THOUGHTS ON FRENCH AFFAIRS, &c. &c.
WRITTEN IN DECEMBER, 1791.

IN all our tranſactions with France, and at all periods, we have treated with that State on the footing of a Monarchy. Monarchy was conſidered in all the external relations of that kingdom with every Power in Europe as it's legal and conſtitu⯑tional Government, and that in which alone it's federal capacity was veſted.

Montmo⯑rin's Letter.It is not yet a year ſince Monſieur de Mont⯑morin, formally, and with as little reſpect as can be imagined, to the King, and to all crowned heads, announced a total revolution in that coun⯑try. He has informed the Britiſh Miniſtry that it's frame of Government is wholly altered; that he is one of the Miniſters of the new ſyſtem; and in ef⯑fect, that the King is no longer his maſter (nor does he even call him ſuch) but the ‘"firſt of the Miniſters"’ in the new ſyſtem.

[2] Acceptance of the Con⯑ſtitution ra⯑tified.The ſecond notification was that of the King's acceptance of the new Conſtitution; accompanied with fanfaronades in the modern ſtyle of the French bureaus, things which have much more the air and character of the ſaucy declamations of their clubs, than the tone of regular office.

It has not been very uſual to notify to foreign Courts, any thing concerning the internal arrange⯑ments of any State. In the preſent caſe, the cir⯑cumſtance of theſe two notifications, with the ob⯑ſervations with which they are attended, does not leave it in the choice of the Sovereigns of Chriſ⯑tendom to appear ignorant either of this French Revolution, or (what is more important) of it's principles.

We know that very ſoon after this Manifeſto of Monſieur de Montmorin, the King of France, in whoſe name it was made, found himſelf obliged to fly, with his whole family: leaving behind him a Declaration, in which he diſavows and annuls that Conſtitution, as having been the effect of force on his perſon and uſurpation on his authority. It is equally notorious that this unfortunate Prince was with many circumſtances of inſult and outrage brought back priſoner, by a deputation of the pre⯑tended National Aſſembly, and afterwards ſuſpend⯑ed by their authority, from his Government. Un⯑der [3] equally notorious conſtraint, and under me⯑naces of total depoſition, he has been compelled to accept what they call a Conſtitution, and to agree to whatever elſe the uſurped power which holds him in conſinement, thinks proper to impoſe.

His next brother, who had fled with him, and his third brother, who had fled before him, all the Princes of his blood, who remained faithful to him, and the flower of his Magiſtracy, his Clergy, and his Nobility, continue in foreign countries, pro⯑teſting againſt all acts done by him in his preſent ſituation, on the grounds upon which he had him⯑ſelf proteſted againſt them at the time of his flight; with this addition, that they deny his very com⯑petence, (as on good grounds they may) to abro⯑gate the Royalty, or the ancient conſtitutional Orders of the Kingdom. In this proteſt they are joined by three hundred of the late Aſſembly it⯑ſelf, and in effect, by a great part of the French Nation. The new Government (ſo far as the people dare to diſcloſe their ſentiments) is diſdain⯑ed, I am perſuaded, by the greater number; who as M. de la Fayette complains, and as the truth is, have declined to take any ſhare in the new elec⯑tions to the National Aſſembly, either as candi⯑dates or electors.

[4] In this ſtate of things (that is in the caſe of a divided kingdom) by ^*the law of nations, Great Britain, like every other Power, is free to take any part ſhe pleaſes. She may decline, with more or leſs formality, according to her diſcretion, to ac⯑knowledge this new ſyſtem; or ſhe may recognize it as a Covernment de facto, ſetting aſide all diſ⯑cuſſion of it's original legality, and conſidering the ancient Monarchy as at an end. The law of na⯑tions leaves our Court open to it's choice. We have no direction but what is found in the well⯑underſtood policy of the King and kingdom.

This Declaration of a new ſpecies of Government, on new principles (ſuch it profeſſes itſelf to be) is a real criſis in the politicks of Europe. The con⯑duct which prudence ought to dietate to Great-Britain, will not depend (as hitherto our connexion or quarrel with other States has for ſome time de⯑pended) upon merely external relations; but, in a great meaſure alſo upon the ſyſtem which we may think it right to adopt for the internal government of our own country.

If it be our policy to aſſimilate our Govern⯑ment to that of France, we ought to prepare for this change, by encouraging the ſchemes of au⯑thority eſtabliſhed there. We ought to wink at [5] the captivity and depoſition of a Prince, with whom, if not in cloſe alliance, we were in friend⯑ſhip. We ought to fall in with the ideas of Monſ. Montmorin's circular Manifeſto; and to do buſi⯑neſs of courſe with the functionaries who act under the new power, by which that King to whom his Majeſty's Miniſter has been ſent to reſide, has been depoſed and impriſoned. On that idea we ought alſo to with-hold all ſorts of direct or indirect countenance from thoſe who are treating in Ger⯑many for the re-eſtabliſhment of the French Mo⯑narchy and the ancient Orders of that State. This conduct is ſuitable to this policy.

The queſtion is, whether this policy be ſuitable to the intereſts of the Crown and ſubjects of Great Britain. Let us therefore a little conſider the true nature and probable effects of the Revolution which, in ſuch a very unuſual manner, has been twice diplomatically announced to his Majeſty.

Difference between this Revolution and others.There have been many internal revolutions in the Government of countries, both as to perſons and forms, in which the neighbouring States have had little or no concern. Whatever the Govern⯑ment might be with reſpect to thoſe perſons and thoſe forms, the ſtationary intereſts of the nation concerned, have moſt commonly influenced the new Governments in the ſame manner in which [6] they influenced the old; and the Revolution, turning on matter of local grievance or of local accommodation, did not extend beyond it's ter⯑ritory.

Nature of the French Revolution.The preſent Revolution in France ſeems to me to be quite of another character and deſcription; and to bear little reſemblance or analogy to any of thoſe which have been brought about in Europe, upon principles merely political. It is a Revolu⯑tion of doctrine and theoretick dogma. It has a much greater reſemblance to thoſe changes which have been made upon religious grounds, in which a ſpi⯑rit of proſelytiſm makes an eſſential part.

The laſt Revolution of doctrine and theory which has happened in Europe, is the Reformation. It is not for my purpoſe to take any notice here of the merits of that Revolution, but to ſtate one only of it's effects.

It's effects.That effect was to introduce other intereſts into all countries, than thoſe which aroſe from their loca⯑lity and natural circumſtances. The principle of the Reformation was ſuch, as by it's eſſence, could not be local or confined to the country in which it had it's origin. For inſtance, the doctrine of ‘"Juſti⯑fication by Faith or by Works,"’ which was the ori⯑ginal baſis of the Reformation, could not have one [7] of it's alternatives true as to Germany, and falſe as to every other country. Neither are queſtions of theoretick truth and falſehood governed by cir⯑cumſtances any more than by places. On that occaſion, therefore, the ſpirit of proſelytiſm ex⯑panded itſelf with great elaſticity upon all ſides; and great diviſions were every where the reſult.

Theſe diviſions however, in appearance merely dogmatick, ſoon became mixed with the political; and their effects were rendered much more intenſe from this combination. Europe was for a long time divided into two great factions, under the name of Catholick and Proteſtant, which not only often alienated State from State, but alſo divided almoſt every State within itſelf. The warm parties in each State were more affectionately attached to thoſe of their own doctrinal intereſt in ſome other country than to their fellow citizens, or to their natural Government, when they or either of them happened to be of a different perſuaſion. Theſe factions, wherever they prevailed, if they did not abſelutely deſtroy, at leaſt weakened and diſtracted the locality of patriotiſm. The publick affections came to have other motives and other ties.

It would be to repeat the hiſtory of the two laſt centuries to exemplify the effects of this Revo⯑lution.

[8] Although the principles to which it gave riſe, did not operate with a perfect regularity and con⯑ſtancy, they never wholly ceaſed to operate. Few wars were made, and few treaties were entered into in which they did not come in for ſome part. They gave a colour, a character, and direction to all the politicks of Europe.

New ſyſtem of Politicks.Theſe principles of internal, as well as external diviſion and coalition, are but juſt now extin⯑guiſhed. But they who will examine into the true character and genius of ſome late events, muſt be ſatisfied that other ſources of faction, combining parties among the inhabitants of different coun⯑tries into one connexion, are opened, and that from theſe ſources are likely to ariſe effects full as important as thoſe which had formerly ariſen from the jarring intereſts of the religious ſects. The intention of the ſeveral actors in the change in France, is not a matter of doubt. It is very openly proſeſſed.

In the modern world, before this time, there has been no inſtance of this ſpirit of general political faction, ſeparated from religion, pervading ſeveral countries, and forming a principle of union be⯑tween the partizans in each. But the thing is not leſs in human nature. The antient world has fur⯑niſhed [9] a ſtrong and ſtriking inſtance of ſuch a ground for faction, full as powerful and full as miſ⯑chievous as our ſpirit of religious ſyſtem had ever been, exciting in all the States of Greece (Euro⯑pean and Aſiatick) the moſt violent animoſities, and the moſt cruel and bloody perſecutions and pro⯑ſcriptions. Theſe ancient factions in each com⯑monwealth of Greece, connected themſelves with thoſe of the ſame deſcription in ſome other States; and ſecret cabals and publick alliances were carried on and made, not upon a conformity of general po⯑litical intereſts, but for the ſupport and aggran⯑dizement of the two leading States which headed the Ariſtocratick and Democratick Factions. For, as in later times, the King of Spain was at the head of a Catholick, and the King of Sweden of a Proteſ⯑tant intereſt, France, (though Catholick, acting ſub⯑ordinately to the latter,) in the like manner the Lacedemonians were every where at the head of the Ariſtocratick intereſts, and the Athenians of the Democratick. The two leading Powers kept alive a conſtant cabal and conſpiracy in every State, and the political dogmas concerning the conſtitu⯑tion of a Republick, were the great inſtruments by which theſe leading States choſe to aggrandize themſelves. Their choice was not unwiſe; be⯑cauſe the intereſt in opinions (merely as opinions, and without any experimental reference to their effects) when once they take ſtrong hold of the [10] mind, become the moſt operative of all intereſts, and indeed very often ſupercede every other.

I might further exemplify the poſſibility of a political ſentiment running through various ſtates and combining factions in them, from the hiſtory of the middle ages in the Guelfs and Ghibellines. Theſe were political factions originally in favour of the Emperor and the Pope, with no mixture of re⯑ligious dogmas; or if any thing religiouſly doc⯑trinal they had in them originally, it very ſoon diſ⯑appeared; as their firſt political objects diſappeared alſo, though the ſpirit remained. They became no more than names to diſtinguiſh factions; but they were not the leſs powerful in their operation, when they had no direct point of doctrine, either religious or civil, to aſſert. For a long time, how⯑ever, thoſe factions gave no ſmall degree of influ⯑ence to the foreign Chiefs in every commonwealth in which they exiſted. I do not mean to purſue further the track of theſe parties. I allude to this part of hiſtory only, as it furniſhes an inſtance of that ſpecies of faction which broke the locality of publick affections, and united deſcriptions of citi⯑zens more with ſtrangers than with their country⯑men of different opinions.

French fun⯑damental principle.The political dogma, which upon the new French ſyſtem, is to unite the factions of different [11] nations, turns is this, ‘"That the majority told, by the head, of the taxable people in every country, is the perpetual, natural, unceaſing, indefeaſible ſovereign; that this majority is perfectly maſter of the form, as well as the adminiſtration of the ſtate, and that the magiſtrates, under whatever names they are called, are only functionaries to obey the orders, (general as laws or particular as decrees) which that majority may make; that this is the only natural government; that all others are tyranny and uſurpation."’

Practical project.In order to reduce this dogma into practice, the Republicans in France, and their aſſociates in other countries, make it always their buſineſs, and often their publick profeſſion, to deſtroy all traces of an⯑tient eſtabliſhments, and to form a new common-wealth in each country, upon the baſis of the French Rights of Men. On the principle of theſe rights, they mean to inſtitute in every country, and as it were, the germe of the whole, parochial governments, for the purpoſe of what they call equal repreſentation. From them is to grow, by ſome media, a general council and repreſentative of all the parochial governments. In that repreſentative is to be veſted the whole national power; totally aboliſhing hereditary name and office, levelling all conditions of men, (except where money muſt make a difference) breaking all connexion between ter⯑ritory [12] and dignity, and aboliſhing every ſpecies of nobility, gentry, and church eſtabliſhments; all their prieſts, and all their magiſtrates being only creatures of election, and penſioners at will.

Knowing how oppoſite a permanent landed in⯑tereſt is to that ſcheme, they have reſolved, and it is the great drift of all their regulations, to reduce that deſcription of men to a mere peaſantry, for the ſuſtenance of the towns, and to place the true effec⯑tive government in cities, among the tradeſmen, bankers, and voluntary clubs of bold, preſuming young perſons;—advocates, attornies, notaries, managers of newſpapers, and thoſe cabals of lite⯑rary men, called academies. Their Republick is to have a firſt functionary, (as they call him) under the name of King, or not, as they think fit. This officer, when ſuch an officer is permitted, is how⯑ever, neither in fact nor name, to be conſidered as ſovereign, nor the people as his ſubjects. The very uſe of theſe appellations is offenſive to their ears.

Particans of the French ſyſtem.This ſyſtem, as it has firſt been realized, dogma⯑tically as well as practically, in France, makes France the natural head of all factions formed on a ſimilar principle, wherever they may prevail, as much as Athens was the head and ſettled ally of all democratick factions, wherever they exiſted. The other ſyſtem has no head.

[13] This ſyſtem has very many partizans in every country in Europe, but particularly in England, where they are already formed into a body, com⯑prehending moſt of the diſſenters of the three lead⯑ing denominations; to theſe are readily aggre⯑gated all who are diſſenters in character, temper, and diſpoſition, though not belonging to any of their congregations—that is, all the reſtleſs people who reſemble them, of all ranks and all parties—Whigs, and even Tories—the whole race of half-bred ſpeculators;—all the Atheiſts, Deiſts, and So⯑cinians;—all thoſe who hate the Clergy, and envy the Nobility;—a good many among the monied people;—the Eaſt Indians almoſt to a man, who cannot bear to find that their preſent importance does not bear a proportion to their wealth. Theſe latter have united themſelves into one great, and in my opinion; formidable Club^*, which, though now quiet, may be brought into action with conſi⯑derable unanimity and force.

Formerly few, except the ambitious great, or the deſperate and indigent, were to be feared as inſtru⯑ments in revolutions. What has happened in France teaches us, with many other things, that there are more cauſes than have commonly been [14] taken into our conſideration, by which Govern⯑ment may be ſubverted. The monied men, mer⯑chants, principal tradeſmen, and men of letters (hitherto generally thought the peaceable and even timid part of ſociety) are the chief actors in the French Revolution. But the fact is, that as money increaſes and circulates, and as the circulation of news, in politicks and letters, becomes more and more diffuſed, the perſons who diffuſe this money, and this intelligence, become more and more im⯑portant. This was not long undiſcovered. Views of ambition were in France, for the firſt time, pre⯑ſented to theſe claſſes of men. Objects in the State, in the Army, in the ſyſtem of civil offices of every kind. Their eyes were dazzled with this new proſpect. They were, as it were, electrified and made to loſe the natural ſpirit of their ſitua⯑tion. A bribe, great without example in the hiſ⯑tory of the world, was held out to them—the whole government of a very large kingdom.

[...] England.There are ſeveral who are perſuaded that the ſame thing cannot happen in England, becauſe here, (they ſay) the occupations of merchants, tradeſmen and manufacturers, are not held as de⯑grading ſituations. I once thought that the low eſtimation in which commerce was held in France, might be reckoned among the cauſes of the late revolution: and I am ſtill of opinion, that the ex⯑cluſive [15] ſpirit of the French nobility, did irritate the wealthy of other claſſes. But I found long ſince, that perſons in trade and buſineſs were by no means deſpiſed in France in the manner I had been taught to believe. As to men of letters, they were ſo far from being deſpiſed or neglected, that there was no country perhaps in the univerſe, in which they were ſo highly eſteemed, courted, careſſed, and even feared; tradeſmen naturally were not ſo much ſought in ſociety (as not furniſhing ſo largely to the fund of converſation as they do to the reve⯑nues of the ſtate) but the latter deſcription got for⯑ward every day. Literary in⯑tereſt.M. Bailly, who made himſelf the popular Mayor on the rebellion of the Baſtile, and is a principal actor in the revolt, before the change poſſeſſed a penſion or office under the Crown, of ſix hundred pound Engliſh, a year, for that coun⯑try, no contemptible proviſion: And this he ob⯑tained ſolely as a man of letters, and on no other title. Monied in⯑tereſt.As to the monied men—whilſt the Monar⯑chy continued, there is no doubt, that merely as ſuch, they did not enjoy the privileges of nobility, but nobility was of ſo eaſy an acquiſition, that it was the fault or neglect of all of that deſcription, who did not obtain it's privileges, for their lives at leaſt, in virtue of office. It attached under the royal government to an innumerable multitude of places, real and nominal, that were vendible; and ſuch nobility were as capable of every thing as [16] their degree of influence or intereſt could make them, that is, as nobility of no conſiderable rank or conſequence. M. Necker, ſo far from being a French gentleman, was not ſo much as a French⯑man born, and yet we all know the rank in which he ſtood on the day of the meeting of the States.

Mercantile intereſt.As to the mere matter of eſtimation of the mer⯑cantile or any other claſs, this is regulated by opi⯑nion and prejudice. In England a ſecurity againſt the envy of men in theſe claſſes, is not ſo very complete as we may imagine. We muſt not im⯑poſe upon ourſelves. What inſtitutions and man⯑ners together had done in France, manners alone do here. It is the natural operation of things where there exiſts a Crown, a Court, ſplendid Or⯑ders of Knighthood, and an Hereditary Nobility;—where there exiſts a fixed, permanent, landed Gen⯑try, continued in greatneſs and opulence by the law of primogeniture, and by a protection given to family ſettlements;—where there exiſts a ſtand⯑ing Army and Navy;—where there exiſts a Church Eſtabliſhment. which beſtows on learning and parts an intereſt combined with that of Religion and the State;—in a country where ſuch things exiſt, wealth, new in it's acquiſition, and precarious in it's duration, can never rank firſt, or even near the firſt; though wealth has it's natural weight, further, than as it is balanced and even preponde⯑rated [17] amongſt us as amongſt other nations, by ar⯑tificial inſtitutions and opinions growing out of them. At no period in the hiſtory of England have ſo few Peers been taken out of trade or from families newly created by commerce. In no pe⯑riod has ſo ſmall a number of noble families en⯑tered into the counting-houſe. I can call to mind but one in all England, and his is of near fifty years ſtanding. Be that as it may, it appears plain to me from my beſt obſervation, that envy and ambition may by art, management and diſpoſition, be as much excited amongſt theſe deſcriptions of men in England, as in any other country; and that they are juſt as capable of acting a part in any great change.

Progreſs of the French Spirit.—It's courſe.What direction the French ſpirit of proſelytiſm is likely to take, and in what order it is likely to prevail in the ſeveral parts of Europe, it is not eaſy to determine. The ſeeds are ſown almoſt every where, chiefly by newſpaper circulations, infinitely more efficacious and extenſive than ever they were. And they are a more important in⯑ſtrument than generally is imagined. They are a part of the reading of all, they are the whole of the reading of the far greater number. There are thirty of them in Paris alone. The language dif⯑fuſes them more widely than the Engliſh, though the Engliſh too are much read. The writers of [18] theſe papers indeed, for the greater part, are either unknown or in contempt, but they are like a bat⯑tery in which the ſtroke of any one ball produces no great effect, but the amount of continual repe⯑tition is deciſive. Let us only ſuffer any perſon to tell us his ſtory, morning and evening, but for one twelvemonth, and he will become our maſter.

All thoſe countries in which ſeveral States are comprehended under ſome general geographical deſcription, and looſely united by ſome federal con⯑ſtitution; countries of which the members are ſmall, and greatly diverſified in their forms of go⯑vernment, and in the titles by which they are held—theſe countries, as it might be well expected, are the principal objects of their hopes and machina⯑tions. Of theſe, the chief are Germany and Swit⯑zerland: after them, Italy has it's place as in cir⯑cumſtances ſomewhat ſimilar.

Germany.As to Germany (in which from their relation to the Emperor, I comprehend the Belgick provinces) it appears to me to be from ſeveral circumſtances, internal and external, in a very critical ſituation, and the laws and liberties of the Empire are by no means ſecure from the contagion of the French doctrines and the effect of French intrigues; or from the uſe which two of the greater German powers may make of a general derangement, to [19] the general detriment. I do not ſay that the French do not mean to beſtow on theſe German States, liberties and laws too, after their mode; but thoſe are not what have hitherto been under⯑ſtood as the laws and liberties of the Empire. Theſe exiſt and have always exiſted under the prin⯑ciples of feodal tenure and ſucceſſion, under Im⯑perial conſtitutions, grants and conceſſions of So⯑vereigns, family compacts and publick treaties, made under the ſanction, and ſome of them gua⯑ranteed by the Sovereign Powers of other nations, and particularly the old Government of France, the author and natural ſupport of the treaty of Weſtphalia.

In ſhort, the Germanick body is a vaſt maſs of heterogeneous States, held together by that hete⯑rogeneous body of old principles which formed the publick law poſitive and doctrinal. The modern laws and liberties which the new power in France propoſes to introduce into Germany, and to ſup⯑port with all it's force, of intrigue and of arms, is of a very different nature, utterly irreconcileable with the firſt, and indeed fundamentally the reverſe of it: I mean the Rights and Liberties of the Man, the Droit de l'Homme. That this doctrine has made an amazing progreſs in Germany, there cannot be a ſhadow of doubt. They are infected by it along the whole courſe of the Rhine, the Maeſe, the [20] Moſelle, and in the greater part of Suabla and Franconia. It is particularly prevalent amongſt all the lower people, churchmen and laity, in the dominions of the Eccleſiaſtical Electors. Eccleſiaſti⯑cal State. It is not eaſy to find or to conceive Governments more mild and indulgent than theſe Church Sovereign⯑ties: but good government is as nothing when the Rights of Man take poſſeſſion of the mind. In⯑deed the looſe rein held over the people in theſe provinces, muſt be conſidered as one cauſe of the facility with which they lend themſelves to any ſchemes of innovation, by inducing them to think lightly of their governments, and to judge of grievances not by feeling, but by imagination.

Balance of Germany.It is in theſe Electorates that the firſt impreſ⯑ſions of France are likely to be made, and if they ſucceed, it is over with the Germanick body as it ſtands at preſent. A great revolution is preparing in Germany; and a revolution, in my opinion, likely to be more deciſive upon the general fate of nations than that of France itſelf; other than as in France is to be found the firſt ſource of all the principles which are in any way likely to diſtin⯑guiſh the troubles and convulſions of our age. If Europe does not conceive the independence, and the equilibrium of the Empire to be in the very eſſence of the ſyſtem of balanced power in Europe, and if the ſcheme of publick law, or maſs of laws [21] upon which that independence and equilibrium are founded, be of no leading conſequence as they are preſerved or deſtroyed, all the politicks of Eu⯑rope for more than two centuries have been mi⯑ſerably erroneous.

Pruſſia and Emperor.If the two great leading Powers of Germany do not regard this danger (as apparently they do not) in the light in which it preſents itſelf ſo naturally, it is becauſe they are powers too great to have a ſocial intereſt. That ſort of intereſt belongs only to thoſe, whoſe ſtate of weakneſs or mediocrity is ſuch, as to give them greater cauſe of apprehenſion from what many deſtroy them, than of hope from any thing by which they may be aggrandized.

As long as thoſe two Princes are at variance, ſo long the liberties of Germany are ſafe. But if ever they ſhould ſo far underſtand one another as to be perſuaded that they have a more direct and more certainly defined intereſt in a proportioned mutual aggrandizement than in a reciprocal reduc⯑tion, that is, if they come to think that they are more likely to be enriched by a diviſion of ſpoil, han to be rendered ſecure by keeping to the old policy of preventing others from being ſpoiled by either of them, from that moment the liberties of Germany are no more.

[22] That a junction of two in ſuch a ſcheme is nei⯑ther impoſſible nor improbable, is evident from the partition of Poland in 1773, which was effected by ſuch a junction as made the interpoſition of other nations to prevent it, not eaſy. Their circumſtances at that time hindered any other three States, or in⯑deed any two, from taking meaſures in common to prevent it, though France was at that time an exiſting power, and had not yet learned to act upon a ſyſtem of politicks of her own invention. The geographical poſition of Poland was a great obſtacle to any movements of France in oppoſi⯑tion to this, at that time unparalleled league. To my certain knowledge, if Great Britain had at that time been willing to concur in preventing the execution of a project ſo dangerous in the exam⯑ple, even exhauſted as France then was by the preceding war, and under a lazy and unenterpriz⯑ing Prince, ſhe would have at every riſque taken an active part in this buſineſs. But a languor with regard to ſo remote an intereſt, and the prin⯑ciples and paſſions which were then ſtrongly at work at home, were the cauſes why Great Britain would not give France any encouragement in ſuch an enterprize. At that time, however, and with regard to that object, in my opinion, Great Britain and France had a common intereſt.

[23] Poſſible pro⯑ject of the Emperor and K. of Pruſ⯑ſia.But the poſition of Germany is not like that of Poland, with regard to France, either for good or for evil. If a conjunction between Pruſſia and the Emperor ſhould be formed for the purpoſe of ſecu⯑lariſing and rendering hereditary the Eccleſiaſtical Electorates and the Biſhoprick of Munſter, for ſettling two of them on the children of the Em⯑peror, and uniting Cologne and Munſter to the dominions of the King of Pruſſia on the Rhine, or if any other project of mutual aggrandizement ſhould be in proſpect, and that to facilitate ſuch a ſcheme, the modern French ſhould be permitted and encouraged to ſhake the internal and external ſecurity of theſe Eccleſiaſtical Electorates, Great Britain is ſo ſituated that ſhe could not with any effect ſet herſelf in oppoſition to ſuch a deſign. Her principal arm, her marine, could here be of no ſort of uſe.

To be reſiſt⯑ed only by France.France, the author of the treaty of Weſtphalia, is the natural guardian of the independence and balance of Germany. Great Britain (to ſay no⯑thing of the King's concern as one of that auguſt body) has a ſerious intereſt in preſerving it; but, except through the power of France, acting upon the common old principles of State policy, in the caſe we have ſuppoſed, ſhe has no ſort of means of ſupporting that intereſt. It is always the inte⯑reſt of Great Britain that the power of France [24] ſhould be kept within the bounds of moderation. It is not her intereſt that that power ſhould be wholly annihilated in the ſyſtem of Europe. Though at one time through France the indepen⯑dence of Europe was endangered, it is and ever was through her alone that the common liberty of Germany can be ſecured againſt the ſingle or the combined ambition of any other power. In truth, within this century the aggrandizement of other Sovereign Houſes has been ſuch that there has been a great change in the whole ſtate of Europe, and other nations as well as France may become objects of jealouſy and apprehenſion.

New princi⯑ples of alli⯑ance.In this ſtate of things, a new principle of alli⯑ances and wars is opened. The treaty of Weſt⯑phalia is, with France, an antiquated fable. The rights and liberties ſhe was bound to maintain are now a ſyſtem of wrong and tyranny which ſhe is bound to deſtroy. Her good and ill diſpoſitions are ſhewn by the ſame means. To communicate peaceably the rights of men is the true mode of her ſhewing her friendſhip; to force Sovereigns to ſubmit to thoſe rights is her mode of hoſtility. So that either as friend or foe her whole ſcheme has been and is, to throw the Empire into confuſion: and thoſe Stateſmen, who follow the old routine of politicks, may ſee in this general confuſion, and in the danger of the leſſer Princes, an occaſion as [25] protectors or enemies, of connecting their territo⯑ries to one or the other of the two great German Powers. They do not take into conſideration that the means which they encourage, as leading to the event they deſire, will with certainty not only ravage and deſtroy the Empire, but if they ſhould for a moment ſeem to aggrandize the two great houſes, will alſo eſtabliſh principles, and confirm tempers amongſt the people, which will preclude the two Sovereigns from the poſſibility of holding what they acquire, or even the dominions which they have inherited. It is on the ſide of the Eccleſiaſti⯑cal Electorates that the dykes, raiſed to ſupport the German liberty, firſt will give way.

