A SHORT HISTORY OF THE OPPOSITION.

IN every age, and almoſt in every country, the ambition, which is inherent in human na⯑ture, has prompted individuals to aſpire to diſ⯑tinction and pre-eminence, among their fellow⯑citizens. The means, uſed to obtain thoſe ob⯑jects, are various; as to render them ſucceſs⯑ful they muſt be accommodated to the ſpirit of the government, under which they are ap⯑plied. In deſpotic monarchies, the favour of the Prince, who is the fountain of all prefer⯑ment, is generally procured by intrigue or ad⯑dreſs. In republics, influence and authority are acquired, by gaining the confidence, or by ſeducing the principles of the people; and, in mixed governments, like that of Great Britain, [2] the neareſt road to power lies between thoſe two extremes.

The Revolution, which happened about ninety years ago, though it made but few changes in the forms of authority, eſtabliſhed a balance of influence, between the Crown and the People. The firſt retained the eſſence, but loſt much of the terror of power. The repreſenta⯑tives of the latter having a great deal to beſtow, as a body, thought themſelves, as individuals, entitled to a ſhare in a government, which they ſupported. A mutual dependence was created, by the poſſeſſion of the means of conferring mu⯑tual favours. A Prince, who ſtood in need of ſupplies, was directed, by common prudence, where to chuſe his ſervants. But as candidates were more numerous than offices, the diſap⯑pointed never failed to perſecute the ſucceſsful, till, by watching faults, errors, or misfortunes, they obtained their point, and they them⯑ſelves became, in their turn, the objects of attack.

As a degree of the public confidence was ne⯑ceſſary to direct the Sovereign in his choice of ſervants, men who wiſhed to be employed, took care to ſupport, in their public appearances, the principles and perhaps the prejudices of the people. An habitual jealouſy of the power [3] of the Crown, kept open the ears of the public to every alarm. Scarce any meaſure of Go⯑vernment could be ſo free from error, as not to be vulnerable on ſome popular ground. Every Oppoſition ſeized this obvious advan⯑tage, and aſſumed or obtained the title of "the popular party." No diſtinction was made, in this reſpect, between Whig and Tory. Each party, when out of place, adopted the ſame principles; and thus both were alternately dignified with the once honourable name of PATRIOTS.

The preſent reign began, with advantages, calculated to put an end to fooliſh diſtinctions, which ought to have expired, with the preju⯑dices, on which they had been founded. A young prince had ſucceeded to the throne, who diſdained to govern his people through the me⯑dium of a faction. The door of preferment was laid open to all his ſubjects; but though this liberal conduct might have pleaſed the un⯑prejudiced, it was incapable of extinguiſhing party among the intereſted. Theſe, though of different principles and characters, by impoſing on the weak and credulous, formed new factions, on the ſhadows of departed political tenets. However heterogeneous before, the heat of re⯑ſentment, and rage of diſappointment, as it were, gradually melted them into one maſs; [4] and they revived in themſelves the name, though little of the principles of WHIGS.

The vehemence of the preſent Oppoſition ſeems to have carried them to extremities, which ſuperſede all former deſcriptions of party, and which cannot fail to defeat their views. In former times, the candidates for public favour thought it prudent to adhere, in their exhibi⯑tions, to public principles. But in our times, an eagerneſs to thwart the meaſures of Govern⯑ment has expelled all regard for the opinions of the people. The dignity and honour of the nation were formerly the favourite themes of Op⯑poſitions; melancholy, meanneſs, and deſpair, now fill the whole circle of patriotic oratory. With a want of prudence, as well as of decency, they tie up the hands of their country in the hour of danger. They not only juſtify rebel⯑lion, againſt her authority, but indirectly pro⯑mote a foreign war againſt her very exiſtence: By magnifying the power of her opponents, they endeavour to depreſs her ſpirits; by ex⯑poſing her real or pretended weakneſs, they wiſh to inſpire her enemies with a confidence of ſucceſs.

Theſe ſtrange poſitions, and many more of the ſame kind, might be eſtabliſhed, on incon⯑teſtible authorities, by a plain narrative of the [5] conduct of oppoſition, ſince the commencement of the preſent parliament. But, the purſu⯑ing them through ſuch a variety of matter, and ſuch a length of time, would be a taſk of great labour, and little entertainment. We ſhall, therefore, confine ourſelves to the moſt ſtriking features of the laſt ſeſſion. In the ſpace of ſeven months, they have contrived to croud together moſt of the abſurdities of ſeven years; and, though the ſtudied brevity of this diſquiſition muſt neceſſarily exclude many cir⯑cumſtances, enough, we truſt, will appear to ſhew the principles, deſigns, and views of ſo ſtrange a confederacy.

On the 26th of November, 1778, the fifth ſeſſion of the preſent parliament was opened, with a ſpeech from the throne. A complaint of the perfidy of France, in commencing hoſti⯑lities, and the obſtinacy of America, in refuſing terms, together with a requeſt of ſupport, were the chief heads of the ſpeech. It expreſſed, at the ſame time, a regret "that the efforts of his Majeſty had not been attended with all the ſucceſs which the juſtice of the cauſe, and the vigour of exertions, ſeemed to promiſe." Unanimity was, in the uſual form, recommend⯑ed; and ſurely no period in hiſtory more re⯑quired the unanimous exertion of the whole nation.

[6] Oppoſition have denominated themſelves "an active Oppoſition;" and if zeal in thwart⯑ing, aſſiduity in obſtructing, and ſucceſs in de⯑feating public meaſures, merit a deſignation, which implies a kind of applauſe, they are certainly entitled to that name. The una⯑nimity and concert, which their Sovereign requeſted, for the ſupport of the intereſts and honour of the nation, exiſt only among them, for the ruin of the one, and the tarniſh⯑ing of the other. A ſhort detail of the prin⯑ciples, which they advanced in the firſt exhibi⯑tions of the ſeaſon, will eſtabliſh the truth of this obſervation. The orators in the Lower Houſe mixed reflections on the paſt, with pro⯑phecies of future diſaſters. The firſt we ſhall ſubmit to the judgment of the Reader; ſeve⯑ral of the latter have been already refuted by time.

Oppoſition opened the political campaign, with aſſertions, which had been often refuted; and with predictions of national diſaſters, which their own conduct ſeemed, uniformly, calculated to realize. As the public misfortunes may be deduced, from the rebellion in America, they aſſerted, contrary to fact, that hoſtilities had been firſt commenced by government. They recurred to their uſual prophecies, relative to foreign wars; and they even went ſo far as to arm Holland, our ancient ally, againſt this devoted [7] kingdom^a To ſow diſcontents, among the militia, they alleged, that the officers had been ſcandalouſly neglected^b. To excite mutiny in the army and navy, they aſſerted that Govern⯑ment had employed no commander of an army, no admiral of a fleet, whom they had not diſ⯑graced, or with whom they had not quarrelled^c. With a contradiction in terms, which nei⯑ther folly nor rage itſelf could juſtify, they aver⯑red that Miniſtry had ſucceeded in no inſtance; yet that fortune had been favourable in every in⯑ſtance, during the whole campaign^d. They owned, that unanimity was abſolutely neceſſary for the ſafety of their country; yet, with pe⯑culiar honeſty, avowed "that they would clog the wheels of government, when it ought to be aſſiſted by every man^e."

