was to make ‘an addition to the county repreſentatives; leaving the rotten boroughs, as he expreſſed it, to drop off by time.’† Mr. Flood propoſed, that the new repreſentatives of counties ſhould be elected by the reſident houſeholders: the ſecond article of Lord Chatham's plan, the leaving the boroughs in their preſent ſtate, he profeſſed to retain; and obſerves up⯑on Mr. Pitt's ſcheme, that ‘to disfranchiſe them might be arbitrary; but that to buy them out, would be to build reform, not on purity, but cor⯑ruption.’ ^*

From this account of the two debates on the change of the repreſentation, it does not ſeem certain, from what paſſed at the firſt, that the ſuppreſſion of the ſmaller boroughs would have been carried into execu⯑tion, if the addition of county members had been con⯑ſented to; and in the ſecond, this part of the plan was not only deſerted, but treated with no very indirect cenſure.

In the further ſupport of this concluſion, I ſhall bring forward the authority of another of the greater patrons of this revolution in the third eſtate; who is to be underſtood as delivering the ſentiments of that great body of men, who have taken the lead in this meaſure, and who have placed him at their head. The evidence here to be produced, is that of the Rev. Mr. Wyvill, late chairman of the committee [99] of the Yorkſhire aſſociation. In his Defence of the Reformers of England, pages 15, 62, 80, 82, 90, 95, when he ſpeaks of the boroughs, he is totally ſilent as to the ſuppreſſion of any: every thing that he ſays relating to them, is confined to the liberation of the electors from the ſtate of influence, or even of ſub⯑jection, under which he ſtates them to be brought by certain individuals: and to theſe he likewiſe ſtrongly urges, the abſolute neceſſity of reſigning their uſur⯑pations; the abolition of which he repreſents as the ultimate object of popular purſuit. This amounts to an abſolute diſavowal of all the plans for their diſ⯑franchiſement. It alſo might be inferred that ſuch a thorough meaſure would not meet his concurrence, or that of the party of which he is the head, from the principle he lays down, ‘that men do not at⯑tempt to correct, what they wiſh to deſtroy.’ He had given great praiſe, indeed, to the plan brought forward by Mr. Pitt in 1785: but what he has ſaid on each ſubject, ought to be ſo conſtrued, that his declarations on both may be made to ſtand together. This praiſe is general; and ſuch praiſe may always be ſuppoſed to be attended with the reſerve of ſome par⯑ticulars, which a writer does not ſtop to ſpecify, or intentionally declines it: his approbation is therefore to be underſtood, to extend to the other parts of Mr. Pitt's plan, excluſive of the disfranchiſement of bo⯑roughs; and ſo taken, the appearance of contradiction ſtated here is done away.

It reſults from the whole of this, that no ſerious at⯑tempt will be probably made, for the ſuppreſſion of any of the ſmaller boroughs: it is rather to be ex⯑pected, that, at a future period, a compromiſe may be offered between the ſpirit of alteration and borough influence, perhaps by laying them a little more open; that ſomething may be gained to the former, and ſome⯑thing preſerved to the latter.

[100]The meaſures to be purſued with reſpect to the boroughs, are not without their conſequence, in de⯑termining what ſhare of power each of the diſtricts will have in the Houſe of Commons, after a change of its conſtitution ſhall have been affected; as will be ſhown in its proper place. What they will probably in future be, has been therefore here examined upon the authorities of leaders of parties. It will be like⯑wiſe ſhown further on, that the plan of laying open the boroughs, as far as it has any effect on this fu⯑ture balance of power, will operate againſt the home diſtrict.

It follows likewiſe from what has been already ad⯑vanced, that the home diſtrict ought ſo to act, when⯑ever this meaſure ſhall be attempted a third time, as if no more was intended to be carried, than what was moved for the ſecond; namely, an addition to the number of county members only.

A ſecond great alteration in the conſtitution of the Houſe, by the plan of 1785, was giving the fran⯑chiſe of election to ſome populous towns at preſent not repreſented: it was calculated that the number of members ſo to be admitted, would amount to about twenty-eight. Now the remote diſtrict having in⯑creaſed in manufactures and population, with much greater celerity than the home counties; the number of towns in the former, riſen into the required degree of conſequence, bear a greater proportion to its mag⯑nitude, than thoſe of the latter; and inſtances per⯑haps are there only to be ſound, of market towns riſing into the magnitude of great cities, and villages into that of populous towns. Hence the number of new members to be thus added to the remote diſtrict, ſhall exceed that of the home diſtrict, more than in the proportion of its magnitude, or that of 314 to 100, the ratio of their landed capital. The neareſt ap⯑proach to this proportion, in integer numbers, is by [101] allotting ſeven members to the ſmaller diſtrict, and twenty-one to the larger; which thus would acquire a majority of fourteen. But the number of votes thus acquired by the remote diſtrict, is leſs than the pro⯑portion aſſigned above points out; and it has been ſhown that it ought to be greater: and more proba⯑bly, the leaſt acquiſition of the latter might be taken at twenty-three, and of the former at five; or the re⯑mote diſtrict acquire a new addition to its majority in the Houſe, on all territorial queſtions, of eighteen voices.

The laſt alteration theſe plans hold out, is that of ad⯑ding to the number of the county members; and in this they both concur. By the plan of Mr. Pitt this addi⯑tion was to have been of ſeventy-two; which were to have been allotted in ſuch proportion to each coun⯑ty, "as the wiſdom of Parliament might preſcribe."^* It may be here taken, that the addition to be made to the number of members returned by each county, would be ſuch, as to make its ſhare in the repreſen⯑tation proportioned as nearly as poſſible to its weight and importance in the ſcale of the general landed in⯑tereſt; that is, to the total value of ſuch county it⯑ſelf. And the preſent number of county members being ninety-two, and that of the propoſed addition ſeventy-two; the repreſentatives of the landed intereſt would thus amount to one hundred and ſixty-four.