The French have begun their general operations by ſeizing upon thoſe territories of the Pope, the ſituation of which was the moſt inviting to the enterprize. Their method of doing it was by excit⯑ing ſedition and ſpreading maſſacre and deſolation thro' theſe unfortunate places, and then under an idea of kindneſs and protection, bringing forward an antiquated title of the Crown of France and an⯑nexing Avignon and the two cities of the Comtat with their territory to the French Republick. Geneva.They have made an attempt on Geneva, in which they very narrowly failed of ſucceſs. It is known that they hold out from time to time the idea of unit⯑ing all the other provinces of which Gaul was an⯑tiently [26] compoſed, Savoy.including Savoy on the other ſide, and on this ſide bounding themſelves by the Rhine.

Switzerland.As to Switzerland, it is a country whoſe long union rather than it's poſſible diviſion, is the mat⯑ter of wonder. Here I know they entertain very ſanguine hopes. The aggregation to France of the Democratick Swiſs Republicks appears to them to be a work half done by their very form; and it might ſeem to them rather an encreaſe of impor⯑tance to theſe little Commonwealths, than a dero⯑gation from their independency, or a change in the manner of their Government. Upon any quarrel amongſt the Cantons nothing is more like⯑ly than ſuch an event. As to the Ariſtocratick Re⯑publicks, the general clamour and hatred which the French excite againſt the very name, (and with more facility and ſucceſs than againſt Monarchs) and the utter impoſſibility of their Government making any ſort of reſiſtance againſt an inſurrec⯑tion, where they have no troops, and the people are all armed and trained, render their hopes in that quarter, far indeed from unfounded. It is certain that the Republick of Berne thinks itſelf obliged to a vigilance next to hoſtile, and to impri⯑ſon or expel all the French whom they find in their territories. But indeed thoſe Ariſtocracies which comprehend whatever is conſiderable, wealthy, and valuable in Switzerland, do now ſo wholly depend [27] upon opinion, Old French maxims the ſecurity of its indepen⯑dence. and the humour of their multitude, that the lighteſt puff of wind is ſufficient to blow them down. If France, under it's antient regimen, and upon the antient principles of policy, was the ſupport of the Germanick Conſtitution, it was much more ſo of that of Switzerland, which al⯑moſt from the very origin of that conſederacy reſt⯑ed upon the cloſeneſs of it's connexion with France, on which the Swiſs Cantons wholly re⯑poſed themſelves for the preſervation of the parts of their body in their reſpective rights and perma⯑nent forms, as well as for the maintenance of all in their general independency.

Switzerland and Germany are the firſt objects of the new French politicians. When I contem⯑plate what they have done at home, which is in effect little leſs than an amazing conqueſt wrought by a change of opinion, in a great part (to be ſure far from altogether) very ſudden, I cannot help letting my thoughts run along with their deſigns, and without attending to geographical order, to conſider the other States of Europe ſo far as they may be any way affected by this aſtoniſhing Re⯑volution. If early ſteps are not taken in ſome way or other to prevent the ſpreading of this influence, I ſcarcely think any of them perfectly ſecure.

Italy.Italy is divided, as Germany and Switzerland are, into many ſmaller States, and with ſome con⯑ſiderable [28] diverſity as to forms of Government; but as theſe diviſions and varieties in Italy are not ſo conſiderable, ſo neither do I think the danger al⯑together ſo imminent there as in Germany and Switzerland. Savoy I know that the French con⯑ſider as in a very hopeful way, and I believe not at all without reaſon. Lombardy.They view it as an old mem⯑ber of the Kingdom of France which may be eaſily re-united in the manner, and on the principles of the re-union of Avignon. This country commu⯑nicates with Piedmont; and as the King of Sardi⯑nia's dominions were long the key of Italy, and as ſuch long regarded by France, whilſt France acted on her old maxims, and with views on Italy; ſo in this new French empire of ſedition, if once ſhe gets that key into her hands, ſhe can eaſily lay open the barrier which hinders the entrance of her preſent politicks into that inviting region. Milan, I am ſure, nouriſhes great diſquiets—and if Milan ſhould ſtir, no part of Lombardy is ſecure to the preſent poſſeſſors—whether the Venetian or the Auſtrian. Genoa is cloſely connected with France.

Bourbon Princes in Italy.The firſt Prince of the Houſe of Bourbon has been obliged to give himſelf up entirely to the new ſyſtem, and to pretend even to propagate it with all zeal; at leaſt that Club of intriguers who aſſemble at the Feuillans, and whoſe cabinet [29] meets at Madame Stahl's, and makes and directs all the Miniſters, is the real Executive Government of France. The Emperor is perfectly in concert, and they will not long ſuffer any Prince of the Houſe of Bourbon, to keep by force the French emiſſaries out of their dominions; nor whilſt France has a commerce with them, eſpecially thro' Marſeilles, (the hotteſt focus of ſedition in France) will it be long poſſible to prevent the intercourſe or the effects.

Naples has an old inveterate diſpoſition to Re⯑publicaniſm, and (however for ſome time paſt quiet) is as liable to exploſion as it's own Veſuvius. Sicily I think has theſe diſpoſitions in full as ſtrong a degree. In neither of theſe countries exiſts any thing which very well deſerves the name of Go⯑vernment or exact police.

Eccleſiaſti⯑cal State.In the Eſtates of the Church, notwithſtanding their ſtrictneſs in baniſhing the French out of that country, there are not wanting the ſeeds of a re⯑volution. The ſpirit of Nepotiſm prevails there nearly as ſtrong as ever. Every Pope of courſe is to give origin or reſtoration to a great family, by the means of large donations. The foreign reve⯑nues have long been gradually on the decline, and ſeem now in a manner dried up. To ſupply this defect the reſource of vexatious and impolitick [30] jobbing at home, if any thing, is rather encreaſed than leſſened. Various, well intended but ill un⯑derſtood practices, ſome of them exiſting, in their ſpirit at leaſt, from the time of the old Roman empire, ſtill prevail; and that Government is as blindly attached to old abuſive cuſtoms, as others are wildly diſpoſed to all ſorts of innovations and experiments. Theſe abuſes were leſs felt whilſt the Pontificate drew riches from abroad, which in ſome meaſure counterbalanced the evils of their remiſs and jobbiſh Government at home. But now it can ſubſiſt only on the reſources of domeſtick management; and abuſes in that management of courſe will be more intimately and more ſeverely ſelt.

In the midſt of the apparently torpid languor of the Eccleſiaſtical State, thoſe who have had oppor⯑tunity of a near obſervation, have ſeen a little rip⯑pling in that ſmooth water, which indicates ſome⯑thing alive under it. There is in the Eccleſiaſti⯑cal State, a perſonage who ſeems capable of acting (but with more force and ſteadineſs) the part of the Tribune Rienzi. The people once inflamed will not be deſtitute of a leader. They have ſuch an one already in the Cardinal or Archbiſhop Buon Campagna. He is, of all men, if I am not ill in⯑formed, the moſt turbulent, ſeditious, intriguing bold, and deſperate. He is not at all made for; [31] Roman of the preſent day. I think he lately held the firſt office of their State, that of Great Cham⯑berlain, which is equivalent to High Treaſurer. At preſent he is out of employment, and in diſ⯑grace. If he ſhould be elected Pope, or even come to have any weight with a new Pope, he will infallibly conjure up a democratick ſpirit in that country. He may indeed be able to effect it without theſe advantages. The next interreg⯑num will probably ſhew more of him. There may be others of the ſame character, who have not come to my knowledge. This much is certain, that the Roman people, if once the blind reverence they bear to the ſanctity of the Pope, which is their only bridle, ſhould relax, are naturally tur⯑bulent, ſerocious, and headlong, whilſt the police is defective, and the Government feeble and re⯑ſourceleſs beyond all imagination.

Spain.As to Spain, it is a nerveleſs country. It does not poſſeſs the uſe, it only ſuffers the abuſe of a nobility. For ſome time, and even before the ſet⯑tlement of the Bourbon Dynaſty, that body has been ſyſtematically lowered, and rendered incapa⯑ble by excluſion, and for incapacity excluded from affairs. In this circle the body is in a manner annihilated—and ſo little means have they of any weighty exertion either to controul or to ſupport the Crown, that if they at all interfere, it is only [32] by abetting deſperate and mobbiſh inſurrections, like that at Madrid which drove Squillace from his place. Florida Blanca is a creature of office, and has little connexion, and no ſympathy with that body.

As to the Clergy, they are the only thing in Spain that looks like an independent order, and they are kept in ſome reſpect by the Inquiſi⯑tion, the ſole but unhappy reſource of publick tranquillity and order now remaining in Spain. As in Venice, it is become moſtly an engine of State, which indeed to a degree it has always been in Spain. It wars no longer with Jews and Hereticks: It has no ſuch war to carry on. It's great object is to keep atheiſtick and republican doctrines from making their way in that kingdom. No French book upon any ſubject can enter there which does not contain ſuch matter. In Spain, the clergy are of moment from their influence, but at the ſame time with the envy and jealouſy that attend great riches and power. Though the Crown has by ma⯑nagement with the Pope got a very great ſhare of the eccleſiaſtical revenues into it's own hands, much ſtill remains to them. There will always be about that Court thoſe who look out to a farther diviſion of the Church property as a reſource, and to be obtained by ſhorter methods than thoſe of negotia⯑tions with the Clergy and their Chief. But at pre⯑ſent I think it likely that they will ſtop, leſt the [33] buſineſs ſhould be taken out of their hands; and leſt that body in which remains the only life that exiſts in Spain, and is not a fever, may with their property loſe all the influence neceſſary to preſerve the Monarchy, or being poor and deſperate, may employ whatever influence remains to them as ac⯑tive agents in it's deſtruction.

Caſtile dif⯑ferent from Catalonia & Arragon.The Caſtilians have ſtill remaining a good deal of their old character, their Gravidad, Lealdad, and il Timor de Dios; but that character neither is, or ever was exactly true, except of the Caſtilians only. The ſeveral kingdoms which compoſe Spain, have perhaps ſome features which run through the whole; but they are in many particulars as diffe⯑rent as nations who go by different names; the Ca⯑talans, for inſtance, and the Arragonians too, in a good meaſure have the ſpirit of the Miquelets, and much more of republicaniſm than of an attach⯑ment to royalty. They are more in the way of trade and intercourſe with France; and upon the leaſt internal movement, will diſcloſe and probably let looſe a ſpirit that may throw the whole Spaniſh Monarchy into convulſions.

It is a melancholy reflection that the ſpirit of melioration which has been going on in that part of Europe, more or leſs during this century, and the various ſchemes very lately on foot for further [34] advancement are all put a ſtop to at once. Refor⯑mation certainly is nearly connected with innovation—and where that latter comes in for too large a ſhare, thoſe who undertake to improve their coun⯑try may riſque their own ſafety. In times where the correction, which includes the confeſſion of an abuſe, is turned to criminate the authority which has long ſuffered it, rather than to honour thoſe who would amend it (which is the ſpirit of this malignant French diſtemper) every ſtep out of the common courſe becomes critical, and renders it a taſk full of peril for Princes of moderate talents to engage in great undertakings. At preſent the only ſafety of Spain is the old national hatred to the French. How far that can be depended upon, if any great ferments ſhould be excited, it is impoſ⯑ſible to ſay.

As to Portugal, ſhe is out of the high road of theſe politicks—I ſhall, therefore, not divert my thoughts that way; but return again to the North of Europe, which at preſent ſeems the part moſt in⯑tereſted, and there it appears to me that the French ſpeculation on the northern countries, may be valued in the following, or ſome ſuch manner.

Denmark.Denmark and Norway do not appear to ſurniſh any of the materials of a democratick revolution, or the diſpoſitions to it. Denmark can only be con⯑ſequentially [35] affected by any thing done in France; Swedenbut of Sweden I think quite otherwiſe. The pre⯑ſent power in Sweden is too new a ſyſtem, and too green and too ſore from it's late Revolution, to be conſidered as perfectly aſſured. The King by his aſtoniſhing activity, his boldneſs, his deciſion, his ready verſatility, and by rouzing and employing the old military ſpirit of Sweden, keeps up the top with continual agitation and laſhing. The mo⯑ment it ceaſes to ſpin, the Royalty is a dead bit of box. Whenever Sweden is quiet externally for ſome time, there is great danger that all the repub⯑lican elements ſhe contains will be animated by the new French ſpirit, and of this I believe the King is very ſenſible.

Ruſſia.The Ruſſian Government is of all others the moſt liable to be ſubverted by military ſeditions, by Court conſpiracies, and ſometimes by headlong re⯑bellions of the people, ſuch as the turbinating move⯑ment of Pugatchef. It is not quite ſo probable that in any of theſe changes the ſpirit of ſyſtem may mingle in the manner it has done in France. The Muſcovites are no great ſpeculators—But I ſhould not much rely on their uninquiſitive diſpo⯑ſition, if any of their ordinary motives to ſedition ſhould ariſe. The little catechiſm of the Rights of Men is ſoon learned; and the inferences are in the paſſions.

[36] Poland.Poland, from one cauſe or another, is always un⯑quiet. The new Conſtitution only ſerves to ſupply that reſtleſs people with new means, at leaſt new modes, of cheriſhing their turbulent diſpoſition. The bottom of the character is the ſame. Saxony.It is a great queſtion, whether the joining that Crown with the Electorate of Saxony, will contribute moſt to ſtrengthen the Royal authority of Poland, or to ſhake the Ducal in Saxony. The Elector is a Ca⯑tholick; the people of Saxony are, ſix ſevenths at the very leaſt, Proteſtants. He muſt continue a Ca⯑tholick according to the Poliſh law, if he accepts that Crown. The pride of the Saxons, formerly flattered by having a Crown in the Houſe of their Prince, though an honour which coſt them dear; the German probity, fidelity and loyalty; the weight of the Conſtitution of the Empire under the Treaty of Weſtphalia; the good temper and good nature of the Princes of the Houſe of Saxony; had for⯑merly removed from the people all apprehenſion with regard to their religion, and kept them per⯑fectly quiet, obedient, and even affectionate. The ſeven years war made ſome change in the minds of the Saxons. They did not, I believe, regret the loſs of what might be conſidered almoſt as the ſucceſ⯑ſion to the Crown of Poland, the poſſeſſion of which, by annexing them to a foreign intereſt, had often obliged them to act an arduous part, towards the ſupport of which that foreign intereſt afforded [37] no proportionable ſtrength. In this very delicate ſituation of their political intereſts, the ſpeculations of the French and German Oeconomiſts, and the ca⯑bals, and the ſecret, as well as public doctrines of the Illuminatenordens and Free Maſons, have made a conſiderable progreſs in that country; and a tur⯑bulent ſpirit under colour of religion, but in reality ariſing from the French Rights of Man, has al⯑ready ſhewn itſelf, and is ready on every occaſion to blaze out.

The preſent Elector is a Prince of a ſafe and quiet temper, of great prudence, and goodneſs. He knows that in the actual ſtate of things, not the power and reſpect belonging to Sovereigns, but their very exiſtence depends on a reaſonable fruga⯑lity. It is very certain that not one Sovereign in Europe can either promiſe for the continuance of his authority in a ſtate of indigence and inſolvency, or dares to venture on a new impoſition to relieve himſelf. Without abandoning wholly the ancient magnificence of his Court, the Elector has con⯑ducted his affairs with infinitely more oeconomy than any of his predeceſſors, ſo as to reſtore his finances beyond what was thought poſſible from the ſtate in which the ſeven years war had left Saxony. Saxony during the whole of that dreadful period having been in the hands of an exaſperated enemy, rigorous by reſentment, by nature and by neceſ⯑ſity, [38] was obliged to bear in a manner the whole burthen of the war; in the intervals when their al⯑lies prevailed, the inhabitants of that country were not better treated.

The moderation and prudence of the preſent Elector, in my opinion, rather perhaps reſpites the troubles than ſecures the peace of the Electorate. The offer of the ſucceſſion to the Crown of Poland is truly critical, whether he accepts, or whether he declines it. If the States will conſent to his ac⯑ceptance, it will add to the difficulties, already great, of his ſituation between the King of Pruſſia and the Emperor. But theſe thoughts lead me too far, when I mean to ſpeak only of the interior con⯑dition of theſe Princes. It has always however ſome neceſſary connexion with their foreign politicks.

Holland.With regard to Holland and the ruling party there, I do not think it at all tainted, or likely to be ſo except by fear; or that it is likely to be miſ⯑led unleſs indirectly and circuitouſly. But the pre⯑dominant party in Holland is not Holland. The ſuppreſſed faction, though ſuppreſſed, exiſts. Un⯑der the aſhes, the embers of the late commotions are ſtill warm. This Anti-Orange party has from the day of it's origin been French, though alienated in ſome degree for ſome time, through the pride and folly of Louis the Fourteenth. It will ever [39] hanker after a French connexion; and now that the internal Government in France has been aſſi⯑milated in ſo conſiderable a degree to that which the immoderate Republicans began ſo very lately to introduce into Holland, their connexion, as ſtill more natural, will be more deſired. I do not well underſtand the preſent exterior politicks of the Stadtholder, nor the Treaty into which the news⯑papers ſay he has entered for the States with the Emperor. But the Emperor's own politicks with regard to the Netherlands ſeem to me to be exactly calculated to anſwer the purpoſe of the French Re⯑volutioniſts. He endeavours to cruſh the Ariſto⯑cratick party—and to nouriſh one in avowed con⯑nexion with the moſt furious Democratiſts in France.

Theſe Provinces in which the French game is ſo well played, they conſider as part of the Old French Empire: certainly they were amongſt the oldeſt parts of it. Theſe they think very well ſituated, as their party is well-diſpoſed to a re-union. As to the greater nations, they do not aim at making a direct conqueſt of them, but by diſturbing them through a propagation of their principles, they hope to weaken, as they will weaken them, and to keep them in perpetual alarm and agitation, and thus render all their efforts againſt them utterly [40] impracticable, whilſt they extend the dominion of their ſovereign anarchy on all ſides.

England.As to England, there may be ſome apprehenſion from vicinity, from conſtant communication, and from the very name of Liberty, which, as it ought to be very dear to us, in it's worſt abuſes carries ſome⯑thing ſeductive. It is the abuſe of the firſt and beſt of the objects which we cheriſh. I know that many who ſufficiently diſlike the ſyſtem of France, have yet no apprehenſions of it's prevalence here. I ſay nothing to the ground of this ſecurity in the at⯑tachment of the people to their Conſtitution, and their ſatisfaction in the diſcreet portion of liberty which it meaſures out to them. Upon this I have ſaid all I have to ſay, in the Appeal I have pub⯑liſhed. That ſecurity is ſomething, and not in⯑conſiderable. But if a ſtorm ariſes I ſhould not much rely upon it.

Objection to the ſtability of the French ſyſtem.There are other views of things which may be uſed to give us a perfect (though in my opinion a deluſive) aſſurance of our own ſecurity. The firſt of theſe is from the weakneſs and ricketty nature of the new ſyſtem in the place of it's firſt formation. It is thought that the monſter of a Commonwealth cannot poſſibly live—that at any rate the ill con⯑trivance of their fabrick will make it fall in pieces [41] of itſelf—that the Aſſembly muſt be bankrupt, and that this bankruptcy will totally deſtroy that ſyſ⯑tem, from the contagion of which apprehenſions are entertained.

For my part I have long thought that one great cauſe of the ſtability of this wretched ſcheme of things in France was an opinion that it could not ſtand; and, therefore, that all external meaſures to deſtroy it were wholly uſeleſs.

Bankruptcy.As to the bankruptcy, that event has happened long ago, as much as it is ever likely to happen. So ſoon as a nation compels a creditor to take paper currency in diſcharge of his debt, there is a bankruptcy. The compulſory paper has in ſome degree anſwered; not becauſe there was a ſurplus from Church lands, but becauſe faith has not been kept with the Clergy. As to the holders of the old funds, to them the payments will be dilatory, but they will be made, and whatever may be the diſcount on paper, whilſt paper is taken, paper will be iſſued.

Reſources.As to the reſt, they have ſhot out three branches of revenue to ſupply all thoſe which they have de⯑ſtroyed, that is, the Univerſal Regiſter of all Tranſ⯑actions, the heavy and univerſal Stamp Duty, and the new Territorial Impoſt, levied chiefly on the [42] reduced eſtates of the gentlemen. Theſe branches of the revenue, eſpecially as they take aſſignats in payment, anſwer their purpoſe in a conſiderable degree, and keep up the credit of their paper; for as they receive it in their treaſury, it is in reality funded upon all their taxes and future reſources of all kinds, as well as upon the church eſtates. As this paper is become in a manner the only viſible maintenance of the whole people, the dread of a bankruptcy is more apparently connected with the delay of a counter-revolution, than with the du⯑ration of this Republick; becauſe the intereſt of the new Republick manifeſtly leans upon it; and in my opinion, the counter-revolution cannot exiſt along with it. The above three projects ruined ſome Miniſters under the old Government, merely for having conceived them. They are the ſalvation of the preſent Rulers.

As the Aſſembly has laid a moſt unſparing and cruel hand on all men who have lived by the bounty, the juſtice, or the abuſes of the old Go⯑vernment, they have leſſened many expences. The royal eſtabliſhment, though exceſſively and ridiculouſly great for their ſcheme of things, is re⯑duced at leaſt one half;—the eſtates of the King's Brothers, which under the ancient Government had been in truth royal revenues, go to the general ſtock of the confiſcation; and as to the crown [43] lands, though under the Monarchy they never yielded two hundred and fifty thouſand a year, by many they are thought at leaſt worth three times as much.

As to the eccleſiaſtical charge, whether as a compenſation for loſſes, or a proviſion for religion, of which they made at firſt a great parade, and entered into a ſolemn engagement in favour of it, it was eſtimated at a much larger ſum than they could expect from the church property, moveable or immoveable: they are completely bankrupt as to that article. It is juſt what they wiſh; and it is not productive of any ſerious inconvenience. The non-payment produces diſcontent and occa⯑ſional ſedition; but is only by fits and ſpaſms, and amongſt the country people who are of no conſequence. Theſe ſeditions furniſh new pre⯑texts for non-payment to the church eſtabliſhment, and help the Aſſembly wholly to get rid of the Clergy, and indeed of any form of religion, which is not only their real, but avowed object.

Want of Money how ſupplied.They are embarraſſed indeed in the higheſt de⯑gree, but not wholly reſourceleſs. They are with⯑out the ſpecies of money. Circulation of money is a great convenience, but a ſubſtitute for it may be found. Whilſt the great objects of production and conſumption, corn, cattle, wine, and the like, [44] exiſt in a country, the means of giving them cir⯑culation with more or leſs convenience, cannot be wholly wanting. The great confiſcation of the church and of the crown lands, and of the ap⯑penages of the princes, for the purchaſe of all which their paper is always received at par, gives means of continually deſtroying and continually creating, and this perpetual deſtruction and reno⯑vation feeds the ſpeculative market, and prevents, and will prevent, till that fund of confiſcation be⯑gins to fail, a total depreciation.

Monied In⯑tereſt not neceſſary to them.But all conſideration of public credit in France is of little avail at preſent. The action indeed of the monied intereſt was of abſolute neceſſity at the beginning of this Revolution; but the French Republicks can ſtand without any aſſiſt⯑ance from that deſcription of men, which, as things are now circumſtanced, rather ſtands in need of aſſiſtance itſelf from the power which alone ſub⯑ſtantially exiſts in France; I mean the ſeveral diſtricts and municipal republicks, and the ſeveral clubs which direct all their affairs and appoint all their magiſtrates. This is the power now para⯑mount to every thing, even to the Aſſembly itſelf called National, and that to which tribunals, prieſthood, laws, finances, and both deſcriptions of military power, are wholly ſubſervient, ſo far as the military power of either deſcription yields obe⯑dience to any name of authority.

[45] The world of contingency and political combi⯑nation is much larger than we are apt to imagine. We never can ſay what may, or may not happen, without a view to all the actual circumſtances. Experience upon other data than thoſe, is of all things the moſt deluſive. Prudence in new caſes can do nothing on grounds of retroſpect. A con⯑ſtant vigilance and attention to the train of things as they ſucceſſively emerge, and to act on what they direct, are the only ſure courſes. The phy⯑ſician that let blood, and by blood-letting cured one kind of plague, in the next added to it's ra⯑vages. That power goes with property is not uni⯑verſally true, and the idea that the operation of it is certain and invariable, may miſlead us very ſa⯑tally.

Power ſepa⯑rated from Property.Whoever will take an accurate view of the ſtate of thoſe Republicks, and of the compoſition of the preſent Aſſembly deputed by them (in which Aſ⯑ſembly there are not quite fifty perſons poſſeſſed of an income amounting to 100l. ſterling yearly) muſt diſcern clearly, that the political and civil power of France is wholly ſeparated from it's property of every deſcription; and of courſe that neither the landed nor the monied intereſt poſſeſſes the ſmalleſt weight or conſideration in the direction of any publick concern. The whole kingdom is directed by the refuſe of it's chicane, with the aid [46] of the buſtling, preſumptuous young clerks of counting-houſes and ſhops, and ſome intermix⯑ture of young gentlemen of the ſame character in the ſeveral towns. The rich peaſants are bribed with church lands: and the poorer of that deſcrip⯑tion are, and can be, counted for nothing. They may riſe in ferocious, ill-directed tumults—but they can only diſgrace themſelves and ſignalize the triumph of their adverſaries.

Effect of the Rota.The truly active citizens. that is, the above de⯑ſcriptions. are all concerned in intrigue reſpecting the various objects in their local or their general government. The rota which the French have eſtabliſhed for their National Aſſembly, holds out the higheſt objects of ambition to ſuch vaſt mul⯑titudes as, in an unexampled meaſure, to widen the bottom of a new ſpecies of intereſt merely po⯑litical, and wholly unconnected with birth or pro⯑perty. This ſcheme of a rota, though it enfeebles the ſtate, conſidered as one ſolid body, and indeed wholly diſables it from acting as ſuch, gives a great, an equal, and a diffuſive ſtrength to the de⯑mocratick ſcheme. Seven hundred and fifty peo⯑ple, every two years raiſed to the ſupreme power, has already produced at leaſt fifteen hundred bold, acting politicians; a great number for even ſo great a country as France. Theſe men never will quietly ſettle in ordinary occupations, nor [47] ſubmit to any ſcheme which muſt reduce them to an entirely private condition, or to the exerciſe of a ſteady, peaceful, but obſcure and unimportant induſtry. Whilſt they ſit in the Aſſembly they are denied offices of truſt and profit—but their ſhort duration makes this no reſtraint—during their probation and apprenticeſhip they are all ſalaried with an income to the greateſt part of them immenſe; and after they have paſſed the novitiate, thoſe who take any ſort of lead are placed in very lucrative offices, according to their influence and credit, or appoint thoſe who divide their profits with them.

This ſupply of recruits to the corps of the higheſt civil ambition, goes on with a regular progreſſion. In very few years it muſt amount to many thouſands. Theſe, however, will be as nothing in compariſon to the multitude of municipal officers, and officers of diſtrict and department, of all ſorts, who have taſted of power and profit, and who hunger for the periodical return of the meal. To theſe needy agitators, the glory of the ſtate, the general wealth and proſperity of the nation, and the riſe or fall of publick credit, are as dreams; nor have arguments deduced from theſe topicks any ſort of weight with them. The indifference with which the Aſſembly regards the ſtate of their Colonies, the only valu⯑able part of the French commerce, is a full proof [48] how little they are likely to be affected by any thing but the ſelfiſh game of their own ambition, now univerſally diffuſed.