Though the clogging the wheels of Govern⯑ment at home, and their encouraging the ſedi⯑tious abroad, had been the obvious cauſe of the riſe and progreſs of the American war, they traced the cauſe of the war to the pretended ty⯑ranny of Great-Britain^f. Though America had continued an atrocious rebellion for many years, [8] againſt her parent and benefactreſs; yet they affirmed, that a war againſt America "is againſt our own country." Though the Americans have been declared rebels, by all the ſolemnity of law, by all the forms of the con⯑ſtitution, "they are ſtill our fellow-ſubjects, and every blow we ſtrike is againſt our⯑ſelves^h." Though they have broke capitu⯑lationsⁱ, diſregarded flags of truce^k, violat⯑ed conventions, trampled on every principle of war, that governs civilized nations^l; "yet as their war is a war of paſſion^m," we ought "to withdraw our forces entirely from their coaſtⁿ." Though "offenſive war is pointed out as proper for this country^o," war ought not "to be offenſive with reſpect to America." With unexampled abſurdity, they alleged, that rebels in arms had a better right to "a relaxation of hoſtilities," than foreign ene⯑mies, whom the alliance of thoſe rebels had excited againſt their country. With a perver⯑ſion of terms, unknown, in any other times, they aſſerted, that men, whoſe hands are daily ſtained with the blood of their countrymen, [9] ought to be treated not as enemies, but as peaceable fellow-ſubjects and friends^o.

In the Upper Aſſembly the zeal of Patriotiſm, as ſpringing from higher ground, roſe to a greater height. Not content to amend the Ad⯑dreſs to the Throne, it was inſiſted, that no Addreſs at all ſhould be made^p. It was aſ⯑ſerted that our armies were either mouldered away, by death, deſertion, and ſickneſs, or re⯑duced by loſs in battle^q. That our com⯑merce was totally loſt, our public credit draw⯑ing to annihilation, our fleet on the verge of abſolute ruin^r. That nothing could ſave the empire, but withdrawing our troops from America, acknowledging her independence, and imploring her forgiveneſs^s. That it would be even imprudent, if not impoſſible, to perſiſt in a war againſt France^t. That Spain would aid France; that Holland, as a commercial ſtate, would treat with America; that the whole world would join againſt us; that we were without men, without money, without an ally; that nothing, in ſhort, could [10] ſave the ſtate, but an immediate diſmiſſion of all his Majeſty's preſent ſervants, and the plac⯑ing the reins of Government, in the hands of Oppoſition^u

Aſſertions, which carried along with them their own refutation, were not likely to make converts within, nor proſelytes without doors. But what the party could not effect by facts and arguments, they endeavoured to accom⯑pliſh, by addreſs and intrigue. Miſmanage⯑ments, and a conſequent want of ſuceeſs, on every ſide of the war, had convinced the na⯑tion, that there was an error in planning at home, or a defect in the execution abroad. Generals and Admirals had returned, from their different commands, not only without laurels, but ſome of them covered with diſgrace or misfortune. The coldneſs, with which they had been received, by their country, had raiſed their reſentment, as it hurt their pride. As Go⯑vernment brought forward no accuſation againſt them, the preſumption was, that they them⯑ſelves were partly to blame. As men of little prudence and conſiderable names, are the fitteſt tools for the hands of party, Oppoſition took care to ſecure engines, which they hoped to play off with advantage, on the enemy.

[11] G [...]l B [...]ne, though a man ſpirit, of conducted himſelf, as if political prudence form⯑ed no part of his character. His enemies re⯑marked, that he came from America, where he had loſt an army, with as much confidence, as Terentius Varro returned to Rome, from the fa⯑tal fields of Cannae. Men, in general, have leſs blamed his conduct abroad, than his beha⯑viour at home. His accepting a leave of abſence from a Congreſs, who had ſhamefully evaded hs own convention, the remembrance of recent misfortunes, and a ſuſpicion of former errors, juſtified the court, in adhering to an etiquette, which excludes officers, who have been unfor⯑tunate, from the Royal Preſence, till they are acquitted by a Court Martial.

The General forgot his own errors, if ſuch exiſted, and remembered only, what he thought, the ſeverity of Government. He alſo forgot, that he had left his captive fellow-ſoldiers, whom he ought to have protected from inſult and oppreſſion, by his preſence; and he even, eluded orders given him to return to their aid, in their melancholy and ſevere captivity. It was obſerved, upon the whole, that regret and pity were all he could hope to meet with; but, it ſeems, he expected approbation. Reſent⯑ment aroſe, in his mind, as from injuſtice; [12] and with a precipitancy, which cannot eaſily be defended, he either ſought or accepted the pro⯑tection of Oppoſition.

Sir W [...] H [...]e had, indeed, loſt no army, but as he had deciſively improved no advantage, the American war rather increaſed, than dimi⯑niſhed, upon his hands. Poſſeſſed of the com⯑mon routine of military knowledge, he ſeems to have been capable of ſecuring from defeat ſuch troops as be led againſt ſuch an enemy: But the conducting them to any brilliant victory, and the making a deciſive uſe of the ſupe⯑riority he enjoyed, appear to have been ob⯑jects foreign to his talents. Senſible, per⯑haps, of this defect, in his own mind, he choſe to prevent any reverie of fortune by retiring from the command of the army; but as "mi⯑litary ſeceſſions," in the midſt of war, require an explanation, his retreat was aſcribed to his having loſt the confidence of men in power. The fact might be true, but it was not ſufficient, to ſatisfy the people. Though he was received with kindneſs by the Sovereign, and attention by the Miniſtry, he perceived that he was va⯑niſhing faſt from the memory of the nation. In the ſpace of a few months, he found him⯑ſelf of as little account, in the eſtimation of the Public, as any of his own commiſſaries; [13] and, to recover his reputation, he cloſed ea⯑gerly, with Oppoſition; as they promiſed him their hearty aſſiſtance, in a Parliamentary In⯑quiry.

To theſe lucky aids from America, the party added a ſtill greater acquiſition in Europe. An Admiral poſſeſſed of profeſſional reputation, equal at leaſt to his merit, though connected with Oppoſition, was placed at the head of the Weſtern Squadron. The ſelecting men of op⯑poſing principles, for the command of fleets and armies, has been long a favourite maxim of Government. This conduct may have had its foundation in liberal ſentiments; but it has ope⯑rated like weakneſs, and led to a train of miſ⯑fortunes. Few officers are ſuch "ſturdy mora⯑liſts," as to exclude political prejudices from the line of their duty.

Our Admiral put to ſea, with one of the moſt powerful ſquadrons, that ever ſailed, from the ports of this kingdom. He met the ene⯑my; and a running fight, rather than an en⯑gagement, enſued. No trophies were loſt; but no laurels were gained. The profeſſional terms, in which the accounts of naval actions are in⯑volved, render them obſcure, if not unintel⯑ligible, [14] to the generality of mankind. One fact, however, was univerſally admitted: "A ſuperior Britiſh fleet had engaged an inferior French ſquadron; and neither advantage nor trophy was obtained."

A nation, accuſtomed to value themſelves upon naval victories, were not likely to be ſa⯑tisfied with a drawn battle, under ſuch circum⯑ſtances. But though no ſymptoms of approba⯑tion appeared, no ſigns of reſentment were ſhown. A cold ſilence certainly prevailed; a ſpecies of cenſure, more mortifying to a feeling mind, than even clamour. Had the Admiral been permitted to remain, under this cloud, he would have become a uſeleſs engine, in the hands of his party. To derive benefit from his former popularity, it was found neceſſary to remove the ſtain, which want of ſucceſs had left upon his character. Some officers, in his ſuite, were, accordingly, induced to propagate inſi⯑nuations, to the diſadvantage of Vice-Admiral Sir H [...] P [...]r. That gentleman, by be⯑ing in place, might be ſuppoſed to act in concert with men in power, for the ruin of his Admiral; and to make the former the accuſer was to arm the prejudices of the people in fa⯑vour of the latter.

[15] The Vice Admiral being a man of more ſpirit than foreſight, unfortunately fell into the trap laid for him by the faction. Conſcious of his deſerving praiſe, inſtead of cenſure, for his be⯑haviour on the 27th of July, he became irri⯑tated at the injuſtice done to his reputation. From being the accuſed, he became the accuſer; and this ſtep turned the ſcale of opinion in fa⯑vour of his opponent. In this circumſtance alone the gallant Vice-Admiral, as it after⯑wards appeared, was to blame. Had he de⯑manded and inſiſted upon his own trial, his character would have recovered its deſerved luſtre; and that of the Admiral might have loſt much of that ſplendour which was thrown upon it, by his induſtrious friends.