Now the value of the home and remote diſtrict be⯑ing to each other as 10,000 and 31,814 reſpectively; the balance of power of thoſe diviſions in the Lower Houſe, according to the preſent ſyſtem, and the pro⯑poſed plan of alteration here conſidered, is ſhown in the following comparative ſtatement.^†

[102]

By this plan the majority of the repreſentatives of the landed intereſt of the home diviſion, would be increaſed from forty-four to eighty-ſix, or very nearly doubled.

But this majority would have received a further acceſſion of ſtrength, by a diſproportionate addition of new members for great towns, if that part of the plan of 1785 had ever been carried into execution. For the majority of the members of the whole di⯑ſtrict would have received a further increaſe of four⯑teen votes, or have now become fifty-ſix in the whole: for the latter would have brought an augmentation of power to the landed intereſt of its proper diſtrict; though perhaps not quite ſo certain and effective, as an equal addition of repreſentatives of counties.

We ſhall find that the conſequences of Mr. Flood's plan would have been in this reſpect very nearly the ſame: and at the firſt view, there is the appearance of total coincidence between both. He propoſed that the number of repreſentatives ſhould be increaſed one hundred, and that they ſhould be elected by the houſeholders of the counties. Theſe are inhabitants of market towns and villages, the latter are chiefly landlords and tenants, with a few little tradeſmen; the former contain a greater number of tradeſmen and artificers in tolerable circumſtances; but whoſe buſineſs chiefly depends upon the neighbouring far⯑mers [103] or gentry. Here we ſee nothing but landed proprietors and electors of the two other deſcriptions, either immediately or mediately dependent upon them. The new claſs of members, in both the great diſtricts of the kingdom, will be returned by the landed in⯑tereſt; and be in all reſpects as much repreſentatives of that intereſt, as if the votes by which they are ap⯑pointed had been given by men of landed property only. Hence, if this ſcheme be carried into execu⯑tion, the number of repreſentatives of the landed in⯑tereſt being increaſed by one hundred, will become one hundred and ninety-two: and the number of members of both the great diviſions of the king⯑dom, by the new arrangement, are to be taken as being made proportional to the value of eſtates in each; according to the ſuppoſition laid down, when the correſponding part of the ſcheme of 1785 was under conſideration: and the comparative ſtatement of the new and old repreſentations of the two diſtricts, may be exhibited as follows.^*

By this plan the majority of the repreſentatives of the landed intereſt of the remote diſtrict, would be conſiderably more than doubled.

This decreaſe of power of the landed intereſt of the home diſtrict in the Commons, is an unbalanced loſs, to be repaired by no probable circumſtance. If the power of ſending members to parliament, had been taken from, or reſigned by a number of the ſmaller [104] boroughs; part of thoſe which would have been ſup⯑preſſed, would undoubtedly have been ſituated in the remote diſtrict; and thus this decreaſe of power would have been in ſome degree, though inadequately, counterbalanced. But that idea, which never ap⯑pears to have been cordially taken up by the greater patrons of the change, was ſoon avowedly deſerted, and even condemed. And if it be now to be purpoſed, that any alteration ſhould take place in them, it will only be in the number and deſcription of their elec⯑tors. But whether meaſures for this purpoſe are to be embraced, or not, the conſequences to reſult from the increaſe of the majority of the county members of the remote diſtrict, will remain the ſame as if no change were made in ſuch bodies or borough elec⯑tion; for there is nothing in ſuch alteration to coun⯑terbalance this increaſed majority: if it have any feeble effect in this caſe, it will act in concurrence with it.

On account of the conſequences which the conti⯑nuance of the ſmaller boroughs will be attended with, the probability of it has been conſidered at ſome length. I therefore add this further obſervation only upon the ſubject: thoſe who are, from principle alone, friends to this alteration of the Conſtitution, will conſent to their continuance under ſome modi⯑fications, to diminiſh the oppoſition they muſt other⯑wiſe meet, and thoſe of the remote diſtrict, who are patrons of it from local intereſts alone, or jointly with other motives, will concur with the former. And this is additional evidence, that a total disfranchiſe⯑ment of the ſmaller boroughs will not be attempted. But let it be now admitted that it actually takes place; and let its conſequence, in conjunction with an in⯑creaſe of the members for counties, upon the propor⯑tion of power to the landed intereſt of the home di⯑ſtrict, in the Lower Houſe, be now examined.

[105]It has been before obſerved, that it muſt be ſuppoſed, that ſome or many of the boroughs to be ſuppreſſed are ſituated in the remote diſtrict: thus ſome counter⯑balance to the increaſe of its majority will take place; although it cannot be doubted, that if a number of boroughs were ſuppreſſed in that diſtrict, and their members added to the counties, its landed intereſt in the Houſe would be very much ſtrengthened; and its influence, in every thing relating to charges upon land, very much increaſed. For the landed eſtates of county members, upon an average, very conſiderably exceed thoſe of the repreſentatives of boroughs: they are there⯑fore far more intereſted in all charges upon their own land; and they will not only join with more unani⯑mity in oppoſing them, but they will individually exert their perſonal abilities with more energy, and em⯑ploy their more extenſive intereſt with a more earneſt diligence, to the ſame end. But let it be admitted that any number of them could be found, diſpoſed to ſacrifice their immediate pecuniary intereſt to public juſtice or expediency; they have another ob⯑ject, at leaſt of equal magnitude, to ſurmount: the private intereſt of all their conſtituents is directly againſt the increaſe of charge upon land, with whom, taken in the aggregate, it is always public virtue, not to give up a partial or total exemption from any ge⯑neral chage; to reſiſt the impoſition of a new, or the extenſion of an old tax. It is a kind of local patrio⯑tiſm: and the honours of this patriotiſm are ac⯑quired in villages, by cheating the hundred for the good of the pariſh; in the hundred, by cheating the province; in the province, by defrauding the nation; and in a nation, by robbing the world in general. And if any individual belonging to one of theſe ſocieties, endeavour to counteract theſe objects of public uti⯑tity, he is looked upon as a betrayer of the public intereſt, and a traitor. Hence, if a county member of the remote diſtrict were to give his vote for the equali⯑zation [106] of the land-tax, he might not only loſe his ſeat, but retire under no ſmall load of popular odium. Many individuals may be found, who have that re⯑gard for the general State, that they will ſubmit to burthens, which they have the moſt probable expec⯑tations of being able to evade: a ſentiment which hardly ever diſcovers itſelf in great bodies of men. Among the reaſons to be given for this, is, that here the blame of injuſtice reſts upon the whole, and no part of it ſeparately attaches itſelf to any one in par⯑ticular.