Impractica⯑bility of Re⯑ſiſtance.It is true, amidſt all theſe turbulent means of ſecurity to their ſyſtem, very great diſcontents every where prevail. But they only produce mi⯑ſery to thoſe who nurſe them at home, or exile, beggary, and in the end, confiſeation, to thoſe who are ſo impatient as to remove from them. Each Municipal Republick has a Committee, or ſome⯑thing in the nature of a Committee of Reſearch. In theſe petty Republicks the tyranny is ſo near it's object, that it becomes inſtantly acquainted with every act of every man. It ſtifles conſpiracy in it's very firſt movements. Their power is abſolute and uncontroulable. No ſtand can be made againſt it. Theſe Republicks are beſides ſo diſconnected, that very little intelligence of what happens in them is to be obtained, beyond their own bounds, except by the means of their clubs, who keep up a conſtant correſpondence, and who give what co⯑lour they pleaſe to ſuch facts as they chooſe to communicate out of the track of their correſpon⯑dence. They all have ſome ſort of communica⯑tion, juſt as much or as little as they pleaſe, with the center. By this conſinement of all commu⯑nication to the ruling faction, any combination grounded on the abuſes and diſcontents in one. [49] ſcarcely can reach the other. There is not one man, in any one place, to head them. The old Government had ſo much abſtracted the Nobility from the cultivation of provincial intereſt, that no man in France exiſts, whoſe power, credit or con⯑ſequence extends to two diſtricts, or who is capa⯑ble of uniting them in any deſign, even if any man could aſſemble ten men together, without be⯑ing ſure of a ſpeedy lodging in a priſon. One muſt not judge of the ſtate of France by what has been obſerved elſewhere. It does not in the leaſt reſemble any other country. Analogical reaſoning from hiſtory or from recent experience in other places is wholly deluſive.

In my opinion there never was ſeen ſo ſtrong a government internally as that of the French Municipalities. If ever any rebellion can ariſe againſt the preſent ſyſtem, it muſt begin, where the Revolution which gave birth to it did, at the Capital. Paris is the only place in which there is the leaſt freedom of intercourſe. But even there, ſo many ſervants as any man has, ſo many ſpies, and irreconcileable domeſtick enemies.

Gentlemen are Fugi⯑tives.But that place being the chief ſeat of the power and intelligence of the ruling faction, and the place of occaſional reſort for their fierceſt ſpirits, [50] even there a revolution is not likely to have any thing to feed it. The leaders of the ariſtocratick party have been drawn out of the kingdom by order of the Princes, on the hopes held out by the Emperor and the King of Pruſſia at Pilnitz; and as to the democratick factions in Paris, amongſt them there are no leaders poſſeſſed of an influence for any other purpoſe but that of maintaining the preſent ſtate of things. The moment they are ſeen to warp, they are reduced to nothing. They have no attached army—no party that is at all perſonal.

It is not to be imagined becauſe a political ſyſ⯑tem is, under certain aſpects, very unwiſe in it's contrivance, and very miſchievous in it's effects, that it therefore can have no long duration. It's very defects may tend to it's ſtability, becauſe they are agreeable to it's nature. The very faults in the conſtitution of Poland made it laſt; the veto which deſtroyed all it's energy preſerved it's life. What can be conceived ſo monſtrous as the Republick of Algiers? and that no leſs ſtrange Republick of the Mammalukes in Egypt? They are of the worſt form imaginable, and exerciſed in the worſt man⯑ner, yet they have exiſted as a nuiſance on the earth for ſeveral hundred years.

[51] Concluſions.From all theſe conſiderations, and many more, that croud upon me, three concluſions have long ſince ariſen in my mind—

Firſt, that no counter-revolution is to be ex⯑pected in France from internal cauſes ſolely.

Secondly, that the longer the preſent ſyſtem ex⯑iſts, the greater will be it's ſtrength; the greater it's power to deſtroy diſcontents at home, and to reſiſt all foreign attempts in favour of theſe diſ⯑contents.

Thirdly, that as long as it exiſts in France, it will be the intereſt of the managers there, and it is in the very eſſence of their plan, to diſturb and diſtract all other governments, and their endleſs ſucceſſion of reſtleſs politicians will continually ſtimulate them to new attempts.

Proceedings of Princes; Defenſive Plans.Princes are generally ſenſible that this is their common cauſe; and two of them have made a publick declaration of their opinion to this effect. Againſt this common danger, ſome of them, ſuch as the King of Spain, the King of Sardinia, and the Republick of Berne, are very diligent in uſing de⯑ſenſive meaſures.

[52] If they were to guard againſt an invaſion from France, the merits of this plan of a merely defen⯑ſive reſiſtance might be ſupported by plauſible to⯑picks; but as the attack does not operate againſt theſe countries externally, but by an internal cor⯑ruption (a ſort of dry rot); they who purſue this merely defenſive plan, againſt a danger which the plan itſelf ſuppoſes to be ſerious, cannot poſſibly eſcape it. For it is in the nature of all defenſive meaſures to be ſharp and vigorous under the im⯑preſſions of the firſt alarm, and to relax by de⯑grees; until at length the danger, by not operat⯑ing inſtantly, comes to appear as a falſe alarm; ſo much ſo that the next menacing appearance will look leſs formidable, and will be leſs provided againſt. But to thoſe who are on the offenſive it is not neceſſary to be always alert. Poſſibly it is more their intereſt not to be ſo. For their unfore⯑ſeen attacks contribute to their ſucceſs.

The French Party how compoſed.In the mean time a ſyſtem of French conſpiracy is gaining ground in every country. This ſyſtem happening to be founded on principles the moſt deluſive indeed, but the moſt flattering to the na⯑tural propenſities of the unthinking multitude, and to the ſpeculations of all thoſe who think, without thinking very profoundly, muſt daily ex⯑tend it's influence. A predominant inclination [53] towards it appears in all thoſe who have no reli⯑gion, when otherwiſe their diſpoſition leads them to be advocates even for deſpotiſm. Hence Hume, though I cannot ſay that he does not throw out ſome expreſſions of diſapprobation on the proceedings of the levellers in the reign of Richard the Second, yet affirms that the doctrines of John Ball were ‘"conformable to the ideas of primitive equality, which are engraven in the hearts of all men."’

Boldneſs formerly was not the character of Atheiſts as ſuch. They were even of a character nearly the reverſe; they were formerly like the old Epicureans, rather an unenterprizing race. But of late they are grown active, deſigning, turbulent and ſeditious. They are ſworn enemies to Kings, Nobility and Prieſthood. We have ſeen all the Academicians at Paris, with Condorcet, the friend and correſpondent of Prieſtley, at their head, the moſt furious of the extravagant Republicans.

Condorcet.The late Aſſembly, after the laſt captivity of the King, had actually choſen this Condorcet by a ma⯑jority on the ballot, for Preceptor to the Dauphin, who was to be taken out of the hands and direction of his parents, and to be delivered over to this fana⯑tick Atheiſt, and furious democratick Republican. His untractability to theſe leaders, and his figure [54] in the Club of Jacobins, which at that time they wiſhed to bring under, alone prevented that part of the arrangement, and others in the ſame ſtyle, from being carried into execution. Whilſt he was candidate for this office, he produced his title to it by promulgating the following ideas of the title of his royal pupil to the crown. In a paper written by him, and publiſhed with his name, againſt the re-eſtabliſhment, even of the appearance of monar⯑chy under any qualifications, He ſays,

[56] Such are the ſentiments of the man who has oc⯑caſionally filled the chair of the National Aſſembly, who is their perpetual ſecretary, their only ſtanding officer, and the moſt important by far. He leads them to peace or war. He is the great theme of the Republican faction in England. Theſe ideas of M. Condorcet, are the principles of thoſe to whom Kings are to entruſt their ſucceſſors, and the inte⯑reſts of their ſucceſſion. This man would be ready to plunge the poignard in the heart of his pupil, or to whet the axe for his neck. Of all men, the moſt dangerous is a warm, hot-headed, zealous Atheiſt. This ſort of man aims at dominion, and his means are, the words he always has in his mouth, ‘"L'é⯑galité naturelle des Hommes, et la Souverainté du Peuple."’

All former attempts grounded on theſe Rights of Men, had proved unfortunate. The ſucceſs of this [57] laſt makes a mighty difference in the effect of the doctrine. Here is a principle of a nature, to the multitude, the moſt ſeductive, always exiſting be fore their eyes, as a thing feaſible in practice. After ſo many failures, ſuch an enterprize previous to the French experiment, carried ruin to the contrivers, on the face of it; and if any enthuſiaſt was ſo wild as to wiſh to engage in a ſcheme of that nature, it was not eaſy for him to find followers: Now there is a party almoſt in all countries, ready made, ani⯑mated with ſucceſs, with a ſure Ally in the very center of Europe. There is no cabal ſo obſcure in any place, that they do not protect, cheriſh, foſter, and endeavour to raiſe it into importance at home and abroad. From the loweſt, this intrigue will creep up to the higheſt. Ambition, as well as enthuſiaſm, may find it's account in the party and in the principle.

Character of Miniſters.The Miniſters of other Kings, like thoſe of the King of France (not one of whom was perfectly free from this guilt, and ſome of whom were very deep in it) may themſelves be the perſons to foment ſuch a diſpoſition and ſuch a faction Hertzberg, the King of Pruſſia's late Miniſter, is ſo much of what is called a philoſopher, that he was of a fac⯑tion with that ſort of politicians in every thing, and in every place. Even when he defends himſelf from the imputation of giving extravagantly into [58] theſe principles, he ſtill conſiders the revolution of France as a great publick good, by giving credit to their fraudulent declaration of their univerſal be⯑nevolence, and love of peace. Nor are his Pruſ⯑ſian Majeſty's preſent miniſters at all diſinclined to the ſame ſyſtem. Their oſtentatious preamble to certain late edicts, demonſtrates (if their actions had not been ſufficiently explanatory of their caſt of mind) that they are deeply infected with the ſame diſtemper of dangerous, becauſe plauſible, though trivial, and ſhallow ſpeculation.

Miniſters turning their backs on the reputation which properly belongs to them, aſpire at the glory of being ſpeculative writers. The duties of theſe two ſituations are, in general, directly oppo⯑ſite to each other. Speculators ought to be neu⯑tral. A Miniſter cannot be ſo. He is to ſupport the intereſt of the publick as connected with that of his maſter. He is his maſter's truſtee, advocate, attorney, and ſteward—and he is not to indulge in any ſpeculation which contradicts that charac⯑ter or even detracts from its efficacy. Necker had an extreme thirſt for this ſort of glory; ſo had others; and this purſuit of a miſplaced and miſ⯑underſtood reputation, was one of the cauſes of the ruin of theſe miniſters, and of their unhappy maſ⯑ter. The Pruſſian miniſters in foreign courts, have (at leaſt not long ſince) talked the moſt democra⯑tick [59] language with regard to France, and in the moſt unmanaged terms.

Corps diplo⯑matique.The whole corps diplomatique, with very few exceptions, leans that way. What cauſe produces in them a turn of mind, which at firſt one would think unnatural to their ſituation, it is not impoſſi⯑ble to explain. The diſcuſſion would however be ſomewhat long and ſomewhat invidious. The fact itſelf is indiſputable, however they may diſ⯑guiſe it to their ſeveral courts. This diſpoſition is gone to ſo very great a length in that corps, in it⯑ſelf ſo important, and ſo important as furniſhing the intelligence which ſways all cabinets, that if Princes and States do not very ſpeedily attend with a vi⯑gorous controul to that ſource of direction and in⯑formation, very ſerious evils are likely to befal them.

Sovereigns—their diſpoſi⯑tions.But indeed Kings are to guard againſt the ſame ſort of diſpoſitions in themſelves. They are very eaſily alienated from all the higher orders of their ſubjects, whether civil or military, laick or eccle⯑ſiaſtical. It is with perſons of condition that Sove⯑reigns chiefly come into contact. It is from them that they generally experience oppoſition to their will. It is with their pride and impracticability, that Princes are moſt hurt; it is with their ſervility and baſeneſs, that they are moſt commonly diſguſt⯑ed; it is from their humours and cabals, that they [60] find their affairs moſt frequently troubled and diſ⯑tracted. But of the common people in pure mo⯑narchical governments, Kings know little or no⯑thing; and therefore being unacquainted with their faults (which are as many as thoſe of the great, and much more deciſive in their effects when ac⯑companied with power) Kings generally regard them with tenderneſs and favour, and turn their eyes towards that deſcription of their ſubjects, par⯑ticularly when hurt by oppoſition from the higher orders. It was thus that the King of France (a perpetual example to all ſovereigns) was ruined. I have it from very ſure information (and it was in⯑deed obvious enough from the meaſures which were taken previous to the aſſembly of the States and afterwards) that the King's counſellors had filled him with a ſtrong diſlike to his nobility, his clergy, and the corps of his magiſtracy. They re⯑preſented to him, that he had tried them all ſeve⯑rally, in ſeveral ways, and found them all untract⯑able. That he had twice called an Aſſembly (the Notables) compoſed of the firſt men of the clergy, the nobility, and the magiſtrates; that he had him⯑ſelf named every one member in thoſe aſſemblies, and that though ſo picked out, he had not, in this their collective ſtate, ſound them more diſpoſed to a compliance with his will than they had been ſe⯑parately. That there remained for him, with the leaſt proſpect of advantage to his authority in the States [61] General, which were to be compoſed of the ſame ſorts of men, but not choſen by him, only the Tiers Etat. In this alone he could repoſe any hope of extricating himſelf from his difficulties, and of ſet⯑tling him in a clear and permanent authority. They repreſented (theſe are the words of one of my in⯑formants) ‘"That the Royal Authority compreſſed with the weight of theſe ariſtocratick bodies, full of ambition, and of faction, when once unloaded, would riſe of itſelf, and occupy it's natural place without diſturbance or controul:"’ That the com⯑mon people would protect, cheriſh, and ſupport, in⯑ſtead of cruſhing it. ‘"The people, (it was ſaid) could entertain no objects of ambition;"’ they were out of the road of intrigue and cabal; and could poſſibly have no other view than the ſupport of the mild and parental authority by which they were inveſted, for the firſt time collectively with real importance in the State, and protected in their peaceable and uſeful employments.

King of France.This unfortunate King (not without a large ſhare of blame to himſelf) was deluded to his ruin by a deſire to humble and reduce his Nobility, Clergy, and his corporate Magiſtracy; not that I ſuppoſe he meant wholly to eradicate theſe bodies, in the manner ſince effected by the Democratick power: I rather believe that even Necker's deſigns did not go to that extent. With his own hand, however, [62] Louis the XVIth pulled down the pillars which up⯑held his throne; and this he did, becauſe he could not bear the inconveniences which are attached to every thing human; becauſe he found himſelf cooped up, and in durance by thoſe limits which nature preſcribes to deſire and imagination; and was taught to conſider as low and degrading, that mutual dependance which Providence has ordain⯑ed that all men ſhould have on one another. He is not at this minute perhaps cured of the dread of the power and credit like to be acquired by thoſe who would ſave and reſcue him. He leaves thoſe who ſuffer in his cauſe to their fate; and hopes by various mean deluſive intrigues in which I am afraid he is encouraged from abroad, to re⯑gain, among Traitors and Regicides, the power he has joined to take from his own family, whom he quietly ſees proſcribed before his eyes, and called to anſwer to the loweſt of his rebels, as the vileſt of all criminals.

Emperor.It is to be hoped that the Emperor may be taught better things by this fatal example. But it is ſure that he has adviſers who endeavour to fill him with the ideas which have brought his bro⯑ther-in-law to his preſent ſituation. Joſeph the Second was far gone in this philoſophy, and ſome, if not moſt who ſerve the Emperor, would kindly initiate him into all the myſteries of this free-ma⯑ſonry. [63] They would perſuade him to look on the National Aſſembly not with the hatred of an ene⯑my, but the jealouſy of a rival. They would make him deſirous of doing, in his own dominions, by a Royal deſpotiſm, what has been done in France by a Democratick. Rather than abandon ſuch enterpriſes, they would perſuade him to a ſtrange alliance between thoſe extremes. Their grand object being now, as in his brother's time, at any rate to deſtroy the higher orders, they think he cannot compaſs this end, as certainly he cannot, without elevating the lower. By depreſſing the one and by raiſing the other, they hope in the firſt place to encreaſe his treaſures and his army; and with theſe common inſtruments of Royal Power they flatter him that the Democracy which they help, in his name, to create, will give him but little trouble. In defiance of the freſheſt ex⯑perience, which might ſhew him that old impoſ⯑ſibilities are become modern probabilities, and that the extent to which evil principles may go, when left to their own operation, is beyond the power of calculation, they will endeavour to per⯑ſuade him that ſuch a Democracy is a thing which cannot ſubſiſt by itſelf; that in whoſever hands the military command is placed, he muſt be in the neceſſary courſe of affairs, ſooner or later the maſter; and that being the maſter of various un⯑connected countries, he may keep them all in or⯑der [64] by employing a military force, which to each of them is foreign. This maxim too, however formerly plauſible, will not now hold water. This ſcheme is full of intricacy, and may cauſe him every where to loſe the hearts of his people. Theſe Counſellors forget that a corrupted army was the very cauſe of the ruin of his brother-in-law; and that he is himſelf far from ſecure from a ſimilar corruption.

Brabant.Inſtead of reconciling himſelf heartily and bonâ fide according to the moſt obvious rules of policy to the States of Brabant as they are conſtituted, and who in the preſent ſtate of things ſtand on the ſame foundation with the Monarchy itſelf, and who might have been gained with the greateſt facility, they have adviſed him to the moſt unkingly pro⯑ceeding which, either in a good or in a bad light, has ever been attempted. Under a pretext taken from the ſpirit of the loweſt chicane, they have counſelled him wholly to break the publick faith, to annul the amneſty, as well as the other condi⯑tions through which he obtained an entrance into the Provinces of the Netherlands, under the guar⯑rantee of Great Britain and Pruſſia. He is made to declare his adherence to the indemnity in a cri⯑minal ſenſe, but he is to keep alive in his own name, and to encourage in others a civil proceſs in the nature of an action of damages for what has [65] been ſuffered during the troubles. Whilſt he keeps up this hopeful law-ſuit in view of the da⯑mages he may recover againſt individuals, he loſes the hearts of a whole people, and the vaſt ſubſi⯑dies which his anceſtors had been uſed to receive from them.

Emperor's conduct with regard to France.This deſign once admitted, unriddles the myſ⯑tery of the whole conduct of the Emperor's Mi⯑niſters with regard to France. As ſoon as they ſaw the life of the King and Queen of France no longer as they thought in danger, they entirely changed their plan with regard to the French na⯑tion. I believe that the chiefs of the Revolution (thoſe who led the Conſtituting Aſſembly) have contrived as far as they can do it, to give the Em⯑peror ſatisfaction on this head. He keeps a con⯑tinual tone and poſture of menace to ſecure this his only point. But it muſt be obſerved, that he all along grounds his departure from the engage⯑ment at Pilnitz to the Princes, on the will and ac⯑tions of the King and the majority of the people, without any regard to the natural and conſtitu⯑tional orders of the State, or to the opinions of the whole Houſe of Bourbon. Though it is manifeſtly under the conſtraint of impriſonment and the fear of death, that this unhappy man has been guilty of all thoſe humilities which have aſtoniſhed mankind, the adviſers of the Emperor will conſider nothing [66] but the phyſical perſon of Louis, which, even in his preſent degraded and infamous ſtate, they regard as of ſufficient authority to give a compleat ſanc⯑tion to the perſecution and utter ruin of all his fa⯑mily, and of every perſon who has ſhewn any de⯑gree of attachment or fidelity to him, or to his cauſe; as well as competent to deſtroy the whole antient conſtitution and frame of the French mo⯑narchy.

The preſent policy therefore of the Auſtrian po⯑liticians, is to recover deſpotiſm through demo⯑cracy; or at leaſt, at any expence, every where to ruin the deſcription of men who are every where the objects of their ſettled and ſyſtematick averſion, but more eſpecially in the Netherlands. Compare this with the Emperor's refuſing at firſt all inter⯑courſe with the preſent powers in France, with his endeavouring to excite all Europe againſt them, and then his not only withdrawing all aſſiſtance and all countenance from the fugitives who had been drawn by his declarations from their houſes, ſituations, and military commiſſions, many even from the means of their very exiſtence, but treat⯑ing them with every ſpecies of inſult and outrage.

Combining this unexampled conduct in the Em⯑peror's adviſers, with the timidity (operating as per⯑ſidy) of the King of France, a fatal example is held [67] out to all ſubjects, tending to ſhew what little ſup⯑port, or even countenance they are to expect from thoſe for whom their principle of fidelity may in⯑duce them to riſque life and fortune. The Em⯑peror's adviſers would not for the world reſcind one of the acts of this or of the late French Aſſem⯑bly; nor do they wiſh any thing better at preſent for their maſter's brother of France, than that he ſhould really be, as he is nominally, at the head of the ſyſtem of perſecution of religion and good or⯑der, and of all deſcriptions of dignity, natural and inſtituted; they only wiſh all this done with a little more reſpect to the King's perſon, and with more appearance of conſideration for his new ſubordi⯑nate office; in hopes that yielding himſelf for the preſent, to the perſons who have effected theſe changes, he may be able to game for the reſt here⯑after. On no other principles than theſe, can the conduct of the Court of Vienna be accounted for. The ſubordinate Court of Bruſſels talks the lan⯑guage of a club of Feuillans and Jacobins.

Moderate party.In this ſtate of general rottenneſs among ſub⯑jects, and of deluſion and falſe politicks in Princes, comes a new experiment. The King of France is in the hands of the Chiefs of the Regicide Faction, the Barnvaes, Lameths, Fayettes, Perigords, Duports, Robeſpierre's, Camus's, &c. &c. &c. They who had impriſoned, ſuſpended, and conditionally de⯑poſed [68] him, are his confidential counſellors. The next deſperate of the deſperate rebels, call them⯑ſelves the Moderate Party. They are the Chiefs of the firſt Aſſembly, who are conſederated to ſupport their power during their ſuſpenſion from the pre⯑ſent, and to govern the exiſtent body with as ſove⯑reign a ſway as they had done the laſt. They have, for the greater part, ſucceeded; and they have many advantages towards procuring their ſucceſs in future. Juſt before the cloſe of their regular power, they beſtowed ſome appearance of preroga⯑tives on the King, which in their firſt plans they had refuſed to him; particularly the miſchievous, and in his ſituation, dreadful prerogative of a Veto. This prerogative (which they hold as their bit in the mouth of the National Aſſembly for the time being) without the direct aſſiſtance of their Club, it was impoſſible for the King to ſhew even the deſire of exerting with the ſmalleſt effect, or even with ſafety to his perſon. However, by playing through this Veto, the Aſſembly againſt the King, and the King againſt the Aſſembly, they have made them⯑ſelves maſters of both. In this ſituation, having deſtroyed the old Government by their ſedition, they would preſerve as much of order as is neceſ⯑ſary for the ſupport of their own uſurpation.

French Am⯑baſſador.It is believed that this, by far the worſt party of the miſcreants of France, has received direct en⯑couragement from the counſellors who betray the [69] Emperor. Thus ſtrengthened by the poſſeſſion of the captive King (now captive in his mind as well as in body) and by a good hope of the Emperor, they intend to ſend their Miniſters to every Court in Europe; having ſent before them ſuch a de⯑nunciation of terror and ſuperiority to every na⯑tion without exception, as has no example in the diplomatick world. Hitherto the Miniſters to fo⯑reign Courts had been of the appointment of the Sovereign of France previous to the Revolu⯑tion; and either from inclination, duty or decorum, moſt of them were contented with a merely paſ⯑ſive obedience to the new power. At preſent the King being entirely in the hands of his jailors, and his mind broken to his ſituation, can ſend none but the enthuſiaſts of the ſyſtem—men framed by the ſecret Committee of the Feuillans, who meet in the houſe of Madame de Stahl, Mr. Necker's daugh⯑ter. Such is every man whom they have talked of ſending hither. Theſe Miniſters will be ſo many ſpies and incendiaries; ſo many active emiſſaries of Democracy. Their houſes will become places of rendezvous here, as every where elſe, and cen⯑ters of cabal for whatever is miſchievous and ma⯑lignant in this country, particularly among thoſe of rank and faſhion. As the Miniſter of the Na⯑tional Aſſembly will be admitted at this Court, at leaſt with his uſual rank, and as entertainments will be naturally given and received by the King's [70] own Miniſters, any attempt to diſcountenance the reſort of other people to that Miniſter would be ineffectual, and indeed abſurd, and full of con⯑tradiction. The women who come with theſe Ambaſſadors will aſſiſt in ſomenting factions amongſt ours, which cannot fail of extending the evil. Some of them I hear are already arrived. There is no doubt they will do as much miſchief as they can.

Connexion of Clubs.Whilſt the publick Miniſters are received under the general law of the communication between na⯑tions, the correſpondences between the factious clubs in France and ours, will be, as they now are, kept up: but this pretended embaſſy will be a cloſer, more ſteady and more effectual link be⯑tween the partizans of the new ſyſtem on both ſides of the water. I do not mean that theſe Anglo Gallick clubs in London, Mancheſter, &c. are not dangerous in a high degree. The ap⯑pointment of feſtive anniverſaries has ever in the ſenſe of mankind been held the beſt method of keeping alive the ſpirit of any inſtitution. We have one ſettled in London; and at the laſt of them, that of the 14th of July, the ſtrong diſcoun⯑tenance of Government, the unfavourable time of the year, and the then uncertainty of the diſpoſi⯑tion of foreign Powers, did not hinder the meeting of at leaſt nine hundred people, with good coats on [71] their backs, who could afford to pay half a guinea a head to ſhew their zeal for the new principles. They were with great difficulty, and all poſſible addreſs, hindered from inviting the French Am⯑baſſador. His real indiſpoſition, beſides the fear of offending any party, ſent him out of town. But when our Court ſhall have recognized a Govern⯑ment in France, founded on the principles an⯑nounced in Montmorin's Letter, how can the French Ambaſſador be frowned upon for an atten⯑dance on thoſe meetings wherein the eſtabliſhment of the Government he repreſents is celebrated? An event happened a few days ago, which in many particulars was very ridiculous; yet even from the ridicule and abſurdity of the proceedings, it marks the more ſtrongly the ſpirit of the French Aſſem⯑bly. I mean the reception they have given to the Frith-Street Alliance. This, though the delirium of a low, drunken alehouſe-club, they have pub⯑licly announced as a formal alliance with the people of England, as ſuch ordered it to be preſented to their King, and to be publiſhed in every province in France. This leads more directly and with much greater force than any proceeding with a regular and rational appearance, to two very ma⯑terial conſiderations. Firſt, it ſhews that they are of opinion that the current opinions of the Engliſh have the greateſt influence on the minds of the people in France, and indeed of all the people in [72] Europe, ſince they catch with ſuch aſtoniſhing eagerneſs at every the moſt trifling ſhew of ſuch opinions in their favour. Next, and what appears to me to be full as important, it ſhews that they are willing publickly to countenance and even to adopt every factious conſpiracy that can be formed in this nation, however low and baſe in itſelf, in order to excite in the moſt miſerable wretches here, an idea of their own ſovereign importance, and to encourage them to look up to France, whenever they may be matured into ſomething of more force, for aſſiſtance in the ſubverſion of their domeſtick Government. This addreſs of the alchouſe club was actually propoſed and accepted by the Aſſem⯑bly as an alliance. The procedure was in my opi⯑nion a high miſdemeanor in thoſe who acted thus in England, if they were not ſo very low and ſo very baſe, that no acts of theirs can be called high, even as a deſcription of criminality; and the Aſ⯑ſembly in accepting, proclaiming and publiſhing this forged alliance, has been guilty of a plain ag⯑greſſion, which would juſtify our Court in demand⯑ing a direct diſavowal, if our policy ſhould not lead us to wink at it.

Whilſt I look over this paper to have it copied, I ſee a Manifeſto of the Aſſembly, as a preliminary to a declaration of war againſt the German Princes on the Rhine. This Manifeſto contains the whole [73] ſubſtance of the French politicks with regard to fo⯑reign States. They have ordered it to be circu⯑lated amongſt the people in every country of Eu⯑rope—even previouſly to it's acceptance by the King and his new Privy Council, the club of the Feuillans. Therefore, as a ſummary of their po⯑licy avowed by themſelves, let us conſider ſome of the circumſtances attending that piece, as well as the ſpirit and temper of the piece itſelf.