A party, who had loſt the confidence of the nation, ſeized with eagerneſs the ſudden change which appeared in the popular tide. Whiſpers artfully propagated, without doors, were im⯑proved by degrees into a general clamour. Within doors, every opportunity was taken, and every artifice uſed to feed the riſing flame. The two Admirals, if a vulgar expreſſion may be uſed, were pitted againſt each other. Much ſport, or what is the ſame thing to Oppoſition, much miſchief, was expected from this conteſt. A man of popularity was accuſed, by a man [16] in office. The common changes of mini⯑ſterial interference were rung, without ceaſ⯑ing, in the ears of the people. The helpleſs condition of INNOCENCE, when perſecuted by POWER, was echoed, from every corner, by the runners, writers, and abettors of Oppoſi⯑tion. The two houſes of Parliament reſounded with vehement declamations, or broken accents of whining oratory; and that amiable but much abuſed virtue, pity, was excited, every where, in the breaſts of the deluded, the credulous and the weak.

In vain had Sir H [...] P [...]r declared, in the moſt ſolemn and public manner, that he had not communicated his deſign to any man in office. In vain did men in office affirm, upon the faith of Gentlemen, that they knew nothing of the accuſation, till it was officially delivered to the Admiralty. No credit was to be given to any member of a Tory Adminiſtration. They were leagued together in one plan of oppreſſion, in one dark deſign, in one pre-concerted conſpi⯑racy, to ruin the reputation, and even to take the life, of a Whig Admiral.

In this general turmoil, this intemperate joy of faction, Oppoſition not only for⯑got their poor country, but even their poor [17] friends. Sir W [...] H [...]could not gain their promiſed ſupport, for a moment, with all the verdure of his laurels. The advantages hoped from his exculpation were not equal in themſelves, and they were more diſtant in pro⯑ſpect, than the benefits to be drived from the acquittal of Admiral K [...]l. In vain did General B [...]ne endeavour to awake the pity of the party, when he failed to command their attention. In vain did he exclaim "that he was one of thoſe brave men who made the con⯑vention at Saratoga: That, however, he claimed no ſingle merit in that tranſaction; that, in the face of famine, deſpair, and death, he had compelled the enemy to grant conditions, honourable, if they had been complied with^x." The party were deaf to "the tale of tears;" and all the attention paid to the unfortunate general ſcarce amounted to one "dolorous anhelation^y," from the feeling boſom of Mr. E [...]d B [...]ke.

The conduct of Oppoſition, during the trial, and after the acquittal of A [...]l K [...]l, is too recent in the recollection of the public, to require more than a very general recapitulation. [18] Their abrogating the old forms of the Admi⯑ralty, by removing a trial for a naval offence to the land, to accommodate their own purpoſes, their appearance at Portſmouth, upon the occa⯑ſion, their biaſſing witneſſes, their carrying all the indecencies of a play-houſe audience into a Court of Juſtice, their ſoliciting the officers of the navy, their ſowing diſcontents among the common ſeamen, their parading the ſtreets, for the purpoſe of inflaming the populace, were ſuch mean, ſcandalous, and unjuſtifiable tricks of faction, as can ſcarcely be paralleled by any example in hiſtory.

The pitiful victory which they obtained over an unfortunate, becauſe a vehement, man, was purſued with an intemperance inexcuſable even in boys, and with a rancour which the moſt pro⯑fligate and hard-hearted men, if prudent, would have concealed, to preſerve, at leaſt, the ap⯑pearance of decency. That men of the firſt fa⯑milies, in this country, ſhould diſguiſe them⯑ſelves like porters to force illuminations by breaking windows, is a circumſtance which throws an indelible ſtain upon the times, as well as on the party. It even appeared, that, with every inclination to commit miſchief, the riotous demagogues were obliged to have re⯑courſe to the bottle, for that courage which na⯑ture [19] had denied. That in the hour of "intoxi⯑cation and adſcititious boldneſs," they attack⯑ed the feeble and old among the men, and terrified into fits and miſcarriages ſeveral wo⯑men, by the rude barbarity of their behaviour. That, however, as a juſt retribution for their wanton cruelties, many of them ſuffered under the hands and cudgels of the injured; and that ſeveral were carried into Roundhouſes, covered with ignominious marks of the chaſtiſement they had received.

Few men of ſenſe, who were not connected with the views, or privy to the deſigns of the party, could perceive any juſt grounds for this ſpecies of vulgar ovation. Though the accuſer had not brought his charges to the ſtandard of legal proof, the accuſed had not exculpated him⯑ſelf to the ſatisfaction of the public. Thoſe who were moſt willing to deny his want of conduct, regretted his want of good fortune; and a ge⯑neral cry went forth, that an opportunity was loſt, which might never return again.

The conduct of the Admiral himſelf, on the occaſion, was not calculated to eſtabliſh any high idea of his good ſenſe or of his principles. If he thought that he merited a triumph for the drawn battle of the 27th of July, 1778, what [20] are we to think of his underſtanding? If, on the other hand, he made himſelf the tool of a faction, what judgment muſt we form of that "dignified honour" which his friends annex to his character? A victory, which had lain con⯑cealed for ſeven months, and was, at length, diſcovered by accident, was not, intrinſically, worth the expence of many candles; and the applauſe of a mob is the coarſeſt commodity either a gentleman or his friends can purchaſe.

But the Faction, as well as their naval friend, acted as if they really gave credit to their own aſſertions and aſſumptions. Whilſt HE paraded the ſtreets amidſt the fooliſh, if not hired, ac⯑clamations of a rabble, THEY were buſy in weaving a wreath, for his brows, in both Houſes of Parliament. Thinking, at length, they had ſufficiently charged the engine with popularity, they reſolved to bring it to bear, not only upon Adminiſtration, but upon their Sovereign. They propoſed to make motions, againſt the former, on naval ſubjects; he un⯑dertook, with peculiar modeſty, to write re⯑ſcripts to the latter. Even before this double battery was opened, Oppoſition began to pre⯑enjoy their expected ſucceſs with that childiſh intemperance which has uniformly marked their conduct.

[21] A [...]l K [...]l having acquired, in the be⯑ginning of March, as many laurels as he was likely to obtain, his honourable relation, Mr. F [...]x, introduced the firſt of a long ſtring of mo⯑tions, which, he owned, led to an addreſs for the removal of the firſt Lord of the Admiralty, and ultimately of all his Majeſty's ſervants^z. In ſupport of the motion, he alleged, that the noble Lord, who preſided over the naval de⯑partment, had, as early as the month of No⯑vember 1777, ſolemnly pledged himſelf, in his official capacity, that there were thirty five ſhips of the line ready for ſea, and fit for actual ſer⯑vice. That, notwithſtanding this aſſertion, there were not ſix ſhips of the line, in a ſtate to meet an enemy, in the month of March 1778. That early in the month of June, his honour⯑able relation^a was ſent to cruize, on the coaſt of France, with twenty ſhips of the line only; though it was known, or ought to have been known, that there were twenty-ſeven ſhips of force lying in Breſt water. From theſe ſup⯑poſed facts, he deduced this concluſion, that the Miniſtry, who had led the nation into ſo pe⯑rilous a ſituation, ought inſtantly to be removed, [22] as unequal to the truſt committed to their charge^b.

In oppoſition to theſe aſſertions, it was proved, from official documents, that, in November 1777, there were actually thirty-five ſhips of the line ready for ſervice. That in the month of March 1778, ſome more ſhips were in a ſtate of great forwardneſs for ſea. That the whole num⯑ber, fit for meeting an enemy in June, amounted to forty-four. That when Mr. K [...]l was ordered to ſail, with twenty ſhips of the line, of which a large proportion was three-deckers, there were but ſeventeen ſhips in the harbour of Breſt ready for action. That ſhould it even appear, which was by no means the caſe, that there actually was a greater number of ſhips in Breſt, it was well known to ſeamen, that an inferior force may block up a ſuperior one in a narrow harbour. That, upon the whole, the Board of Admiralty had placed a number of ſhips, ade⯑quate to the ſervice, under the command of A [...]l K [...]l; even to the ſatisfaction and approbation of the Admiral himſelf. That, therefore, as the premiſes, endeavoured to be eſtabliſhed by Oppoſition, were not founded in [23] fact, their concluſions muſt of courſe fall to the ground^c.