And as charges on land are leſs expenſive in general upon the repreſentatives of boroughs, their property in land, upon an average, not being nearly ſo large as that of members for counties; ſo their conſtituents of the foRmer are leſs intereſted in ſuch charges than thoſe of the latter. It will even frequently happen, that they are totally unintereſted in the tax of the lands in their neighbourhood: or as, by the impoſi⯑tion of ſuch taxes, they may expect to avoid future additions to their own, their intereſt may be con⯑trary to that of the diſtrict in which the borough is ſituated. The members of many boroughs are there⯑fore quite uninfluenced by the landed intereſt of the circumjacent country, as far as reſpects the ſecurity of their ſeats: and even where a member is effec⯑tively nominated by a ſingle opulent landed man, it is much more probable that he will leave him to act by his own diſcretion, on this head, than that he will ſo be left, in this caſe, by the landlords of a whole county; for individuals are much more frequently determined by diſintereſted motives, than numerous bodies of men.

It follows from this, that if a number of boroughs disfranchiſed, and their members added to the landed intereſt, increaſing the number ſent by both diſtricts, ſo as to render them proportional to their values, the [107] ſuperiority of the remote diſtrict in the Houſe will be very conſiderably increaſed.

And if the privilege of voting for the members of the ſmaller boroughs be extended to the land-owners of the circumjacent counties, the repreſentatives of every ſuch borough, will be more influenced by the landed intereſt than before: and if all ſuch boroughs be ſo laid open, the remote diſtrict will acquire ſome further degree of ſuperiority in the Legiſlature; which may not be inconſiderable, and without danger to the home counties.

What has been already ſaid leads to a queſtion, the examination of which cannot properly be here de⯑clined; that is, how far the conſequences reſulting from this alteration, have or have not been among the motives for the ſingular zeal and perſeverance with which this object has been purſued, of late years, in certain parts of the kingdom.

In the firſt place, it may here be obſerved, that it ſeems impoſſible that it could at any time have been the general motive of any great combination of men, in any part of the kingdom; for in that caſe the expected effect of the meaſure muſt have been as extenſively known, as the motive was general: and its very publicity would have rendered its ſucceſs im⯑poſſible, by alarming the home diſtrict againſt it, whoſe concurrence in it its advocates might not only wiſh, but otherwiſe expect to obtain. Beſide, the ar⯑guments by which it would be defended, whatever ſuperficial appearance of plauſibility they might be dreſſed out with, would appear to be nothing but the mockery of injuſtice. It cannot therefore have poſſi⯑bly been the motive of the great exertions of com⯑munities at large.

Again, the conſequence pointed out cannot have been the motive of numerous committees in any part of England, to have taken up ſuch a meaſure; for [108] if it had been ſo, it would have become matter of general notoriety: nor is it to me credible, there can be indiſcriminately taken in any part of England, out of any political party, a numerous aſſembly of men of property and education, as many of the com⯑mittees for this purpoſe have been, to whom any man, or ſet of men, would venture to propoſe the purſuit of ſuch an end as has been deſcribed, by ſuch means.

Yet it appears extremely probable, that the effect of this alteration to perpetuate the inequality of the land-tax, did not eſcape the attention of all perſons who were intereſted in it: however, it might paſs to⯑tally unheeded, by a great body of thoſe who actively concurred with them, and even of their oſtenſible leaders; and of theſe perſons ſome might have con⯑tributed to give movement to this buſineſs, and to ſupport that unwearied ſpirit with which it has been perſevered in. And the general cicumſtances of the caſe, the county where, and the peculiar time when, the meaſures to carry this plan into execution were firſt ſet on foot, are, taken together, no inconſide⯑rable evidence of this; at leaſt it renders the contrary very difficult to conceive. Such was the perſuaſion at leaſt which impreſſed itſelf upon me, if a writer may ſtate his individual conviction, about the time of the intermiſſion of the long perſevering ſtruggle of the party formed to effect this change in the con⯑ſtitution of Parliament, after the check it received by the defeat of 1785.

The firſt county which took up the alteration of the Commons with zeal and ſyſtem, was that of York; and indeed it is the only one which can be ſaid to have done ſo. This meaſure was entered upon, at a general meeting of the freeholders, in the year 1779. How far the county was intereſted in this as a defen⯑ſive meaſure, is evident by a compariſon of its actual and proportional charges to the land-tax. When [109] the nominal rate of that tax is 4s. in the pound, its ac⯑tual charge on the home diſtrict is 2s. and 1⅔d;^* and on the county of York to 8 [...]/ [...] d. its actual pay⯑ment to the tax, at the ſame nominal rate, is £.91,620: but its charge on every tract of the home counties, equal in rent, amounts on an average to £.263,120.^† It is evident therefore, upon an equalization of the land-tax, the charge upon the county of York would be very greatly increaſed; and that it is much more deeply intereſted againſt a parliamentary reform of this abuſe, than any other county in England.