Declaration againſt the Emperor.It was preceded by a ſpeech from Briſſot, full of unexampled inſolence towards all the Sovereign States of Germany, if not of Europe. The Aſſem⯑bly, to expreſs their ſatisfaction in the ſentiments which it contained, ordered it to be printed. This Briſſot had been in the loweſt and baſeſt employ under the depoſed Monarchy; a ſort of thieſ⯑taker, or ſpy of police, in which character he acted after the manner of perſons in that deſcription. He had been employed by his maſter, the Lieutenant de Police, for a conſiderable time in London, in the ſame or ſome ſuch honourable occupation. The Revolution which has brought forward all merit of that kind, raiſed him, with others of a ſimilar claſs and diſpoſition, to fame and eminence. On the Revolution he became a publiſher of an infamous newſpaper, which he ſtill continues. He is charged, and I believe juſtly, as the firſt mover of the troubles in Hiſpaniola. There is no wick⯑edneſs, [74] if I am rightly informed, in which he is not verſed, and of which he is not perfectly capable. His quality of news-writer, now an employment of the firſt dignity in France, and his practices and principles, procured his election into the Aſſembly, where he is one of the leading members.—Mr. Condorcet produced on the ſame day a draft of a Declaration to the King, which the Aſſembly pub⯑liſhed before it was preſented.

Condorcet (though no Marquis, as he ſtyled himſelf before the Revolution) is a man of another ſort of birth, faſhion, and occupation from Briſſot; but in every principle, and in every diſpoſition to the loweſt as well as the higheſt and moſt deter⯑mined villainies, fully his equal. He ſeconds Briſ⯑ſot in the Aſſembly, and is at once his coadjutor and his rival in a newſpaper, which in his own name and as ſucceſſor to Mr. Garat, a Member alſo of the Aſſembly, he has juſt ſet up in that Empire of Gazettes. Condorcet was choſen to draw the firſt Declaration preſented by the Aſſem⯑bly to the King, as a threat to the Elector of Treves, and the other Princes on the Rhine. In that piece, in which both Feuillans and Jacobins concurred, they declared publickly, and moſt proudly and inſolently, the principle on which they mean to proceed in their future diſputes with any of the Sovereigns of Europe, for they ſay, ‘"That [75] it is not with fire and ſword they mean to attack their territories, but by what will be more dread⯑ful to them, the introduction of liberty."’—I have not the paper by me to give the exact words—but I believe they are nearly as I ſtate them. Dreadful indeed will be their hoſtility, if they ſhould be able to carry it on according to the ex⯑ample of their modes of introducing liberty. They have ſhewn a perfect model of their whole deſign, very complete, though in little. This gang of murderers and ſavages have wholly laid waſte and utterly ruined the beautiful and happy country of the Comtat Venaiſſin and the city of Avignon. This cruel and treacherous outrage the Sovereigns of Europe, in my opinion, with a great miſtake of their honour and intereſt, have permitted even without a remonſtrance to be carried to the deſired point, on the principles on which they are now themſelves threatened in their own States; and this, becauſe, according to the poor and narrow ſpirit now in faſhion, their brother Sovereign, whoſe ſubjects have been thus traiterouſly and inhumanly treated in violation of the law of nature and of nations, has a name ſomewhat different from theirs, and inſtead of being ſtyled King or Duke, or Land⯑grave, is uſually called Pope.

State of the Empire.The Electors of Treves and Mentz were fright⯑ened with the menace of a ſimilar mode of war. [76] The Aſſembly, however, not thinking that the Electors of Treves and Mentz had done enough under their firſt terror, have again brought forward Condorcet. preceded by Briſſot, as I have juſt ſtat⯑ed. The Declaration which they have ordered now to be circulated in all countries, is in ſubſtance the ſame as the firſt, but ſtill more inſolent, becauſe more full of detail. There they have the impu⯑dence to ſtate that they aim at no conqueſt; inſi⯑nuating that all the old lawful Powers of the World had each made a conſtant open profeſſion of a de⯑ſign of ſubduing his neighbours. They add, that if they are provoked, their war will be directed only againſt thoſe who aſſume to be Maſters. But to the People they will bring peace, law, liberty, &c. &c. There is not the leaſt hint that they conſider thoſe whom they call perſons ‘"aſſuming to be Maſters,"’ to be the lawful Government of their country, or perſons to be treated with the leaſt ma⯑nagement or reſpect. They regard them as uſurp⯑ers and enſlavers of the people. If I do not miſ⯑take they are deſcribed by the name of tyrants in Condorcet's firſt draft. I am ſure they are ſo in Briſſot's ſpeech, ordered by the Aſſembly to be printed at the ſame time and for the ſame purpoſes. The whole is in the ſame ſtrain, full of falſe philo⯑ſophy and falſe rhetorick, both however calculated to captivate and influence the vulgar mind, and to excite ſedition in the countries in which it is or⯑dered [77] to be circulated. Indeed it is ſuch, that if any of the lawful acknowledged Sovereigns of Eu⯑rope had publickly ordered ſuch a manifeſto to be circulated in the dominions of another, the Am⯑baſſador of that power would inſtantly be ordered to quit every Court without an audience.

Effect of Fear on the Sovereign Powers.The powers of Europe have a pretext for con⯑cealing their fears, by ſaying that this language is not uſed by the King; though they well know that there is in effect no ſuch perſon, that the Aſ⯑ſembly is in reality, and by that King is acknow⯑ledged to be the Maſter, that what he does is but matter of formality, and that he can neither cauſe nor hinder, accelerate or retard any meaſure what⯑ſoever, nor add to or ſoften the manifeſto which the Aſſembly has directed to be publiſhed, with the declared purpoſe of exciting mutiny and rebellion in the ſeveral countries governed by theſe powers. By the generality alſo of the menaces contained in this paper (though infinitely aggravating the out⯑rage) they hope to remove from each power ſepa⯑rately the idea of a diſtinct affront. The perſons firſt pointed at by the menace are certainly the Princes of Germany, who harbour the perſecuted houſe of Bourbon and the Nobility of France; the declaration, however, is general, and goes to every ſtate with which they may have a cauſe of quarrel. But the terror of France has fallen upon all nations. A few months ſince all Sovereigns ſeemed diſpoſed [78] to unite againſt her, at preſent they all ſeem to combine in her favour. At no period has the power of France ever appeared with ſo formidable an aſpect. In particular the liberties of the Empire can have nothing more than an exiſtence the moſt tot⯑tering and precarious, whilſt France exiſts with a great power of fomenting rebellion, and the greateſt in the weakeſt; but with neither power nor diſpo⯑ſition to ſupport the ſmaller ſtates in their indepen⯑dence againſt the attempts of the more powerful.

I wind up all in a full conviction within my own breaſt, and the ſubſtance of which I muſt repeat over and over again, that the ſtate of France is the firſt conſideration in the politicks of Europe, and of each ſtate, externally as well as internally con⯑ſidered.

Moſt of the topicks I have uſed are drawn from fear and apprehenſion. Topicks derived from fear or addreſſed to it, are, I well know, of doubtful appearance. To be ſure, hope is in general the incitement to action. Alarm ſome men—you do not drive them to provide for their ſecurity; you put them to a ſtand; you induce them not to take meaſures to prevent the approach of danger, but to remove ſo unpleaſant an idea from their minds; you perſuade them to remain as they are, from a new fear that their activity may bring on the ap⯑prehended miſchief before it's time. I confeſs [79] freely that this evil ſometimes happens from an overdone precaution; but it is when the meaſures are raſh, ill choſen, or ill combined, and the ef⯑fects rather of blind terror than of enlightened foreſight. But the few to whom I wiſh to ſubmit my thoughts, are of a character which will enable them to ſee danger without aſtoniſhment, and to provide againſt it without perplexity.

To what lengths this method of circulating mutinous manifeſtos, and of keeping emiſſaries of ſedition in every Court under the name of Am⯑baſſadors, to propagate the ſame principles and to follow the practices, will go, and how ſoon they will operate, it is hard to ſay—but go on it will—more or leſs rapidly, according to events, and to the humour of the time. The Princes menaced with the revolt of their ſubjects, at the ſame time that they have obſequiouſly obeyed the ſovereign mandate of the new Roman Senate, have received with diſtinction, in a publick character, Ambaſſa⯑dors from thoſe who in the ſame act had circulated the manifeſto of ſedition in their dominions. This was the only thing wanting to the degradation and diſgrace of the Germanick Body.

The Ambaſſadors from the Rights of Man, and their admiſſion into the diplomatick ſyſtem, I hold to be a new aera in this buſineſs. It will be the moſt important ſtep yet taken to affect the exiſt⯑ence [80] of Sovereigns, and the higher claſſes of life—I do not mean to exclude it's effects upon all claſſes—but the firſt blow is aimed at the more prominent parts in the ancient order of things.

What is to be done?

It would be preſumption in me to do more than to make a caſe. Many things occur. But as they, like all political meaſures, depend on diſpoſi⯑tions, tempers, means, and external circumſtances, for all their effect, not being well aſſured of theſe, I do not know how to let looſe any ſpeculations of mine on the ſubject. The evil is ſtated in my opinion as it exiſts. The remedy muſt be where power, wiſdom and information, I hope are more united with good intentions than they can be with me. I have done with this ſubject, I believe for ever. It has given me many anxious moments for the two laſt years. If a great change is to be made in human affairs, the minds of men will be ſitted to it; the general opinions and feelings will draw that way. Every fear, every hope, will forward it; and then they who perſiſt in oppoſing this mighty current in human affairs, will appear rather to re⯑ſiſt the decrees of Providence itſelf, than the mere deſigns of men. They will not be reſolute and firm, but perverſe and obſtinate.

HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS.
WRITTEN IN NOVEMBER, 1792.
[] HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION, &c. &c.
WRITTEN IN NOVEMBER, 1792.

THAT France, by it's mere geographical po⯑ſition, independently of every other cir⯑cumſtance, muſt affect every State of Europe; ſome of them immediately, all of them through mediums not very remote.

That the ſtanding policy of this kingdom ever has been to watch over the external proceedings of France (whatever form the interiour Government of that kingdom might take) and to prevent the extenſion of it's dominion or it's ruling influence, over other States.

That, there is nothing in the preſent internal ſtate of things in France, which alters the na⯑tional policy with regard to the exteriour relations of that country.

That there are, on the contrary, many things in the internal circumſtances of France (and perhaps [84] of this country too) which tend to ſortify the prin⯑ciples of that fundamental policy; and which ren⯑der the active aſſertion of thoſe principles more preſſing at this, than at any former time.

That, by a change effected in about three weeks, France has been able to penetrate into the heart of Germany; to make an abſolute conqueſt of Savoy; to menace an immediate invaſion of the Netherlands; and to awe and overbear the whole Helvetick Body, which is in a moſt perilous ſitua⯑tion. The great Ariſtocratick Cantons having, perhaps, as much or more to dread from their own people whom they arm, but do not chuſe or dare to employ, as from the foreign enemy, which againſt all publick faith has butchered their troops, ſerving by treaty in France. To this picture, it is hardly neceſſary to add, the means by which France has been enabled to effect all this, namely the apparently entire deſtruction of one of the largeſt, and certainly the higheſt diſciplined, and beſt appointed army ever ſeen, headed by the firſt military Sovereign in Europe, with a Captain un⯑der him of the greateſt renown; and that without a blow given or received on any ſide. This ſtate of things ſeems to me, even if it went no further, truly ſerious.

[85] Circumſtances have enabled France to do all this by land. On the other element ſhe has begun to exert herſelf; and ſhe muſt ſucceed in her de⯑ſigns, if enemies very different from thoſe ſhe has hitherto had to encounter, do not reſiſt her.

She has fitted out a naval force, now actually at ſea, by which ſhe is enabled to give law to the whole Mediterranean. It is known as a fact (and if not ſo known, it is in the nature of things highly probable) that ſhe propoſes the ravage of the Ec⯑cleſiaſtical State, and the pillage of Rome, as her firſt object; that next ſhe means to bombard Na⯑ples; to awe, to humble, and thus to command all Italy—to force it to a nominal neutrality, but to a real dependence—to compel the Italian Prin⯑ces and Republicks to admit the free entrance of the French commerce, an open intercourſe, and the ſure concomitant of that intercourſe, the affili⯑ated ſocieties, in a manner ſimilar to thoſe ſhe has eſtabliſhed at Avignon, the Comtat, Chamberry, London, Mancheſter, &c. &c. which are ſo many colonies planted in all theſe countries, for extend⯑ing the influence, and ſecuring the dominion of the French Republick.

That there never has been hitherto a period in which this kingdom would have ſuffered a French fleet to domineer in the Mediterranean, and to [86] force ITALY to ſubmit to ſuch terms as France would think ſit to impoſe—to ſay nothing of what has been done upon land in ſupport of the ſame ſyſtem. The great object for which we preſerved Minorea, whilſt we could keep it, and for which we ſtill retain Gibraltar, both at a great expence, was, and is, to prevent the predominance of France over the Mediterranean.

Thus far as to the certain and immediate effect of that armament upon the Italian States. The probable effect which that armament, and the other armaments preparing at Toulon, and other ports may have upon SPAIN, on the ſide of the Medi⯑terranean, is worthy of the ſerious attention of the Britiſh councils.

That it is moſt probable, we may ſay, in a man⯑ner certain, that if there ſhould be a rupture be⯑tween France and Spain, France will not confinc her offenſive piratical operations againſt Spain, to her efforts in the Mediterranean; on which ſide, however, ſhe may grievouſly affect Spain, eſpecially if ſhe excites Morocco and Algiers, which un⯑doubtedly ſhe will, to fall upon that power.

That ſhe will fit out armaments upon the ocean, by which the flota itſelf may be intercepted, and thus the treaſures of all Europe, as well as the [87] largeſt and ſureſt reſources of the Spaniſh monar⯑chy, may be conveyed into France, and become powerful inſtruments for the annoyance of all her neighbours.

That ſhe makes no ſecret of her deſigns.

That, if the inward and outward bound flota ſhould eſcape, ſtill France has more and better means of diſſevering many of the provinces in the Weſt and Eaſt Indies, from the ſtate of Spain, than Hol⯑land had when ſhe ſucceeded in the ſame attempt. The French marine reſembles not a little the old ar⯑maments of the Flibuſtriers, which about a century back, in conjunction with pirates of our nation, brought ſuch calamities upon the Spaniſh colonies. They differ only in this, that the preſent piratical force is, out of all meaſure and compariſon, greater; one hundred and fifty ſhips of the line, and frigates being ready built, moſt of them in a manner new, and all applicable in different ways to that ſervice. Privateers and Mooriſh corſaires poſſeſs not the beſt ſeamanſhip, and very little diſcipline, and in⯑deed can make no figure in regular ſervice, but in deſperate adventures, and animated with a luſt of plunder, they are truly formidable.

That the land forces of France are well adapted to concur with their marine in conjunct expeditions [88] of this nature. In ſuch expeditions, enterprize ſup⯑plies the want of diſcipline, and perhaps more than ſupplies it. Both for this, and for other ſervice (however contemptible their military is, in other re⯑ſpects) one arm is extremely good, the Engineer⯑ing and Artillery branch. The old officer corps in both being compoſed for the greater part of thoſe who were not gentlemen, or gentlemen newly ſuch, few have abandoned the ſervice, and the men are veterans well enough diſciplined, and very expert. In this piratical way they muſt make war with good advantage. They muſt do ſo, even on the ſide of Flanders, either offenſively or defenſively. This ſhews the difference between the policy of Louis the XIVth. who built a wall of braſs about his kingdom: and that of Joſeph the Second, who premeditatedly uncovered his whole frontier.

That Spain from the actual and expected preva⯑lence of French power, is in a moſt perilous ſitua⯑tion: perfectly dependent on the mercy of that Republick. If Auſtria is broken, or even hum⯑bled, ſhe will not dare to diſpute it's mandates.

In the preſent ſtate of things, we have nothing at all to dread from the power of Spain by ſea, or by land, or from any rivalry in commerce.

[89] That we have much to dread from the con⯑nexions into which Spain may be forced.

From the circumſtances of her territorial poſſeſ⯑ſions, of her reſources, and the whole of her civil and political ſtate, we may be authorized ſafely, and with undoubted confidence to affirm, that

Spain is not a ſubſtantive Power:

That ſhe muſt lean on France, or on England.

That it is as much for the intereſt of Great Britain to prevent the predominancy of a French intereſt in that kingdom, as if Spain were a province of the Crown of Great Britain, or a State actually depen⯑dent on it; full as much ſo as ever Portugal was reputed to be. This is a dependency of much greater value: and it's deſtruction, or it's being carried to any other dependency, of much more ſerious misfortune.

One of theſe two things muſt happen. Either Spain muſt ſubmit to circumſtances, and take ſuch conditions as France will impoſe; or ſhe muſt en⯑gage in hoſtilities along with the Emperor, and the King of Sardinia.

[90] If Spain ſhould be forced or awed into a treaty with the Republick of France, ſhe muſt open her ports and her commerce, as well as the land com⯑munication for the French labourers, who were ac⯑cuſtomed annually to gather in the harveſt in Spain. Indeed ſhe muſt grant a free communica⯑tion for travellers and traders through her whole country. In that caſe it is not conjectural, it is certain, the Clubs will give law in the Provinces; Bourgoing, or ſome ſuch miſcreant, will give law at Madrid.

In this England may acquieſee if ſhe pleaſes; and France will conclude a triumphant peace, with Spain under her abſolute dependence, with a broad highway into that, and into every State of Europe. She actually invites Great Britain to di⯑vide with her the ſpoils of the new world, and to make a partition of the Spaniſh Monarchy. Clearly it is better to do ſo, than to ſuffer France to poſſeſs thoſe ſpoils, and that territory alone; which, with⯑out doubt, unreſiſted by us, ſhe is altogether as able, as ſhe is willing to do.

This plan is propoſed by the French, in the way in which they propoſe all their plans; and in the only way in which indeed they can propoſe them, where there is no regular communication between his Majeſty and their Republick.

[91] What they propoſe is a plan. It is a plan alſo to reſiſt their predatory project. To remain quiet, and to ſuffer them to make their own uſe of a na⯑val power before our face, ſo as to awe and bully Spain into a ſubmiſſive peace, or to drive them into a ruinous war, without any meaſure on our part, I fear is no plan at all.

However, if the plan of co-operation which France deſires, and which her affiliated ſocieties here ardently wiſh and are conſtantly writing up, ſhould not be adopted, and the war between the Emperor and France ſhould continue, I think it not at all likely that Spain ſhould not be drawn into the quarrel. In that caſe, the neutrality of England will be a thing abſolutely impoſſible. The time is only the ſubject of deliberation.

Then the queſtion will be, whether we are to de⯑fer putting ourſelves into a poſture for the common defence, either by armament, or negotiation, or both, until Spain is actually attacked; that is, whether our Court will take a decided part for Spain, whilſt Spain on her ſide, is yet in a condi⯑tion to act with whatever degree of vigour ſhe may have; whilſt that vigour is yet unexhauſted;—or whether we ſhall connect ourſelves with her broken fortunes; after ſhe ſhall have received material blows, and when we ſhall have the whole ſlow [92] length of that always unwieldy, and all conſtructed, and then wounded and crippled body, to drag af⯑ter us, rather than to aid us. Whilſt our diſpoſi⯑tion is uncertain, Spain will not dare to put herſelf in ſuch a ſtate of defence as will make her hoſti⯑lity formidable, or her neutrality reſpectable.

If the deciſion is ſuch as the ſolution of this queſtion (I take it to be the true queſtion) con⯑ducts to—no time is to be loſt. But the meaſures though prompt, ought not to be raſh and indi⯑geſted. They ought to be well choſen, well com⯑bined, and well purſued. The ſyſtem muſt be ge⯑neral: but it muſt be executed, not ſucceſſively, or with interruption, but all together, uno flatu, in one melting, and one mould.

For this purpoſe, we muſt put Europe before us, which plainly is, juſt now, in all it's parts, in a ſtate of diſmay, derangement and confuſion; and very poſſibly amongſt all it's Sovereigns, full of ſe⯑cret heart-burning, diſtruſt, and mutual accuſation. Perhaps it may labour under worſe evils. There is no vigour any where, except the diſtempered vi⯑gour and energy of France. That country has but too much life in it, when every thing around is ſo diſpoſed to tameneſs and languor. The very vices of the French ſyſtem at home tend to give force to foreign exertions. The Generals muſt join [93] the armies. They muſt lead them to enterprize, or they are likely to periſh by their hands. Thus without law or government of her own, France gives law to all the Governments in Europe.

This great maſs of political matter muſt, have been always under the view of thinkers for the pub⯑lick, whether they act in office or not. Amongſt events, even the late calamitous events were in the book of contingency. Of courſe, they muſt have been in deſign, at leaſt, provided for. A plan which takes in as many as poſſible of the States concerned, will rather facilitate and ſimplify a ra⯑tional ſcheme for preſerving Spain, (if that were our ſole, as I think it ought to be our principal object) than to delay and perplex it.

If we ſhould think that a provident policy (per⯑haps now more than provident, urgent and neceſ⯑ſary) ſhould lead us to act, we cannot take mea⯑ſures as if nothing had been done. We muſt ſee the faults, if any, which have conducted to the preſent misfortunes; not for the ſake of criticiſm, military or political, or from the common motives of blaming perſons and counſels which have not been ſucceſsful; but in order, if we can, to admi⯑niſter ſome remedy to theſe diſaſters, by the adop⯑tion of plans, more bottomed in principle, and [94] built on with more diſcretion. Miſtakes may be leſſons.

There ſeem indeed to have been ſeveral miſtakes in the political principles on which the War was en⯑tered into, as well as in the plans upon which it was conducted; ſome of them very fundamental, and not only viſibly, but I may ſay, palpably erroneous; and I think him to have leſs than the diſcernment of a very ordinary Stateſman. who could not fore⯑ſee from the very beginning, unpleaſant conſe⯑quences from thoſe plans, though not the unparal⯑leled diſgraces and diſaſters which really did attend them: for they were, both principles and mea⯑ſures, wholly new and out of the common courſe, without any thing apparently very grand in the conception, to juſtify this total departure from all rule.

For, in the firſt place, the united Sovereigns very much injured their cauſe by admitting, that they had nothing to do with the interiour arrange⯑ments of France; in contradiction to the whole tenour of the publick Law of Europe, and to the correſpondent practice of all it's States, from the time we have any hiſtory of them. In this parti⯑cular, the two German Courts ſeem to have as little conſulted the Publiciſts of Germany, as [95] their own true intereſts, and thoſe of all the Sove⯑reigns of Germany and Europe. This admiſſion of a falſe principle in the Law of Nations, brought them into an apparent contradiction, when they inſiſted on the re-eſtabliſhment of the Royal Au⯑thority in France. But this confuſed and contra⯑dictory proceeding gave riſe to a practical error of worſe conſequence. It was derived from one and the ſame root; namely, that the perſon of the Mo⯑narch of France was every thing; and the Mo⯑narchy, and the intermediate orders of the State, by which the Monarchy was upheld, were nothing. So that, if the united Potentates had ſucceeded ſo far, as to re-eſtabliſh the authority of that King, and that he ſhould be ſo ill-adviſed as to confirm all the confiſeations, and to recognize as a lawful body, and to claſs himſelf with, that rabble of mur⯑derers (and there wanted not perſons who would ſo have adviſed him) there was nothing in the principle, or in the proceeding of the United Powers, to prevent ſuch an arrangement.

An expedition to free a brother Sovereign from priſon, was undoubtedly a generous and chival⯑rous undertaking. But the ſpirit and generoſity would not have been leſs, if the policy had been more profound, and more comprehenſive; that is, if it had taken in thoſe conſiderations, and thoſe perſons, by whom, and, in ſome meaſure, for [96] whom, Monarchy exiſts. This would become a bottom for a ſyſtem of ſolid and permanent policy, and of operations conformable to that ſyſtem.

The ſame fruitful error was the cauſe why no⯑thing was done to impreſs the people of France (ſo far as we can at all conſider the inhabitants of France as a people) with an idea that the Govern⯑ment was ever to be really French, or indeed any thing elſe than the nominal government of a Mo⯑narch, a Monarch abſolute as over them, but whoſe ſole ſupport was to ariſe from foreign Poten⯑tates, and who was to be kept on his Throne by German forces; in ſhort, that the King of France was to be a Viceroy to the Emperor and the King of Pruſſia.

It was the firſt time that foreign Powers inter⯑fering in the concerns of a nation divided into par⯑ties, have thought proper to thruſt wholly out of their councils, to poſtpone, to diſcountenance, to reject, and in a manner to diſgrace the party whom thoſe Powers came to ſupport. The ſingle perſon of a King cannot be a party. Woe to the King who is himſelf his party! The Royal party with the King or his Repreſentatives at it's head, is the Royal cauſe. Foreign Powers have hitherto choſen to give to ſuch wars as this, the appearance of a civil conteſt, and not that of an hoſtile invaſion. [97] When the Spaniards, in the ſixteenth century, ſent aids to the chiefs of the League, they appeared as Allies to that League, and to the impriſoned King (the Cardinal de Bourbon) which that League had ſet up. When the Germans came to the aid of the Proteſtant Princes, in the ſame ſeries of civil wars, they came as Allies. When the Engliſh came to the aid of Henry the Fourth, they appear⯑ed as Allies to that Prince. So did the French always when they intermeddled in the affairs of Germany. They came to aid a party there. When the Engliſh and Dutch intermeddled in the ſucceſſion of Spain, they appeared as Allies to the Emperor Charles the Sixth. In ſhort, the po⯑licy has been as uniform as it's principles were ob⯑vious to an ordinary eye.

According to all the old principles of law and policy, a regency ought to have been appointed by the French Princes of the Blood, Nobles, and Par⯑liaments, and then recognized by the combined Powers. Fundamental law and antient uſage, as well as the clear reaſon of the thing, have always ordained it during an impriſonment of the King of France; as in the caſe of John, and of Francis the Firſt. A Monarchy ought not to be left a mo⯑ment without a Repreſentative, having an intereſt in the ſucceſſion. The orders of the State, ought alſo to have been recognized in thoſe amongſt [98] whom alone they exiſted in freedom, that is, in the Emigrants.

Thus laying down a firm foundation on the re⯑cognition of the authorities of the Kingdom of France, according to nature and to it's fundamen⯑tal laws, and not according to the novel and incon⯑ſiderate principles of the uſurpation which the United Powers were come to extirpate. The King of Pruſſia and the Emperor, as Allies of the antient Kingdom of France, would have proceeded with dignity, firſt, to free the Monarch, if poſſible; if not, to ſecure the Monarchy as principal in the deſign; and in order to avoid all riſques to that great object (the object of other ages than the preſent, and of other countries than that of France) they would of courſe avoid proceeding with more haſte, or in a different manner than what the nature of ſuch an object required.

Adopting this, the only rational ſyſtem, the ra⯑tional mode of proceeding upon it, was to com⯑mence with an effective ſiege of Liſle, which the French Generals muſt have ſeen taken before their faces, or be forced to fight. A plentiful country of friends, from whence to draw ſupplies, would have been behind them; a plentiful country of enemies, from whence to force ſupplies, would have been before them. Good towns were always [99] within reach to depoſit their hoſpitals and maga⯑zines. The March from Liſle to Paris, is through a leſs defenſible country, and the diſtance is hardly ſo great as from Longwy to Paris.

If the old politick and military ideas had govern⯑ed, the advanced guard would have been formed of thoſe who beſt knew the country, and had ſome intereſt in it, ſupported by ſome of the beſt light troops and light artillery, whilſt the grand ſolid body of an army diſciplined to perfection, proceeded lei⯑ſurely, and in cloſe connexion with all it's ſtores, proviſions, and heavy cannon, to ſupport the ex⯑pedite body in caſe of miſadventure, or to improve and compleat it's ſucceſs.

The direct contrary of all this was put in prac⯑tice. In conſequence of the original ſin of this project, the army of the French Princes was every where thrown into the rear, and no part of it brought forward to the laſt moment, the time of the commencement of the ſecret negotiation. This naturally made an ill impreſſion on the people, and furniſhed an occaſion for the rebels at Paris to give out that the faithful ſubjects of the King were diſtruſted, deſpiſed, and abhorred by his allies. The march was directed through a ſkirt of Lor⯑raine, and thence into a part of Champagne, the Duke of Brunſwick leaving all the ſtrongeſt places [100] behind him; leaving alſo behind him, the ſtrength of his artillery; and by this means giving a ſu⯑periority to the French, in the only way in which the preſent France is able to oppoſe a German force.