Such were the aſſertions, which Oppoſition, mixed with much abuſe and altercation, re⯑peatedly echoed, from ſide to ſide, in both Houſes. Though the public, as well as Par⯑liament, are frequently invited to an entertain⯑ment of politics, by ſome very eloquent Patriots, the diſh ſerved up is always the ſame. To uſe their own expreſſion, "they have travelled ſo often over the ground," that they have trod out every appearance of vegetation; and thoſe who are ſo idle as to accompany them in the "dreary journey," can neither expect amuſe⯑ment, nor reap advantage.

The operations of the party, without doors, were more deciſive than their arguments within. Confident of ſucceſs, or aſſuming the appear⯑ance of confidence, they had previouſly gained the votes of ſeveral provident members, who wiſely look into futurity. Lazy Whigs and expecting patriots were roundly told, that to ſhare in the ſpoil it was neceſſary to take an active part in obtaining the victory. Mandates were iſſued for the immediate appearance of all [24] abſentees, from every corner of the kingdom. The beds of the ſick, the couches of the gouty and lame were viſited; leaders were ſent to the blind. In ſhort, patriotiſm crowded the lobbies of both Houſes, with all the mortifying pictures of age, misfortune and diſeaſe.

To aid, with a ſpecies of mutiny among ſea⯑men, the attacks of Oppoſition upon Admi⯑ralty, the ſeeds of ſedition had been ſown with a laviſh hand at Portſmouth. Officers had been attacked through their ruling paſſions; the vain with flattery, the weak with fallacious reaſon⯑ings, and the avaricious and ambitious with promiſes. To add indecency to preſumption and folly, the nation was threatened, with what is vulgarly called a Round Robin, from every ſeaport. An Admiral, who had made ſuch a ſplendid figure on the 27th of July, 1778, dared to ſay to his ſovereign, that he would withdraw his talents from the ſervice, unleſs the Admiralty, and every department of the State, were placed in the hands of men whom he could truſt.

Oppoſition drove, with ſo much rapidity and ſo little judgment, that they overturned their own deſigns. Their mean, and even criminal conduct, offended the people; and the Sove⯑reign, [25] with becoming dignity, rejected their inſolent requiſitions. The current turned a⯑gainſt them, and their ſpirit vaniſhed when their hopes declined. The nation diſcovered their inſidious deſigns, their luſt for power, their thirſt for places. It was perceived that they meant to ſacrifice Great Britain, her rights, her intereſts, and even honour, to the demagogues of America, by rendering her independent of the parent from whom ſhe ſprung. Even thoſe who had been ſeduced by their aſſurances, or gained by their promiſes, finding their miſtake, began to retreat. The friends whom they had brought from the country, by a ſpecies of habeas corpus, packed up their cloak-bags and left the town. The beds of the ſick, and cou⯑ches of the lame, were re-occupied; and even the blind found their way home. Ad [...]l K [...]l executed his threats againſt his devoted country, by quitting her ſervice. The muddy ſtream, which had overflowed the whole kingdom, and covered it with ſlime, returned to its old bed; and babbled, as formerly, through the rugged channel of Oppoſition^c.

[26] The hopes of the Faction had been raiſed ſo high, that diſappointment depreſſed their minds in proportion to their former elevation. Some, who either ignorantly or fondly imagi⯑ned that the nation would take their part, be⯑gan to talk of a ſeceſſion. A few orators are ſaid to have actually retired, to vent the tropes of unfiniſhed ſpeeches to the "echo of trees and murmur of rills" on ſome friend's eſtate.^d. But as "liſtleſs groves and in⯑ſenſible ſtreams" are not the moſt encou⯑raging audiences, the ſolitary patriots were induced to rejoin their friends, who, though defeated, ſtill remained in the field.

Whilſt the expectations of Oppoſition were at their height, by the aid received from A [...]l K [...]l's acquittal, a new topic was ſtarted, which, as it promiſed much miſchief to their country, opened a freſh proſpect of advantage to the party. The trade of Ireland, and conſe⯑quently its revenue, had been on the decline for ſome years paſt. The cauſes of that misfor⯑tune are more difficult to aſcertain than the fact itſelf. Whether this diminution of com⯑merce [27] proceeded from a decreaſe of the do⯑meſtic induſtry, or a failure of foreign markets, it equally demanded a remedy, if it could be applied. Some ſteps had been accordingly ta⯑ken, toward that object, in the preceding ſeſſion. But it appeared, at the time, that the facility with which relief was granted, inſtead of ſatisfying Oppoſition, was calculated to create new demands. Theſe demands, as they interfered with the commerce of Great Britain, were certain of being oppoſed: a circumſtance, which could not fail to create the deſirable con⯑fuſion which ſuits the views of the party.

To thoſe, who really wiſhed to remove the evil, it appeared that the Iriſh legiſlature ought to be the beſt judges of the remedy. But nei⯑ther that legiſlature, nor their conſtituents, had ſignified any diſſatisfaction at the relief obtain⯑ed. To convince both of the impropriety of their peaceable conduct, Oppoſition, by making demands in the name of Ireland, pointed out what ſhe might extort from Great Britain. This artifice, they hoped, would reduce the Miniſtry to a diſagreeable dilemma. Should they grant the demanded relief to the Iriſh, they could not fail to offend the whole com⯑mercial intereſt in great Britain: ſhould they refuſe it, there was a proſpect, by proper ma⯑nagement, [28] of creating tumults, and, perhaps, of kindling a rebellion in Ireland.

Though this commercial adventure has not yet been productive of all the profit expected by the Faction, as the ſhip is ſtill at ſea, the cargo may turn out to ſome account. The in⯑ferior Iriſh are, and have been in a diſtreſſed ſituation. The nature of the government, the tenures of the country, a liſtleſs inactivity, which always accompanies diſtreſs, a want of induſtry, created by domeſtic diſcouragements of various kinds, have combined to render their condition more wretched than that of almoſt any other in Europe. They have long felt their own miſery, without knowing well from whence it came. Our worthy Patriots, by pointing out Great Britain as the author of Iriſh diſtreſs, may have ſome chance of rou⯑ſing Iriſh reſentment. They have fomented and encouraged reſiſtance in America, and why may they not excite rebellion in Ireland? The truth is, they ſeem to have injured their country beyond their degree of forgiveneſs; and if they cannot ſatisfy their ambition by her misfortunes, they are at leaſt reſolved to gratify their reſentment by her ruin.

The attacks, in both Houſes were ſo ſimi⯑lar, in manner, aſſertion, declamation, and in⯑vective, [29] that it was apparent every meaſure had been weighed and pre-concerted in the cabinet of ſedition without doors. In this political war⯑fare, the poſt of honour was given to the Pa⯑triots of the Lower Aſſembly, where the enemy was ſuppoſed to be moſt vulnerable. After the battle was loſt below, it was generally rehearſed above; where ſome noble orators wielded, with peculiar dexterity, thoſe very weapons of ſcurri⯑lity and invective, which had ſo little availed the cauſe in the hands of their more humble friends.

In the ſlighteſt ſkirmiſhes, with the common enemy, the ſame co-operation, the ſame concert appeared. Though compoſed of ſuch diſcordant members, the whole party played in uniſon; and every key, that was touched below, was faithfully anſwered by a ſimilar note from above.