Therefore the probability here contended for, re⯑ceives all the ſupport which can poſſibly be derived from the conſideration of the place where the meaſure originated. The evidence deducible from the time and circumſtance of its being ſo taken up, and of the great effort made ſome years after to carry it into exe⯑cution, is now to be brought forward.

It has been ſhown before, that apprehenſions had always been entertained in the favoured counties, that an equalization of the tax was an event which would one day take place; and theſe apprehenſions were greatly increaſed in 1779, the time when the aſſoci⯑ation of the county of York was ſet on foot. Now, in a former Section of this tract, many circumſtances have been produced, to prove that a conſiderable ad⯑dition muſt be made to the land-tax, at a near pe⯑riod: they were moſtly written, when the concluſion of a very proſperous peace was not eſteemed to be ſo near, as in fact it was found to be: the neceſſity of that augmentation could not appear leſs in degree, or more remote in diſtance, during the deſpondency and miſ⯑fortunes of the war of the colonies, when enemy was ſuperadded to enemy, and when the county of York formed its aſſociation. And every ſuch appearance [110] of neceſſity to increaſe the tax, muſt increaſe the ap⯑prehenſion entertained by the favoured counties, and by that of York in particular: their comparative exemption is approaching with ſpeed to its end.

But there were other cauſes then exiſting, peculiar to that juncture, to alarm the foreſight of ſelf-intereſt, and put it upon its guard. Circumſtances ſufficient to make an impreſſion upon every mind, had recently and ſtrongly tended to draw the inequality of the tax to public attention. It has been ſeen before, that the reſiſt⯑ance of the colonies to the claims of taxation, was defended by Dr. Franklin (who might then have been properly called their miniſter in England) by the injuſtice of the Engliſh Parliament, ſhown by this inequality; that this injuſtice he frequently inveighed againſt.^* Truths derive effective weight, and receive general currency, from the greatneſs of the occaſion on which they are laid down, and the great conſequences they are ſeen to draw after them; and whatever gives a ſubſequent addition to the celebrity of the man who employs them with ſuch effect, tends more ſtrongly at the inſtant to concentrate the general at⯑tentention to them, and to excite alarm in thoſe whoſe [111] intereſts they oppoſe. And in the begining of 1778, it was known that he had completed the diſmem⯑berment of the empire, by his treaty with France; and in the next, the aſſociation of this county was formed. From the political ſentiments of the majority of its members, he had many admirers, and probably per⯑ſonal friends, among them: and no doubt can be entertained, that his ſentiments on this ſubject were ſufficiently underſtood to ſeveral. As therefore it was a period in which there was greater reaſon to expect a formidable attempt, on their relative immunity from the tax, than at any other preceding it; the ſtrongeſt probability indicates that there muſt have been ſome perſons who urged on the aſſociation, as an adequate defenſive meaſure againſt it.

If the circumſtances which took place when this country made its great effort in 1785, be examined; the ſame concluſion reſults from them. Dr. Price, writing in the beginning of 1784, informs us that in 1783 there had exiſted an exceſs of annual expences of the nation above the receipt, of £.1,393,204: part of this he ſtates to have been temporary; and he eſti⯑mates the reduced deficit at £.823,642.^* We may ſuppoſe this ſtate of the revenue to have been known and given full credit to, by many members of that aſ⯑ſociation; of which his able defender, the Rev. Mr. Wyvill, had long continued the head, Baron Maſeres, one of the firſt calculators of the age, and the friend of Dr. Price, in his very important work treating on revenues and debt, had the year before affirmed that there was reaſon to apprehend that on the re⯑turn of peace it would be neceſſary to add two millions a year to the land-tax; to make good the payment of the intereſt of the debt, and acquire a ſurplus of a million or twelve hundred thouſand [112] pounds, to be applied to its reduction;^* that is, in caſe, upon the return of peace, we ſhall have a defi⯑ciency of revenue, nearly of the ſame amount which was actually found to exiſt. The State was then in the very ſituation he deſcribed; in ſpeaking of which he had added, that it was highly fit to correct the in⯑equality of the land-tax.

If the revenue had not recovered from this ſtate of deficiency, recourſe muſt have been had to ſome very effective tax, or ſet of taxes; and there was ſufficient probability, that it muſt have been to the land-tax, to alarm thoſe who were intereſted in it.

This alarm muſt have been greatly increaſed, by the ſingular decline of public credit, in the following year 1784; for the price of ſtock in that year, ſo far from holding out any expectation of an amend⯑ment in our ſituation, ſeemed to indicate, that addi⯑tional calamities were coming upon us with rapidity, and that nothing leſs than the moſt ready and effec⯑tual aids could ſupport us. That year was marked, by the average price of the 3 per cents ſtocks having fallen to the loweſt point of depreſſion, which had ever been known in the whole period of their exiſt⯑ence: they had ſunk nearly £.9¾ per cent. below the average of the preceding unfortunate war; their mean neat value, in that year, having been £.56.09^† per cent. only, even below the loweſt year of that term: and in March 1785, their price in the market had been reduced to £.54⅞^‡ per cent.

Such was the ſituation of our finances, and the ap⯑parent neceſſity of obtaining a great augmentation of revenue from ſome quarter by a very productive tax, in the year 1784, and the begining of 1785; when [113] the Yorkſhire aſſociation exerted all its efforts, to bring about what is called a reform. Now this mea⯑ſure being adapted to the purpoſe of continuing their comparative exemption from the land-tax, like a means to an end; being puſhed with great energy, by the county moſt intereſted in flinging obſtruc⯑tions in the way of real reform, that of ſubſtantial injuſtice; and their ſtrongeſt exertions having been twice made, at a criſis when the moſt alarming dan⯑ger threatened that exemption; theſe circumſtances combined render it credible, that there are perſons, not ignorant of the conſequences of an alteration of the conſtitution of the Houſe of Commons here de⯑ſcribed, mixed with the general body of the friends of that plan in the remote diſtrict, and who are not without influence in the direction of their meaſures.