In conſequence of the adoption of thoſe falſe politicks, which turned every thing on the King's ſole and ſingle perſon, the whole plan of the war was reduced to nothing but a coup de main, in or⯑der to ſet that Prince at liberty. If that failed, every thing was to be given up.

The ſcheme of a coup de main, might (under fa⯑vourable circumſtances) be very fit for a partizan at the head of a light corps, by whoſe failure no⯑thing material would be deranged. But for a royal army of eighty thouſand men, headed by a King in perſon, who was to march an hundred and fifty miles through an enemy's country—ſurely this was a plan unheard of.

Although this plan was not well choſen, and proceeded upon principles altogether ill judged and impolitick, the ſuperiority of the military force, might in a great degree have ſupplied the defects, and furniſhed a corrective to the miſtakes. The greater probability was that the Duke of Brunſwick would make his way to Paris, over the bellies of the [101] rabble of drunkards, robbers, aſſaſſins, rioters, mu⯑tineers, and half-grown boys, under the ill-obeyed command of a theatrical, vapouring, reduced Cap⯑tain of cavalry, who oppoſed that great Comman⯑der and great army. But—Diis aliter viſum—He began to treat, the winds blew, and the rains beat, the houſe fell—becauſe it was built upon ſand—and great was the fall thereof. This march was not an exact copy of either of the two marches made by the Duke of Parma into France.

There is ſome ſecret. Sickneſs and weather may defeat an army purſuing a wrong plan; not that I believe the ſickneſs to have been ſo great as it has been reported: but there is a great deal of ſuperfluous humiliation in this buſineſs, a perfect prodigality of diſgrace. Some advantage, real or imaginary, muſt compenſate to a great Sovereign, and to a great General, for ſo immenſe a loſs of reputation. Longwy, ſituated as it is, might (one ſhould think) be evacuated without a capitulation with a Republick juſt proclaimed by the King of Pruſſia as an uſurping and rebellious body. He was not far from Luxembourg. He might have taken away the obnoxious French in his flight. It does not appear to have been neceſ⯑ſary that thoſe Magiſtrates who declared for their own King, on the faith, and under the immediate protection of the King of Pruſſia, ſhould be deli⯑vered over to the gallows. It was not neceſſary that [102] the emigrant Nobility and Gentry who ſerved with the King of Pruſſia's army, under his immediate command, ſhould be excluded from the cartel, and given up to be hanged as rebels. Never was ſo groſs, and ſo cruel a breach of the public faith, not with an enemy, but with a friend. Dumourier, has dropped very ſingular hints. Cuſtine, has ſpoken out more broadly. Theſe accounts have never been contradicted. They tend to make an eternal rup⯑ture between the Powers. The French have given out, that the Duke of Brunſwick endeavoured to negotiate ſome name and place for the captive King, amongſt the murderers and proſcribers of thoſe who have loſt their all for his cauſe. Even this has not been denied.

It is ſingular, and indeed, a thing, under all it's circumſtances, inconceivable, that every thing ſhould by the Emperor be abandoned to the King of Pruſſia. That Monarch was conſidered as prin⯑cipal. In the nature of things, as well as in his poſition with regard to the war, he was only an ally; and a new ally, with croſſing intereſts in many particulars, and of a policy rather uncertain. At beſt, and ſuppoſing him to act with the greateſt fidelity, the Emperor, and the Empire, to him muſt be but ſecondary objects. Countries out of Ger⯑many, muſt affect him in a ſtill more remote man⯑ner. France, other than from the fear of it's doc⯑trinal [103] principles, can to him be no object at all. Accordingly, the Rhine, Sardinia, and the Swiſs, are left to their fate. The King of Pruſſia has no direct and immediate concern with France; conſe⯑quentially, to be ſure, a great deal; but the Empe⯑ror touches France directly in many parts: he is a near neighbour to Sardinia, by his Milaneſe terri⯑tories; he borders on Switzerland; Cologne, poſ⯑ſeſſed by his uncle, is between Mentz and Treves, the King of Pruſſia's territories on the Lower Rhine. The Emperor is the natural guardian of Italy and Germany; the natural balance againſt the ambition of France, whether Republican or Monarchical. His Miniſters and his Generals, therefore, ought to have had their full ſhare in every material conſultation, which I ſuſpect they had not. If he has no Miniſter capable of plans of policy, which comprehend the ſuperintendancy of a war, or no General with the leaſt of a political head, things have been as they muſt be. However, in all the parts of this ſtrange proceeding, there muſt be a ſecret.

It is probably known to Miniſters. I do not mean to penetrate into it. My ſpeculations on this head muſt be only conjectural. If the King of Pruſſia, under the pretext, or on the reality of ſome information relative to ill practice on the part of the Court of Vienna, takes advantage of his [104] being admitted into the heart of the Emperor's do⯑minions in the character of an ally, afterwards to join the common enemy, and to enable France to ſeize the Netherlands, and to reduce and humble the Empire, I cannot conceive, upon every prin⯑ciple, any thing more alarming for this country, ſe⯑parately, and as a part of the general ſyſtem. After all, we may be looking in vain in the regions of po⯑liticks, for what is only the operation of temper and character upon accidental circumſtances—But I never knew accidents to decide the whole of any great buſineſs; and I never knew temper to act, but that ſome ſyſtem of politicks, agreeable to it's peculiar ſpirit, was blended with it, ſtrengthened it, and got ſtrength from it. Therefore the poli⯑ticks can hardly be put out of the queſtion.

Great miſtakes have been committed; at leaſt I hope ſo. If there have been none, the caſe in fu⯑ture is deſperate. I have endeayoured to point out ſome of thoſe which have occurred to me, and moſt of them very early.

Whatever may be the cauſe of the preſent ſtate of things, on a full and mature view and compa⯑riſon of the hiſtorical matter, of the tranſactions that have paſſed before our eyes, and of the future proſpect, I think I am authorized to form an opi⯑nion without the leaſt heſitation.

[105] That there never was, nor is, nor ever will be, or ever can be, the leaſt rational hope of making an impreſſion on France by any Continental Powers, if England is not a part, is not the directing part, is not the ſoul, of the whole confederacy againſt it.

This, ſo far as it is an anticipation of future, is grounded on the whole tenour of former hiſtory—In ſpeculation it is to be accounted for on two plain principles.

Firſt, That Great Britain is likely to take a more fair and equal part in the alliance, than the other Powers, as having leſs of croſſing intereſt, or per⯑plexed diſcuſſion with any of them.

Secondly, Becauſe France cannot have to deal with any of theſe continental Sovereigns, without their feeling that nation, as a maritime Power, greatly ſuperiour to them all put together; a force which is only to be kept in check by England.

England, except during the excentrick aberration of Charles the Second, has always conſidered it as her duty and intereſt, to take her place in ſuch a confederacy. Her chief diſputes muſt ever be with France, and if England ſhews herſelf indiffe⯑rent and unconcerned when theſe Powers are com⯑bined [106] againſt the enterprizes of France, ſhe is to look with certainty for the ſame indifference on the part of theſe Powers, when ſhe may be at war with that nation. This will tend totally to diſconnect this kingdom from the ſyſtem of Europe, in which, if ſhe ought not raſhly to meddle, ſhe ought never wholly to withdraw herſelf from it.

If then England is put in motion, whether by a conſideration of the general ſafety, or of the influ⯑ence of France upon Spain, or by the probable operations of this new ſyſtem on the Netherlands, it muſt embrace in it's project the whole as much as poſſible, and the part it takes ought to be as much as poſſible a leading and preſiding part.

I therefore beg leave to ſuggeſt,

Firſt, That a Miniſter ſhould forthwith be ſent to Spain, to encourage that Court to perſevere in the meaſures they have adopted againſt France; to make a cloſe alliance and guarantee of poſſeſ⯑ſions, as againſt France, with that power, and whilſt the formality of the treaty is pending, to aſſure them of our protection, poſtponing any leſſer diſ⯑putes to another occaſion.

Secondly, To aſſure the Court of Vienna, of our deſire to enter into our antient connexions with [107] her, and to ſupport her effectually in the war which France has declared againſt her.

Thirdly, To animate the Swiſs, and the King of Sardinia, to take a part, as the latter once did on the principles of the Grand Alliance.

Fourthly, To put an end to our diſputes with Ruſſia, and mutually to forget the paſt. I believe if ſhe is ſatisfied of this oblivion, ſhe will return to her old ſentiments, with regard to this Court, and will take a more forward part in this buſineſs than any other Power.

Fifthly, If what has happened to the King of Pruſſia is only in conſequence of a ſort of panick or of levity, and an indiſpoſition to perſevere long in one deſign—the ſupport and concurrence of Ruſſia will tend to ſteady him, and to give him reſolution. If he be ill diſpoſed, with that power on his back, and without one ally in Europe, I conceive he will not be eaſily led to derange the plan.

Sixthly, To uſe the joint influence of our Court, and of our then Allied Powers, with Holland, to arm as fully as ſhe can by ſea, and to make ſome ad⯑dition by land.

[108] Seventhly, To acknowledge the King of France's next brother (aſſiſted by ſuch a Council and ſuch Repreſentatives of the Kingdom of France, as ſhall be thought proper) Regent of France, and to ſend that Prince a ſmall ſupply of money, arms, cloath⯑ing and artillery.

Eighthly, To give force to theſe negociations, an inſtant naval armament ought to be adopted; one ſquadron for the Mediterranean; another for the Channel. The ſeaſon is convenient, moſt of our trade being, as I take it, at home.

After ſpeaking of a plan formed upon the an⯑tient policy and practice of Great Britain, and of Europe; to which this is exactly conformable in every reſpect, with no deviation whatſoever, and which is, I conceive much more ſtrongly called for by the preſent circumſtances, than by any former, I muſt take notice of another which I hear, but cannot perſuade myſelf to believe, is in agitation. This plan is grounded upon the very ſame view of things which is here ſtated, namely, the danger to all Sovereigns, and old Republicks, from the prevalence of French power and influ⯑ence.

[109] It is to form a Congreſs of all the European powers, for the purpoſe of a general defenſive alli⯑ance, the objects of which ſhould be,

Firſt, The recognition of this new Republick (which they well know is formed on the princi⯑ples, and for the declared purpoſe of the deſtruc⯑tion of all Kings), and whenever the heads of this new Republick ſhall conſent to releaſe the Royal Captives, to make Peace with them.

Secondly, To defend themſelves with their joint forces againſt the open aggreſſions or the ſecret practices, intrigues and writings, which are uſed to propagate the French principles.

It is eaſy to diſcover from whoſe ſhop this com⯑modity comes. It is ſo perfectly abſurd, that if that, or any thing like it, meets with a ſerious entertainment in any Cabinet, I ſhould think it the effect of what is called a judicial blindneſs, the certain forerunner of the deſtruction of all Crowns and Kingdoms.

An offenſive alliance, in which union is pre⯑ſerved, by common efforts in common dangers, againſt a common active enemy, may preſerve it's conſiſtency, and may produce for a given time, [110] ſome conſiderable effect; though this is not eaſy, and for any very long period, can hardly be ex⯑pected. But a defenſive alliance, formed of long diſcordant intereſts, with innumerable diſcuſſions exiſting, having no one pointed object to which it is directed, which is to be held together with an unremitted vigilance, as watchful in peace as in war, is ſo evidently impoſſible, is ſuch a chimera, is ſo contrary to human nature, and the courſe of human affairs, that I am perſuaded no perſon in his ſenſes, except thoſe whoſe Country, Religion and Sovereign, are depoſited in the French funds, could dream of it. There is not the ſlighteſt petty boundary ſuit, no difference between a family ar⯑rangement, no ſort of miſunderſtanding, or croſs purpoſe between the pride and etiquette of Courts, that would not entirely disjoint this ſort of alli⯑ance, and render it as ſutile in it's effects, as it is feeble in it's principle. But when we conſider that the main drift of that defenſive alliance muſt be to prevent the operation of intrigue, miſchievous doctrine and evil example, in the ſucceſs of un⯑provoked rebellion, regieide, and ſyſtematick aſ⯑ſaſſination and maſſacre, the abſurdity of ſuch a ſcheme becomes quite lamentable. Open the communication with France, and the reſt follows of courſe.

[111] How far the interiour circumſtances of this coun⯑try ſupport what is ſaid with regard to it's foreign politicks, muſt be left to better judgments. I am ſure the French faction here is infinitely ſtrength⯑ened by the ſucceſs of the aſſaſſins on the other ſide of the water.—This evil in the heart of Europe muſt be extirpated from that center, or no part of the circumference can be free from the miſchief which radiates from it, and which will ſpread circle beyond circle, in ſpite of all the little defenſive precautions which can be employed againſt it.

I do not put my name to theſe hints ſubmitted to the conſideration of reflecting men. It is of too little importance to ſuppoſe the name of the writer could add any weight to the ſtate of things con⯑tained in this paper. That ſtate of things preſſes irreſiſtibly on my judgment, and it lies, and has long lain, with an heavy weight upon my mind. I cannot think that what is done in France, is bene⯑ficial to the human race. If it were, the Engliſh Conſtitution ought no more to ſtand againſt it than the antient Conſtitution of the kingdom in which the new ſyſtem prevails. I thought it the duty of a man, not unconcerned for the publick, and who is a faithful ſubject to the King, reſpect⯑fully to ſubmit this ſtate of facts at this new ſtep [112] in the progreſs of the French arms and politicks, to his Majeſty, to his confidential ſervants, and to thoſe perſons who, though not in office, by their birth, their rank, their fortune, their character and their reputation for wiſdom, ſeem to me to have a large ſtake in the ſtability of the antient order of things.

Bath, November 5, 1793.

REMARKS ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES WITH RESPECT TO FRANCE.
BEGUN IN OCTOBER, 1793.
[115] REMARKS ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
BEGUN IN OCTOBER, 1793.

AS the propoſed manifeſto is, I underſtand, to promulgate to the world the general idea of a plan for the regulation of a great kingdom, and through the regulation of that kingdom probably to decide the fate of Europe for ever, nothing requires a more ſerious deliberation with regard to the time of making it, the circumſtances of thoſe to whom it is addreſſed, and the matter it is to contain.

As to the time, (with the due diffidence in my own opinion) I have ſome doubts whether it is not rather unfavourable to the iſſuing any Manifeſto, with regard to the intended government of France; and for this reaſon, that it is, (upon the principal [116] point of our attack) a time of calamity and defeat. Manifeſtoes of this nature are commonly made when the army of ſome Sovereign enters into the enemy's country in great force, and under the im⯑poſing authority of that force employs menaces towards thoſe whom he deſires to awe; and makes promiſes to thoſe whom he wiſes to engage in his favour.

As to a party, what has been done at Toulon leaves no doubt, that the party for which we de⯑clare muſt be that which ſubſtantially declares for Royalty as the baſis of the government.

As to menaces—Nothing, in my opinion, can contribute more effectually to lower any Sovereign in the publick eſtimation, and to turn his defeats into diſgraces, than to threaten in a moment of im⯑potence. The ſecond Manifeſto of the Duke of Brunſwick appeared therefore to the world to be extremely ill-timed. However, if his menaces in that Manifeſto had been ſeaſonable, they were not without an object. Great crimes then appre⯑hended, and great evils then impending, were to be prevented. At this time, every act, which early menaces might poſſibly have prevented, is done. Puniſhment and vengeance alone remain, and God forbid that they ſhould ever be forgotten. But the puniſhment of enormous offenders, will [117] not be the leſs ſevere, or the leſs exemplary when it is not threatened at a moment when we have it not in our power to execute our threats. On the other ſide, to paſs by proceedings of ſuch a nefa⯑rious nature, in all kinds, as have been carried on in France, without any ſignification of reſentment, would be in effect to ratify them; and thus to become acceſſaries after the fact, in all thoſe enor⯑mities which it is impoſſible to repeat, or think of without horror. An abſolute ſilence appears to me to be at this time the only ſafe courſe.

The ſecond uſual matter of Manifeſtoes is com⯑poſed of promiſes to thoſe who co-operate with our deſigns. Theſe promiſes depend in a great mea⯑ſure, if not wholly, on the apparent power of the perſon who makes them to fulfil his engagements. A time of diſaſter on the part of the promiſer, ſeems not to add much to the dignity of his per⯑ſon, or to the effect of his offers. One would hardly wiſh to ſeduce any unhappy perſons to give the laſt provocation to a mercileſs tyranny, without very effectual means of protecting them.

The time therefore ſeems (as I ſaid) not favourable to a general Manifeſto, on account of the unplea⯑ſant ſituation of our affairs. However, I write in a changing ſcene, when a meaſure very imprudent to day, may be very proper to-morrow. Some [118] great victory may alter the whole ſtate of the queſ⯑tion, ſo far as it regards our power of fulfilling any engagement we may think fit to make.

But there is another conſideration of far greater importance for all the purpoſes of this Manifeſto. The publick, and the parties concerned, will look ſomewhat to the diſpoſition of the promiſer indi⯑cated by his conduct, as well as to his power of fulfilling his engagements.

Speaking of this nation as part of a general com⯑bination of powers, are we quite ſure, that others can believe us to be ſincere, or that we can be even fully aſſured of our own ſincerity in the pro⯑tection of thoſe who ſhall riſque their lives for the reſtoration of Monarchy in France, when the world ſees, that thoſe who are the natural, legal, conſti⯑tutional repreſentatives of that Monarchy, if it has any, have not had their names ſo much as men⯑tioned in any one publick act; that in no way whatever are their perſons brought forward, that their rights have not been expreſsly or implicitly allowed, and that they have not been in the leaſt conſulted on the important intereſts they have at ſtake. On the contrary, they are kept in a ſtate of obſcurity and contempt, and in a degree of in⯑digence at times bordering on beggary. They are in fact, little leſs priſoners in the village of [119] Hanau, than the Royal captives who are locked up in the tower of the Temple. What is this, according to the common indications which guide the judgment of mankind, but, under the pretext of protecting the crown of France, in reality to uſurp it?

I am alſo very apprehenſive, that there are other circumſtances which muſt tend to weaken the force of our declarations. No partiality to the allied powers, can prevent great doubts on the fairneſs of our intentions as ſupporters of the Crown of France, or of the true principles of legitimate Government in oppoſition to Jacobiniſm, when it is viſible that the two leading orders of the State of France, who are now the victims, and who muſt always be the true and ſole ſupports of Mo⯑narchy in that country, are, at beſt, in ſome of their deſcriptions, conſidered only as objects of charity, and others are, when employed, employed only as mercenary ſoldiers; that they are thrown back out of all reputable ſervice, are in a manner diſowned, conſidered as nothing in their own cauſe, and never once conſulted in the concerns of their King, their country, their laws, their religion, and their property! We even affect to be aſhamed of them. In all our proceedings we carefully avoid the appearance of being of a party with them. In all our ideas of Treaty we do not regard [120] them as what they are, the two leading orders of the kingdom. If we do not conſider them in that light, we muſt recognize the ſavages by whom they have been ruined, and who have declared war upon Europe, whilſt they diſgrace and perſecute human nature, and openly defy the God that made them, as real proprietors of France.

I am much afraid, too, that we ſhall ſcarcely be believed fair ſupporters of lawful Monarchy againſt Jacobiniſm, ſo long as we continue to make and to obſerve cartels with the Jacobins, and on fair terms exchange priſoners with them, whilſt the Royaliſts, invited to our ſtandard, and employed under our publick faith, againſt the Jacobins, if taken by that ſavage faction, are given up to the executioner without the leaſt attempt whatſoever at repriſal. For this, we are to look at the King of Pruſſia's conduct, compared with his Mani⯑feſtoes about a twelvemonth ago. For this we are to look at the capitulations of Mentz and Va⯑lenciennes, made in the courſe of the preſent cam⯑paign. By theſe two capitulations, the Chriſtian Royaliſts were excluded from any participation in the cauſe of the combined powers. They were conſidered as the outlaws of Europe. Two armies were in effect ſent againſt them. One of thoſe armies (that which ſurrendered Mentz) was very near overpowering the Chriſtians of Poitou, and [121] the other (that which ſurrendered at Valenciennes) has actually cruſhed the people whom oppreſſion and deſpair had driven to reſiſtance at Lyons, has maſſacred ſeveral thouſands of them in cold blood, pillaged the whole ſubſtance of the place, and pur⯑ſued their rage to the very houſes, condemning that noble city to deſolation, in the unheard of manner we have ſeen it devoted.

It is then plain by a conduct which overturns a thouſand declarations, that we take the Royaliſts of France only as an inſtrument of ſome conve⯑nience in a temporary hoſtility with the Jacobins, but that we regard thoſe atheiſtick and murderous barbarians as the bonâ fide poſſeſſors of the ſoil of France. It appears at leaſt, that we conſider them as a fair Government de facto, if not de jure; a reſiſtance to which in favour of the King of France, by any man who happened to be born within that country, might equitably be conſidered by other nations, as the crime of treaſon.

For my part, I would ſooner put my hand into the fire than ſign an invitation to oppreſſed men to fight under my ſtandard, and then on every ſiniſter event of war, cruelly give them up to be puniſhed as the baſeſt of traitors, as long as I had one of the common enemy in my hands to be put to death in order to ſecure thoſe under my protection, and to [122] vindicate the common honour of Sovereigns. We hear nothing of this kind of ſecurity in favour of thoſe whom we invite to the ſupport of our cauſe. Without it, I am not a little apprehenſive that the proclamations of the combined powers might (contrary to their intention no doubt) be looked upon as frauds, and cruel traps laid for their lives.

So far as to the correſpondence between our declarations and our conduct, let the declaration be worded as it will, the conduct is the practical comment by which, and which alone it can be un⯑derſtood. This conduct acting on the declara⯑tion, leaves a Monarchy without a Monarch; and without any repreſentative or truſtee for the Mo⯑narch, and the Monarchy. It ſuppoſes a kingdom without ſtates and orders; a territory without pro⯑prietors; and faithful ſubjects, who are to be left to the fate of rebels and traitors.

The affair of the eſtabliſhment of a Govern⯑ment is a very difficult undertaking for foreign powers to act in as principals; though as auxiliaries and mediators, it has been not at all unuſual, and may be a meaſure full of policy and humanity, and true dignity.

The firſt thing we ought to do, ſuppoſing us not giving the law as conquerors, but acting as [123] friendly powers applied to for counſel and aſſiſtance in the ſettlement of a diſtracted country, is well to conſider the compoſition, nature, and temper of its objects, and particularly of thoſe who actually do, or who ought to exerciſe power in that ſtate. It is material to know who they are, and how conſtituted, whom we conſider as the people of France?

The next conſideration is, through whom our arrangements are to be made, and on what princi⯑ples the Government we propoſe is to be eſta⯑bliſhed.

The firſt queſtion on the people is this, Whether we are to conſider the individuals now actually in France, numerically taken and arranged into Jacobin Clubs, as the body politick, conſtituting the nation of France? or, Whether we conſider the original individual proprietors of lands, expelled ſince the Revolution, and the ſtates and the bodies politick, ſuch as the colleges of juſtice called parliaments, the corporations noble and not noble of balliages, and towns, and cities, the biſhops and the clergy, as the true conſtituent parts of the nation, and forming the legally organized parts of the people of France?

[124] In this ſerious concern it is very neceſſary that we ſhould have the moſt diſtinct ideas annexed to the terms we employ; becauſe it is evident, that an abuſe of the term people, has been the original fundamental cauſe of thoſe evils, the cure of which, by war and policy, is the preſent object of all the ſtates of Europe.

If we conſider the acting power in France in any legal conſtruction of publick law, as the people, the queſtion is decided in favour of the Republick one and indiviſible. But we have decided for Monarchy. If ſo, we have a King and Subjects; and that King and Subjects have rights and privi⯑leges which ought to be ſupported at home; for I do not ſuppoſe that the Government of that king⯑dom can, or ought to be regulated, by the arbi⯑trary Mandate of a foreign Confederacy.

As to the faction exerciſing power, to ſuppoſe that Monarchy can be ſupported by principled Regicides, Religion by profeſſed Atheiſts, Order by Clubs of Jacobins, Property by Committees of Proſcription, and Juriſprudence by Revolu⯑tionary Tribunals, is to be ſanguine in a degree of which I am incapable. On them I decide, for myſelf, that theſe perſons are not the legal Corpo⯑ration of France, and that it is not with them we can (if we would) ſettle the Government of France.

[125] Since, then, we have decided for Monarchy in that kingdom, we ought alſo to ſettle who is to be the Monarch, who is to be the Guardian of a Minor, and how the Monarch and Monarchy is to be modified and ſupported? If the Monarch is to be elected, who the Electors are to be: if heredi⯑tary, what order is eſtabliſhed correſponding with an hereditary Monarchy, and fitted to maintain it? Who are to modify it in its exerciſe? Who are to reſtrain its powers where they ought to be limited, to ſtrengthen them where they are to be ſupported, or to enlarge them, where the ob⯑ject, the time, and the circumſtances, may de⯑mand their extenſion? Theſe are things which, in the outline, ought to be made diſtinct and clear; for if they are not (eſpecially with regard to thoſe great points, who are the proprietors of the ſoil, and what is the corporation of the kingdom) there is nothing to hinder the compleat eſtabliſhment of a Jacobin Republick, (ſuch as that formed in 1790 and 1791) under the name of a Democracie Royale. Jacobiniſm does not conſiſt in the having or not having, a certain Pageant under the name of a King, but ‘"in taking the people as equal individuals, without any corporate name or de⯑ſcription, without attention to property, without diviſion of powers, and forming the governmen of delegates from a number of men ſo conſtituted, [126] in deſtroying or confiſcating property, and bribing the publick creditors, or the poor, with the ſpoils, now of one part of the community, now of ano⯑ther, without regard to preſcription or poſſeſſion."’

I hope no one can be ſo very blind as to ima⯑gine that Monarchy can be acknowledged and ſupported in France upon any othe baſis than that of its property, corporate and individual, or that it can enjoy a moment's permanence or ſecu⯑rity upon any ſcheme of things, which ſets aſide all the antient corporate capacities and diſtinctions of the kingdom, and ſubverts the whole fabrick of its antient laws and uſages, political, civil and re⯑ligious, to introduce a ſyſtem founded on the ſup⯑poſed Rights of the Man, and the abſolute equality of the human race. Unleſs, therefore, we declare clearly and diſtinctly in favour of the reſtoration of property, and confide to the hereditary property of the kingdom, the limitation and qualifications of its hereditary Monarchy, the blood and treaſure of Europe is waſted for the eſtabliſhment of Jacobiniſm in France. There is no doubt that Danton and Robeſpiere, Chaumette and Barrere, that Condorcet, that Thomas Paine, that La Fayette, and the Exbiſhop of Autun, the Abbé Gregoire, with all the gang of the Syeyes's, the Henriots, and the Santerres, if they could ſecure themſelves in the fruits of their rebellion and robbery, would be perfectly indifferent, whether the moſt unhappy [127] of all infants, whom by the leſſons of the ſhoe⯑maker, his governour and guardian, they are train⯑ing up ſtudiouſly and methodically to be an idiot, or what is worſe, the moſt wicked and baſe of mankind, continues to receive his civic education in the Temple or the Thuilleries, whilſt they, and ſuch as they, really govern the kingdom.

It cannot be too often and too ſtrongly incul⯑cated, that Monarchy and property muſt, in France, go together; or neither can exiſt. To think of the poſſibility of the exiſtence of a per⯑manent and hereditary Royalty, where nothing elſe is hereditary or permanent in point either of perſonal or corporate dignity, is a ruinous chimera worthy of the Abbé Syeyes and thoſe wicked Fools his Aſſociates, who uſurped Power by the Murders of the 19th of July, and the 6th of October 1789, and who brought forth the Monſter which they called Democracie Royale, or the Conſtitution.