The Iriſh buſineſs ſeemed to promiſe ſuch a plentiful harveſt of confuſion, that the whole party employed their joint labour, in pre⯑paring the ſoil and ſowing the feed. Indi⯑viduals were not, in the mean time, idle, in their ſeparate efforts, for the benefit of the common cauſe. The D [...] of R [...]d, with his uſual application, tenacity, and vehe⯑mence, had introduced and ſupported, in the [30] Upper Houſe, an Inquiry into the Magagement of Greenwich Hoſpital. The nature and fate of this Inquiry, are ſo recent in the memory of the Public, that a particular detail is as unneceſſa⯑ry in itſelf, as it would be here out of place.

It may be ſufficient to obſerve, that the in⯑tention of the enquiry was to criminate the firſt Lord of the Admiralty. That after a moſt te⯑dious examination, which laſted near three months, not one of the charges was proved. That the E. of S [...]ch, inſtead of meriting cenſure, deſerved the higheſt praiſe. That he had paid peculiar and uncommon attention to the hoſpital. That he had improved its reve⯑nue, increaſed the number of the penſioners, prevented the admiſſion of improper objects, made new regulations, for the more ſpeedy re⯑covery of the ſick, and the better accommodati⯑on of thoſe in health. That inſtead of convert⯑ing his ſuperintendency of the charity to any advantage, he had aboliſhed all ſinecures of inferior offices, which had formerly been in the diſpoſal of the firſt Lord. That, in direct oppoſition to what had been alledged, there is not one, out of 2169 penſioners at preſent in the Hoſpital, who is not intitled to the chari⯑ty, by length of ſervice, or infirmities, con⯑tracted in the diſcharge of duty.

[31] Whilſt the D. of R [...]d derived ſome hopes, to the faction, from the expected iſſue of the Hoſpital Inquiry, a more flattering proſ⯑pect of criminating men in office was open⯑ed, in the Lower Aſſembly. Sir W [...] H [...]we, though not publicly accuſed, was ſtill anxious to exculpate himſelf to the Public. Either ſwayed, by a good opinion of his own con⯑duct, or truſting to the kind partiality of his friends, he had flattered the Patriots and, per⯑haps, himſelf, that he ſhould be able to lay the burden of American misfortunes, to the ac⯑count of the miniſter for the American de⯑partment. The nation found itſelf diſap⯑pointed, but till matters were examined, it was not known decidedly where cenſure ought to fall. An unwillingneſs in Government, to admit of a Parliamentary Inquiry, on a military ſubject, furniſhed their enemies with an oppor⯑tunity of drawing concluſions, unfavourable to Miniſtry. Theſe concluſions, in the uſual manner, became topics of patriotic invective and declamation; which, in a manner, extort⯑ed an inquiry, that had been once refuſed, by a vote.

But the reſult of the Inquiry, was very different from what Oppoſition hoped. It appeared, that rebellion firſt aroſe in America, from an ambi⯑tious [32] faction; and not from the general ſenſe of the body of the people^a. That the reduction of that faction and, conſequently, the extinc⯑tion of rebellion, had uniformly been the object of Adminiſtration, and not the conqueſt or un⯑conditional ſubjection of the colonies^b. That to accompliſh that deſirable end, they had not only ſent a force ſufficient for the purpoſe, but a much greater one, than was either wiſhed for or expected, by the moſt ſanguine friend of Go⯑vernment in America^c. That the army had been amply provided, on all occaſions, with every neceſſary, every implement, every re⯑ſource of war. That the hands of the General had been ſo far from being tied up, by inſtruc⯑tions, or his operations counteracted, by or⯑ders, from home, that the manner of carrying on the war had been left entirely to his judg⯑ment and diſcretion.

[33] It appeared, that the Americans, inſtead of overpowering by numbers, had never, together, at one place, above 16,000, and conſequently had never been ſo numerous in the field, as the army under Sir W [...] H [...]we^d. That our troops were well diſciplined, and uniformly made the beſt and moſt military appearance^e. That the enemy were an undiſciplined rabble, without order, without arms, without cloathing ^f; though by procraſtinating the war, they attained diſcipline and acquired military know⯑ledge. That, upon all occaſions, the Britiſh troops executed their duty, with energy, brave⯑ry and effect. That, upon no occaſion, thoſe of America behaved, with the ſpirit, firmneſs, and intrepidity of ſoldiers. That the former were victorious, in every aſſault, attack, and fair battle. That the latter obtained no advan⯑tage, but by ſtratagem or ſurpriſe. The infe⯑rences deducible, from theſe facts, were, that the Britiſh army were either unſkilfully or lan⯑guidly led; or that the natural ſtrength of the country, and unanimity of its inhabitants, had enabled the Americans to prevent the conſe⯑quences of loſſes, and diſaſters in the field.

[34] In ſupport of the firſt poſition it appeared, That the evacuation of Boſton had been too long delayed; and undertaken, at length, in an improper ſeaſon. That the retreat to Ha⯑lifax furniſhed the rebels, with an opportunity of ſtrengthening their force at New-York. That the victory obtained at Long-iſland might have proved deciſive, had it been properly pur⯑ſued ^g. That an opportunity of putting an end to the war had been loſt at the White⯑Plains, by a delay in attacking the rebels, when they offered battle. That the diſtance and in⯑judicious diſpoſitions of the ſtations choſen in the Jerſeys, the placing foreigners, who neither knew the nature nor the language of the coun⯑try, in a poſt liable to ſurpriſe and attack, the giving the command to an Officer, whom an habitual intemperance had rendered unfit for the diſcharge of his duty, by preſenting an un⯑expected opportunity to a ruined and diſperſed enemy^h, encouraged them to re-aſſemble, and enabled them to obtain an advantage which turned the ſcale of the war. That the operations, which followed this diſaſter, were [35] leſs calculated to retrieve the misfortune, than to encourage the enemy. That the retreat from Quibbletonⁱ, the embarkation of the troops, the tedious expedition to the Delaware, and then to Cheſapeak-Bay, the neglecting to im⯑prove the victory obtained at the Brandywine, the ſurpriſe at German Town, the injudicious manner of aſſaulting Red-Bank and attacking Mud-Iſland, the inactive winter at Philadel⯑phia, if not proofs of incapacity, were inſtan⯑ces of blameable inactivity, in the General.

With regard to the ſtrength of the country, it appeared, that it preſented no advantages to the natives, which it did not hold forth to the invaders. That, on the contrary, it was rather more favourable to the latter, than to the former. That its great rivers, inſtead of co⯑vering the retreat of the rebels, by being navi⯑gable, laid them open to freſh misfortunes, from an enemy, poſſeſſing the command of the ſea. That Hudſon's River, in particular, by dividing the whole continent from North to [36] South, formed a natural and ſtrong barrier, between the revolted provinces. That the ſeizing this barrier was an object of the firſt conſequence^k, towards the extinction of the rebellion. That this object might have been eaſily obtained, as the river preſents an excel⯑lent and expeditious water-communication, between New-York and Albany^l. That this great advantage rendered the co-operation of the main army, with the troops coming from Canada, as obvious, as it was eaſy and ex⯑peditious; and that, it was the want of ſuch co-operation, that ruined the Northern expe⯑dition^m, loſt an army, turned the ſcale in favour of rebellion, and loaded Great-Britain, with the expence and danger of a foreign war.

In the courſe of the Evidence taken at home, and more eſpecially by the moſt authentic in⯑formation from abroad, it has appeared, that the [37] injudicious and inactive management of the war has been the ſole obſtacle, to the reſtoration of peace. That a very great majority of the peo⯑ple of America are and have been, averſe to the meaſures, and diſguſted at the tyranny of the Congreſsⁿ. That they were prevented, from exhibiting their loyalty to their Sovereign and their averſion to uſurpation, by the deſultory manner, in which the war was conducted, on our part; as it deprived them of permanent protection, and left them expoſed to the inſo⯑lence, cruelty, and revenge of their enemies.