And there is nothing diſcoverable which dimi⯑niſhes the degree of this probability, in the general inaction of this party in the remote diſtrict, during the ſix years of great proſperity, following the rejec⯑tion of the Bill of 1785, which ſeemed to have re⯑moved the danger to an indefinite diſtance; nor in the reſumption of their operations, with ſome little change of mode, during the ſpring of laſt year, when a war upon the Continent was become certain, in which there were grounds to conjecture, that we might be ſooner or later involved; whereby their former dan⯑ger might return upon them, and perhaps increaſed in degree.

I ſhall now addreſs a few obſervations to both the diſtricts, drawn from what has preceded. To the inhabitants of the home counties in general, it may be ſaid, that, as Nature has given you diſadvantages to ſtruggle with, your attention ought to be vigilantly employed, that no addition be made to them that can be prevented: Nature, in giving coal-mines to your countrymen, has rendered you tributary to them. This unfortunate diſparity in phyſical circumſtances, [114] has diminiſhed many of your manufactures, and per⯑haps annihilated ſome: and on account of the expence of fuel, you are leſs able to ſupport the competition of foreigners, in thoſe articles of export trade which remain to you. The ſuperiority you once poſſeſſed over the reſt of the kingdom in foreign commerce, has been loſt above a century: theſe misfortunes are derived from natural circumſtances; they will proba⯑bly be as permanent as their cauſe, and the inhabi⯑tants of the home counties muſt acquieſce under them.

The ſame however cannot be ſaid of that which is now to be ſtated: the ſhipping in your ports has been ſo decreaſed, that it requires half the augmen⯑tation of that of the reſt of the kingdom, to make up the loſs; and this ſhows, not only a relative, but an abſolute decline: and it does not ſeem, that any natural cauſe can be produced for it. It is a loſs of which perhaps no ſecond inſtance can be found to have taken place on the ſame extent of coaſt, in any part of Europe. In natural advantages, in ſkits, in capital, the maritime parts of this diſtrict are ſuperior to many, if not to moſt of theſe equal tracts. This indicates the exiſtence of ſome artificial cauſe, by which this depreſſion muſt have been greatly increaſed, if not abſolutely genera [...]ed: and the only apparent cauſe of it, is the inequality of the land-tax, which not only diſtreſſes theſe counties by its direct opera⯑tion, but, by a circuitous effect, transfers annually a great balance in ſpecie into the more flouriſhing di⯑viſion of the kingdom, in addition to the large yearly ſum, neceſſarily remitted thither for firing. In the preſent ſtate of the repreſentation, the latter cauſe of the depreſſion of the home counties, does not ſeem abſolutely out of the reach of remedy: I appeal to the apprehenſions always entertained by the remote diſtrict, on the ſubject of an equalization of the tax, as a proof of it. But their uniform determination to [115] employ all their force to oppoſe it, has been evident, from the days of Davenant, to the preſent time. By an alteration of the conſtitution of the third eſtate, their majority of repreſentatives of the landed intereſt will be doubled: and if at this time, under any pre⯑tence, they be aſſiſted by you in meaſures which will effect it, you add to the will to oppreſs you, in order to exonerate themſelves, a power to do it, which you will never be able to reſiſt; and deprive yourſelves of every future hope of palliating your natural diſad⯑vantages, which, though you may be unable to con⯑quer, your vigilance, if duly exerted, may diminiſh.

With thoſe among ourſelves who call this alteration a reform, I would argue thus:—An equality of repre⯑ſentation, or a nearer approach to it, if deſirable, is certainly deſirable for ſome end. It is to be con⯑ſidered as a means, and not as a final object, which is deſireable of itſelf, without looking any further. If it be not an end or final object, what is the end or object meant to be obtained by it? You will anſwer, that the public charges may be rendered the leaſt poſ⯑ſible; that they be impoſed, with perfect equality, up⯑on every one of equal ability, and proportionally up⯑on perſons of different abilities. But it is evident the change for which you are ſuch ſtrenuous advocates, will give new powers which may be employed to ſub⯑vert theſe very ends: theſe new powers will be by you entruſted to men, whom experience ſhows to have been always leagued together, to prevent your ends being carried into effect; and when you have dou⯑bled their power to defeat them, by your patriotic ex⯑ertions, you certainly will have made no alteration in their ſentiments, except that which an increaſe of ſtrength always inſpires. The ſelf deceits of intereſt gild over many a piece of baſe metal, until it paſſes for fine gold from the crucible, even in the opinion of the operator himſelf. Some ſemi-voluntary decep⯑tion [116] like this, I believe, may have taken place in this buſineſs in the remote counties: this is an every-day human infirmity, which may be ſome apology for them; but what ſhall be the apology for you, ſacri⯑ficing your own ends, in the purſuit of means utterly ſubverſive of them, and of your immediate intereſt?

By theſe plans, ſome members are indeed added to the home counties: but with your own hands, you put a weight ſo much greater into the oppoſite ſcale, that you effectively annihilate the power of the for⯑mer. And what is the intereſt of that power you labour to anihilate? To deſtroy a groſs ſyſtem of in⯑equality and diſproportion, the very profeſſed end of your exertions. What will be the uſe made of the power you labour ſo heartily to render ſuperior to all oppoſition? To apply the increaſe of ſtrength you con⯑fer on it, to perpetuate in practice and effect, prin⯑ciples diametrically oppoſite to your avowed object; and that upon a large and an increaſing ſcale. This muſt be the conſequence of your ultimate ſucceſs, if you do not make the equalization of the tax, a pre⯑vious condition to your concurrence in what you call a reform.