I believe that moſt thinking men, would prefer infinitely ſome ſober and ſenſible form of a Re⯑publick, in which there was no mention at all of a King, but which held out ſome reaſonable ſecurity to property, life, and perſonal freedom, to a ſcheme of things like this Democracie Royale, founded on impiety, immorality, fraudulent currencies, the confiſcation of innocent individuals, and the pre⯑tended Rights of Man; and which, in effect, excluding the whole body of the nobility, clergy, [128] and landed property of a great nation, threw every thing into the hands of a deſperate ſet of obſcure adventurers who led to every miſchief, a blind and bloody band of Sans-Culottes. At the head, or rather at the tail of this ſyſtem, was a miſerable pageant as its oſtenſible inſtrument, who was to be treated with every ſpecies of indignity, till the moment, when he was conveyed from the Palace of Contempt to the Dungeon of Horrour, and thence led by a Brewer of his Capital through the applauſes of an hired, frantick, drunken multitude, to loſe his head upon a ſcaffold.

This is the Conſtitution, or Democracie Royale; and this is what infallibly would be again ſet up in France to run exactly the ſame round, if the predominant power ſhould ſo far be forced to ſub⯑mit as to receive the name of a King, leaving it to the Jacobins, (that is, to thoſe who have ſub⯑verted Royalty and deſtroyed Property) to modify the one, and to diſtribute the other as ſpoil. By the Jacobins I mean indiſcriminately the Briſſotins and the Maratiſts, knowing no ſort of difference between them. As to any other party, none exiſts in that unhappy country. The Royaliſts (thoſe in Poitou excepted) are baniſhed and extinguiſhed; and as to what they call the Conſtitutionaliſts, or Democrats Royaux, they never had an exiſtence of the ſmalleſt degree of power, conſideration or autho⯑rity; [129] nor, if they differ at all from the reſt of the Atheiſtick Banditti (which from their actions and principles I have no reaſon to think) were they ever other than the temporary tools and inſtru⯑ments of the more determined, able, and ſyſte⯑matick Regicides. Several attempts have been made to ſupport this chimerical Democracie Royale—the firſt was by La Fayette—the laſt by Dumourier:—they tended only to ſhew, that this abſurd project had no party to ſupport it. The Girondiſts under Wimpfen, and at Bourdeaux, have made ſome ſtruggle. The Conſtitutionaliſts never could make any; and for a very plain rea⯑ſon; they were Leaders in Rebellion. All their principles, and their whole ſcheme of government being Republican, they could never excite the ſmalleſt degree of enthuſiaſm in favour of the un⯑happy Monarch, whom they had rendered con⯑temptible, to make him the Executive Officer in their new Commonwealth. They only appeared as traitors to their own Jacobin cauſe, not as faith⯑ful adherents to the King.

In an Addreſs to France, in an attempt to treat with it, or in conſidering any ſcheme at all relative to it, it is impoſſible we ſhould mean the geogra⯑phical, we muſt always mean the moral and poli⯑tical country. I believe we ſhall be in a great errour if we act upon an idea that there exiſts in [130] that country any organized body of men who might be willing to treat on equitable terms, for the reſtoration of their Monarchy; but who are nice in balancing thoſe terms, and who would accept ſuch as to them appeared reaſonable, but who would quietly ſubmit to the predominant power, if they were not gratified in the faſhion of ſome conſtitution which ſuited with their fancies.

I take the ſtate of France to be totally different. I know of no ſuch body, and of no ſuch party. So far from a combination of twenty men (always excepting Poitou) I never yet heard, that a ſingle man could be named of ſufficient force or influ⯑ence to anſwer for another man, much leſs for the ſmalleſt diſtrict in the country, or for the moſt incomplete company of ſoldiers in the army. We ſee every man that the Jacobins chuſe to apprehend, taken up in his village, or in his houſe, and conveyed to priſon without the leaſt ſhadow of reſiſtance; and this indifferently, whether he is ſuſpected of Royaliſm or Federaliſm, Moderan⯑tiſm, Democracy Royal, or any other of the names of faction which they ſtart by the hour. [...]What is much more aſtoniſhing, (and if we did not carefully attend to the genius and circum⯑ſtances of this Revolution, muſt indeed appear incredible) all their moſt accredited military men, from a generaliſſimo to a corporal, may be arreſted, [131] (each in the midſt of his camp, and covered with the laurels of accumulated victories) tied neck and heels, thrown into a cart, and ſent to Paris to be diſpoſed of at the pleaſure of the Revolutionary Tribunals.

No Corpo⯑rations of Juſtice, Commerce, or Police.As no individuals have power and influence, ſo there are no Corporations, whether of Lawyers or Burghers exiſting. The Aſſembly called Conſti⯑tuent, deſtroyed all ſuch inſtitutions very early. The Primary and Secondary Aſſemblies, by their original conſtitution, were to be diſſolved when they anſwered the purpoſe of electing the Ma⯑giſtrates; and were expreſsly diſqualified from per⯑forming any corporate act whatſoever. The tran⯑ſient Magiſtrates have been almoſt all removed before the expiration of their terms, and new have been lately impoſed upon the people, without the form or ceremony of an election: theſe Magiſtrates during their exiſtence are put under, as all the Executive Authorities are from firſt to laſt, the popular Societies (called Jacobin Clubs) of the ſeveral countries, and this by an expreſs order of the National Convention: it is even made a caſe of death to oppoſe or attack thoſe Clubs. They too have been lately ſubjected to an expurgatory ſcrutiny, to drive out from them every thing ſavouring of what they call the crime of Moderan⯑tiſm, of which offence however few were guilty. [132] But as people began to take refuge from their per⯑ſecutions—amongſt themſelves, they have driven them from that laſt aſylum.

The State of France is perfectly ſimple. It conſiſts of but two deſcriptions—The Oppreſſors and the Oppreſſed.

The firſt have the whole authority of the State in their hands, all the arms, all the revenues of the publick, all the confiſcations of individuals and corporations. They have taken the lower ſort from their occupations and have put them into pay, that they may form them into a body of Janiſaries to overrule and awe property. The heads of theſe wretches they never ſuffer to cool. They ſupply them with a food for fury varied by the day—beſides the ſenſual ſtate of intoxication from which they are rarely free. They have made the Prieſts and people formally abjure the Divinity; they have eſtranged them from every civil, moral, and ſocial, or even natural and inſtinctive ſenti⯑ment, habit, and practice, and have rendered them ſyſtematically ſavages, to make it impoſſible for them to be the inſtruments of any ſober and vir⯑tuous arrangement, or to be reconciled to any ſtate of order, under any name whatſoever.

[133] The other deſcription, the Oppreſſed—are people of ſome property; they are the ſmall reliques of the perſecuted Landed Intereſt; they are the Burghers and the Farmers. By the very circum⯑ſtance of their being of ſome property, though numerous in ſome points of view, they cannot be very conſiderable as a number. In cities the nature of their occupations renders them domeſtick and feeble; in the country it confines them to their farm for ſubſiſtence. The National Guards are all changed and reformed. Every thing ſuſpicious in the deſcription of which they were compoſed is rigorouſly diſarmed. Committees, called of Vigi⯑lance and Safety, are every where formed; a moſt ſevere and ſcrutinizing Inquiſition, far more rigid than any thing ever known or imagined. Two perſons cannot meet and confer without hazard to their liberty, and even to their lives. Numbers ſcarcely credible have been executed, and their property confiſcated. At Paris and in moſt other towns, the bread they buy is a daily dole—which they cannot obtain without a daily ticket delivered to them by their Maſters. Multitudes of all ages and ſexes are actually impriſoned. I have reaſon to believe, that in France there are not, for various ſtate crimes, ſo few as twenty thouſand^* actually in jail—a large portion of people of property in any State. If a father of a family ſhould ſhew any [134] diſpoſitions to reſiſt, or to withdraw himſelf from their power, his wife and children are cruelly to anſwer for it. It is by means of theſe hoſtages; that they keep the troops, which they ſorce by maſſes (as they call it) into the field—true to their colours.

Another of their reſources is not to be forgotten.—They have lately found a way of giving a ſort of ubiquity to the ſupreme Sovereign Authority, which no Monarch has been able yet to give to any repreſentation of his.

The Commiſſioners of the National Convention, who are the Members of the Convention itſelf, and really exerciſe all its powers, make continual circuits through every province, and viſits to every army. There they ſuperſede all the ordinary Au⯑thorities civil and military, and change and alter every thing at their pleaſure. So that in effect no deliberative capacity exiſts in any portion of the inhabitants.

Toulon, republican in principle, having taken its deciſion in a moment under the guillotine, and before the arrival of theſe Commiſſioners, Toulon, being a place regularly fortified, and having in its boſom a navy in part highly diſcontented, has eſcaped, though by a ſort of miracle; and it would not have eſcaped, if two powerful fleets had not [135] been at the door to give them not only ſtrong, but prompt and immediate ſuccour, eſpecially, as neither this nor any other ſea-port town in France can be depended on, from the peculiarly ſavage diſpoſitions, manners, and connexions among the lower ſort of people in thoſe places. This I take to be the true ſtate of things in France; ſo far as it regards any exiſting bodies, whether of legal or voluntary aſſociation, capable of acting or of treating in corps.

As to the oppreſſed individuals, they are many; and as diſcontented as men muſt be under the monſtrous and complicated tyranny of all ſorts, with which they are cruſhed. They want no ſtimulus to throw off this dreadful yoke: but they do want (not Manifeſtoes, which they have had even to ſurfeit, but) real protection, force and ſuccour.

The diſputes and queſtions of men at their eaſe, do not at all affect their minds, or ever can occupy the minds of men in their ſituation. Theſe theories are long ſince gone by; they have had their day, and have done their miſchief. The queſtion is not between the Rabble of Syſtems, Fayetteiſm, Condorcetiſm, Monarchiſm, or Democratiſm or Federaliſm, on the one ſide, and the fundamental Laws of France on the other—or between all theſe ſyſtems amongſt themſelves. It is a controverſy [136] (weak indeed and unequal on the one part) between the proprietor and the robber; between the priſoner and the jailor; between the neck and the guillotine. Four-fifths of the French inhabitants would thankfully take protection from the Emperor of Morocco, and would never trouble their heads about the abſtract principles of the power by which they were ſnatched from impriſonment, robbery, and murder. But then theſe men can do little or nothing for themſelves. They have no arms, nor magazines, nor chiefs, nor union, nor the poſſi⯑bility of theſe things within themſelves. On the whole therefore I lay it down as a certainty, that in the Jacobins, no change of mind is to be expected—and that no others in the territory of France have an independent and deliberative exiſtence.

The truth is, that France is out of itſelf—The moral France is ſeparated from the geographical. The maſter of the houſe is expelled, and the robbers are in poſſeſſion. If we look for the corporate people of France exiſting as corporate in the eye and intention of public Law, (that corpo⯑rate people, I mean, who are free to deliberate and to decide, and who have a capacity to treat and conclude) they are in Flanders, and Germany, in Switzerland, Spain, Italy, and England. There are all the Princes of the Blood, there are all the [137] Orders of the State, there are all the Parliaments of the kingdom.

This being, as I conceive, the true ſtate of France, as it exiſts territorially, and as it exiſts morally, the queſtion will be, with whom we are to concert our arrangements; and whom we are to uſe as our inſtruments in the reduction, in the pacification, and in the ſettlement of France. The work to be done muſt indicate the workmen. Suppoſing us to have rational objects, we have two principal, and one ſecondary. The firſt two are ſo intimately connected as not to be ſeparated even in thought; the re-eſtabliſhment of Royalty, and the re-eſtabliſhment of Property. One would think it requires not a great deal of argument to prove, that the moſt ſerious endeavours to reſtore Royalty, will be made by Royaliſts. Property will be moſt energetically reſtored by the antient proprietors of that kingdom.

When I ſpeak of Royaliſts, I wiſh to be under⯑ſtood of thoſe who were always ſuch from prin⯑ciple. Every arm lifted up for Royalty from the beginning, was the arm of a man ſo principled. I do not think there are ten exceptions.

The principled Royaliſts are certainly not of force to effect theſe objects by themſelves. If they [138] were, the operations of the preſent great Combi⯑nation would be wholly unneceſſary. What I con⯑tend for is, that they ſhould be conſulted with, treated with, and employed; and that no Foreigners whatſoever are either in intereſt ſo engaged, or in judgment and local knowledge ſo competent, to anſwer all theſe purpoſes as the natural proprietors of the country.

Their number for an exiled party is alſo con⯑ſiderable. Almoſt the whole body of the landed proprietors of France, eccleſiaſtical and civil, have been ſteadily devoted to the Monarchy. This body does not amount to leſs than ſeventy thou⯑ſand—a very great number in the compoſition of the reſpectable claſſes in any ſociety.—I am ſure, that if half that number of the ſame deſcription were taken out of this country, it would leave hardly any thing that I ſhould call the people of England. On the faith of the Emperor and the King of Pruſſia, a body of ten thouſand Nobility on horſeback, with the King's two brothers at their head, ſerved with the King of Pruſſia in the cam⯑paign of 1792, and equipped themſelves with the laſt ſhilling of their ruined fortunes and exhauſted credit^*. It is not now the queſtion how that great [139] force came to be rendered uſeleſs and totally diſſi⯑pated. I ſtate it now, only to remark, that a great part of the ſame force exiſts, and would act if it were enabled. I am ſure every thing has ſhewn us that in this war with France, one Frenchman is worth twenty foreigners. La Vendee is a proof of this.

If we wiſh to make an impreſſion on the minds of any perſons in France, or to perſuade them to join our ſtandard, it is impoſſible that they ſhould not be more eaſily led, and more readily formed and diſciplined, (civilly and martially diſciplined) by thoſe who ſpeak their language, who are ac⯑quainted with their manners, who are converſant with their uſages and habits of thinking, and who have a local knowledge of their country, and ſome remains of antient credit and conſideration, than with a body congregated from all tongues and tribes. Where none of the reſpectable native intereſts are ſeen in the tranſaction, it is impoſſible that any declarations can convince thoſe that are within, or thoſe that are without, that any thing [140] elſe than ſome ſort of hoſtility in the ſtyle of a conqueror is meant. At beſt it will appear to ſuch wavering perſons, (if ſuch there are) whom we mean to fix with us, at beſt a choice whether they are to continue a prey to domeſtick banditti, or to be fought for as a carrion carcaſs, and picked to the bone by all the crows and vultures of the ſky. They may take protection, (and they would I doubt not) but they can have neither alacrity nor zeal in ſuch a cauſe. When they ſee nothing but bands of Engliſh, Spaniards, Neapolitans, Sardi⯑nians, Pruſſians, Auſtrians, Hungarians, Bohe⯑mians, Sclavonians, Croatians, acting as principals, it is impoſſible they ſhould think we come with a beneficent deſign. Many of thoſe fierce and bar⯑barous people have already given proofs how little they regard any French party whatſoever. Some of theſe nations the people of France are jealous of; ſuch are the Engliſh, and the Spaniards—others they deſpiſe; ſuch are the Italians—others they hate and dread; ſuch are the German and Danu⯑bian powers. At beſt ſuch interpoſition of antient enemies excites apprehenſion; but in this caſe, how can they ſuppoſe that we come to main⯑tain their legitimate Monarchy in a truly paternal French Government, to protect their privileges, their laws, their religion, and their property, when they ſee us make uſe of no one perſon who has any intereſt in them, any knowledge of them, or [141] any the leaſt zeal for them? On the contrary, they ſee, that we do not ſuffer any of thoſe who have ſhewn a zeal in that cauſe, which we ſeem to make our own, to come freely into any place in which the Allies obtain any footing.

If we wiſh to gain upon any people, it is right to ſee what it is they expect. We have had a pro⯑poſal from the Royaliſts of Poitou. They are well intitled, after a bloody war maintained for eight months againſt all the powers of anarchy, to ſpeak the ſentiments of the Royaliſts of France. Do they deſire us to exclude their Princes, their Clergy, their Nobility? The direct contrary. They earneſtly ſolicit that men of every one of theſe deſcriptions ſhould be ſent to them. They do not call for Engliſh, Auſtrian, or Pruſſian officers. They call for French emigrant officers. They call for the exiled prieſts. They have demanded the Comte d'Artois to appear at their head. Theſe are the demands, (quite natural demands) of thoſe who are ready to follow the ſtandard of Monarchy.

The great means therefore of reſtoring the Monarchy which we have made the main object of the war, is to aſſiſt the dignity, the religion, and the property of France, to repoſſeſs themſelves of the means of their natural influence. This [142] ought to be the primary object of all our politicks, and all our military operations. Otherwiſe every thing will move in a prepoſterous order, and nothing but confuſion and deſtruction will follow.

I know that misfortune is not made to win reſ⯑pect from ordinary minds. I know that there is a leaning to proſperity however obtained, and a prejudice in its favour; I know there is a diſpoſition to hope ſomething from the variety and incon⯑ſtancy of villany, rather than from the tireſome uniformity of fixed principle. There have been, I admit, ſituations in which a guiding perſon or party might be gained over, and through him or them, the whole body of a nation. For the hope of ſuch a converſion, and of deriving advantage from enemies, it might be politick for a while to throw your friends into the ſhade. But examples drawn from hiſtory in occaſions like the preſent will be found dangerouſly to miſlead us. France has no reſemblance to other countries which have undergone troubles and been purified by them. If France, jacobiniſed as it has been for four full years, did contain any bodies of authority and diſpoſition to treat with you, (moſt aſſuredly ſhe does not) ſuch is the levity of thoſe who have expelled every thing reſpectable in their country, ſuch their ferocity, their arrogance, their mutinous ſpirit, their habits of defying every thing human [143] and divine, that no engagement would hold with them for three months; nor indeed could they cohere together for any purpoſe of civilized ſociety, if left as now they are. There muſt be a means not only of breaking their ſtrength within them⯑ſelves, but of civilizing them; and theſe two things muſt go together, before we can poſſibly treat with them, not only as a nation, but with any diviſion of them. Deſcriptions of men of their own race, but better in rank, ſuperiour in property and decorum, of honourable, decent and orderly habits, are abſolutely neceſſary to bring them to ſuch a frame as to qualify them ſo much as to come into contact with a civilized nation. A ſet of thoſe ferocious ſavages with arms in their hands, left to themſelves in one part of the coun⯑try, whilſt you proceed to another, would break forth into outrages at leaſt as bad as their former. They muſt, as faſt as gained (if ever they are gained) be put under the guide, direction and government of better Frenchmen than themſelves, or they will inſtantly relapſe into a ſever of aggra⯑vated Jacobiniſm.

We muſt not judge of other parts of France by the temporary ſubmiſſion of Toulon, with two vaſt fleets in its harbour, and a garriſon far more numerous than all the inhabitants able to bear arms. If they were left to themſelves I am quite [144] ſure they would not retain their attachment to Mo⯑narchy of any name, for a ſingle week.

To adminiſter the only cure for the unheard of diſorders of that undone country, I think it infi⯑nitely happy for us, that God has given into our hands, more effectual remedies than human con⯑trivance could point out. We have in our boſom, and in the boſom of other civilized ſtates, nearer forty than thirty thouſand perſons, providentially preſerved not only from the cruelty and violence, but from the contagion of the horrid practices, ſentiments and language of the Jacobins, and even ſacredly guarded from the view of ſuch abominable ſcenes. If we ſhould obtain in any conſiderable diſtrict, a footing in France, we poſſeſs an immenſe body of phyſicians and magiſtrates of the mind, whom we now know to be the moſt diſcreet, gentle, well tempered, conciliatory, virtuous, and pious perſons, who in any order probably exiſted in the world. You will have a miſſioner of peace and order in every pariſh. Never was a wiſer national oeconomy than in the charity of the Engliſh and of other countries. Never was money better ex⯑pended than in the maintenance of this body of civil troops for re-eſtabliſhing order in France, and for thus ſecuring its civilization to Europe. This means, if properly uſed, is of value ineſti⯑mable.

[145] Nor is this corps of inſtruments of civilization confined to the firſt order of that ſtate, I mean the clergy. The allied powers poſſeſs alſo, an exceedingly numerous, well informed, ſenſible, ingenious, high principled and ſpirited body of cavaliers in the expatriated landed intereſt of France, as well qualified at leaſt, as I, (who have been taught by time and experience to moderate my calculation of the expectancy of human abili⯑ties) ever expected to ſee in the body of any landed gentlemen and ſoldiers by their birth. France is well winnowed and ſifted. Its virtuous men are, I believe, amongſt the moſt virtuous, as its wicked are amongſt the moſt abandoned upon earth. Whatever in the territory of France may be found to be in the middle between theſe, muſt be attracted to the better part. This will be compaſſed, when every gentleman, every where being reſtored to his landed eſtate, each on his patrimonial ground, may join the Clergy in reani⯑mating the loyalty, fidelity and religion of the people; that theſe gentlemen proprietors of land, may ſort that people according to the truſt they ſeverally merit, that they may arm the honeſt and well affected, and diſarm and diſable the factious and ill diſpoſed. No foreigner can make this diſ⯑crimination nor theſe arrangements. The antient corporations of Burghers according to their ſeveral modes ſhould be reſtored; and placed, (as they [146] ought to be) in the hands of men of gravity and property in the cities or baillages, according to the proper conſtitutions of the commons or third eſtate of France. They will reſtrain and regulate the ſeditious rabble there, as the gentlemen will on their own eſtates. In this way, and in this way alone, the country (once broken in upon by foreign force well directed) may be gained and ſettled. It muſt be gained and ſettled by itſelf, and through the medium of its own native dignity and property. It is not honeſt, it is not decent, ſtill leſs is it poli⯑tick, for foreign powers themſelves to attempt any thing in this minute, internal, local detail, in which they could ſhew nothing but ignorance, imbecility, confuſion and oppreſſion. As to the Prince who has a juſt claim to exerciſe the regency of France, like other men he is not without his faults and his defects. But faults or defects (always ſuppoſing them faults of common human infirmity) are not what in any country deſtroy a legal title to Govern⯑ment. Theſe princes are kept in a poor obſcure country town of the King of Pruſſia's. Their reputation is entirely at the mercy of every calum⯑niator. They cannot ſhew themſelves, they can⯑not explain themſelves, as princes ought to do. After being well informed, as any man here can be, I do not find, that theſe blemiſhes in this emi⯑nent perſon, are at all conſiderable, or that they at all affect a character, which is full of probity, [147] honour, generoſity, and real goodneſs. In ſome points he has but too much reſemblance to his un⯑fortunate Brother; who with all his weakneſſes, had a good underſtanding and many parts of an excellent man, and a good King. But Monſieur, without ſuppoſing the other deficient, (as he was not) excells him in general knowledge and in a ſharp and keen obſervation, with ſomething of a better addreſs, and an happier mode of ſpeaking and of writing. His converſation is open, agreeable and informed, his manners gracious and princely. His brother the Comte'd Artois ſuſtains ſtill better the repreſentation of his place. He is eloquent, lively, engaging in the higheſt degree, of a deci⯑ded character, full of energy and activity. In a word he is a brave, honourable, and accompliſhed cavalier. Their brethren of Royalty, if they were true to their own cauſe and intereſt, inſtead of relegating theſe illuſtrious perſons to an obſcure town, would bring them forward in their courts and camps, and exhibit them to, what they would ſpee⯑dily obtain, the eſteem, reſpect, and affection of mankind.

Objection made to the Regent's en⯑deavour to go to Spain.As to their knocking at every door, (which ſeems to give offence) can any thing be more natural? Abandoned, deſpiſed, rendered in a man⯑ner outlaws by all the powers of Europe, who have treated their unfortunate brethren with all the [148] giddy pride, and improvident inſolence of blind unfeeling proſperity, who did not even ſend them a compliment of condolence on the murder of their brother and ſiſter; in ſuch a ſtate is it to be wondered at, or blamed, that they tried every way, likely or unlikely, well or ill choſen, to get out of the horrible pit into which they are fallen, and that in particular they tried whether the Princes of their own blood, might at length be brought to think the cauſe of Kings, and of Kings of their race, wounded in the murder and exile of the branch of France, of as much importance as the killing of a brace of partridges. If they were abſolutely idle, and only eat in ſloth their bread of ſorrow and dependence, they would be forgotten, or at beſt thought of as wretches unworthy of their pretenſions which they had done nothing to ſup⯑port. If they err from our intereſts, what care has been taken to keep them in thoſe intereſts? or what deſire has ever been ſhewn to employ them in any other way than as inſtruments of their own degradation, ſhame, and ruin?

The Parliament of Paris, by whom the title of the Regent is to be recognized (not made) accord⯑ing to the laws of the kingdom, is ready to recognize it, and to regiſter it, if a place of meeting was given to them, which might be within their own juriſdic⯑tion, ſuppoſing that only locality was required for the [149] exerciſe of their functions: for it is one of the ad⯑vantages of Monarchy, to have no local ſeat. It may maintain its rights out of the ſphere of its ter⯑ritorial juriſdiction, if other powers will ſuffer it.

I am well appriſed, that the little intrigners, and whiſperers, and ſelf-conceited thoughtleſs babblers, worſe than either, run about to depreciate the fallen virtue of a great nation. But whilſt they talk, we muſt make our choice—they or the Jacobins. We have no other option. As to thoſe, who in the pride of a proſperity, not ob⯑tained by their wiſdom, valour, or induſtry, think ſo well of themſelves and of their own abilities and virtues, and ſo ill of other men; truth obliges me to ſay, that they are not founded in their preſump⯑tion concerning themſelves, nor in their contempt of the French Princes, Magiſtrates, Nobility, and Clergy. Inſtead of inſpiring me with diſlike and diſtruſt of the unfortunate, engaged with us in a common cauſe againſt our jacobin enemy, they take away all my eſteem for their own characters, and all my deference to their judg⯑ment.

There are ſome few French gentlemen indeed who talk a language not wholly different from this jargon. Thoſe whom I have in my eye, I reſpect as gallant ſoldiers, as much as any one can do, but [150] on their political judgment, and prudence, I have not the ſlighteſt reliance, nor on their knowledge of their own country, or of its laws and conſtitu⯑tion. They are, if not enemies, at leaſt not friends to the orders of their own ſtate; not to the Princes, the Clergy, or the Nobility; they poſſeſs only an attachment to the Monarchy, or rather to the perſons of the late King and Queen. In all other reſpects their converſation is Jacobin. I am afraid they or ſome of them, go into the cloſets of Miniſters, and tell them that the affairs of France will be better arranged by the allied Powers than by the landed proprietors of the kingdom, or by the Princes who have a right to govern; and that if any French are at all to be employed in the ſettlement of their country, it ought to be only thoſe who have never declared any decided opinion or taken any active part in the Revolution^*.

I ſuſpect that the authors of this opinion are mere ſoldiers of fortune, who, though men of integrity and honour, would as gladly receive military rank from Ruſſia, or Auſtria, or Pruſſia, as from the Regent of France. Perhaps their not having as much importance at his court as they could wiſh, may incline them to this ſtrange imagination. Perhaps having no property in old France, they [151] are more indifferent about its reſtoration. Their language is certainly flattering to all Miniſters in all courts. We all are men; we all love to be told of the extent of our own power and our own faculties. If we love glory, we are jealous of partners, and afraid even of our own inſtruments. It is of all modes of flattery the moſt effectual to be told, that you can regulate the affairs of another kingdom better than its hereditary proprietors. It is formed to flatter the principle of conqueſt ſo natural to all men. It is this principle which is now making the partition of Poland. The powers concerned have been told by ſome perfidious Poles, and perhaps they believe, that their uſurpation is a great benefit to the people, eſpecially to the com⯑mon people. However this may turn out with regard to Poland, I am quite ſure that France could not be ſo well under a foreign direction as under that of the repreſentatives of its own King, and its own antient Eſtates.

I think I have myſelf ſtudied France, as much as moſt of thoſe whom the allied courts are likely to employ in ſuch a work. I have likewiſe of myſelf as partial and as vain an opinion as men commonly have of themſelves. But if I could command the whole military arm of Europe, I am ſure, that a bribe of the beſt province in that kingdom, would not tempt me to intermeddle in their affairs, except [152] in perfect concurrence and concert with the natural legal intereſts of the country, compoſed of the Eccleſiaſtical, the Military, the ſeveral Corporate Bodies of Juſtice, and of Burgherſhip, making under a Monarch (I repeat it again and again) the French Nation, according to its fundamental Conſti⯑tution. No conſiderate Stateſmen would undertake to meddle with it upon any other condition.

The Government of that kingdom is funda⯑mentally Monarchical. The publick law of Europe has never recognized in it any other form of Go⯑vernment. The Potentates of Europe have by that law, a right, an intereſt, and a duty to know with what government they are to treat, and what they are to admit into the federative Society, or in other words into the diplomatick Republick of Europe. This Right is clear and indiſputable.