That the quitting of the Jerſeys, and the go⯑ing to ſea, with the whole army in July 1777, terrified other provinces from ſubmitting, for fear of being deſerred. That the three Dela⯑ware Counties had offered their ſubmiſſion to Government, on condition of their being only aſſiſted, in protecting themſelves, againſt the re⯑bels^o. That their application having either been diſregarded or neglected, they adhered to the uſurped government. That, as a gene⯑ral idea had gone abroad, that protection was uncertain, or rather that deſertion was certain^p, [38] the victory at the Brandywine, the taking of Philadelphia, the deſtruction of the rebel ſhip⯑ping, the reduction of Mud-Iſland and Red-Bank, were attended with none of thoſe ad⯑vantages, which accompany ſucceſſes in war. That no perſon of great conſequence, and few of any conſequence at all, ſubmitted after thoſe events. That, when a reſolution was for⯑med to evacuate Philadelphia, ſuch as had ſubmitted were adviſed to make their peace ^q, with the congreſs. That ſome unfortunate perſons, who followed that advice, fell a ſacri⯑fice, to the relentleſs violence and unforgiving tyranny of the rebels. That, in ſhort, the want of protection on the one ſide, and the certain⯑ty of puniſhment for defection, on the other, eradicated every hope from the minds of the loyal, and forced them to ſwear allegiance to an uſurpation, which they deſpiſed and abhor⯑red.

[39] Though theſe facts came forward with a force, which commanded conviction, the fac⯑tion adhered, with invincible obſtinacy, to the line of their former conduct. With their uſual inſult, upon the common feelings and common ſenſe of mankind, they eſtabliſhed falſe pre⯑miſes, and deduced, from thoſe premiſes, ar⯑guments for the total dereliction, and conſe⯑quently, for the dependance of America. They affirmed, that rebellion can never be ex⯑tinguiſhed; though the want of vigour, in pur⯑ſuing our ſucceſſes, has been the demonſtrable cauſe of its continuing ſo long. They aſſerted, that a general unanimity prevails againſt Great Britain; though the adherence of the people to the congreſs proceeded, from our not af⯑fording them a permanent protection, under the ſhelter of our arms. They alleged, that the courage of the rebels, and the natural ſtrength of their country, are unſurmountable obſta⯑cles; though the firſt ſeldom appear in the field, but to fly, and the latter opens every where its boſom to invaſion, by the means of extenſive arms of the ſea, and many great and navigable rivers.

When we deny other public virtues to Op⯑poſition, we muſt allow, that they poſſeſs the negative merit of conſiſtency in their political [40] conduct. They ſtruck one key, at the begin⯑ning of the American troubles, and they have ever ſince continued the ſame note, or impro⯑ved upon it, as events aroſe. When the tu⯑mults began at Boſton, when licentiouſneſs and riot exhibited their firſt wild ſcenes, in Fa⯑neuil-Hall, they encouraged the piece, by ap⯑plauding the actors. The prints of the depar⯑ting ſteps of Freedom, like thoſe of Aſtraea, were only to be found, they affirmed, round the Tree of Liberty, on Boſton Common. A gloomy deſpotiſm had ſeized Great Britain at home, and it became neceſſary, that her hands ſhould be ſettered, to prevent the recovery of her authority abroad. Every effort on the part of the Mother-country was an exertion of ty⯑ranny; every reſiſtance, in the colonies, was an inſtance of public virtue. The grim tyrant, Arbitrary Power, had taken up arms againſt that innocent little child, American Liberty; and to defend the weak againſt the ſtrong was a ſervice of much reputation and little danger.

Obvious as the deceptions, held forth by the party, ought to have been, they were attended with ſucceſs, both without and within doors. The people thought, that aſſertions, ſo confi⯑dently and ſo often repeated, had ſome found⯑ation in truth; and, though Government knew [41] the contrary, they acted, as if they gave them credit. The conſequence was, that languid meaſures were adopted, when vigour and exer⯑tion were neceſſary; and, thus, by the for⯑bearance of Adminiſtration, the encourage⯑ment of Oppoſition, the inactivity or inability of commanders, that monſter, REBELLION, which ſhould have been ſtifled as ſoon as born, was foſtered and reared to maturity.

Unfortunately for this country, Oppoſition were permitted, in a manner, to take the lead in American meaſures. War, and eſpecially rebellion, being one of the greateſt evils, that can afflict a ſtate, the moſt ſpeedy and power⯑ful remedies muſt be applied, to remove the diſeaſe. The only certain road to peace lies through exertion and victory. An anxiety for negociation, being generally a mark of weak⯑neſs, too often encourages an enemy to a conti⯑nuation of reſiſtance. It has alſo a moſt unfa⯑vourable effect on the ſpirit of the people, a⯑mong whoſe leaders ſuch anxiety appears. This double conſideration had rendered the propo⯑ſing terms a favourite topic of patriotic elo⯑quence. To depreſs the minds of their coun⯑trymen, to elevate thoſe of the rebels; to make the firſt to doubt, the ſecond to become con⯑fident of ſucceſs; to keep up, if the expreſſion [42] may be uſed, the ball of contention between the parties, were circumſtances that probably might lengthen the diſpute to the verge of ſome public misfortune; that misfortune, if it favoured not the views of ambition, might, at leaſt, be turned to the purpoſes of revenge.

The calamity expected, with ſo much anxi⯑ety, by Oppoſition, at length arrived. An ar⯑my was loſt in America. A rebellion, which ſeemed to ſtagger under partial and ill-purſu⯑ed defeats, became firmly eſtabliſhed by vic⯑tory. The ſpirits of the country began to ſink; and the Faction added to the general depreſſi⯑on, by their unmanly oratory. Inſtead of pro⯑poſing thoſe vigorous exertions, which the ho⯑nour, as well as intereſt of the nation required, they recommended a tame ſubmiſſion to re⯑bels; an acknowledgment of former errors, and aſſurances of future amendment. The world, in general, aſcribed to artifice a con⯑duct which could not be reconciled to the prin⯑ciples of common ſenſe. Was it probable that inſurgents, who had offered no terms during their misfortunes, would receive any in the moment of victory? Or could it be expected, that a Congreſs, who had declared for inde⯑pendence, when thirty thouſand diſciplined ſoldiers were ready to land on the coaſt, would [43] relinquiſh that independence, after they had made a whole army priſoners of war?

The moſt ſanguine lovers of tranquility could ſcarcely derive any hopes from this pa⯑cific ſyſtem; but it was adopted. The Faction thus obtained that degradation of their own country, which ſeems to have been uniformly a part of their plan. But as it had been juſtly apprehended, that American reſiſtance might, at laſt, ceaſe, through the failure of American reſources, it had become neceſſary to procure powerful allies, for the ſupport of the cauſe. The defeat and capture of the army, under G [...]l B [...]ne, had certainly its weight in the French cabinet. But the deplorable pic⯑ture given, in both Houſes, of the ſtate of this kingdom, could only induce France to throw her weight into the ſcale of America.

The weight of France having been found inſufficient in the operations of the laſt ſum⯑mer, the neceſſity of obtaining another ally, to the cauſe of Liberty, became apparent during the winter. Every encouragement and every lure were held out to Spain. Under a pretence of bewailing their unfortunate country, Oppo⯑ſition expoſed her weakneſs. Their own decla⯑mations ſhewed that her councils were diſ⯑tracted by faction; and their aſſertions, rela⯑tive [44] to the ſtate of her navy and army, repre⯑ſented her to foreigners as an eaſy prey. To bring the certainty of her approaching ruin to a point of demonſtration, ſome theoriſts, ac⯑quainted with figures, were employed to make fictitious ſtates of her finances. Even ſome of the party had the folly, or rather preſumption, to aſſert, in public, that the very indepen⯑dence of Great Britain was in the power of the houſe of Bourbon^r.