This attachment to proportion and certain beauties of abſtract form, induces you to endeavour to aug⯑ment the number of the county members, and that of the great towns: and ſo far, the maſter-builders of conſtitutions in the remote diſtrict, will aſſiſt you, but at no inconſiderable expence; for the land-tax muſt be increaſed; and you muſt pay double your proportion to the augmentation, as you do to the pre⯑ſent tax. You wiſh, in addition, to disfranchiſe the maller boroughs; here other reformers will conter⯑act you, and your magnificent deſign remain incom⯑plete. And this conduct of yours, to make no ſmall conceſſion in its favour, very much reſembles that of many of the Ialian Nobility, at the revival of archi⯑tecture, [117] who began magnificent palaces, which they were totally unable to complete; but almoſt every one of them, and their deſcendants, has ever ſince had the gratification of ſtarving, in a building full of pro⯑portion and beauty, as far as they were able to run it up, but not quite covered in.

What is further to be ſaid, will be addreſſed to the zealous advocates for a revolution in the Houſe of Commons, belonging to the remote diſtrict; and firſt (as far as the ſubject will permit ſuch a diſtinction to be preſerved) to thoſe who puſh on the meaſure, only on account of ſome analogy they ſuppoſe they diſcern in it to the ſpirit of the Conſtitution; who, I am confident, compoſe almoſt the whole of the party, though this deſcription does not abſolutely extend to all.

The ſucceſs of your efforts will terminate, in fling⯑ing into your hands a majority of the landed intereſt in the Houſe, of double its preſent amount. It will then be abſolutely in your power, to continue to com⯑pel the home counties to pay in the double of the proportion you are charged at to the land-tax, and to aſſeſs them at the ſame rate, in all the augmentations which muſt be hereafter made to it. Experience has taught you, that you may with facility run into this abuſe: and if we refer to the whole courſe of that of the laſt century, we ſhall find the diſorder to have been hereditary, and endemial; and you ſhould wiſh at once to get rid of it out of the country. Injuſtice is a more deformed local diſeaſe, than an Alpine goi⯑tre. Now this abuſe you can (previous to the great conceſſions you ſolicit being made to you) put it out of your power to commit: and you will ſtill be able to attain, by the grant, every end you profeſs to ſeek; and by thus removing all ſuſpicion of a latent ſelf-in⯑tereſt mixing with it, you will remove no inconſide⯑rable obſtacle to the acquiſition of your object. But [118] if you refuſe previouſly to place this injuſtice out of your reach, in order to give facility to the acquiſition of your object, which in your opinion is great; and no leſs than to carry the fineſt ſyſtem of government a nation ever had the happineſs to live under, to a height of perfection and excellence even far above what it ever knew; if, to this end, you refuſe to ſa⯑crifice this power of abuſe; you clearly prefer the ſe⯑cond to the firſt. What diſtance there may be between ſuch conduct, and that of thoſe whoſe ori⯑ginal motive was the abuſe, and not the uſe of theſe additional powers, I ſhall not attempt to determine: it may be admitted to be conſiderable, but it is not enough.

Beſide, it is to be obſerved, that there is a repug⯑nancy between the ultimate effect of this majority, and the principle upon which it is declared to be ſought; which is, that repreſentation, and contri⯑bution, and the ability to contribute, ſhould be pro⯑portional: now that effect will be, to render the aſſeſſment by which the home diſtrict is double-taxed, permanent; and to double the majority of repreſen⯑tatives, which that part of the landed intereſt now has, which evades half its payments to the public charge. You demand that a ſtrict proportion ſhould be eſtabliſhed between repreſentation and property; and yet refuſe to eſtabliſh it, between property and conſtitution. We have heard much of teſt laws; and thoſe who will not comply with them, are legally ex⯑cluded from power: the admiſſion of this propoſition in practice in its full effect, is a teſt you muſt com⯑ply with, before you can legally be admitted to an increaſe of power; and it is required by a law, the authority of which you will not venture to diſpute; it is the law of wiſdom and of juſtice. To put on an appearance of public principle, ſolely to ſerve for a cover to the injuſtice of ſelf-intereſt, is political hypo⯑criſy [119] of the worſt kind; and to thoſe who ſhall come to diſcern the oppreſſive conſequences of this meaſure to the home diſtrict, after they have taken it up, and yet perſevere in it, muſt be added, that even to per⯑mit ourſelves to be biaſſed by the ſeductions of the ſame motive, to perſevere in reducing a ſyſtem into execution, whoſe effects are diſcovered to be contrary to the better ends which induced us at firſt to em⯑brace it, cannot eſcape without the like reprehenſion, however mitigated in degree.