What other and further interference they have a right to in the interior of the concerns of another people, is a matter on which, as on every political ſubject, no very definite or poſitive rule can well be laid down. Our neighbours are men; and who will attempt to dictate the laws, under which it is allowable or forbidden to take a part in the concerns of men, whether they are conſidered individually or in a collective capacity, whenever charity to them, or a care of my own ſafety, calls forth my [153] activity. Circumſtances perpetually variable, di⯑recting a moral prudence and diſcretion, the gene⯑ral principles of which never vary, muſt alone preſcribe a conduct fitting on ſuch occaſions. The lateſt caſuiſts of public law are rather of a Repub⯑lican caſt, and in my mind, by no means ſo averſe as they ought to be to a Right in the people (a word which ill defined is of the moſt dangerous uſe) to make changes at their pleaſure in the fun⯑damental laws of their country. Theſe writers, however, when a country is divided, leave abun⯑dant liberty for a neighbour to ſupport any of the parties according to his choice^*. This interfer⯑ence muſt indeed always be a Right, whilſt the privilege of doing good to others, and of averting from them every ſort of evil, is a Right: Circum⯑ſtances may render that Right a Duty. It depends wholly on this, whether it be a bona fide charity to a party, and a prudent precaution with regard to yourſelf, or whether under the pretence of aiding one of the parties in a nation, you act in ſuch a manner as to aggravate its calamities, and accom⯑pliſh its final deſtruction. In truth it is not the in⯑terfering or keeping aloof, but iniquitous inter⯑meddling, or treacherous inaction which is praiſed or blamed by the deciſion of an equitable judge.

[154] It will be a juſt and irreſiſtible preſumption againſt the fairneſs of the interpoſing power, that he takes with him no party or deſcription of men in the divided ſtate. It is not probable, that theſe parties ſhould all, and all alike, be more adverſe to the true intereſts of their country, and leſs ca⯑pable of forming a judgment upon them, than thoſe who are abſolute ſtrangers to their affairs, and to the character of the actors in them, and have but a remote, feeble, and ſecondary ſympa⯑thy with their intereſt. Sometimes a calm and healing arbiter may be neceſſary; but, he is to compoſe differences, not to give laws. It is im⯑poſſible that any one ſhould not feel the full force of that preſumption. Even people, whoſe poli⯑tics for the ſuppoſed good of their own country lead them to take advantage of the diſſentions of a neighbouring nation in order to ruin it, will not directly propoſe to exclude the natives, but they will take that mode of conſulting and employing them which moſt nearly approaches to an exclu⯑ſion. In ſome particulars they propoſe what amounts to that excluſion, in others they do much worſe. They recommend to Miniſtry, ‘"that no Frenchman who has given a decided opinion, or acted a decided part in this great Revolution for or againſt it, ſhould be countenanced, brought for⯑ward, truſted or employed, even in the ſtricteſt ſubordination to the Miniſters of the allied powers."’ [155] Although one would think that this advice would ſtand condemned on the firſt propoſition, yet as it has been made popular, and has been proceeded upon practically, I think it right to give it a full conſideration.

And firſt, I have aſked myſelf who theſe French⯑men are, that, in the ſtate their own country has been in for theſe laſt five years, of all the people of Europe, have alone not been able to form a de⯑cided opinion, or have been unwilling to act a de⯑cided part?

Looking over all the names I have heard of in this great Revolution, in all human affairs, I find no man of any diſtinction who has remained in that more than ſtoical apathy, but the Prince de Conti. This mean, ſtupid, ſelfiſh, ſwiniſh, and cowardly animal, univerſally known and deſpiſed as ſuch, has indeed, execept in one abortive attempt to elope, been perfectly neutral. However his neu⯑trality, which it ſeems would qualify him for truſt, and on a competition muſt ſet aſide the Prince de Condé, can be of no ſort of ſervice. His modera⯑tion has not been able to keep him from a jail. The allied powers muſt draw him from that jail, before they can have the full advantage of the ex⯑ertions of this great neutraliſt.

[156] Except him, I do not recollect a man of rank or talents, who by his ſpeeches or his votes, by his pen or by his ſword, has not been active on this ſcene. The time indeed could admit no neutrality in any perſon worthy of the name of man. There were originally two great diviſions in France; the one is that which overturned the whole of the Govern⯑ment in Church and State, and erected a Republic on the baſis of Atheiſm. Their grand engine was the Jacobin Club, a ſort of ſeceſſion from which, but exactly on the ſame principles, begat another ſhort⯑lived one, called the Club of Eighty Nine^*, which was chiefly guided by the Court Rebels, who, in addition to the crimes of which they were guilty in common with the others, had the merit of betray⯑ing a gracious Maſter, and a kind Benefactor. Subdiviſions of this faction, which ſince we have ſeen, do not in the leaſt differ from each other in their principles, their diſpoſitions, or the means they have employed. Their only quarrel has been about power: in that quarrel, like wave ſucceeding wave, one faction has got the better and expelled the other. Thus La Fayette for a while got the better of Orleans; and Orleans afterwards prevailed over La Fayette. Briſſot overpower'd Orleans; Barrere and Roberſpiere, and their faction, maſtered [157] them both and cut off their heads. All who were not Royaliſts have been liſted in ſome or other of theſe diviſions. If it were of any uſe to ſettle a precedence, the Elder ought to have his rank. The firſt authors, plotters, and contrivers of this monſtrous ſcheme, ſeem to me intitled to the firſt place in our diſtruſt and abhorrence. I have ſeen ſome of thoſe who are thought the beſt amongſt the original Rebels; and I have not neglected the means of being informed concerning the others. I can very truly ſay, that I have not found by ob⯑ſervation or enquiry, that any ſenſe of the evils produced by their projects has produced in them, or any one of them, the ſmalleſt degree of repent⯑ance. Diſappointment and mortification undoubt⯑edly they feel: but to them, repentance is a thing impoſſible. They are Atheiſts. This wretched opinion, by which they are poſſeſſed even to the height of fanaticiſm, leading them to exclude from their ideas of a Commonwealth, the vital principle of the phyſical, the moral, and the political world, engages them in a thouſand abſurd contrivances, to fill up this dreadful void. Incapable of innoxious repoſe, or honourable action, or wiſe ſpeculation, in the lurking holes of a foreign land, into which (in a common ruin) they are driven to hide their heads amongſt the innocent victims of their madneſs, they are at this very hour, as buſy in the confection of the dirt-pyes of their imaginary Conſtitutions, as if [158] they had not been quite freſh from deſtroying by their impious and deſperate vagaries, the fineſt country upon earth.

It is however, out of theſe, or of ſuch as theſe, guilty and impenitent, deſpiſing the experience of others, and their own, that ſome people talk of chuſing their Negotiators with thoſe Jacobins, who they ſuppoſe may be recovered to a ſounder mind. They flatter themſelves, it ſeems, that the friendly habits formed during their original partnerſhip of iniquity, a ſimilarity of character, and a con⯑formity in the ground-work of their principles, might facilitate their converſion, and gain them over to ſome recognition of Royalty. But ſurely this is to read human nature very ill. The ſeveral Sectaries in this ſchiſm of the Jacobins, are the very laſt men in the world to truſt each other. Fellow⯑ſhip in Treaſon, is a bad ground of confidence. The laſt quarrels are the ſoreſt; and the injuries received or offered by your own aſſociates, are ever the moſt bitterly reſented. The people of France of every name and deſcription, would a thouſand times ſooner liſten to the Prince de Condé, or to the Archbiſhop of Aix, or the Biſhop of St. Pol, or to Monſieur De Cazalès, than to La Fayette, or Dumourier, or the Vicomte De Noailles, or the Biſhop of Autun, or Necker, or his Diſciple Lally Tolendal. Againſt the firſt deſcription they have [159] not the ſmalleſt animoſity beyond that of a merely political diſſention. The others they regard as Traitors.

The firſt deſcription is that of the Chriſtian Royaliſts, men who as earneſtly wiſhed for refor⯑mation, as they oppoſed innovation in the funda⯑mental parts of their Church and State. Their part has been very decided. Accordingly they are to be ſet aſide in the reſtoration of Church and State. It is an odd kind of diſqualification where the reſtoration of Religion and Monarchy is the queſtion. If England ſhould (God forbid it ſhould) fall into the ſame misfortune with France, and that the Court of Vienna ſhould undertake the reſtora⯑tion of our Monarchy, I think it would be extraor⯑dinary to object to the admiſſion of Mr. Pitt, or Lord Grenville, or Mr. Dundas into any ſhare in the management of that buſineſs, becauſe in a day of trial they have ſtood up firmly and manfully, as I truſt they always will do, and with diſtinguiſhed powers, for the Monarchy and the legitimate Con⯑ſtitution of their country. I am ſure if I were to ſuppoſe myſelf at Vienna at ſuch a time, I ſhould, as a Man, as an Engliſhman, and as a Royaliſt, proteſt in that caſe, as I do in this, againſt a weak and ruin⯑ous principle of proceeding, which can have no other tendency, than to make thoſe who wiſh to ſupport the Crown, meditate too profoundly on the conſe⯑quences [160] of the part they take—and conſider whe⯑ther for their open and forward zeal in the Royal Cauſe, they may not be thruſt out from any ſort of confidence and employment, where the intereſt of crowned heads is concerned.

Theſe are the Parties. I have ſaid, and ſaid truly, that I know of no neutrals. But as a general obſervation on this general principle of chuſing neutrals on ſuch occaſions as the preſent, I have this to ſay—that it amounts to neither more nor leſs than this ſhocking propoſition—that we ought to ex⯑clude men of honour and ability from ſerving theirs and our cauſe; and to put the deareſt intereſts of ourſelves and our poſterity into the hands of men of no decided character, without judgment to chuſe, and without courage to profeſs any prin⯑ciple whatſoever.

Such men can ſerve no cauſe, for this plain rea⯑ſon—they have no cauſe at heart. They can at beſt work only as mere mercenaries. They have not been guilty of great crimes; but it is only be⯑cauſe they have not energy of mind to riſe to any height of wickedneſs. They are not hawks or kites; they are only miſerable fowls whoſe flight is not above their dunghill or henrooſt. But they tremble before the authors of theſe horrors. They admire them at a ſafe and reſpectful diſtance. [161] There never was a mean and abject mind that did not admire an intrepid and dexterous villain. In the bottom of their hearts they believe ſuch hardy miſcreants to be the only men qualified for great affairs: if you ſet them to tranſact with ſuch per⯑ſons, they are inſtantly ſubdued. They dare not ſo much as look their antagoniſt in the face. They are made to be their ſubjects, not to be their arbiters or controllers.

Theſe men to be ſure can look at atrocious acts without indignation, and can behold ſuffering virtue without ſympathy. Therefore they are conſidered as ſober diſpaſſionate men But they have their paſſions, though of another kind, and which are infinitely more likely to carry them out of the path of their duty. They are of a tame, timid, languid, inert temper wherever the welfare of others is concerned. In ſuch cauſes, as they have no motives to action, they never poſſeſs any real ability, and are totally deſtitute of all reſource.

Believe a man who has ſeen much, and obſerved ſomething. I have ſeen in the courſe of my life a great many of that family of men. They are generally choſen, becauſe they have no opinion of their own; and as far as they can be got in good earneſt to embrace any opinion, it is that of who⯑ever happens to employ them (neither longer or [162] ſhorter, narrower or broader) with whom they have no diſcuſſion or conſultation. The only thing which occurs to ſuch a man when he has got a buſineſs for others into his hands, is how to make his own fortune out of it. The perſon he is to treat with, is not, with him, an adverſary over whom he is to prevail, but a new friend he is to gain: therefore he always ſyſtematically betrays ſome part of his truſt. Inſtead of thinking how he ſhall defend his ground to the laſt, and if forced to re⯑treat, how little he ſhall give up, this kind of man conſiders how much of the intereſt of his employer he is to ſacrifice to his adverſary. Having nothing but himſelf in view, he knows, that in ſerving his principal with zeal, he muſt probably incur ſome reſentment from the oppoſite party. His object is to obtain the good will of the perſon with whom he contends, that when an agreement is made, he may join in rewarding him. I would not take one of theſe as my arbitrator in a diſpute for ſo much as a fiſh-pond—for if he reſerved the mud to me, he would be ſure to give the water that fed the pool, to my adverſary. In a great cauſe I ſhould cer⯑tainly wiſh, that my agent ſhould poſſeſs conciliat⯑ing qualities; that he ſhould be of a frank, open, and candid diſpoſition, ſoft in his nature, and of a temper to ſoften animoſities and to win confidence. He ought not to be a man odious to the perſon he treats with, by perſonal injury, by violence, or by [163] deceit, or, above all, by the dereliction of his cauſe in any former tranſactions. But I would be ſure that my Negotiator ſhould be mine, that he ſhould be as earneſt in the cauſe as myſelf, and known to be ſo; that he ſhould not be looked upon as a ſtipendiary advocate, but as a principled partizan. In all treaty it is a great point that all idea of gaining your agent is hopeleſs. I would not truſt the cauſe of Royalty with a man, who, profeſſing neutrality, is half a Republican. The Enemy has already a great part of his ſuit without a ſtruggle—and he contends with advantage for all the reſt. The common principle allowed between your adverſary and your agent, gives your adverſary the advantage in every diſcuſſion.

Before I ſhut up this Diſcourſe about neutral Agency (which I conceive is not to be found, or if found, ought not to be uſed) I have a few other remarks to make on the cauſe, which I conceive gives riſe to it.

In all that we do, whether in the ſtruggle or after it, it is neceſſary that we ſhould conſtantly have in our eye, the nature and character of the enemy we have to contend with. The Jacobin Revolution is carried on by men of no rank, of no conſidera⯑tion, of wild ſavage minds, full of levity, arrogance and preſumption, without morals, without probity, [164] without prudence. What have they then to ſupply their innumerable defects, and to make them terri⯑ble even to the firmeſt minds? One thing, and one thing only—but that one thing is worth a thouſand—they have energy. In France, all things being put into an univerſal ſerment, in the decompoſition of ſociety, no man comes forward but by his ſpirit of enterprize and the vigour of his mind. If we meet this dreadful and portentous energy, reſtrained by no conſideration of God or man, that is always vigilant, always on the attack, that allows itſelf no repoſe, and ſuffers none to reſt an hour with impu⯑nity; if we meet this energy with poor common⯑place proceeding, with trivial maxims, paltry old ſaws, with doubts, fears and ſuſpicions, with a languid, uncertain heſitation, with a formal, official ſpirit, which is turned aſide by every obſtacle from its purpoſe, and which never ſees a difficulty but to yield to it, or at beſt to evade it; down we go to the bottom of the abyſs—and nothing ſhort of Omnipotence can ſave us. We muſt meet a vi⯑cious and diſtempered energy with a manly and rational vigour. As virtue is limited in its reſources—we are doubly bound to uſe all that, in the circle drawn about us by our morals, we are able to command.

I do not contend againſt the advantages of diſ⯑truſt. In the world we live in it is but too neceſ⯑ſary. [165] Some of old called it the very ſinews of diſcretion. But what ſignify common-places, that always run parallel and equal? Diſtruſt is good or it is bad, according to our poſition and our pur⯑poſe. Diſtruſt is a defenſive principle. They who have much to loſe have much to fear. But in France we hold nothing. We are to break in upon a power in poſſeſſion; we are to carry every thing by ſtorm, or by ſurprize, or by intelligence, or by all. Adventure therefore, and not caution, is our policy. Here to be too preſuming is the better error.

The world will judge of the ſpirit of our pro⯑ceeding in thoſe places of France which may fall into our power, by our conduct in thoſe that are already in our hands. Our wiſdom ſhould not be vulgar. Other times, perhaps other meaſures: But in this awful hour our politicks ought to be made up of nothing but courage, deciſion, manlineſs, and rectitude. We ſhould have all the magnanimity of good faith. This is a royal and commanding po⯑licy; and as long as we are true to it we may give the law. Never can we aſſume this command if we will not riſque the conſequences. For which reaſon we ought to be bottomed enough in prin⯑ciple not to be carried away upon the firſt proſpect of any ſiniſter advantage. For depend upon it, that if we once give way to a ſiniſter dealing, we [166] ſhall teach others the game, and we ſhall be out⯑witted and overborne: the Spaniards, the Pruſſians, God knows who, will put us under contribution at their pleaſure; and inſtead of being the head of a great confederacy, and the arbiters of Europe, we ſhall, by our miſtakes, break up a great deſign into a thouſand little ſelfiſh quarrels; the enemy will triumph, and we ſhall ſit down under the terms of unſafe and dependent peace, weakened, mortified, and diſgraced, whilſt all Europe, Eng⯑land included, is left open and defenceleſs on every part, to jacobin principles, intrigues, and arms. In the caſe of the King of France, declared to be our friend and ally, we will ſtill be conſidering ourſelves in the contradictory character of an ene⯑my. This contradiction, I am afraid, will, in ſpite of us, give a colour of fraud to all our tranſ⯑actions, or at leaſt will ſo complicate our politicks, that we ſhall ourſelves be inextricably entangled in them.

I have Toulon in my eye. It was with infinite ſorrow I heard that in taking the king of France's fleet in truſt, we inſtantly unrigged and diſmaſted the ſhips, inſtead of keeping them in a condition to eſcape in caſe of diſaſter, and in order to fulfil our truſt, that is, to hold them for the uſe of the owner, and, in the mean time, to employ them for our common ſervice. Theſe ſhips are now ſo [167] circumſtanced, that if we are forced to evacuate Toulon, they muſt fall into the hands of the enemy, or be burnt by ourſelves. I know this is by ſome conſidered as a fine thing for us. But the Athenians ought not to be better than the Engliſh, or Mr. Pitt leſs virtuous than Ariſtides.

Are we then ſo poor in reſources that we can do no better with eighteen or twenty ſhips of the line than to burn them? Had we ſent for French Royaliſt naval officers, of which ſome hundreds are to be had, and made them ſelect ſuch ſeamen as they could truſt, and filled the reſt with our own and Mediterranean ſeamen, which are all over Italy to be had by thouſands, and put them under judicious Engliſh commanders in chief, and with a judicious mixture of our own ſubordinates, the Weſt Indies would at this day have been ours. It may be ſaid that theſe French officers would take them for the King of France, and that they would not be in our power. Be it ſo. The iſlands would not be ours, but they would not be jacobinized. This is how⯑ever a thing impoſſible▪ They muſt in effect and ſubſtance be ours. But all is upon that falſe prin⯑ciple of diſtruſt, which, not confiding in ſtrength, can never have the full uſe of it. They that pay, and feed, and equip, muſt direct. But I muſt ſpeak plain upon this ſubject▪ The French iſlands, if they were all our own, ought not to be all kept. [168] A fair partition only ought to be made of thoſe territories. This is a ſubject of policy very ſerious, which has many relations and aſpects. Juſt here I only hint at it as anſwering an objection, whilſt I ſtate the miſchievous conſequences which ſuffer us to be ſurprized into a virtual breach of faith, by confounding our ally with our enemy, becauſe they both belong to the ſame geographical territory.

My clear opinion is, that Toulon ought to be made, what we ſet out with, a royal French city. By the neceſſity of the caſe, it muſt be under the influence, civil and military, of the allies. But the only way of keeping that jealous and diſcordant maſs from tearing its component parts to pieces, and hazarding the loſs of the whole, is to put the place into the nominal government of the regent, his officers being approved by us. This, I ſay, is abſolutely neceſſary for a poiſe amongſt ourſelves. Otherwiſe is it to be believed that the Spaniards, who hold that place with us in a ſort of part⯑nerſhip contrary to our mutual intereſt, will ſee us abſolute maſters of the Mediterranean, with Gibraltar on one ſide, and Toulon on the other, with a quiet and compoſed mind, whilſt we do little leſs than declare that we are to take the whole Weſt Indies into our hands, leaving the vaſt, unwieldy, and feeble body of the Spaniſh dominions in that part of the world, abſolutely at our mercy, without [169] any power to balance us in the ſmalleſt degree. Nothing is ſo fatal to a nation as an extreme of ſelf-partiality, and the total want of conſideration of what others will naturally hope or ſear. Spain muſt think ſhe ſees, that we are taking advantage of the confuſions which reign in France, to diſable that country, and of courſe every country from affording her protection, and in the end to turn the Spaniſh Monarchy into a province. If ſhe ſaw things in a proper point of light, to be ſure, ſhe would not conſider any other plan of politicks as of the leaſt moment in compariſon of the ex⯑tinction of jacobiniſm. But her miniſters (to ſay the beſt of them) are vulgar politicians. It is no wonder that they ſhould poſtpone this great point, or balance it, by conſiderations of the common politicks, that is, the queſtions of power between ſtate and ſtate. If we manifeſtly endeavour to de⯑ſtroy the balance, eſpecially the maritime and commercial balance, both in Europe and the Weſt Indies, (the latter their ſore and vulnerable part) from fear of what France may do for Spain here⯑after, is it to be wondered, that Spain, infinitely weaker than we are, (weaker indeed that ſuch a maſs of empire ever was,) ſhould feel the ſame fears from our uncontroled power, that we give way to ourſelves from a ſuppoſed reſurrection of the antient power of France under a Monarchy? It ſignifies nothing whether we are wrong or right [170] in the abſtract; but in reſpect to our relation to Spain, with ſuch principles followed up in practice, it is abſolutely impoſſible that any cordial alliance can ſubſiſt between the two nations. If Spain goes, Naples will ſpeedily follow. Pruſſia is quite certain, and thinks of nothing but making a market of the preſent confuſions. Italy is broken and divided; Switzerland is jacobinized, I am afraid, completely. I have long ſeen with pain the pro⯑greſs of French principles in that country. Things cannot go on upon the preſent bottom. The poſſeſſion of Toulon, which, well managed, might be of the greateſt advantage, will be the greateſt misfortune that ever happened to this nation. The more we multiply troops there, the more we ſhall multiply cauſes and means of quarrel amongſt our⯑ſelves. I know but one way of avoiding it, which is to give a greater degree of ſimplicity to our politicks. Our ſituation does neceſſarily render them a good deal involved. And, to this evil, in⯑ſtead of increaſing it, we ought to apply all the remedies in our power.

See what is, in that place, the conſequence (to ſay nothing of every other) of this complexity. Toulon has, as it were, two gates, an Engliſh, and a Spaniſh. The Engliſh gate is, by our policy, faſt barred againſt the entrance of any Royaliſts. The Spaniards open theirs, I fear, upon no fixed principle, and with very little judgment. By [171] means, however, of this fooliſh, mean, and jealous policy on our ſide, all the Royaliſts whom the Engliſh might ſelect as moſt practicable, and moſt ſubſervient to honeſt views, are totally excluded. Of thoſe admitted, the Spaniards are maſters. As to the inhabitants they are a neſt of Jacobins which is delivered into our hands, not from principle, but from fear. The inhabitants of Toulon may be deſcribed in few words. It is differtum nautis, cauponibus atque malignis. The reſt of the ſeaports are of the ſame deſcription.

Another thing which I cannot account for is, the ſending for the Biſhop of Toulon, and afterwards forbidding his entrance. This is as directly con⯑trary to the declaration, as it is to the practice of the allied powers. The King of Pruſſia did better. When he took Verdun, he actually re-inſtated the Biſhop and his Chapter. When he thought he ſhould be the maſter of Chalons, he called the biſhop from Flanders, to put him into poſſeſſion. The Auſtrians have reſtored the clergy wherever they obtained poſſeſſion. We have propoſed to reſtore Religion as well as Monarchy; and in Toulon we have reſtored neither the one nor the other. It is very likely that the Jacobin Sans-Culottes, or ſome of them, objected to this meaſure, who rather chuſe to have the atheiſtick buffoons of clergy they have got to ſport with, till they are [172] ready to come forward, with the reſt of their worthy brethren, in Paris and other places, to de⯑clare that they are a ſet of impoſtors, that they never believed in God, and never will preach any ſort of religion. If we give way to our Jacobins in this point, it is fully and fairly putting the go⯑vernment, civil and eccleſiaſtical, not in the King of France, to whom, as the protector and go⯑vernor, and in ſubſtance the head of the Gallican Church, the nomination to the biſhopricks belonged, and who made the biſhop of Toulon; it does not leave it with him, or even in the hands of the King of England, or the King of Spain; but in the baſeſt Jacobins of a low ſea-port, to exerciſe, pro tempore, the ſovereignty. If this point of religion is thus given up, the grand inſtrument for reclaiming France is abandoned. We cannot, if we would, delude ourſelves about the true ſtate of this dread⯑ful conteſt. It is a religious war. It includes in its object undoubtedly every other intereſt of ſo⯑ciety as well as this; but this is the principal and leading feature. It is through this deſtruction of religion that our enemies propoſe the accompliſh⯑ment of all their other views. The French Revo⯑lution, impious at once and fanatical, had no other plan for domeſtick power and foreign empire. Look at all the proceedings of the National Aſſembly from the firſt day of declaring itſelf ſuch in the year 1789, to this very hour, and you will find full [173] half of their buſineſs to be directly on this ſubject. In fact it is the ſpirit of the whole. The religious ſyſtem, called the Conſtitutional Church, was on the face of the whole proceeding ſet up only as a mere temporary amuſement to the people, and ſo conſtantly ſtated in all their converſations, till the time ſhould come, when they might with ſafety caſt off the very appearance of all religion whatſoever, and perſecute chriſtianity throughout Europe with fire and ſword. The Conſtitutional Clergy are not the Miniſters of any religion: they are the agents and inſtruments of this horrible conſpiracy againſt all morals. It was from a ſenſe of this, that in the Engliſh Addition to the Articles propoſed at St. Domingo, tolerating all Religions, we very wiſely refuſed to ſuffer that kind of traitors and buffoons.

This religious war is not a controverſy between ſect and ſect as formerly, but a war againſt all ſects and all religions. The queſtion is not whether you are to overturn the catholick, to ſet up the proteſtant. Such an idea in the preſent ſtate of the world is too contemptible. Our buſineſs is to leave to the ſchools the diſcuſſion of the contro⯑verted points, abating as much as we can the acrimony of diſputants on all ſides. It is for chriſtian Stateſmen, as the world is now circumſtanced, to ſecure their common Baſis, and not to riſque the ſubverſion of the whole Fabrick by purſuing theſe [174] diſtinctions with an ill-timed zeal. We have in the preſent grand Alliance, all modes of Govern⯑ment as well as all modes of religion. In Govern⯑ment, we mean to reſtore that which, notwithſtand⯑ing our diverſity of forms we are all agreed in, as fundamental in Government. The ſame principle ought to guide us in the religious part; conforming the mode, not to our particular ideas (for in that point we have no ideas in common) but to what will beſt promote the great general ends of the Alliance. As Stateſmen we are to ſee which of thoſe modes beſt ſuits with the intereſts of ſuch a Commonwealth as we wiſh to ſecure and promote. There can be no doubt, but that the catholick religion, which is fundamentally the religion of France, muſt go with the Monarchy of France; we know that the Monarchy did not ſurvive the Hierarchy, no not even in appearance, for many months; in ſubſtance, not for a ſingle hour. As little can it exiſt in future, if that pillar is taken away, or even ſhattered and impaired.

If it ſhould pleaſe God to give to the Allies the means of reſtoring peace and order in that focus of war and confuſion, I would, as I ſaid in the beginning of this Memorial, firſt replace the whole of the old Clergy: becauſe we have proof more than ſufficient, that whether they err or not in the ſcholaſtick diſputes with us, they are not tainted [175] with atheiſm, the great political evil of the time. I hope I need not apologize for this phraſe, as if I thought religion nothing but policy; it is far from my thoughts; and I hope it is not to be inferred from my expreſſions. But in the light of policy alone I am here conſidering the queſtion. I ſpeak of policy too in a large light; in which large light, policy too is a ſacred thing.

There are many, perhaps half a million or more, calling themſelves proteſtants, in the ſouth of France, and in other of the provinces. Some raiſe them to a much greater number, but I think this nearer to the mark. I am ſorry to ſay, that they have behaved ſhockingly ſince the very be⯑ginning of this rebellion, and have been uniformly concerned in its worſt and moſt atrocious acts. Their Clergy are juſt the ſame atheiſts with thoſe of the Conſtitutional catholicks; but ſtill more wicked and daring. Three of their number have met, from their Republican aſſociates, the reward of their crimes.