The phlegmatic councils of Spain were, how⯑ever, too ſlow for the fire and vehemence of her Britiſh friends. Though their eloquence had its proper influence at Madrid, that deſira⯑ble circumſtance had been concealed in "Caſ⯑tilian taciturnity." Deprived almoſt of every hope, from the other ſide of the Bay of Biſcay, the eyes of our Patriots were again turned to the regions beyond the Atlantic. As the treaty [45] attempted laſt ſummer had ſtopt the operati⯑ons of war, it was expedient to throw negoti⯑ation in the way of hoſtility in the preſent year. Though the party had reprobated their own meaſure, the conciliatory bills, as degrading and diſgraceful, they propoſed the renewal of the commiſſion, which thoſe bills authorized. This mode of relief, or rather reſpite, to rebel⯑lion, having been refuſed, the old propoſal, of withdrawing the troops from America, was renewed. This laſt effort was alſo unſucceſs⯑ful; and that melancholy gloom, which uſu⯑ally covers the rear of unſucceſsful, political campaigns, began to fall on the party.

A ſudden, though not unexpected light, broke through this gloom, and revived their drooping ſpirits. Spain, being ſeduced by France, and, perhaps, encouraged by the re⯑preſentations given, in our public aſſemblies, of our weakneſs^s, determined to throw her [46] weight in the ſcale of our enemies. Of One hundred injuries, which ſhe had received, ſhe only ſpecified two, and proved none. With peculiar attention to her worthy friends out of office, ſhe pointed her whole reſentment againſt the Britiſh Miniſtry. Theſe men, it ſeems, had grievouſly offended this froward Dame; but how or where, ſhe could not tell. When ſhe has time to recollect the cir⯑cumſtances, BUCCARELLI, or ſome other old Spaniſh acquaintance, will, no doubt, com⯑municate them to C [...]l B [...]ré, and then we ſhall know the whole.

The uniform conduct of Oppoſition ſeemed calculated, if not intended, to arm Spain in fa⯑vour of France and America; yet they affect⯑ed a degree of melancholy when that event was announced. With a pernicious conſiſtency, they dwelt on the weakneſs of Great Britain, and on the force of her enemies. Inſtead of ſtanding forth with that manly boldneſs, which other patriots have either felt or feigned, in times of peril, they unbraced the nerves of their country with womaniſh lamentations. To magnify the danger, they pretended to recom⯑mend unanimity; and to promife ſupport to the S [...]n, whilſt they undermined his juſt influence and authority. But the notes of af⯑fected ſorrow were ſoon changed for the voice [47] of diſcord; and it became apparent, that the party lamented their own condition more than the ſtate of their country.

In the preceding detail, many circumſtan⯑ces are omitted, equally deſcriptive of the conduct, and expreſſive of the deſigns of Op⯑poſition, with thoſe that have been related. But, as the intention of this Eſſay is only to give a general idea of the ſubject, it was thought unneceſſary to deſcend to every par⯑ticular. One obvious obſervation will natural⯑ly ſuggeſt itſelf to the mind of the Reader: That an Oppoſition begun in ambition, has degenerated, through diſappointment, into a ſpecies of infinity; and that, in attempting to ruin the Miniſtry, the party have given a fatal ſtab to the honour and intereſts of their country.

In every popular government, oppoſition is not only natural, but, when conducted on libe⯑ral principles, uſeful, and even neceſſary. There is a kind of charm in authority, which may induce the moſt virtuous magiſtrates to extend it too far, if ſubject to no controul. The original object of a national repreſentative, was to watch over the political rights of the executive power. The truſt is great; and, ſtrictly ſpeaking, ought to be ſolely appro⯑priated [48] to the public good. Thoſe who uſe it as an engine of private ambition and perſonal inrereſt, meet with forgiveneſs, on account of the frequency of the practice. But the employ⯑ing a weapon, given for the defence of our country, againſt its exiſtence, is a ſpecies of political aſſaſſination which no example can juſtify, no ſtate ought to paſs without puniſh⯑ment.

If the great lines of the conduct of Oppoſiti⯑on, during the laſt ſeſſion of parliament, have been fairly traced, in the preceding diſquiſiti⯑on, no terms can be too ſevere, no indignati⯑on too violent, in expoſing the principles and plans of the party. If the account, which has been given of their aſſertions and actions, has been exaggerated, the Public will judge of both with more candour. But, unfortunately for Great Britain, the ſtamp of truth has been affixed to the repreſentation, contained in this Eſſay, by the moſt uncontrovertible of all argu⯑ments, the events of the times: events unparal⯑leled in the hiſtory of any other age or country.

Let the conſequences of an oppoſite conduct, in the party, be conſidered, for a moment. Let it be ſuppoſed, that, inſtead of abetting re⯑bellion and encouraging foreign war, they had declared that, when the American Congreſs [49] avowed Independence, and eſpecially when they leagued with France, the grounds of the origi⯑nal queſtion were entirely changed. That, as friends of their country, they had reſolved to ſtrengthen her hands, to reſtore her authority, to protect her intereſts, and to recover her ho⯑nour. That the object of their purſuit had been to render Miniſters reſponſible for remiſſneſs in carrying on the war; or for obſtinacy in refuſing adequate and honourable conditions of peace. That they had been the firſt to inquire into the failure of meaſures in the execution; not to aſſert without examination, that the error lay in the cabinet and not in the field. That they had taken meaſures to aſcertain, by what miſ⯑management or miſconduct, in commanders, an army had been loſt, to a contemptible enemy, and a ſuperior fleet had returned from action, without a victory? That, inſtead of receiving into the boſom of their party, a general, who had quitted his command in the midſt of war, they had inquired, why the advantages, he either poſſeſſed or obtained, had not been more deciſively improved?

To render ſtill more finiſhed the picture of the reverſe of their actual proceedings, let it be ſuppoſed, that inſtead of announcing, to all Europe, the weakneſs of Great Britain, they [50] had, in their ſpeeches and their actions, exhi⯑bited a ſpirited and diſintereſted love for their country, an unanimity to arm her exertions, not to clog her meaſures, a manly boldneſs to meet, to break, to diſconcert the combinations of her domeſtic and foreign enemies. What would have been, in ſuch a caſe, the preſent ſituation of public affairs? What the ſtate of public opinion, relative to themſelves? The re⯑ſiſtance of America muſt have ceaſed. France might have given up the conteſt; and the junc⯑tion of Spain would have been prevented.

One ſhould ſuppoſe it hardly poſſible, that an Oppoſition, conſiſting of ſeveral men, whoſe rank and fortune connect their private intereſt with that of the public, ſhould follow a line of con⯑duct, that leads to the deſtruction of their coun⯑try, and, conſequently, to their own ruin. This is an argument which they themſelves repeat, and think unanſwerable. The truth is, that every faction may avail itſelf of the ſame argument; but general reaſoning muſt fall to the ground, when contradicted by facts. There is a pride and obſtinacy in party, which diſdain to ac⯑knowledge error; and, therefore, though Op⯑poſition may, nay muſt, perceive the pernicious tendency of their conduct, they chooſe to perſiſt, rather than own a fault.

[51] An opportunity offered itſelf lately, which might have reflected credit on Oppoſition, with⯑out the ſuppoſed diſgrace of changing their former opinions. The Spaniſh Reſcript fur⯑niſhed this opportunity; yet the nation cannot ſee, without indignation and aſtoniſhment, that ACTS indiſpenſably neceſſary for the ſafety of the State have been combated, with all the vi⯑rulence and obſtinacy of oratory, in every ſtage of their progreſs. That the party clogged every meaſure for arming the kingdom, by ſea and land, while they aſſerted, that the enemy were ready to invade our coaſt, and that a few days might bring the report of their guns to the ears of both houſes of parliament. That, when a ſpirit of unanimity and exertion became the duty of all lovers of their country, the faction an⯑nounced, with a ſpecies of ſavage triumph, that the City of London would not vote a man or a ſhilling, for the national defence in the pre⯑ſent emergency. That, in ſhort, they preſumed to aſſert in public, that the tyranny of France and Spain would be more welcome to them, than the continuance of their rivals in power.