It has been repeatedly obſerved, that if the prin⯑ciple of the old aſſeſſment be continued, the charge of the home diſtrict above its proportion muſt in⯑creaſe with every increaſe of the tax; and that the effect of the new ſyſtem will be to render this increa⯑ſing oppreſſion inevitable. The great majority of its patrons in the remote counties, I make no doubt, will join with every one, who reveres the ſpirit of our own Conſtitution, in condeming much of the ge⯑neral ſyſtem of the old government of France, and much of the detail of its adminiſtration. Yet ſuch abuſes as theſe, that ſyſtem was adequate to the cor⯑rection of, and effected it. They did not call it re⯑form, even under that government, bad as it was, to invent a new mode of fortification to cover old op⯑preſſions, and to be able to extend them. In France as well as in England, parts of the provinces were aggrieved, by being aſſeſſed above their proportion to the land-tax.^* Mr. Neckar has given us the mode, in which a remedy was applied to theſe inequalities. I think it was put in practice in Upper Guyenne: a valuation was made of the lands, a number of diſ⯑tricts, which were generally admitted to be taxed at the average rate: and as the firſt ſtep to an equali⯑zation, [120] it was permitted to any diſtrict, the inhabi⯑tants of which ſuppoſed their lands to be taxed one third more than that rate, to have them ſurveyed at their own expence; and if the meaſure of the exceſs was found to be of that magnitude, the whole of it was remitted, and the deficiency of the tax made up, by a ſmall additional levy upon the pro⯑vince. The greater inequalities being thus remedied, the ſame redreſs was extended, as a ſecond ſtep in the operation, to all thoſe diviſions whoſe charge exceed⯑ed their due proportion by one fourth: and laſtly, all thoſe places were relieved in the ſame mode, who thought the amount of the abatement they would be entitled to, equal to the expence of a ſurvey and valua⯑tion.^* A compariſon of the meaſure of theſe inequalities with that of the Engliſh land-tax, will not be an impro⯑per addition to this account. Now the average exceſs of the charge of the home diſtrict in England, is much greater than the limit of the higheſt claſs of unequal aſſeſſments in this province: for the average real rate of the tax in this kingdom, is here the proper ſtand⯑ard of compariſon, and correſponds to the fixed charge found in France by the firſt valuation which was made the ſtandard of compariſon there. Now that average in England is (one ſhilling and three pence three farthings) 15.892 pence in the pound^†; and one third of this rate, is (5¼d.) 5.297 pence, corre⯑ſponding to the ſmaller limit of the diſparity of charge of the moſt oppreſſed claſs of the landlords in this part of France. But the meaſure of that diſparity in the home diſtrict of England, is (9¾d.) 9.752 pence in the pound: therefore the mean exceſs of charge of that diſtrict, is to the lower limit of the moſt op⯑preſſed diſtrict, in this part of France, as 9.752 to 5.297, or as 18,410 to 10,000; or ſomething more [121] than nine to five. In this tranſaction the French adopted the idea of a graduated ſcale, on which they marked the different meaſures of oppreſſion, ariſing from the inequality of the land-tax, with the purpoſe of apply⯑ing a remedy to each ſucceſſively, according to its degree. And, in its conſtruction, it reſembled in principle that of a thermometer; for the fixed point, or that of abſolute equality of contribution, was the zero from which the comparative degrees of oppreſ⯑ſion or injuſtice began to be eſtimated. We have ſeen that, in the home diſtrict of England, its mean degree would fall nearly twice as high, as the lower limit of extreme diſparity in France; and, if the de⯑grees of oppreſſion in England were marked on a ſcale by ſimilar graduation, as one half muſt fall be⯑low that mean point, ſo, by the very nature of an average, the other half in number and amount muſt fall above it. The evils of the old French Conſti⯑tution, and even this evil, while it ſubſiſted, cer⯑tainly deſerved condemnation: but it becomes not the mouth of thoſe who perſiſt in meaſures whoſe effects promote the continuance, and perhaps the extenſion of greater. Its appearance, it is true, was dark; but when placed upon a ground ſo much darker, its co⯑lour ſeems to aſſume a different character.

I do not find in the account I follow, that any op⯑poſition was made by the favoured diſtricts, againſt carrying this fair meaſure into execution; although the ſufferers could not add to the principles of uni⯑verſal equity, on which they applied for relief, a ſe⯑cond claim to juſtice, and the prompteſt juſtice that could be rendered them, drawn from the particular circumſtances affecting both parties. They could not, as the proprietors of lands in the home counties, pro⯑duce hiſtorical proofs, that the inequality of the tax had been a neceſſary relief to their countrymen, at the formation of the original aſſeſſment, who then la⯑boured [122] under great difficulties and diſtreſs (a ſect which has been ſhown in the hiſtory of the Engliſh tax); and then appeal to the united principles, of gratitude, juſtice, and of honour, to be freed from a burthen their humanity had been inſtrumental in im⯑poſing upon them, now the reaſon had ſo long ceaſed.

The lighteſt cenſure with which any of theſe ſchemes for alteration can be diſmiſſed, is that it is a refine⯑ment totally uſeleſs, if it fail in the ends for which it is recommended to us; and one great end muſt be, to bring about a proportional diviſion of all public burthens, particularly contributions to the public ſer⯑vice: it is otherwiſe, at beſt, a parade of deſign and accuracy, without uſe; a great movement, without a motive. But it is to thoſe who make uſe of theſe well-ſounding maxims, as pretences to ſcreen other motives which it is not ſo convenient to avow, that the remainder of this obſervation, and that which fol⯑lows it, are directed.

When changes of this kind are called for, planned to fortify old abuſes with new ſtrength, and ſting into the hands of thoſe who have always ſupported them, powers to add to their weight, men feel them⯑ſelves inſulted as well as injured: they ſee that the realities of public principle and juſtice are ſacrificed to the mockery of proportion and ſpeculative equa⯑lity; and that a ſyſtem called by the name of a reform, under a deluſive pretence of ſtrengthening public liberty, and putting a neceſſary weight into the popular ſcale, ſlips at clandeſtinely into that of inequality and oppreſſion, already more loaded than a decent ſel⯑fiſhneſs would wiſh. But the preſent example of a neighbouring nation, and that of our own in the mid⯑dle of the laſt century, ſhow that the ſelfiſhneſs which hypocriſy has taught to wear the maſk of pa⯑triotiſm, ſtrides over all ordinary bounds.