As the antient catholick religion is to be reſtored for the body of France, the antient calviniſtick religion ought to be reſtored for the proteſtants with every kind of protection and privilege. But not one Miniſter concerned in this rebellion ought to be ſuffered amongſt them. If they have not [176] Clergy of their own, men well recommended as untainted with Jacobiniſm, by the ſynods of thoſe places where calviniſm prevails and French is ſpoken, ought to be ſought. Many ſuch there are. The preſbyterian diſcipline ought, in my opinion, to be eſtabliſhed in its vigour, and the people pro⯑feſſing it ought to be bound to its maintenance. No man, under the falſe and hypocritical pretence of liberty of conſcience, ought to be ſuffered to have no conſcience at all. The King's com⯑miſſioner ought alſo to ſit in their ſynods as before the revocation of the Edict of Nantz. I am con⯑ſcious, that this diſcipline diſpoſes men to Repub⯑licaniſm: but it is ſtill a diſcipline, and it is a cure, (ſuch as it is) for the perverſe and undiſciplined habits which for ſome time have prevailed. Re⯑publicaniſm repreſſed may have its uſe in the com⯑poſition of a State. Inſpection may be practicable, and reſponſibility in the teachers and elders may be eſtabliſhed in ſuch an Hierarchy as the preſbyterian. For a time like ours, it is a great point gained, that people ſhould be taught to meet, to combine, and to be claſſed and arrayed in ſome other way than in Clubs of Jacobins. If it be not the beſt mode of proteſtantiſm under a Monarchy, it is ſtill an orderly chriſtian church, orthodox in the fundamentals, and what is to our point, capable enough of rendering men uſeful citizens. It was the impolitick abolition of their diſcipline which [177] expoſed them to the wild opinions and conduct, that have prevailed amongſt the Hugonots. The toleration in 1787 was owing to the good diſpo⯑ſition of the late King; but it was modified by the profligate folly of his atheiſtick Miniſter the Cardinal de Lomenie. This miſchievous Miniſter did not follow, in the Edict of toleration, the wiſdom of the Edict of Nantz. But his toleration was granted to Non-Catholicks—a dangerous word, which might ſignify any thing, and was but too expreſſive of a fatal indifference with regard to all piety. I ſpeak for myſelf: I do not wiſh any man to be converted from his ſect. The diſtinctions which we have reformed from animoſity to emulation, may be even uſeful to the cauſe of religion. By ſome moderate contention they keep alive zeal. Whereas people who change, except under ſtrong convic⯑tion (a thing now rather rare) the religion of their early prejudices, eſpecially if the converſion is brought about by any political machine, are very apt to degenerate into indifference, laxity, and often downright atheiſm.

Another political queſtion ariſes about the mode of Government which ought to be eſtabliſhed. I think the proclamation (which I read before I had proceeded far in this Memorial,) puts it on the beſt footing, by poſtponing that arrangement to a time of peace.

[178] When our politicks lead us to enterprize a great, and almoſt total political revolution in Europe, we ought to look ſeriouſly into the conſequences of what we are about to do. Some eminent perſons diſcover an apprehenſion that the Monarchy, if reſtored in France, may be reſtored in too great ſtrength for the liberty and happineſs of the natives, and for the tranquillity of other States. They are therefore of opinion that terms ought to be made for the modification of that Monarchy. They are perſons too conſiderable from the powers of their mind, and from their ſituation, as well as from the real reſpect I have for them, who ſeem to entertain theſe apprehenſions, to let me paſs them by un⯑noticed.

As to the power of France, as a State, and in its exteriour relations, I confeſs my fears are on the part of its extreme reduction. There is un⯑doubtedly ſomething in the vicinity of France, which makes it naturally and properly an object of our watchfulneſs and jealouſy, whatever form its Government may take. But the difference is great between a plan for our own ſecurity, and a ſcheme for the utter deſtruction of France. If there were no other countries in the political map but theſe two, I admit that policy might juſtify a wiſh to lower our neighbour to a ſtandard which would even render her in ſome meaſure, if not wholly, [179] our dependent. But the ſyſtem of Europe is ex⯑tenſive and extremely complex. However formi⯑dable to us as taken in this one relation, France is not equally dreadful to all other States. On the contrary, my clear opinion is, that the Liberties of Europe cannot poſſibly be preſerved, but by her remaining a very great and preponderating power. The deſign at preſent evidently purſued by the combined Potentates, or of the two who lead, is totally to deſtroy her as ſuch a Power. For Great Britain reſolves that ſhe ſhall have no Colonies, no Commerce, and no Marine. Auſtria means to take away the whole frontier from the borders of Switzerland, to Dunkirk. It is their plan alſo to render the interiour Government lax and feeble, by preſcribing by force of the arms of rival and jealous nations, and without conſulting the natural intereſts of the kingdom; ſuch arrange⯑ments as in the actual ſtate of Jacobiniſm in France, and the unſettled ſtate in which property muſt re⯑main for a long time, will inevitably produce ſuch diſtraction and debility in Government, as to reduce it to nothing, or to throw it back into its old con⯑fuſion. One cannot conceive ſo frightful a ſtate of a Nation. A maritime country, without a ma⯑rine, and without commerce; a continental country without a frontier, and for a thouſand miles ſur⯑rounded with powerful, warlike, and ambitious neighbours! It is poſſible, that ſhe might ſubmit [180] to loſe her commerce and her colonies; her ſecurity ſhe never can abandon. If, contrary to all expectations, under ſuch a diſgraced and im⯑potent Government, any energy ſhould remain in that country, ſhe will make every eſſort to recover her ſecurity, which will involve Europe for a cen⯑tury in war and blood. What has it coſt to France to make that frontier? What will it coſt to re⯑cover it? Auſtria thinks that without a Frontier ſhe cannot ſecure the Netherlands. But without her Frontier France cannot ſecure herſelf. Auſtria has been however ſecure for an hundred years in thoſe very Netherlands, and has never been diſpoſ⯑ſeſſed of them by the chance of war, without a moral certainty of receiving them again on the reſtoration of peace. Her late dangers have ariſen not from the power or ambition of the King of France. They aroſe from her own ill policy, which diſmantled all her towns, and diſcontented all her ſubjects by Jacobinical innovations. She diſmantles her own towns, and then ſays, Give me the Frontier of France. But let us depend upon it, whatever tends, under the name of ſecu⯑rity, to aggrandize Auſtria, will diſcontent and alarm Pruſſia. Such a length of Frontier on the ſide of France, ſeparated from itſelf, and ſepa⯑rated from the maſs of the Auſtrian country, will be weak, unleſs connected at the expence of the Elector of Bavaria (the Elector Palatine) and [181] other leſſer Princes, or by ſuch exchanges as will again convulſe the Empire.

Take it the other way, and let us ſuppoſe that France ſo broken in ſpirit as to be content to re⯑main naked and defenceleſs by ſea and by land, is ſuch a country no prey? Have other Nations no views? Is Poland the only country of which it is worth while to make a partition? We cannot be ſo childiſh as to imagine, that ambition is local, and that no others can be infected with it but thoſe who rule within certain parallels of latitude and longitude? In this way I hold war equally certain. But I can conceive that both theſe principles may operate, ambition on the part of Auſtria, to cut more and more from France, and French impa⯑tience under her degraded and unſafe condition. In ſuch a Conteſt will the other Powers ſtand by? Will not Pruſſia call for indemnity as well as Auſtria and England? Is ſhe ſatisfied with her gains in Poland? By no means. Germany muſt pay; or we ſhall infallibly ſee Pruſſia leagued with France and Spain, and poſſibly with other Powers for the reduction of Auſtria; and ſuch may be the ſitua⯑tion of things, that it will not be ſo eaſy to decide what part England may take in ſuch a Conteſt.

I am well aware how invidious a taſk it is to oppoſe any thing which tends to the apparent [182] aggrandizement of our own country. But I think no country can be aggrandized whilſt France is Jacobiniſed. This poſt removed, it will be a ſerious queſtion how far her further reduction will contribute to the general ſafety which I always con⯑ſider as included. Among precautions againſt am⯑bition, it may not be amiſs to take one precaution againſt our own. I muſt fairly ſay, I dread our own power and our own ambition; I dread our being too much dreaded. It is ridiculous to ſay we are not men; and that, as men, we ſhall never wiſh to aggrandize ourſelves in ſome way or other. Can we ſay, that even at this very hour we are not invidiouſly aggrandized? We are already in poſ⯑ſeſſion of almoſt all the commerce of the world. Our Empire in India is an awful thing. If we ſhould come to be in a condition not only to have all this aſcendant in commerce, but to be abſo⯑lutely able, without the leaſt controul, to hold the commerce of all other Nations totally dependent upon our good pleaſure, we may ſay that we ſhall not abuſe this aſtoniſhing, and hitherto unheard of power. But every other Nation will think we ſhall abuſe it. It is impoſſible but that ſooner or later, this ſtate of things muſt produce a com⯑bination againſt us which may end in our ruin.

As to France, I muſt obſerve that for a long time ſhe has been ſtationary. She has, during this [183] whole century, obtained far leſs by conqueſt or negotiation than any of the three great continental Powers. Some part of Lorraine excepted, I re⯑collect nothing ſhe has gained; no not a village. In truth, this Lorraine acquiſition does little more than ſecure her Barrier. In effect and ſubſtance it was her own before.

However that may be, I conſider theſe things at preſent chiefly in one point of view, as obſtructions to the war on Jacobiniſm, which muſt ſtand as long as the Powers think its extirpation but a ſecondary object, and think of taking advantage under the name of indemnity and ſecurity to make war upon the whole Nation of France Royal, and Jacobin, for the aggrandizement of the Allies on the ordi⯑nary principles of intereſt, as if no Jacobiniſm exiſted in the world.

So far is France from being formidable to its neighbours for its domeſtick ſtrength, that I conceive it will be as much as all its neighbours can do by a ſteady guarantee, to keep that Monarchy at all upon its baſis. It will be their buſineſs to nurſe France, not to exhauſt it. France, ſuch as it is, s indeed highly formidable. Not formidable, however, as a great Republick; but as the moſt dreadful gang of robbers and murderers that ever was embodied. But this diſtempered ſtrength of [184] France, will be the cauſe of proportionable weak⯑neſs on its recovery. Never was a country ſo com⯑pletely ruined; and they who calculate the reſur⯑rection of her power by former examples, have not ſufficiently conſidered what is the preſent ſtate of things. Without detailing the inventory of what organs of Government have been deſtroyed, together with the very materials of which alone they can be recompoſed, I wiſh it to be conſidered what an operoſe affair the whole ſyſtem of taxa⯑tion is in the old ſtates of Europe. It is ſuch as never could be made but in a long courſe of years. In France, all taxes are aboliſhed. The preſent powers reſort to the capital; and to the capital in kind. But a ſavage undiſciplined people ſuffer a rebbery with more patience than an impoſt. The former is in their habits and their diſpoſitions. They conſider it as tranſient, and as what, in their turn, they may exerciſe. But the terrours of the preſent power are ſuch as no regular Government can poſſibly employ. They who enter into France do not ſucceed to their reſources. They have not a ſyſtem to reform, but a ſyſtem to begin. The whole eſtate of Government is to be re-acquired.

What difficulties this will meet with in a coun⯑try exhauſted by the taking of the capital, and among a people, in a manner new principled, trained, and actually diſciplined to anarchy, rebel⯑lion, [185] diſorder, and impiety, may be conceived by thoſe who know what Jacobin France is, and who may have occupied themſelves by revolving in their thoughts, what they were to do if it fell to their lot to re-eſtabliſh the affairs of France. What ſupport, or what limitations the reſtored Monarchy muſt have, may be a doubt, or how it will pitch and ſettle at laſt: But one thing I con⯑ceive to be far beyond a doubt: that the ſettle⯑ment cannot be immediate; but that it muſt be preceded by ſome ſort of power, equal at leaſt in vigour, vigilance, promptitude and deciſion to a military Government. For ſuch a preparatery Government, no ſlow-paced, methodical, formal, Lawyer-like ſyſtem, ſtill leſs that of a ſhewy, ſuperficial, trifling, intriguing Court, guided by cabals of ladies, or of men like ladies; leaſt of all, a philo⯑ſophic, theoretic, diſputatious ſchool of ſophiſtry. None of theſe ever will, or ever can lay the foun⯑dations of an order that can laſt. Whoever claims a right by birth to govern there, muſt find in his breaſt, or muſt conjure up in it, an energy not to be expected, perhaps not always to be wiſhed for, in well ordered States. The lawful Prince muſt have, in every thing but crime, the character of an uſurper. He is gone, if he imagines himſelf the quiet poſſeſſor of a throne. He is to contend for it as much after an apparent conqueſt as before. His taſk is to win it; he muſt leave poſterity to [186] enjoy and to adorn it. No velvet cuſhions for him. He is to be always (I ſpeak nearly to the letter) on horſeback. This opinion is the reſult of much patient thinking on the ſubject, which I conceive no event is likely to alter.

A valuable friend of mine, who I hope will con⯑duct theſe affairs ſo far as they fall to his ſhare, with great ability, aſked me what I thought of acts of general indemnity and oblivion, as a means of ſettling France, and reconciling it to Monarchy. Before I venture upon any opinion of my own in this matter, I totally diſclaim the interference of foreign powers in a buſineſs that properly be⯑longs to the Government which we have declared legal. That Government is likely to be the beſt judge of what is to be done towards the ſecurity of that kingdom, which it is their duty and their intereſt to provide for by ſuch meaſures of juſtice or of lenity, as at the time they ſhould find beſt. But if we weaken it, not only by arbitrary limita⯑tions of our own, but preſerve ſuch perſons in it as are diſpoſed to diſturb its future peace, as they have its paſt, I do not know how a more direct declaration can be made of a diſpoſition to per⯑petual hoſtility againſt a Government. The per⯑ſons ſaved from the juſtice of the native Magiſ⯑trate, by foreign authority, will owe nothing to his clemency. He will, and muſt, look to thoſe to [187] whom he is indebted for the power he has of diſ⯑penſing it. A Jacobin faction, conſtantly foſtered with the nouriſhment of foreign protection, will be kept alive.

This deſire of ſecuring the ſafety of the actors in the preſent ſcene is owing to more laudable motives. Miniſters have been made to conſider the brothers of the late merciful King, and the Nobility of France, who have been faithful to their honor and duty, as a ſet of inexorable and remorſeleſs tyrants. How this notion has been infuſed into them, I cannot be quite certain. I am ſure it is not juſtified by any thing they have done. Never were the two Princes guilty, in the day of their power, of a ſingle hard or ill-natured act. No one inſtance of cruelty on the part of the Gen⯑tlemen ever came to my ears. It is true that the Engliſh Jacobins, (the natives have not thought of it) as an excuſe for their infernal ſyſtem of mur⯑der, have ſo repreſented them. It is on this prin⯑ciple that the maſſacres in the month of Sep⯑tember 1792 were juſtified by a writer in the Morning Chronicle. He ſays, indeed, that ‘"the whole French nation is to be given up to the hands of an irritated and revengeful Nobleſſe:"’—and judging of others by himſelf and his brethren, he ſays, ‘"Whoever ſucceeds in a civil war, will be cruel. But here the emigrants flying to revenge [188] in the cars of military victory, will almoſt inſatiably call for their victims and their booty; and a body of emigrant traitors were attending the King of Pruſſia, and the Duke of Brunſwick, to ſuggeſt the moſt ſanguinary counſels."’ So ſays this wicked Jacobin; but ſo cannot ſay the King of Pruſſia nor the Duke of Brunſwick, who never did receive any ſanguinary council; nor did the King's bro⯑thers, or that great body of Gentlemen who at⯑tended thoſe Princes, commit one ſingle cruel ac⯑tion, or hurt the perſon or property of one indi⯑vidual. It would be right to quote the inſtance. It is like the military luxury attributed to theſe unfortunate ſufferers in our common cauſe.

If theſe Princes had ſhewn a tyrannic diſpoſition, it would be much to be lamented. We have no others to govern France. If we ſcreened the body of murderers from their juſtice, we ſhould only leave the innocent in future to the mercy of men of fierce and ſanguinary diſpoſitions, of which in ſpite of all our intermeddling in their Conſtitution, we could not prevent the effects. But as we have much more reaſon to fear their feeble lenity than any blameable rigour, we ought, in my opinion, to leave the matter to themſelves.

If however I were aſked to give an advice merely as ſuch—here are my ideas. I am not for [189] a total indemnity, nor a general puniſhment. And firſt, the body and maſs of the people never ought to be treated as criminal. They may become an object of more or leſs conſtant watchfulneſs and ſuſpicion, as their preſervation may beſt require, but they can never become an object of puniſh⯑ment. This is one of the few fundamental and unalterable principles of politicks.

To puniſh them capitally would be to make maſſacres. Maſſacres only increaſe the ferocity of men, and teach them to regard their own lives and thoſe of others as of little value; whereas the great policy of Government is to teach the people to think both of great importance in the eyes of God and the State, and never to be ſacrificed or even hazarded to gratify their paſſions, or for any thing but the duties preſcribed by the rules of morality, and under the direction of public law and public authority. To puniſh them with leſſer penalties would be to debilitate the commonwealth, and make the nation miſerable, which it is the buſineſs of Government to render happy and flou⯑riſhing.

As to crimes too, I would draw a ſtrong line of limitation. For no one offence, politically an offence of rebellion, by council, contrivance, perſuaſion or compulſion, for none properly a military offence of [190] rebellion, or any thing done by open hoſtility in the field, ſhould any man at all be called in queſ⯑tion; becauſe ſuch ſeems to be the proper and natural death of civil diſſentions. The offences of war are obliterated by peace.

Another claſs will of courſe be included in the indemnity, namely, all thoſe who by their activity in reſtoring lawful Government ſhall obliterate their offences. The offence previouſly known, the acceptance of ſervice is a pardon for crimes. I fear that this claſs of men will not be very nu⯑merous.

So far as to indemnity. But where are the objects of juſtice, and of example, and of future ſecurity to the public peace? They are naturally pointed out, not by their having outraged political and civil laws, nor their having rebelled againſt the ſtate, as a State, but by their having rebelled againſt the law of nature, and outraged man, as man. In this liſt, all the regicides in general, all thoſe who laid ſacrilegious hands on the King, who without any thing in their own rebellious miſſion to the convention to juſtify them, brought him to his trial and unanimouſly voted him guilty; all thoſe who had a ſhare in the cruel murder of the Queen, and the deteſtable proceedings with regard to the young King, and the unhappy Prin⯑ceſſes; [191] all thoſe who committed cold-blooded murder any where, and particularly in their revo⯑lutionary tribunals, where every idea of natural juſtice and of their own declared Rights of Man, have been trod under foot with the moſt inſolent mockery; all men concerned in the burning and demolition of houſes or churches, with audacious and marked acts of ſacrilege and ſcorns offered to religion; in general, all the leaders of Jacobin Clubs;—not one of theſe ſhould eſcape a puniſh⯑ment ſuitable to the nature, quality and degree of their offence, by a ſteady but a meaſured juſtice.

In the firſt place, no man ought to be ſubject to any penalty, from the higheſt to the loweſt, but by a trial according to the courſe of law, carried on with all that caution and deliberation which has been uſed in the beſt times and precedents of the French juriſprudence, the criminal law of which country, faulty to be ſure in ſome particulars, was highly landable and tender of the lives of men. In reſtoring order and juſtice, every thing like re⯑taliation, ought to be religiouſly avoided; and an example ought to be ſet of a total alienation from the Jacobin proceedings in their accurſed revolu⯑tionary tribunals. Every thing like lumping men in maſſes, and of forming tables of proſcription ought to be avoided.

[192] In all theſe puniſhments, any thing which can be alledged in mitigation of the offence ſhould be fully conſidered. Mercy is not a thing oppoſed to juſtice. It is an eſſential part of it; as neceſſary in criminal caſes, as in civil affairs equity is to law. It is only for the Jacobins never to pardon. They have not done it in a ſingle inſtance. A council of mercy ought therefore to be appointed, with powers to report on each caſe, to ſoften the penalty, or entirely to remit it, according to cir⯑cumſtances.

With theſe precautions, the very firſt founda⯑tion of ſettlement muſt be to call to a ſtrict account thoſe bloody and mercileſs offenders. With⯑out it Government cannot ſtand a year. People little conſider the utter impoſſibility of getting thoſe who having emerged from very low, ſome from the loweſt claſſes, of ſociety, have exerciſed a power ſo high, and with ſuch unrelenting and bloody a rage, quietly to fall back into their old ranks, and be⯑come humble, peaceable, laborious and uſeful members of ſociety. It never can be. On the other hand is it to be believed, that any worthy and virtuous ſubject, reſtored to the ruins of his houſe, will with patience ſee the cold-blooded murderer of his father, mother, wife, or children, or perhaps all of theſe relations (ſuch things have been) noſe him in his own village, and inſult him [193] with the riches acquired from the plunder of his goods, ready again to head a Jacobin Faction to attack his life? He is unworthy of the name of man who would ſuffer it. It is unworthy of the name of a Government, which taking juſtice out of the private hand, will not exerciſe it for the injured by the public arm.

I know it ſounds plauſible, and is readily adopted by thoſe who have little ſympathy with the ſuffer⯑ings of others, to wiſh to jumble the innocent and guilty into one maſs, by a general indemnity. This cruel indifference dignifies itſelf with the name of humanity.

It is extraordinary that as the wicked arts of this regicide and tyrannous faction increaſe in number, variety, and atrocity, the deſire of puniſhing them becomes more and more faint, and the talk of an indemnity towards them, every day ſtronger and ſtronger. Our ideas of juſtice appear to be fairly conquered and overpowered by guilt when it is grown gigantick. It is not the point of view in which we are in the habit of viewing guilt. The crimes we every day puniſh are really below the penalties we inflict. The criminals are obſcure and feeble. This is the view in which we ſee or⯑dinary crimes and criminals. But when guilt is ſeen, though but for a time, to be furniſhed with [194] the arms and to be inveſted with the robes of power, it ſeems to aſſume another nature, and to get, as it were, out of our juriſdiction. This I fear is the caſe with many. But there is another cauſe full as powerful towards this ſecurity to enor⯑mous guilt, the deſire which poſſeſſes people who have once obtained power, to enjoy it at their eaſe. It is not humanity, but lazineſs and inertneſs of mind which produces the deſire of this kind of in⯑demnities. This deſcription of men love general and ſhort methods. If they puniſh, they make a promiſcuous maſſacre; If they ſpare, they make a general act of oblivion. This is a want of diſpoſi⯑tion to proceed laboriouſly according to the caſes, and according to the rules and principles of juſtice on each caſe; a want of diſpoſition to aſſort criminals, to diſcriminate the degrees and modes of guilt, to ſeparate accomplices from principals, leaders from followers, ſeducers from the ſeduced, and then by following the ſame principles in the ſame detail, to claſs puniſhments, and to fit them to the nature and kind of the delinquency. If that were once attempted, we ſhould ſoon ſee that the taſk was neither infinite, nor the execution cruel. There would be deaths, but for the number of criminals, and the extent of France, not many. There would be caſes of tranſportation; caſes of labour to re⯑ſtore what has been wickedly deſtroyed; caſes of impriſonment, and caſes of mere exile. But be [195] this as it may, I am ſure that if juſtice is not done there, there can be neither peace or juſtice there, nor in any part of Europe.

Hiſtory is reſorted to for other acts of indem⯑nity in other times. The Princes are deſired to look back to Henry the Fourth. We are deſired to look to the Reſtoration of King Charles. Theſe things, in my opinion, have no reſemblance whatſoever. They were caſes of a civil war; in France more ferocious, in Eng⯑land more moderate than common. In neither country were the orders of ſociety ſubverted; religion and morality deſtroyed on principle, or property totally annihilated In England the Go⯑vernment of Cromwell was to be ſure ſomewhat rigid, but for a new power, no ſavage tyranny. The country was nearly as well in his hands as in thoſe of Charles the Second, and in ſome points much better. The laws in general had their courſe, and were admirably adminiſtered. The King did not in reality grant an act of in⯑demnity; the prevailing power, then in a manner the nation, in effect granted an indemnity to him. The idea of a preceding Rebellion was not at all admitted in that convention and that parliament. The Regicides were a common enemy, and as ſuch given up.

[196] Among the ornaments of their place which emi⯑nently diſtinguiſh them, few people are better acquainted with the hiſtory of their own country than the illuſtrious Princes now in exile: but I caution them not to be led into errour by that which has been ſuppoſed to be the guide of life. I would give the ſame caution to all Princes. Not that I derogate from the uſe of hiſtory. It is a great im⯑prover of the underſtanding, by ſhewing both men and affairs in a great variety of views. From this ſource much political wiſdom may be learned; that is, may be learned as habit, not as precept; and as an exerciſe to ſtrengthen the mind, as furniſhing materials to enlarge and enrich it, not as a repertory of caſes and precedents for a lawyer: if it were, a thouſand times better would it be that a Stateſman had never learned to read—vellem neſcirent literas. This method turns their underſtanding from the object before them, and from the preſent exigencies of the world, to compariſons with former times, of which after all, we can know very little and very imperfectly; and our guides, the hiſtorians, who are to give us their true interpretation, are often preju⯑diced, often ignorant, often fonder of ſyſtem than of truth. Whereas if a man with reaſonable good parts and natural ſagacity, and not in the leading⯑ſtrings of any maſter, will look ſteadily on the buſineſs before him, without being diverted by retroſpect and compariſon, he may be capable of [197] forming a reaſonable good judgment of what is to be done. There are ſome fundamental points in which nature never changes—but they are few and obvious, and belong rather to morals than to poli⯑ticks. But ſo far as regards political matter, the human mind and human affairs are ſuſceptible of infinite modifications, and of combinations wholly new and unlooked for. Very few, for inſtance, could have imagined that property, which has been taken for natural dominion, ſhould, through the whole of a vaſt kingdom, loſe all its importance and even its influence. This is what hiſtory or books of ſpeculation could hardly have taught us. How many could have thought, that the moſt com⯑plete and formidable Revolution in a great empire ſhould be made by men of letters, not as ſubordi⯑nate inſtruments and trumpeters of ſedition, but as the chief contrivers and managers, and in a ſhort time as the open adminiſtrators and ſovereign Rulers? Who could have imagined that Atheiſm could produce one of the moſt violently operative principles of fanaticiſm? Who could have ima⯑gined that, in a Commonwealth in a manner cradled in war, and in an extenſive and dreadful war, military commanders ſhould be of little or no account? That the Convention ſhould not contain one military man of name? That adminiſtrative bodies in a ſtate of the utmoſt confuſion, and of but a momentary duration, and compoſed of men [198] with not one impoſing part of character, ſhould be able to govern the country and its armies, with an authority which the moſt ſettled Senates, and the moſt reſpected Monarchs ſcarcely ever had in the ſame degree? This, for one, I confeſs I did not foreſee, though all the reſt was preſent to me very early, and not out of my apprehenſion even for ſeveral years.

I believe very few were able to enter into the effects of mere terrour, as a principle not only for the ſupport of power in given hands or forms, but in thoſe things in which the ſoundeſt political Spe⯑culators were of opinion, that the leaſt appearance of force would be totally deſtructive,—ſuch is the the market, whether of money, proviſion, or com⯑modities of any kind. Yet for four years we have ſeen loans made, treaſuries ſupplied, and armies levied and maintained, more numerous than France ever ſhewed in the field, by the effects of fear alone.

Here is a ſtate of things of which, in its totality, if hiſtory furniſhes any examples at all, they are very remote and feeble. I therefore am not ſo ready as ſome are, to tax with folly or cowardice, thoſe who were not prepared to meet an evil of this nature. Even now, after the events, all the cauſes may be ſomewhat difficult to aſcertain. Very many are however traceable. But theſe things hiſtory and [199] books of ſpeculation (as I have already ſaid) did not teach men to foreſee, and of courſe to reſiſt. Now that they are no longer a matter of ſagacity, but of experience, of recent experience, of our own experience, it would be unjuſtifiable to go back to the records of other times, to inſtruct us to manage what they never enabled us to foreſee.