After ſuch proofs of averſion to the public good, it will be in vain to hope for any reform⯑ation in Oppoſition. The diſtreſs in which they have involved their country, can advance but [52] one ſtep farther, to furniſh them with an oppor⯑tunity of retreating from the line of their miſcon⯑duct. That ſtep is an invaſion of this Iſland, the laſt effort of the conſpiracy of our foreign enemies. In that critical moment, a moment which every good ſubject would meet with ſpirit and confidence in his cauſe, there is every rea⯑ſon to fear, that Oppoſition would be ſtill an Oppoſition. Such has been the inveteracy which a conſciouſneſs of criminality, a jealouſy of rivals, a habit of oppoſing the intereſts and degrading the dignity of their country; and a deſpair em⯑bittered by an unpopular and fruitleſs conteſt of many years, have mixed with every ſpring of their actions, every power of their minds.

Upon the whole, we may fairly affirm, that neither the talents they poſſeſs, nor the conduct they have purſued, are likely to re⯑commend Oppoſition as proper perſons for ma⯑naging public affairs at the preſent criſis. If our ſituation is alarming, we muſt look for re⯑lief to the reſources of the kingdom, and the ſpirit of our countrymen, and not to thoſe, who have uniformly endeavoured to depreciate the firſt, and to damp the ſecond. The truth is, that, very fortunately for this country, this deſponding party have hitherto failed in their views of convincing us that our ruin is inevitable. [53] We feel the contrary, in the internal vigour of the ſtate, and in that unanimity of ſentiment among the people, which forbids us to connect danger with deſpair.

But why ſhould either be mentioned, upon the preſent occaſion? This country, with much ſmaller reſources, and much leſs unanimity, has repeatedly weathered more dreadful ſtorms than thoſe which only ſeem to threaten it at preſent. In the firſt Dutch war, France and Denmark joined the enemy againſt England^b. She had no friendly port on the continent, from the Pyre⯑nees to the pole; no ally but the Biſhop of Munſter. The Dutch came out, to a deciſive battle, with one hundred and thirteen ſhips of war, eleven fire-ſhips, and ſeven yatchts; led by able, experienced, and brave commanders. France, co-operating with her allies, entered the Channel with forty ſhips of the line. The uſual revenue of England amounted only to the annual ſum of one million two hundred thou⯑ſand pounds; and the ſupplies granted, for the year, exceeded not double that ſum. Our ſtanding army ſcarcely conſiſted of five thou⯑ſand men; and there was no militia in the king⯑dom.

[54] The nation was, in the mean time, viſited with two of the moſt dreadful calamities that can afflict a people, peſtilence and fire. Near eighty thouſand perſons had been carried off by the firſt, in London alone. The city had become a kind of deſert; and graſs was obſerved to grow in the middle of Cheapſide^c. The plague followed thoſe who fled to the country; and terror and death filled every corner of the kingdom. This ſcourge was followed by a fire, which conſumed fifteen out of the twenty⯑ſix wards of the city, conſiſting of four hundred ſtreets and lanes, thirteen thouſand houſes, and eighty-nine pariſh-churches^d. But theſe miſ⯑fortunes neither damped the ſpirits of the people, nor obſtructed the meaſures of Govern⯑ment. Our fleets, though much inferior, fought, and vanquiſhed the enemy. The alliance againſt us was broken, and an honourable and advan⯑tageous peace was obtained.

In the year 1690, the French fleet entered the Engliſh channel, appeared before Plymouth, on the 20th of June, drove the combined fleets of England and Holland, from the back, of the iſle of Wight, engaged and totally defeated them, in a general battle, near Beachy-head. [55] In this unfortunate action we loſt eight ſhips of the line, beſides many more, that were rendered unfit for ſervice; and the ſhattered remains of the fleet were forced to ſhelter themſelves in the Thames^e. The French rode triumphant, for ſome months, in the Channel. They in⯑ſulted our ſea-ports; and threatened our coaſts with invaſion. There were, at the time, no more than five thouſand regular troops in Eng⯑land; the militia were not arrayed; King Wil⯑liam was, in a manner, confined to Ireland, by the ſuperiority of the enemy at ſea.

The nation was, at the ſame time, diſ⯑tracted and divided in opinion, on account of a diſputed ſucceſſion. Public credit, du⯑ring the whole war, was ſo low, that ſoon after this period, Exchequer and Navy Bills became almoſt of as little value, as the paſte⯑board dollars of the American Congreſs; and even the notes of the Bank of England were at forty per cent. diſcount^f. Near ſix thou⯑ſand trading veſſels were taken by the French in the courſe of the war^g. Notwithſtanding theſe misfortunes, the vigour of Government and ſpirit of the people ſurmounted all difficul⯑ties [56] The enemy was diſappointed, in all his ambitious views, an honourable peace was ob⯑tained, the revolution confirmed, the proteſt⯑ant ſucceſſion ſecured, and public credit re⯑ſtored.

In the preſent times, our reſources are much greater, our ſpirit equal, and our danger leſs, than at either of thoſe periods. We have an ample revenue, an untainted credit, a great and a growing navy. Inſtead of five thouſand men, we have above ſixty thouſand diſciplined troops, for our internal defence; and we have a certain proſpect of half as many more, in the ſpace of a few months. A ſpirit of unanimity, vigour, and exertion, begins to pervade the whole king⯑dom. Our nobility and gentry, with a ſpirit becoming Britons, either ſerve in our conſtitu⯑tional defence, the militia, or with their in⯑fluence and purſes exert themſelves, in raiſing new corps. The greateſt commercial ſociety, in the kingdom, has ſet a noble example to their fellow-ſubjects, by an unanimous and powerful aid to the ſtate, in the preſent emer⯑gency. Voluntary ſubſcriptions, for raiſing ſol⯑diers, and for giving a bounty to ſailors, have been opened, in ſeveral places; and the ſame ſpirit will diffuſe itſelf through both the Britiſh iſles. Such as are debarred, by infirmities and [57] years, from perſonal ſervice, will undoubtedly exhibit, on the preſent occaſion, their love for their country, and their zeal for its ſafety.

Inſtead of being depreſſed, with a ſenſe of danger, all ranks and degrees of men feel that elevation, which threatened perils excite, in generous minds. Inſtead of looking forward to future diſgraces or diſaſters, they reflect on the glory of former times. The poſterity of thoſe, who conquered at Poictiers, Creſſy, and Agin⯑court, and annexed France itſelf to the Engliſh crown, cannot form to themſelves any fears from a French invaſion. On the contrary, when they have ſufficiently prepared for ſecurity at home, they will act offenſively abroad; and carry back to the boſom of the enemy that terror, which he vainly hopes to create.

If we are at war in America, we have not the burden of a continental war; that ſink, in which our treaſure has always diſ⯑appeared, without any hope of return. The money laid out on our navy, or expended in our Colonies, will return to the center of the kingdom, through all the veins of commerce. Our trade has been protected, againſt the ene⯑my, to a degree unknown in any former war. We have loſt, in no quarter of the world, any [58] territory without an equivalent; in ſome we have gained. In the Weſt Indies, we are ſtill ſuperior to our Enemies. We have eradicated them entirely from the Eaſt Indies, and we have a flattering proſpect of a ſpeedy termina⯑tion of reſiſtance, in North America.

In the firſt ſtage of a war, the advantage of attack is poſſeſſed, by that nation, who firſt breaks the peace. The diſadvantages of de⯑fence muſt, for ſome time, remain with its op⯑ponent. A ſtate poſſeſſing ſuch extenſive do⯑minions, as Great Britain, cannot be ſuppoſed, to be invulnerable, on every ſide. We may ſuffer ſome loſſes, at the beginning; for what people was ever uniformly ſucceſsful in war? The Romans themſelves were not always invinci⯑ble. They frequently loſt provinces and ar⯑mies; yet they roſe ſuperior to all nations. The profits and loſſes of war can only be eſtimated, on the day, which concludes a peace. Let us be unanimous among ourſelves, and that day cannot be diſtant, diſadvantageous, or diſho⯑nourable; on the contrary, it will be attended with that glory, which the ſpirit and exertion of a great ſtate cannot fail to acquire.