It is not only juſtice that ſuffers thus; the ſpirit of [123] liberty itſelf ſuffers with it. Great and good princi⯑ples, which have taken deep root in the character of a nation, are moſt liable to be deſtroyed by abuſe, by being practiſed upon by an inſidious policy, for its own crooked ends, and being excited to the wildneſs and folly of fanaticiſm: for every great principle has both its fanatics, real and hypocritical, and its fana⯑ticiſm. Inſtead of a fire regularly and fully fed, it may be kindled into a conflagration, which deſtroys every thing in its neighbourhood, devours its own magazines; and, amidſt the ruin which it ſpreads round, hardly a ſpark may be found to ſurvive, co⯑vered up in the embers. Our hiſtory in the laſt cen⯑tury furniſhed more than one example of this; and it will be the happineſs of the preſent, if our poſterity has to recur ſo far back as to that period, for ſuch do⯑meſtic inſtances. In the reign of Charles I. the prin⯑ciple of loyalty had been overſtrained, to ſerve the purpoſes of the Court: when the civil war and all its calamities might have been prevented by its conſtitu⯑tional exertions, it was found to be too much ex⯑hauſted.

The ſpirit of liberty, whoſe increaſe at firſt was neceſſary, to oppoſe the overgrown and formidable prerogatives of the Crown, ran into a contemptible and wild enthuſiaſm: by its extravagances, it almoſt loſt all hold of the affections of the people; and at the return of Charles II. the virtue of his miniſter prevented parliament from making an entire ſacrifice of the national freedom, by conferring upon the ſo⯑vereign a fixed revenue, which would have made him for ever independent of that aſſembly. The ſobriety of manners, and ſerious attachment to religion, which ſo honourably diſtinguiſhed the Engliſh in the begin⯑ning of the century, had been very generally debaſed, during the civil wars, into a puritanical hypocriſy: [124] and at the Reſtoration, public decency appeared almoſt ſwept away, by a torrent of profligacy and irreligion. Here it is ſeen, that the ſame phyſical law ſeems to affect ſociety, to which individuals are ſubjected: immoderate elevation proceeds, and cauſes a depreſſion in an equal degree; or to make uſe of the language of medicine, a ſtate of excitation is con⯑ſtantly followed by a ſtate of collapſe. The ſpirit of liberty ſhould always be vigilantly preſerved in a full and regulated degree: but when it is artificially ſti⯑mulated into fanaticiſm, to ſerve mean and oppreſſive purpoſes, the contempt with which the end only ought to be ſurveyed, becomes, with the generality of mankind, attached to the inſtrument employed to bring it about; and the meaner the motives an oſtentatious affectation of it is made a ſcreen to, the more it will be degraded in the general opinion. The national attachment to liberty is in danger enough, from the abuſe of its name, to carry on purpoſes inimical to the regulations and exiſtence of civil ſociety: and if it be further perverted, to procure the creation of new powers, to protect a lucrative ſyſtem of injuſtice, and to add more weight to its oppreſſion, it may be pro⯑nounced, that its extinction is not far diſtant.

One very important queſtion on this ſubject ſtill remains to be diſcuſſed: and that is, how will the intereſt of the public creditors, and the whole claſs of men whoſe income is derived from the profit of ſtock, be affected by the landed intereſt of the remote coun⯑ties acquiring an additional power in the Houſe of Commons?

By the plans for this alteration here examined, the weight of the landed intereſt in the Houſe will be greatly increaſed. If ſeventy-two members for counties were ſubſtituted inſtead of the ſame number for boroughs; its weight will be very conſiderably augmented, al⯑though [125] twenty-eight members were admitted, for the more populous unrepreſented towns.

But there is no occaſion to employ much conſide⯑ration upon this, as the plan for the abſolute ſup⯑preſſion of boroughs ſeems abandoned. If they be left in their preſent ſtate, and any number of members be added to the counties, the addition to the landed intereſt in the Houſe will diminiſh the relative im⯑portance of that of the other two—the mercantile and the monied men. If the mode of election in boroughs be changed, by admitting more of their inhabitants to have votes, it will not tend to counter-balance the increaſe of weight the landed intereſt will acquire as above: but if that change be made, by admitting the inhabitants of the circumjacent coun⯑try, of any deſcription, to votes in a borough, it will give ſome further ſuperiority to the landed inte⯑reſt.

By the equalization of the land-tax, ſuch an addi⯑tion may be made to the applicable ſinking fund, that it will very ſoon, by its own operation, become what has been called, in this Eſſay, an adequate fund. It has been ſhown to be the property of that fund, that while it is applied to the extinction of ca⯑pital, a debt ceaſes to increaſe periodically; or the additions made to it in every war are paid off in peace. By the operations of ſuch a fund, it is evi⯑dent, that the price of ſtock would be ſupported, both in peace and war, at a rate much higher than at preſent can permanently take place. Hence the value of the funded income of that great body of the public creditors, the proprietors of the 3 per cent. ſtocks, and the irredeemable annuities, will be very greatly increaſed; while the intereſt of capitals in trade will be reduced; and that great claſs of men will be benefited by ſome moderate increaſe of profit, [126] and by a new facility of obtaining capital, whenever an opportunity of employing a greater to advantage, preſents itſelf.

Theſe are the conſequences of a revenue acquired by an equalization of the tax, ſo applied: it is the only apparent anchor of the national hope; juſtice demands it from the landed proprietors of the remote diſtrict: they themſelves will be great ſharers of the benefit which the public may thus receive from it; and ſo far the expence of their ſacrifice will be leſ⯑ſened: but I think an enlightened attachment to the good of their country ought to make them preſerve it for this purpoſe, to give it up on no other condition.

But if, before the equalization be obtained, the commercial intereſt and the public creditors concur in any plan for the alteration of the repreſentation, which adds to the majority of the members of the remote diſtrict in the Houſe of Commons, they render it ap⯑parently impoſſible, and deſtroy the foundation of their beſt hopes. No bodies of men exiſt, whoſe intereſt at this juncture ſhould lead them more ſtrongly to oppoſe the alteration of the conſtitution of the Commons, than the inhabitants of our commercial cities and towns, both in the home and remote di⯑ſtrict, together with the great majority of our public creditors: and perhaps it would be difficult to fix upon a meaſure which it was more their intereſt to unite all their ſtrength againſt.